Com. v. Devries, N. , 112 A.3d 663 ( 2015 )

J-S55035-14
2015 Pa. Super. 58
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
NICOLE DOLORES DEVRIES
Appellant No. 326 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 20, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-52-CR-0000054-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J.
OPINION BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 20, 2015
Nicole Dolores Devries appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
on December 20, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County.
Devries was tried by a jury and convicted on charges of escape, resisting
arrest, two counts of reckless endangerment, driving under the influence
(DUI), and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 She received an aggregate
sentence of 25–60 months’ incarceration. Relevant to this timely appeal,
the deadly weapon enhancement was applied to her escape sentence.
Devries raises three issues; she claims the trial court erred in: (1) denying
her motion for change of venue, (2) denying her motion for acquittal on the
charge of escape, and (3) improperly applying the deadly weapon
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5121(a), 5104, 2705; 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1), and 35 P.S.
§ 780-113(a)(32), respectively.
J-S55035-14
enhancement. After a thorough review of the submissions by the parties,
relevant law, and the certified record, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand for resentencing in accordance with this decision.
We relate the factual history as stated in the trial court’s Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion.
The criminal information was filed for this case on March 4, 2013
alleging that [Devries], on November 9, 2012, unlawfully
removed herself from official detention by fleeing from two Pike
County Probation Officers, Jennifer Tamblyn and Jeffrey Baker,
after she had been told numerous times that she was under
arrest. As testimony at trial established, the Parole and
Probation Officers had gone to [Devries’] home in order to do a
drug test as part of [Devries’] probation supervision.
During this drug testing, [Devries] tested positive for some drug
use which she maintained was a Vicodin pill she had taken for a
toothache. After the two officers informed her that she would be
placed under arrest and taken to jail for the violation, [Devries]
bolted for her car outside her home and tried to flee. The
officers followed her to her vehicle, where a brief struggle
ensued that resulted with Officer Baker being dragged a short
distance by the car before managing to free himself.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/2014, at 1-2.
In Devries’ first issue, she argues the trial court erred in failing to
grant her motion for change of venue based on the fact the alleged victims
were employees of Pike County. “The standard of review for a denial of a
motion for change of venue is whether there has been an abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial judge.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 612 A.2d
1382, 1384-85 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation omitted). Pursuant to the rules
of criminal procedure, “Venue or venire may be changed by that court when
-2-
J-S55035-14
it is determined after hearing that a fair and impartial trial cannot otherwise
be had in the county where the case is currently pending.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
584(A). Further, pursuant to Rule 584(B), when a change of venue is
granted, unless otherwise ordered by our Supreme Court, a trial judge from
the original venue will preside over the trial. This provision of the rules
reinforces the fact that a change of venue addresses a problem with the
location, while recusal addresses an issue with a specific judge or judges.
Here, Devries’ challenge to venue was based upon the suggestion that
because the complaining witnesses were employees of the county court, the
unrealized possibility of prejudice was sufficient to warrant the change.
However, the motion for change of venue provided only vague allegations of
prejudice, noting the work relationship between the complaining witnesses
and the county court. The motion did not allege that the trial judge would
be unfair in any way and there is no indication of how or why jurors would
be unable to be fair and impartial.
Devries cites Com. ex rel Armor v. Armor, 398 A.2d 173 (Pa. Super.
1978) to support her position. However, that case provides no aid to
Devries. In Armor, one of a divorced couple remarried a Montgomery
County trial judge. The other ex-spouse filed a petition to modify child
support in Montgomery County, which had been the proper venue. A
counter petition was filed seeking to increase child support. A panel of our
Court determined the appearance of conflict was too great, having a
Montgomery County trial judge ruling on a matter that directly affected a
-3-
J-S55035-14
fellow Montgomery County trial judge. The problem in Armor was not with
venue, it was with the trial judges and the appearance of impropriety, not
with the Montgomery County location itself.
Armor might be relevant to provide support for Devries had she
claimed the judges of Pike County could not be fair because the complaining
witnesses were employees of the court. Such a claim of judicial bias was
specifically denied by Devries. The trial court quoted defense counsel at the
hearing on the motion:
This motion is styled as a Motion to Change Venue rather than a
request for recusal for a very specific reason. It has nothing to
do with a conflict that I believe you or Judge Chelak have in this
case as individuals.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/2014, at 5, quoting N.T. Hearing, 6/4/2013, at 2.2
The vast majority of case law regarding change of venue addresses
the issue of pre-trial publicity. “[I]n reviewing a trial court's decision [as to
a change of venue] the only legitimate inquiry is whether any juror formed a
fixed opinion of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence as a result of pre-trial
publicity.” Commonwealth v. Boring, 684 A.2d 561, 566 (Pa. Super.
1996) (citation omitted). We see no reason why this line of inquiry does
not apply in the current situation. Devries has provided no evidence that
____________________________________________
2
The notes of testimony from the hearing on the Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion
were not included in the certified record. Reviewing the claim as presented
in Devries’ appellant’s brief, we do not believe review of those notes was
necessary.
-4-
J-S55035-14
any juror formed a fixed opinion of her guilt because of the complaining
witnesses being employees of Court of Common Pleas of Pike County.
Accordingly, she is not entitled to relief on this issue.
In her second claim, Devries argues the trial court erred in denying her
motion for acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to support her
conviction of escape in that the evidence failed to demonstrate she was
under “official detention” at the time she fled. In relevant part, the statutory
definition of escape is:
A person commits an offense if he unlawfully removes himself
from official detention or fails to return to official detention
following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or
limited period.
18 Pa.C.S. § 5121(a).
Additionally, relevant to our inquiry:
A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain a conviction on a particular charge, and
is granted only in cases in which the Commonwealth has failed
to carry its burden regarding that charge.
Commonwealth v. Emanuel, 86 A.3d 892, 894 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
The standard of review for claims of insufficient evidence is well-
settled. With respect to such claims, we consider the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner.
Commonwealth v. Barnes, 871 A.2d 812, 819 (Pa. Super.
2005). In that light, we decide if the evidence and all reasonable
inferences from that evidence are sufficient to establish the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We keep
in mind that it was for the trier of fact to determine the weight of
the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. The jury was
free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Id. This Court
-5-
J-S55035-14
may not weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment or that of
the factfinder. Id.
Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 569 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Official detention is defined as:
Arrest, detention in any facility for custody of persons under
charge of conviction of crime or alleged or found to be
delinquent, detention for extradition or deportation, or any other
detention for law enforcement purposes; but the phrase does not
include supervision of probation or parole.
18 Pa.C.S. § 5121(e).
The relevant aspect of this definition is “any other detention for law
enforcement purposes.” Here, the evidence demonstrated that Devries was
under supervision of probation. Her probation officer and a co-worker went
to Devries’ residence to conduct a routine home visit. As part of such
supervision, Devries would be required to supply a urine sample to
demonstrate she was drug free. Devries was informed if she failed her drug
test, she could be taken before a judge and her supervision might be
terminated. See N.T. Trial, 11/7/2013, at 39. Further, while in the
bathroom, immediately after she supplied the specimen and there was a
preliminary indication of opiate use, Devries was told “due to her violation
and testing positive that my supervisor had already predetermined if she
was to test positive, she would be arrested and taken to jail.” Id. at 46.
Subsequent to this, Devries repeatedly asked not to be taken to jail because
she did not want to leave her daughter. Probation Officer Tamblyn testified
she repeatedly told Devries she was going to be placed under arrest or was
-6-
J-S55035-14
under arrest. Id. at 48. Officer Tamblyn testified she did not place Devries
in handcuffs while in the residence because she did not want the daughter to
see her mother in handcuffs. Id. at 49-50. Finally, Officer Tamblyn told
Devries, “[L]et’s go, it’s time to go, we have to get out of here.” Id. at 50.
She allowed Devries to retrieve her wallet, but at the same time, Devries
grabbed her car keys and fled. Id. at 50-51.
Our review of the certified record supports the trial court’s
determination that Devries was under official detention at the time she fled.
Devries was informed of the specific consequences of a failed urine test,
specifically that she would be arrested, taken to jail, and brought before a
judge. Devries knew, having failed the drug test, that she was in the
custody of her probation officer. She knew she was going to jail and pled
not to be taken from her daughter. This evidences her knowledge of the
situation. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
verdict winner, there was sufficient evidence to prove Devries was under
official detention at the time she fled. See Commonwealth v. Fountain,
811 A.2d 24 (Pa. Super. 2002) (defendant under official detention prior to
official arrest where officer told defendant not to run, and indicated she was
attempting to serve an arrest warrant).
Devries’ final claim is that the trial court improperly applied the deadly
weapon enhancement to her conviction of escape. In relevant portion of the
escape statute quoted above, we note:
-7-
J-S55035-14
(1) An offense under this section is a felony of the third
degree where:
(ii) the actor employs force, threat, deadly weapon or
other dangerous instrumentality to effect the escape
18 Pa.C.S. § 5121(d)(1)(ii).
Additionally, the deadly weapon enhancement is found at 204 Pa.Code
§ 303 and states in relevant part:
(a) Deadly Weapon Enhancement.
(1) When the court determines that the offender possessed a
deadly weapon during the commission of the current conviction
offense, the court shall consider the DWE/Possessed Matrix
(§ 303.17(a)). An offender has possessed a deadly weapon if
any of the following were on the offender’s person or within his
immediate physical control:
(i) Any firearm, (as defined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712)
whether loaded or unloaded, or
(ii) Any dangerous weapon (as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 913), or
(iii) Any device, implement, or instrumentality designed as
a weapon or capable of producing death or serious bodily injury
where the court determines that the offender intended to use the
weapon to threaten or injure another individual.
(2) When the court determines that the offender used a
deadly weapon during the commission of the current conviction
offense, the court shall consider the DWE/Used Matrix
(§ 303.17(b)). An offender has used a deadly weapon if any of
the following were employed by the offender in a way that
threatened or injured another individual:
(i) Any firearm, (as defined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712)
whether loaded or unloaded, or
(ii) Any dangerous weapon (as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 913), or
-8-
J-S55035-14
(iii) Any device, implement, or instrumentality capable of
producing death or serious bodily injury.
(3) There shall be no Deadly Weapon Enhancement for the
following offenses:
(ix) Any other offense for which possession of a deadly
weapon is an element of the crime.
204 Pa.Code 303(a)(1)-(3).
At sentencing, the Commonwealth argued that pursuant to the jury’s
verdict, Devries had employed a dangerous instrumentality to aid her
escape, not a deadly weapon. Therefore, the Commonwealth argued, the
Deadly Weapon Enhancement was applicable to the crime and did not violate
the prohibition against double-counting sentencing factors. Counsel for
Devries disagreed, claiming the prohibition in Section 303(a)(3)(ix)
controlled because possession of a deadly weapon was an element of the
crime of which Devries had been convicted. The trial court agreed with the
Commonwealth and imposed the enhancement, thereby raising the standard
range minimum sentence from 1-12 months to 13-24 months. The trial
court imposed a 13-month minimum sentence for escape. This sentence
would have represented an aggravated range sentence without the
enhancement.
Before we conduct a statutory and regulatory analysis, we examine the
trial court’s reasoning. Both the Commonwealth and trial court maintain
that because the jury specifically determined Devries used a dangerous
instrument, not a deadly weapon, the exception found at section
-9-
J-S55035-14
303(a)(3)(ix) is not applicable. We find this position unpersuasive based
upon our review of the certified record.
Specifically, during closing argument, the Commonwealth stated:
…but there’s a third consideration then after you decide those
first two elements of the crime…. [T]he third consideration is did
she employ, let me make sure I get this right, force[,] threat,
deadly weapon, or dangerous instrumentality to affect [her]
escape? So, did she use one of those methods to cause her
escape, to aid her escape?
N.T. Trial, 11/7/2013, at 104-105.
The trial court then charged the jury, in relevant part:
Third, if you do find the first two elements have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must indicate on the
verdict form whether you find the following element has also
been proven and that element is that the defendant employed
force, threat, a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrumentality to
affect the escape.
Id. at 114-115.
Finally, in relevant part, the trial court explained the verdict form:
Then you go to the second question and it says if you have
marked the defendant as guilty to the above offense, please
indicate whether you also find the defendant employed force,
threat, a deadly weapon or other dangerous instrumentality to
affect he escape and under that we have two choices[,] the first
defendant did employ a dangerous instrumentality, the second
defendant did not employ a dangerous instrumentality. You
must place an X in one of those areas indicating what your
decision is.
Id. at 117-118.
The verdict slip reiterates what the trial court explained. It read:
If you have marked the Defendant as guilty to the above
offense, please indicate whether you also find that the Defendant
- 10 -
J-S55035-14
employed force, threat, a deadly weapon or other dangerous
instrumentality to affect her escape.
___ Defendant Did Employ a Dangerous Instrumentality
___ Defendant Did Not Employ a Dangerous Instrumentality
Jury Verdict Form, 11/7/2013.
The jury was not asked to differentiate between the four statutory
elements; the jurors were asked to determine if any of the four elements
applied. If the jury determined that ANY of the four elements applied, the
form was to be marked as indicated. Because the jury was not asked or
instructed to differentiate between the statutory elements and the verdict
form did not allow for a determination of such differentiation, we cannot
agree that the jury specifically determined Devries had used a dangerous
instrumentality and not a deadly weapon. Rather, the finding as marked on
the verdict form was an acknowledgement that Devries had employed at
least one of the four required elements.
Analysis of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions is subject
to the Statutory Construction Act (S.C.A.), 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq.3
Relevant to our discussion:
Because statutory interpretation is a matter of law, our standard
of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.
____________________________________________
3
The S.C.A. also applies to Pennsylvania Code provisions. See 1 Pa.C.S. §
1502(a)(1)(ii); Keffer v. Bob Nolan’s Auto Service, Inc., 59 A.3d 621,
647 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2012); Commonwealth v. Mohamud, 15 A.3d 80, 86
n.7 (Pa. Super. 2010).
- 11 -
J-S55035-14
Commonwealth v. McClintic, 589 Pa. 465, 472, 909 A.2d
1241, 1245 (2006). Consequently, we are not bound by the
lower court's conclusions regarding the proper meaning of the
applicable provisions of this statute. See Commonwealth v.
Kyle, 582 Pa. 624, 632, 874 A.2d 12, 17 (2005) (holding that
our Court owes no duty of deference to the legal conclusions of
lower courts regarding an issue of statutory construction).
Our review is further governed by the Statutory
Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 et seq., under which
our paramount interpretative task is to give effect to the
intent of our General Assembly in enacting the particular
legislation under review. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921 (a) (“The
object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is
to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General
Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to
give effect to all its provisions.”); Nationwide Ins. Co. v.
Schneider, 599 Pa. 131, 143, 960 A.2d 442, 448 (2008).
Generally, the best indication of the General Assembly's
intent may be found in the plain language of the statute.
Martin v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of
Driver Licensing, 588 Pa. 429, 438, 905 A.2d 438, 443
(2006). In this regard, “it is not for the courts to add, by
interpretation, to a statute, a requirement which the
legislature did not see fit to include.” Commonwealth v.
Rieck Investment Corp., 419 Pa. 52, 59-60, 213 A.2d
277, 282 (1965). Consequently, “[a]s a matter of statutory
interpretation, although one is admonished to listen
attentively to what a statute says[;][o]ne must also listen
attentively to what it does not say.” Kmonk-Sullivan v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 567 Pa. 514, 525, 788
A.2d 955, 962 (2001) (internal quotations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Wright, 609 Pa. 22, 14 A.3d 798, 814
(2011).
Here, we must construe the meaning of a criminal statute. As
such, additional principles apply to our interpretation, such as
the statutory mandate that penal statute “shall be strictly
construed[.]” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1).
Of course, the mandate to construe penal statutes
narrowly does not override the “general principle that the
words of a statute must be construed according to their
- 12 -
J-S55035-14
common and approved usage,” and does not require this
Court to give the words of a penal statute their “narrowest
possible meaning.” Commonwealth v. Booth, 564 Pa.
228, 766 A.2d 843, 846 (2001). The mandate “does mean,
however, that where ambiguity exists in the language of a
penal statute, such language should be interpreted in the
light most favorable to the accused. More specifically,
where doubt exists concerning the proper scope of a penal
statute, it is the accused who should receive the benefit of
such doubt.” Id. (internal citation omitted)[.]
Commonwealth v. McCoy, 599 Pa. 599, 962 A.2d 1160, 1168-
69 (2009).
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 102 A.3d 1025, 1029-30 (Pa. Super. 2014).
The language of both 204 Pa. Code § 303(a)(3)(ix) and 18 Pa.C.S. §
1521(d)(1)(ii) is clear. To be convicted of escape as a felony, one must
employ any of the four stated factors, including a deadly weapon. The
possession of a deadly weapon is, therefore, an element of the crime.
Section 303(a)(3)(ix) forbids the application of the deadly weapon
enhancement to any crime of which possession of a deadly weapon is an
element. Accordingly, the deadly weapon enhancement is not instantly
applicable to escape as a felony of the third degree. Therefore, we must
vacate the sentence and remand this matter for resentencing.
Judgment of sentence affirmed in part, vacated in part. Remanded for
resentencing in conformance with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
- 13 -
J-S55035-14
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/20/2015
- 14 -