Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Ace Property & Casualty , 182 A.3d 1011 ( 2018 )


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  • J-A17045-16
    
    2018 Pa. Super. 68
    CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION                IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    ACE PROPERTY & CASUALTY
    INSURANCE CO. (FORMERLY AETNA
    INS. CO.), ALLIANZ GLOBAL RISKS U.S.
    INSURANCE CO. (FORMERLY ALLIANZ
    INS. CO.), ALLIANZ UNDERWRITERS
    INSURANCE CO., ALLSTATE INSURANCE
    CO. (AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO
    NORTHBROOK EXCESS & SURPLUS INS.
    CO. A/K/A NORTHBROOK INS. CO.),
    AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO.
    (AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP),
    AMERICAN MOTORISTS INSURANCE CO.
    (KEMPER), AVIVA INSURANCE CO. OF
    CANADA (U.S. BRANCH), (FORMERLY
    GAN GENERAL INS. CO. (FORMERLY
    SIMCOE & ERIE GENERAL INS. CO.)),
    BIRMINGHAM FIRE INSURANCE CO. OF
    PA. (AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL
    GROUP), BRITAMCO UNDERWRITERS,
    INC. C/O DEVONSHIRE GROUP,
    CENTURY INDEMNITY CO. (SUCCESSOR
    IN INTEREST TO CIGNA SPECIALTY INS.
    CO. (FORMERLY CALIFORNIA UNION
    INSURANCE CO.) AND AS SUCCESSOR
    TO CCI INSURANCE CO., SUCCESSOR
    TO INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH
    AMERICA), CONTINENTAL INSURANCE
    CO. (IN ITS OWN RIGHT AND AS
    SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO HARBOR
    INSURANCE CO.) (CNA INSURANCE
    COS.), EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
    CO. (EMC INSURANCE COS.),
    EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU
    (FORMERLY EMPLOYERS MUTUAL OF
    WAUSAU), EVANSTON INSURANCE CO.,
    J-A17045-16
    EVEREST REINSURANCE CO. (FORMERLY
    PRUDENTIAL REINSURANCE CO.),
    FEDERAL INSURANCE CO. (CHUBB
    GROUP OF INS. COS.), FIREMAN’S FUND
    INSURANCE CO., FIRST STATE
    INSURANCE CO. (HARTFORD
    INSURANCE GROUP), GRANITE STATE
    INSURANCE CO. (AMERICAN
    INTERNATIONAL GROUP), HARTFORD
    ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY CO.
    (HARTFORD INSURANCE GROUP),
    HUDSON INSURANCE CO., INSCO C/O
    DEVONSHIRE GROUP, INSURANCE
    COMPANY OF THE STATE OF
    PENNSYLVANIA (AMERICAN
    INTERNATIONAL GROUP), LANDMARK
    INSURANCE CO. (AMERICAN
    INTERNATIONAL GROUP), LEXINGTON
    INSURANCE CO. (AMERICAN
    INTERNATIONAL GROUP), LIBERTY
    MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., MIDSTATES
    REINSURANCE CORP. (FORMERY MEAD
    REINSURANCE CORP.), NATIONAL
    CASUALTY CO., NATIONAL UNION FIRE
    INSURANCE CO. OF PITTSBURGH, PA
    (AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP),
    NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE
    CO. (FORMERLY BELLEFONTE
    UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO.), OLD
    REPUBLIC INSURANCE CO., PACIFIC
    INSURANCE CO. (CNA INSURANCE
    COS.), REPUBLIC INSURANCE CO.,
    ROYAL INSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA
    (FORMERLY ROYAL GLOBE INS. CO.)
    (ROYAL & SUN ALLIANCE INSURANCE
    GROUP), SENTRY INSURANCE GROUP
    (AS ASSUMPTIVE REINSURER OF GREAT
    SOUTHWEST FIRE INS. CO. AND GREAT
    SOUTHWEST SURPLUS LINES INS. CO.),
    ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE
    CO. (ST. PAUL TRAVELERS
    COMPANIES), ST PAUL SURPLUS LINES
    INSURANCE CO. (ST. PAUL TRAVELERS
    COMPANIES), STONEWALL INSURANCE
    -2-
    J-A17045-16
    CO., TIG INSURANCE CO. (AS
    SUCCESSOR TO INTERNATIONAL INS.
    CO. (FORMERLY INTERNATIONAL
    SURPLUS LINES INS. CO.)) (FAIRFAX
    FINANCIAL (USA) GROUP), TIG PREMIER
    INSURANCE CO. (FORMERLY
    TRANSAMERICA INS. CO.) (FAIRFAX
    FINANCIAL (USA) GROUP), TRAVELERS
    CASUALTY AND SURETY CO. (FORMERLY
    ATENA CASUALTY AND SURETY CO.)
    (ST. PAUL TRAVELERS COMPANIES),
    TRAVELERS INDEMNITY CO.(ST. PAUL
    TRAVELERS COMPANIES), TWIN CITY
    FIRE INSURANCE CO. (HARTFORD
    INSURANCE GROUP), UNIONE ITALIANA
    REINSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA, INC.,
    UTICA MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.,
    ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE CO.
    (FORMERLY ZURICH INSURANCE CO.)
    AND CERTAIN LONDON MARKET
    INSURANCE COMPANIES AND
    PENNSYLVANIA PROPERTY & CASUALTY
    INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION
    (FORMERLY PENNSYLVANIA INSURANCE
    GUARANTY ASSOCIATION)
    Appellees                No. 1376 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 8, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No(s): 002638 Civil Action Sept. Term, 2004
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
    OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                            FILED MARCH 23, 2018
    Appellant, Consolidated Rail Corporation (“Conrail”), appeals from the
    summary judgment entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    -3-
    J-A17045-16
    Pleas, in favor of Stonewall Insurance Company (“Stonewall”), Continental
    Insurance Company (“Continental”), and Lloyd Italico & L’Ancora (“Lloyd”).
    For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
    further proceedings.
    This case involves Conrail’s efforts to obtain indemnification for
    contamination remediation, clean-up costs, and other expenses related to
    toxic spills and releases at various geographic sites. The trial court set forth
    the relevant facts regarding the Elkhart site as follows:
    From 1976 through 1999, Conrail owned a large
    classification yard for freight cars in Indiana. Beginning in
    1986, the [United States Environmental Protection Agency
    (“EPA”)] found significant amounts of [trichloroethene
    (“TCE”)] and [carbon tetrachloride (“CCl4”)] in portions of
    Conrail’s property and in the groundwater under a large
    number of neighboring properties.
    Conrail admits that [t]here is only one incident that resulted
    in carbon tetrachloride contamination at Elkhart—a release
    of [CCl4] in the vicinity of track number 69…in May 1968[,]
    while Penn Central was operating Elkhart…eight years
    before Conrail began its own operations at Elkhart.
    Conrail also claims that [t]he principal source of the TCE
    contamination at Elkhart was a release of TCE in the Track
    65-66 area of the rail yard. The TCE emanating from the
    rail yard has reached the drag strip and the St. Joseph River
    on the northern border of the site. The EPA’s expert, Gary
    Chirlin, opined that [s]ubstantial TCE contamination exists
    over the entire aquifer thickness…within this source area;
    this is consistent with a local release of sufficient magnitude
    that separate phase TCE [a dense non-aqueous phase liquid
    (“DNAPL”)] penetrated nearly to bedrock. Conrail’s lead
    environmental consultant at the Elkhart [s]ite, Miranda
    Menzies, testified that the nature of the contamination at
    Tracks 65-66—i.e., a large release of contaminants in
    undissolved form that sank through the soil into the
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    J-A17045-16
    aquifer—is consistent with a large spill from a tank car, as
    opposed to multiple small spills [which] would remain close
    to the soil surface. While the exact date of this release [of
    TCE] is unknown, it likely took place before 1976.
    In addition, Conrail notes that its employees told the EPA
    that solvents were used as degreasers at the car shop, then
    poured onto concrete pads and hosed down; they did not
    specify the year(s) in which this occurred or the types of
    solvent(s) used.
    Through September 2012, Conrail incurred over $15 million
    in remediation costs, approximately $3.8 million in
    government payments, and more than $2 million in defense
    costs in connection with the Elkhart [s]ite. Remediation is
    ongoing and Conrail continues to incur additional costs with
    respect to the Elkhart [s]ite.
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed October 28, 2014, at 1-2) (internal quotation marks
    and footnotes omitted). The trial court set forth the relevant facts regarding
    the Hollidaysburg, Douglasville, Conway, Beacon, and Paoli sites as follows:
    The Hollidaysburg, Pennsylvania, [s]ite was owned by
    Conrail from 1976 until 1999. It was a car shop, which was
    used to build, rebuild, and repair railway cars, and a
    reclamation plant, which was used to repair railcars and
    components, to recover parts and equipment from railcars,
    and to recycle rail equipment and materials that could no
    longer be used.
    In 1997, the [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
    Protection (“PaDEP”)] and Conrail discovered over 3,500
    drums of waste material buried on the [s]ite. It appears
    that Conrail’s predecessors buried the drums. In addition,
    there was apparently spilling and/or leaking of hazardous
    waste from [Conrail’s] drum crusher and its catch basin onto
    the adjacent ground.
    [Polychlorinated biphenyl (“PCB”)] and lead contamination
    was found in the soil at the Hollidaysburg [s]ite, but not at
    any neighboring sites. Arsenic contamination was also a
    problem at the site. In addition, [n]aphthalene and various
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    J-A17045-16
    metals were present at levels exceeding established
    maximum allowable levels in the groundwater at the [s]ite,
    but Conrail’s environmental consultants concluded that the
    contaminated groundwater was not migrating off-site.
    The PaDEP ordered Conrail to excavate and remove the
    drums. Conrail was also ordered to install a control system
    to prevent off-site migration of surface water, submit a plan
    to control wind dispersion of contamination, and submit a
    groundwater monitoring plan to determine whether any
    contaminated groundwater was migrating off-site. Conrail
    promptly undertook the remediation required by [the
    PaDEP’s] Administrative Order, which included the
    performance of groundwater flow and usage studies; the
    testing and monitoring of groundwater; the performance of
    an ecological assessment of the Beaverdam and Frankstown
    branches of the Juniata River; and the investigation of
    potential contamination at other locations at the [s]ite.
    In connection with the Hollidaysburg [s]ite, Conrail paid
    $4,999,806.60 in remediation costs and $2,828,740.45 in
    defense costs which it seeks to recover [through
    indemnification]. It also paid $4.1 million in governmental
    fines and penalties for which it seeks coverage.
    *    *    *
    The Douglasville Disposal [s]ite is located in Pennsylvania.
    It was never owned or operated by Conrail. It was operated
    by Berks Associates as a waste oil recycling plant. Between
    1976 when Conrail came into being and 1985 when waste
    oil processing ceased at the Douglassville [s]ite, Conrail sent
    its waste oil to be processed there, as did many other
    entities. At least one Conrail agent testified to the effect
    that Conrail contracted with Berks Associates to safely
    process and recycle its waste oil, and to do so in compliance
    with all applicable environmental regulations.
    In the 1980s, the EPA investigated the [s]ite and discovered
    a panoply of contaminants, including [volatile organic
    compounds      (“VOCs”)],    PCBs,   [polycyclic    aromatic
    hydrocarbons (“PAHs”)], and lead in the soil, ground and
    surface water, which had emanated from [ten] different
    source areas of contamination at the [s]ite.             The
    -6-
    J-A17045-16
    contamination was the result of Berks Associates’ waste
    storage and disposal methods, including disposing of it in
    lagoons, landfarming it, and depositing filter cakes, as well
    as leaks and spills resulting from Berks’ recycling
    operations.   There were also serious risks [of further
    contamination] arising from Berks’ abandoned processing
    facility.
    Litigation and remediation took place over the next [ten] or
    more years.      In 2001, Conrail and other potentially
    responsible parties entered into agreements regarding
    payment of their respective shares of the remediation costs.
    Conrail claims it paid $5,983,997.95 in such costs and
    incurred $1,313,053.02 in defense costs for both of which it
    seeks [indemnification].     Additional costs may yet be
    incurred by Conrail.
    *    *    *
    The Conway rail yard is located in western Pennsylvania. A
    creek, Crows Run, flows through a stone and concrete
    culvert under the rail yard. Upon exiting the culvert, Crows
    Run flows approximately 200 feet before joining the Ohio
    River. Thirty-eight storm water outfalls and drains intersect
    the rail yard and discharge into the Ohio River or into Crows
    Run along the culvert wall. Conrail operated Conway from
    1976 until 1999.
    [C]ertain areas at the Conway rail yard were contaminated
    with oil [as a result of releases occurring] both before and
    after April 1, 1976, [when Conrail assumed control of the
    site. The oil] leached and migrated through the soil and was
    able to enter Crows Run by way of the Conway drainage
    system, as well as from groundwater seepage through the
    culvert side wall.
    Two documented oil releases occurred at Conway while
    Conrail was operating there. The first occurred on or around
    September 29, 1977, and resulted from a spill that made its
    way into the Ohio River through a sewer outfall. The release
    of oil appears to have continued unabated until
    approximately October 7, 1977. Although Conrail was never
    able to confirm the source of the spill, it was suspected that
    the discharge was caused when part of the wastewater
    -7-
    J-A17045-16
    treatment facility was temporarily shut down by a contractor
    hired to clean out sewer lines at the rail yard.
    The second spill occurred in December 1979[,] when an
    underground fueling pipe separated at a joint, causing the
    release of oil directly into the ground (as opposed to directly
    into Crows Run) near a building in the vicinity of Crows Run.
    Approximately 25,000 gallons of oil [were] recovered from
    Crows Run during and immediately after the spill; the
    quantity of oil that was released from the pipeline but stayed
    in the ground and was not [immediately] released to Crows
    Run or the river is unknown. Although the spill was
    originally thought to have occurred because of a ruptured
    pipeline, the actual source of the spill was identified on
    December 31, 1979[,] as a separated pipeline and was
    repaired by January 2, 1980. Booms and other recovery
    efforts were implemented to remove oil from Crows Run.
    There were also two, non-oil, chemical spills at Conway, one
    of styrene monomer in 1984[,] and one of carbon disulfide
    in 1985.
    Conrail admits that it knew about the existing oil
    contamination when it assumed control of Conway, but
    denies that it knew until the 1990s that it would be liable for
    millions of dollars in remediation costs with respect to the
    [s]ite. Conrail seeks coverage relating to the remediation
    of diesel fuel and lubricant oil, as well as styrene and carbon
    disulfide, from the ground and subsurface of the rail yard,
    as well as from the groundwater, Crows Run, and the Ohio
    River.
    Through December 2012, Conrail has incurred over $14
    million in remediation costs, almost $1.2 million in
    government     payments     to the  Commonwealth     of
    Pennsylvania and the Borough of Conway, and more than
    $2 million in defense costs. Conrail continues to incur
    additional remediation costs.
    *    *    *
    The Beacon Park rail yard is located in Massachusetts and
    was operated by Conrail from 1976 through 1999. The rail
    yard is bisected by the Massachusetts Turnpike, so that it
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    J-A17045-16
    comprises two distinct units. Portions of both units are
    contaminated with [light non-aqueous phase liquids
    (“LNAPLs”)], primarily oil and diesel fuel.
    [T]he first area of contamination at the Beacon Park [s]ite
    is known as the “Charles River Chamber” area and is located
    near the diesel servicing facility in the loop track area. The
    Charles River Chamber is a collection point for several storm
    sewers. LNAPL in the surrounding groundwater entered the
    chamber through cracks and fissures in the sewer system,
    often as the result of heavy rains. The sources of this
    contamination are the various historical releases at the
    Beacon Park [s]ite as well as the diesel servicing area and
    the lube oil tank area west of the chamber, all of which
    migrated to the area surrounding the chamber.
    The second area of contamination is located in the
    classification yard section of Beacon Park and is known as
    the “Control Tower” area. Contamination at the Control
    Tower area consists of a layer of LNAPL on the water table
    beneath the Turnpike and the northern portion of the rail
    yard. When precipitation increased the height of the water
    table, the oil would infiltrate a storm drain running through
    this area and flow into the Charles River.
    Conrail knew, at the time that it took over operations of the
    Beacon Park rail yard, that there was contamination [there],
    and that an EPA Administrative Order had been issued
    regarding contamination at Beacon Park on March 1, 1976….
    Conrail [also] knew, in August 1976, that it would be
    responsible for complying with an order issued by the
    Massachusetts Division of Water Pollution Control. Once
    Conrail completed the work required by these two orders,
    however, [Conrail claims] it had no reason to believe that it
    would be responsible for further remediation of the [s]ite.
    Conrail denies that it was aware in 1976, or at any other
    time during the period when [its insurers] issued policies,
    [that subsequent] remediation would approach the level of
    coverage provided by [its insurers’ p]olicies.
    There is evidence that at least two spills occurred [in the
    Charles River Chamber area after Conrail assumed
    operations of the rail yard]: a spill of approximately 2,000
    gallons of fuel reported to Conrail on November 1, 1981,
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    J-A17045-16
    and a spill of approximately 800 gallons on or about August
    9, 1982.
    With respect to the 1981 leak, the EPA determined that oil
    discharg[ing] from Conrail’s corroded underground [two
    inch] pipe [entered] into surrounding earth, leached through
    the ground and groundwater into a storm conduit, flowed
    through the conduit to a junction box, and spilled through
    two culverts from the junction box to the Charles River.
    [C]ontamination from the pipe leak reached the Charles
    River Chamber area of Beacon Park. The leak occurred for
    [eight] days until Conrail located its source and capped the
    pipe.
    [N]o identifiable release or source of the contamination in
    the Control Tower area of the yard was ever identified.
    Conrail seeks coverage here for $5,388,264.76 in
    remediation costs and $352,101.49 in defense costs.
    Conrail dropped its claim for approximately $2.5 million in
    government penalties that it paid.
    *     *      *
    The Paoli [s]ite was a rail yard and car shop that Conrail
    operated in Pennsylvania from 1976 through 1982, and
    which was operated by [the Southeastern Pennsylvania
    Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”)] thereafter. [F]rom the
    early 1950s, railcars using transformer oil that contained
    PCBs were repaired and maintained at the Paoli rail yard….
    [F]or most of the period before April 1, 1976, the hazards
    of PCBs were unknown and…from an environmental
    standpoint the PCB-containing transformer fluid was treated
    similarly to other oils. … [R]eleases of PCB-containing fluid
    onto the ground occurred during Conrail’s and SEPTA’s
    occupancy at the site, including some releases during
    maintenance operations.
    [A]fter [Conrail] assumed operations at Paoli, federal and
    state regulations began to require that PCBs be treated as
    hazardous substances and Conrail’s own internal policies
    began to require that PCBs be treated as a hazardous
    substance soon thereafter. [As a result,] there was a
    significant decrease in the incidence of PCB discharges
    - 10 -
    J-A17045-16
    during the operations conducted by Conrail and…known
    spills were commonly cleaned up promptly.
    However, on at least [twenty] different occasions between
    1979 and 1985, PCBs spilled from railcars at the Paoli [s]ite.
    Conrail admits that the [railcar] transformers were designed
    to release PCB-containing fluid in the event of excessive
    pressure, but Conrail denies that th[is] “burping” of the
    transformers was routine or that it was the exclusive source
    of PCB releases into the ground at Paoli. Conrail [also]
    admits that leaks occurred from time to time from faulty
    gaskets or eroded and fractured sight glass on some cars,
    but denies that such leaks occurred frequently.
    Conrail seeks $12,766,859.05 in indemnity costs and
    $5,215,407.74 in defense costs…. Some of those costs were
    incurred by SEPTA, which Conrail claims is an additional
    insured under the [p]olicies.
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed October 28, 2014, at 1-11) (footnotes and
    some internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court set forth the
    relevant facts regarding the Lloyd principal-agent relationship as
    follows:
    [Conrail] claims that [Lloyd] issued a $1,000,000 Umbrella
    Excess Liability [p]olicy to Conrail for the April 1, 1978
    through April 1, 1979 policy period. [Lloyd] denies that it
    issued any such policy to Conrail. Due to the passage of
    time ([thirty-six] years), many relevant records have been
    lost or destroyed, memories have dimmed, and witnesses
    can no longer be found, so the court must determine which
    party must bear the consequences of this lack of evidence.
    *     *      *
    In support of its claim that [Lloyd] issued an insurance
    contract to Conrail, Conrail proffers a single page that
    purports to be an “Umbrella Excess Liability Policy Issued By
    [Lloyd]” (the “[Lloyd p]olicy”). It is signed by “Joseph F.
    Ambriano” on behalf of “PLAR GROUP.” There is also a
    second page that purports to be “Endorsement No. 1” to the
    - 11 -
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    [Lloyd p]olicy, which increases the coverage provided by the
    [p]olicy from $500,000 to $1,000,000. That Endorsement
    is signed by “R.A. Browing” on behalf of the “Independence
    Marine Group.” A third page purports to be “Endorsement
    No. 2” to the [p]olicy. It sets forth a computation of the
    earned premium based on Conrail’s revenues during the
    [p]olicy year, which results in an additional premium
    payment due. Endorsement No. 2 was issued in July 1979,
    after the [p]olicy period ended, and is signed “Richard H.
    Byron for Plar.”
    Through discovery, Conrail has established that, at the time
    this transaction allegedly occurred, the following
    relationships existed:
    1.    Conrail’s broker was Marsh & McLennan (“Marsh”)
    in New York, New York.
    2.    Marsh worked with a sub-broker East West
    International (“EWI”) in Geneva, Switzerland.
    3.    EWI negotiated with Mr. Ambriano of Davis,
    Dorland & Co. (“Davis Dorland”) in New York, New
    York.
    4.    Mr. Ambriano and George B. McNeill International
    had some authority to act on behalf of the Pool
    Latino Americano de Reaseguros (“PLAR”) in
    Panama.
    5.    [Lloyd] was a member of PLAR. In [February
    1977], [Lloyd] expressly authorized PLAR’s
    Administrator, Estudio Consultivo De Seguros S.A.
    “to accept shares in Reinsurance transactions” on
    behalf of [Lloyd] up to a limit of $10,000.
    *     *      *
    Conrail has not been able to discover any document giving
    PLAR or Mr. Ambriano express authority to bind [Lloyd] with
    respect to the issuance of excess policies in the amount of
    [$500,000] such as the one at issue here. Instead, the
    evidence shows only that PLAR’s and thereby Mr.
    Ambriano’s, express authority to act on behalf of [Lloyd]
    was limited to reinsurance policies up to $10,000.
    Conrail [also] obtained an affidavit from Mr. Ambriano, who
    stated as follows with respect to the [Lloyd p]olicy:
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    J-A17045-16
    I do not recognize the policy number or the form of
    such number. I have no recollection of signing this
    document. However, the signature that appears on
    [it] is a photocopy of my signature.
    Although I have no specific recollection of signing [it]
    or the 1978 transaction to which it refers
    approximately [thirty-six] years ago, I recall that
    [Lloyd] was a member of PLAR and I wrote business
    on behalf of PLAR. I understood I was authorized to
    sign [it] in May 1978. I would not have signed [it] if
    I did not believe I was authorized by PLAR to sign it
    on behalf of [Lloyd].
    *     *      *
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed December 30, 2014, at 1-4) (footnotes omitted).
    Procedurally, Conrail initiated this action in 2004 against fifty-five
    insurers; since then, only Stonewall, Continental, and Lloyd remain in the case
    as Appellees in this appeal.        On October 6, 2010, Lloyd filed preliminary
    objections to Conrail’s complaint, and on April 29, 2011, Lloyd filed a
    memorandum of law in support of its preliminary objections, claiming it did
    not authorize the insurance policy to Conrail.          Following briefing and oral
    argument, the trial court sustained Lloyd’s preliminary objections and
    dismissed Conrail’s complaint against Lloyd on February 21, 2012.                  On
    February 6, 2013, the court reconsidered its previous ruling on Lloyd’s
    preliminary objections and overruled them. On March 25, 2013, Stonewall
    and Continental filed motions for summary judgment, and Conrail filed cross-
    motions for summary judgment. The court issued an opinion, on November
    13,   2013,    interpreting   the    “Operations      Clause”   of   Stonewall’s   and
    - 13 -
    J-A17045-16
    Continental’s insurance policy. The court determined that the insurance policy
    required the insurers to reimburse Conrail only for the damages arising out of
    an “occurrence” (i.e., environmental contamination) that was caused by or
    grew out of Conrail’s operations at the sites.    In other words, the policies
    provided coverage to Conrail only if Conrail could prove it had discharged
    some of the pollutants during the policy terms for which it had incurred
    liability.   Lloyd filed a motion for summary judgment on June 16, 2014,
    arguing it did not authorize the policy Conrail proffered against Lloyd.
    On October 28, 2014, the court applied its ruling of the “Operations
    Clause” to the sites and granted Continental’s motion for summary judgment
    in part and denied it in part. The court determined facts for some of the sites
    indicated that pollutants had been discharged before Conrail took over
    operations. On that same day, the court granted summary judgment in favor
    of Stonewall because the court found pollutants had been discharged before
    Conrail began to operate at the site Stonewall insured.      On December 30,
    2014, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Lloyd, finding Lloyd
    did not authorize Conrail’s policy.     The court dismissed as moot Lloyd’s
    remaining motions for summary judgment and Conrail’s cross motion for
    summary judgment. Conrail and Continental filed a stipulation for entry of
    final judgment on April 6, 2015. On April 8, 2015, the court entered an order
    discontinuing without prejudice Conrail’s claims regarding the twenty-seven
    non-focus sites listed in Conrail’s complaint and entering final judgment in
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    favor of the Insurers and against Conrail as to all remaining claims and parties.
    Conrail timely filed a notice of appeal on April 23, 2015. The court, on April
    28, 2015, ordered Conrail to file a concise statement of errors complained of
    on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Conrail timely complied on May
    22, 2015.
    Conrail raises three issues for our review:
    WHETHER      LIABILITY     INSURANCE    POLICIES
    UNAMBIGUOUSLY PRECLUDE COVERAGE FOR CONRAIL’S
    POLLUTION-RELATED LIABILITIES UNLESS CONRAIL CAN
    PROVE ITSELF GUILTY OF DISCHARGING SOME OF THE
    POLLUTANTS…[?]
    WHETHER (I) CONRAIL HAD THE BURDEN TO PROVE THAT
    IT POLLUTED THIRD-PARTY PROPERTY TO ESCAPE
    APPLICATION OF THE INSURANCE POLICIES’ OWN
    PROPERTY EXCLUSION TO ITS ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
    AT THE HOLLIDAYSBURG SITE, AND (II) CONRAIL FAILED
    TO SATISFY THIS BURDEN DESPITE EVIDENCE THAT IT
    HAD CONTAMINATED GROUNDWATER UNDER THE SITE
    AND WAS LIABLE FOR ON-SITE REMEDIATION DESIGNED
    TO PREVENT THREATENED OFF-SITE DAMAGE[?]
    WHETHER CONRAIL FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO
    PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF AN INSURANCE POLICY
    ALLEGEDLY ISSUED BY THE ITALIAN INSURER [LLOYD],
    DESPITE EVIDENCE FROM WHICH A JURY COULD FIND (I)
    THAT THE AGENT WHO SIGNED THE POLICY HAD ACTUAL
    OR APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ACT FOR [LLOYD], OR (II)
    THAT [LLOYD] SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THE
    AGENT’S AUTHORITY[?]
    (Conrail’s Brief at 3-4) (footnote omitted).
    Conrail argues the insurance policy language is ambiguous and can be
    reasonably read to provide coverage for Conrail’s liability for preexisting
    contamination, regardless of whether Conrail actively contributed to that
    - 15 -
    J-A17045-16
    contamination. As a result, Conrail contends the policy language should be
    construed against the drafter to effect the dominant purpose of the policy,
    which is to provide indemnity to Conrail.     Specifically, Conrail offers three
    interpretations of the policy language to provide liability coverage.      First,
    Conrail disagrees with the court’s definition of an “occurrence” because it
    ignores the phrase “all operations incidental thereto,” which is not specifically
    defined in the policy but is ordinarily defined by standard dictionaries as
    “related to.”   Had the trial court given effect to the phrase “all operations
    incidental thereto,” Conrail suggests the court could have reasonably
    interpreted the policy to cover “occurrences” as related to Conrail’s operations,
    because Conrail is engaged in the same operations as the previous site
    operators, conducted operations on the same properties, and used many of
    the same equipment and personnel in those operations.
    Second, Conrail maintains the trial court should have considered the
    term “occurrence” under the more expansive policy language of “continuous
    or repeated exposure to conditions which cause injury or damage during the
    term of the policy.” If the trial court had considered the term “occurrence” as
    a continuous and repeated exposure caused by the initial discharge event,
    Conrail posits the court could have concluded that the migration of previously
    discharged contaminants into and through the groundwater and off the site
    was covered by the policy.      Conrail submits the policy should cover the
    continuous and repeated exposure occurring as a result of the initial event;
    - 16 -
    J-A17045-16
    otherwise, the language “caused by or grew out of” is superfluous. Relying
    on a Kansas federal court case, Conrail claims the phrase “grew out of” should
    mean “associated with.” Based on Conrail’s interpretations of these applicable
    terms and phrases, Conrail reasons the preexisting contamination that
    evolved and expanded by migration on and off the site are “occurrences”
    which continued to happen during Conrail’s operations; and the policy
    language lends itself to this construction to provide coverage for Conrail’s
    liability.
    Third, Conrail avers the language, “caused by or growing out of the
    insured’s operations,” when read in the context of the policy as a whole, could
    reasonably be interpreted to permit broader coverage than just for a single
    event because the phrase “caused by or grew out of” modifies both
    “occurrence” and the larger promise of the policy to provide indemnification
    for the insured’s liability. Under this broader interpretation, Conrail suggests
    liability can arise not only out of a triggering event but also the triggering
    event can stretch into a continued or repeated exposure to migrating
    contaminants. Because Conrail is liable for the preexisting contamination at
    the sites, under this broader policy interpretation, Conrail insists it should be
    covered by the relevant policies.
    For its second issue, Conrail argues Continental should indemnify Conrail
    for the Hollidaysburg site remediation because the contaminated groundwater
    found at the site constitutes damage to third-party property. Conrail reasons
    - 17 -
    J-A17045-16
    groundwater belongs to the Commonwealth under Pennsylvania law, not just
    to Conrail, so the contaminated groundwater is not Conrail’s “owned property”
    within the meaning of the “Own Property Exclusion,” thus liability coverage
    under the policy is available.    Conrail alternatively posits the trial court
    incorrectly placed the burden of proving the “Own Property Exclusion” on
    Conrail where Pennsylvania law requires the insurer to prove policy exclusions.
    Conrail further complains the trial court improperly required Conrail to show
    that actual damage to third-party property occurred, where Pennsylvania
    courts have held “own property” exclusions do not bar coverage for
    remediation efforts to prevent threatened damage to third-party property.
    Conrail emphasizes that it engaged in remediation efforts by removing the
    buried drums at the Hollidaysburg site to prevent further contamination of any
    groundwater and surface waters, which Conrail maintains is property of the
    Commonwealth as a third party.
    For Conrail’s third and final issue, it argues a genuine issue of material
    fact exists in this case to preclude summary judgment. Specifically, Conrail
    claims Mr. Joseph Ambriano (“Mr. Ambriano”) had authority to bind Lloyd to
    the terms of the Lloyd policy because Mr. Ambriano underwrote the policy
    through an implied principal-agent relationship based on the following facts:
    (a) Mr. Ambriano signed a statement indicating that he understood he was
    authorized to sign the Lloyd policy in May 1978 and that he would not have
    signed it if he did not believe he was so authorized; (b) an employee of EWI
    - 18 -
    J-A17045-16
    documented a conversation he had with Mr. Ambriano, wherein Mr. Ambriano
    notified EWI that a recent change in government regulations restricted Lloyd’s
    ability to issue a letter of credit for another Italian insurer and Mr. Ambriano
    suggested deferring the transfer; (c) PLAR, an international reinsurance
    syndicate, entered into an agreement with Mr. Ambriano through which he
    was deemed the sole and exclusive agent for all of PLAR’s United States
    business; Lloyd was a PLAR member; and the majority of the policies issued
    by PLAR that are still of-record were direct policies rather than reinsurance
    policies; (d) PLAR negotiated policies for individual members, two of which
    were issued by another PLAR member to Conrail; and (e) Mr. Ambriano was
    highly regarded in the international insurance market. Based on these facts,
    Conrail also argues Mr. Ambriano bound Lloyd to the policy because he
    possessed apparent authority through a “limited delegation” from Lloyd to
    underwrite it. Conrail emphasizes Lloyd was a member of PLAR, and by nature
    of that membership, Lloyd delegated authority to PLAR to issue insurance
    policies on its behalf; and Mr. Ambriano frequently acted for PLAR. Conrail
    further contends that from the perspective of a third party engaging with Mr.
    Ambriano, it was reasonable for a broker to believe Mr. Ambriano possessed
    the authority to act on behalf of Lloyd because of his prominence in the
    market. Alternatively, Conrail avers Lloyd is estopped from arguing that a
    principal-agent relationship does not exist because once Lloyd was made
    aware of the policy, Lloyd failed to take reasonable steps to notify Conrail that
    - 19 -
    J-A17045-16
    Mr. Ambriano was unauthorized to underwrite it. Conrail concludes the trial
    court erred as a matter of law in misinterpreting the policy clauses and
    exclusions at issue and misapplying Pennsylvania agency law, and this Court
    must reverse summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. For
    the following reasons, we disagree in part and agree in part.
    Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment requires
    us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an
    error of law.   Mee v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 
    908 A.2d 344
    , 347
    (Pa.Super. 2006).
    Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on
    facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing
    and consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its
    discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies
    the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking
    reason. Similarly, the trial court abuses its discretion if it
    does not follow legal procedure.
    Miller v. Sacred Heart Hospital, 
    753 A.2d 829
    , 832 (Pa.Super. 2000)
    (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).       Our scope of review is
    plenary. Pappas v. Asbel, 
    564 Pa. 407
    , 418, 
    768 A.2d 1089
    , 1095 (2001),
    cert. denied, 
    536 U.S. 938
    , 
    122 S. Ct. 2618
    , 
    153 L. Ed. 2d 802
    (2002).         In
    reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment,
    [W]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing
    all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists
    a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the
    light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts
    as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must
    be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is
    no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that
    the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
    - 20 -
    J-A17045-16
    law will summary judgment be entered. All doubts as to the
    existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be
    resolved against the moving party.
    Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly
    implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [a] cause of
    action.    Summary judgment is proper if, after the
    completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including
    the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will
    bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce
    evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or
    defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be
    submitted to a jury. In other words, whenever there is no
    genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element
    of the cause of action or defense, which could be established
    by additional discovery or expert report and the moving
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary
    judgment is appropriate. Thus, a record that supports
    summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are
    undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to
    make out a prima facie cause of action or defense.
    Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court’s
    conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions.
    Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 
    895 A.2d 55
    , 61 (Pa.Super. 2006)
    (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
    “The interpretation of an insurance contract is a matter of law and is
    generally performed by a court.” Kropa v. Gateway Ford, 
    974 A.2d 502
    ,
    505 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 
    605 Pa. 701
    , 
    990 A.2d 730
    (2010). The
    goal of insurance contract interpretation is “to ascertain the intent of the
    parties as manifested by the language of the written instrument.” Madison
    Const. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 
    557 Pa. 595
    , 606, 
    735 A.2d 100
    ,
    106 (1999).    “[A] court is required to give effect to such language, if
    - 21 -
    J-A17045-16
    unambiguous, but to interpret it in favor of the insured, if otherwise.” Lititz
    Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steely, 
    567 Pa. 98
    , 104, 
    785 A.2d 975
    , 978 (2001).
    Ambiguity in a contract exists “if the language at issue could reasonably
    be construed in more than one way.” 
    Id. Nevertheless, “[w]hether
    ambiguity
    exists cannot be resolved in a vacuum, …but must instead be considered in
    reference to a specific set of facts.” 
    Id. In other
    words, the ambiguity cannot
    be measured in the abstract; rather, the policy language must be tested
    against the facts of the case. See Wagner v. Erie Ins. Co., 
    801 A.2d 1226
    (Pa.Super. 2002), aff’d, 
    577 Pa. 563
    , 
    847 A.2d 1274
    (2004). No ambiguity
    exists if after close review, it appears that only a lawyer’s ingenuity has made
    the language uncertain. Lower Paxton Twp. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
    
    557 A.2d 393
    , 402 (Pa.Super. 1989), appeal denied, 
    523 Pa. 649
    , 
    567 A.2d 653
    (1989).
    “When analyzing a policy, words of common usage are to be construed
    in their natural, plain, and ordinary sense.” Continental Cas. Co. v. Pro
    Machine, 
    916 A.2d 1111
    , 1118 (Pa.Super. 2007). “[W]hen ‘the language of
    the [insurance] contract is clear and unambiguous, a court is required to give
    effect to that language.’” Mitsock v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 
    909 A.2d 828
    ,
    831 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting Madison Const. Co., supra at 
    606, 735 A.2d at 106
    ). A court must not distort the meaning of the language or resort to a
    strained contrivance to find an ambiguity. 
    Mitsock, supra
    .
    [T]he proper focus regarding issues of coverage under
    insurance contracts is the reasonable expectation[s] of the
    - 22 -
    J-A17045-16
    insured. In determining the reasonable expectations of the
    insured, courts must examine the totality of the insurance
    transaction involved.        However, while reasonable
    expectations of the insured are focal points in interpreting
    the contract language of insurance policies, an insured may
    not complain that [its]…reasonable expectations were
    frustrated by policy limitations which are clear and
    unambiguous.      Like every other contract, the goal of
    interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent
    of the parties as manifested by the language of the policy.
    St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Corbett, 
    630 A.2d 28
    , 30 (Pa.Super. 1993)
    (en banc) (internal citations omitted).
    Additionally, the insured has the burden to prove a valid policy claim.
    Antrim Mining, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 
    648 A.2d 532
    , 534
    (Pa.Super. 1994), appeal denied, 
    540 Pa. 616
    , 
    657 A.2d 487
    (1995) (citing
    Riehl v. Travelers Insurance Co., 
    772 F.2d 19
    , 23 (3d Cir. 1985)). On the
    other hand, where “an insurer relies on a policy exclusion as the basis for its
    denial of coverage…, the insurer has asserted an affirmative defense, and
    accordingly, bears the burden of proving such defense.” McEwing v. Lititz
    Mut. Ins. Co., 
    77 A.3d 639
    , 646 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Madison Const.
    Co., supra at 
    605; 735 A.2d at 106
    ).         Further, if the policy contains an
    exception to an exclusion, the burden to prove whether the exception applies
    falls again on the insured. Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Aardvark
    Assocs., Inc., 
    942 F.2d 189
    , 194-95 (3d Cir. 1991).
    Regarding the existence of a principal-agent relationship, that question
    is ordinarily one of fact for the jury to determine. Joyner v. Harleysville
    Ins. Co., 
    574 A.2d 664
    , 668 (Pa.Super. 1990), appeal denied, 
    527 Pa. 587
    ,
    - 23 -
    J-A17045-16
    
    588 A.2d 510
    (1991). Where the facts giving rise to the relationship are not
    in dispute, however, the question is one which is properly decided by the
    court. Breslin by Breslin v. Ridarelli, 
    454 A.2d 80
    , 82 (Pa.Super. 1982).
    An agency relationship may be created by any of the following ways:
    (1) express authority, (2) implied authority, (3) apparent
    authority, and/or (4) authority by estoppel.          Express
    authority exists where the principal deliberately and
    specifically grants authority to the agent as to certain
    matters. Implied authority exists in situations where the
    agent’s actions are “proper, usual and necessary” to carry
    out express agency. Apparent agency exists where the
    principal, by word or conduct, causes people with whom the
    alleged agent deals to believe that the principal has granted
    the agent authority to act. Authority by estoppel occurs
    when the principal fails to take reasonable steps to disavow
    the third party of their belief that the purported agent was
    authorized to act on behalf of the principal.
    *     *      *
    The basic elements of agency are the manifestation by the
    principal that the agent shall act for him, the agent’s
    acceptance of the undertaking and the understanding of the
    parties that the principal is to be in control of the
    undertaking.     The creation of an agency relationship
    requires no special formalities. The existence of an agency
    relationship is a question of fact. The party asserting the
    existence of an agency relationship bears the burden of
    proving it by a fair preponderance of the evidence. In
    establishing agency, one need not furnish direct proof of
    specific authority, provided it can be inferred from the facts
    that at least an implied intention to create the relationship
    of principal and agent existed.
    V-Tech Services, Inc. v. Street, 
    72 A.3d 270
    , 278–79 (Pa.Super. 2013)
    (citing Walton v. Johnson, 
    66 A.3d 782
    , 786–88 (Pa.Super. 2013)
    (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
    - 24 -
    J-A17045-16
    Instantly, Stonewall’s policy provides the following language:
    TO INDEMNIFY THE INSURED ANY AND ALL SUMS THE
    INSURED SHALL BECOME LEGALLY LIABLE TO PAY AS
    DAMAGES, INCLUDING LIABILITY ASSUMED BY THE
    INSURED UNDER ANY AGREEMENT OR CONTRACT, TO ANY
    PERSON OR PERSONS AS COMPENSATION FOR:
    (1)   PERSONAL INJURY
    (2)   PROPERTY DAMAGE
    (3)   EVACUATION EXPENSES
    TO REIMBURSE THE INSURED FOR COSTS PAID OR
    INCURRED BY THE INSURED IN CONNECTION WITH
    PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR EVACUATION
    EXPENSES ARISING OUT OF AN OCCURRENCE TO WHICH
    THIS POLICY APPLIES. SUCH COSTS ARE PAYABLE IN
    ADDITION TO ANY LIMIT OF INSURER’S LIABILITY FOR
    ULTIMATE NET LOSS, BUT THE [INSURER] SHALL NOT BE
    OBLIGATED TO PAY ANY GREATER PROPORTION OF SUCH
    COSTS THAN THE AMOUNTS OF ULTIMATE NET LOSS
    PAYABLE UNDER THIS POLICY BEARS TO THE TOTAL OF ALL
    ULTIMATE   NET   LOSS    RESULTING    FROM    SUCH
    OCCURRENCE.
    ARISING OUT OF ANY OCCURRENCE OR OCCURRENCES
    CAUSED BY OR GROWING OUT OF THE INSURED’S
    OPERATIONS   ANYWHERE    IN  THE WORLD,  AND
    OPERATIONS INCIDENTAL THERETO.
    (CRL 1985 Policy at 2; R.R. at 001417a). The policy defines “occurrence” as
    “an event, or continuous repeated exposure to conditions which cause
    personal injury, property damage or evacuation expenses.” (Id. at 3; R.R. at
    001418a). The policy defines “property damage” as “(1) physical injury to or
    destruction of tangible property (other than property owned by the named
    insured) which occurs during the policy period, including loss of use thereof at
    - 25 -
    J-A17045-16
    any time resulting therefrom, or (2) loss of use of tangible property which has
    not been physically injured or destroyed provided such loss of use is caused
    by an occurrence during the policy period, but (2) above shall not include
    evacuation expenses.” (Id. at 4; R.R. at 001419a).
    In preparation for analyzing the application of Stonewall’s policy to the
    Elkhart site, the trial court relied on its interpretation of the substantially
    similar “Operations Clause” in Continental’s policy, as follows:
    The acquired assets at issue here are parcels of real
    property located in several states that suffer from
    environmental contamination for which Conrail has been
    found liable under the Comprehensive Environmental
    Response Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).
    Under CERCLA, a current owner or operator of a
    contaminated site may be held strictly and wholly liable for
    the environmental clean-up of the site, even if the causes of
    that contamination predate its ownership or operation of the
    site.
    *     *      *
    [T]he opening provisions of the [p]olicies [provide]:
    TO INDEMNIFY THE INSURED FOR ANY AND ALL
    SUMS THE INSURED SHALL BECOME LEGALLY LIABLE
    TO PAY AS DAMAGES, INCLUDING LIABILITY
    ASSUMED BY THE INSURED UNDER ANY AGREEMENT
    OR CONTRACT, TO ANY PERSON OR PERSONS AS
    COMPENSATION FOR:
    *     *      *
    (b) DAMAGE TO OR DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY,
    INCLUDING LOSS OF USE THEREOF, EXCLUDING
    INSURED’S OWN PROPERTY BUT INCLUDING
    PROPERTY OF OTHERS IN INSURED’S CARE,
    CUSTODY OR CONTROL;
    - 26 -
    J-A17045-16
    *     *      *
    ARISING  OUT   OF   ANY  OCCURRENCE   OR
    OCCURRENCES CAUSED BY OR GROWING OUT OF
    THE INSURED’S OPERATIONS ANYWHERE IN THE
    WORLD, AND ALL OPERATIONS INCIDENTAL
    THERETO.
    The [p]olicies further provide that the “Named Insured” is
    Conrail, and “[o]ccurrence means an event, or continuous
    or repeated exposure to conditions which cause injury or
    damage during the term of the policy.”
    *     *      *
    In 1976, when the first [p]olicies were executed, CERCLA
    did not yet exist, so such far[-]reaching environmental
    liability was not contemplated by Conrail and its insurers.
    Conrail had expressly disclaimed assumption of its
    predecessor’s liabilities in its acquisition agreements, and
    the [p]olicies did not include such predecessors in their
    definition of the “Insured.”
    In enacting the Rail Act, Conrail’s enabling legislation,
    Congress intended for Conrail to get a “fresh start” with a
    “clean slate.” Then, in 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA and
    radically changed the legal landscape in which Conrail and
    its insurers had been operating.
    CERCLA was enacted to ensure that hazardous pollutants
    which had accumulated in the nation’s land and water
    through decades of industrial activity were removed,
    contained, or otherwise remediated. Under CERCLA, the
    government may opt to pursue only one potentially
    responsible party for the entire cost of the clean-up, and
    that party must then seek contribution from other
    responsible parties. In this case, Conrail has apparently
    settled or entered into tolling agreements with respect to its
    contribution claims against the reorganized Penn Central, so
    it does not have to shoulder the entire burden of the clean-
    up costs alone. However, there may be other potentially
    responsible parties who are defunct, insolvent, or otherwise
    unable to contribute their fair share to the clean-up costs,
    so Conrail may have to cover their portion too.
    - 27 -
    J-A17045-16
    As noted by Judge Wisdom of the Special Regional Rail
    Reorganization Court, there is a potential conflict between
    the Rail Act’s fresh start policy and CERCLA’s broad liability
    provisions. However, he found that
    CERCLA takes precedence over this general fresh start
    policy because Congress specifically stated that
    CERCLA liability arises “[n]otwithstanding any other
    provision or rule of law.” In a conflict, CERCLA
    prevails. [As a result,] the fresh start policy may work
    to limit [Conrail’s] liability to post-conveyance
    contamination; it does not, however, affect our
    decision to leave for the district courts the decision
    whether to impose joint and several liability [on
    Conrail under CERCLA].
    In reaching this conclusion, Judge Wisdom recognized that
    where the environmental harm caused by several potentially
    responsible parties is not clearly divisible, joint and several
    liability may be imposed, and, as a result, Conrail may end
    up paying for contamination that was caused by others,
    prior to 1976. However, just because Conrail may be found
    liable to pay for the clean-up of pollution that was not
    caused by its own operations, that does not necessarily
    mean its general liability insurers must reimburse it for such
    costs under the [p]olicies.
    *     *      *
    The language of the [p]olicies makes clear that the insurers
    will reimburse Conrail only for the damages (clean-up costs)
    arising out of an occurrence (environmental contamination)
    that was caused by or grew out of Conrail’s operations.
    Where Conrail’s CERCLA liability is premised solely upon its
    status as a current, passive owner of the contaminated site,
    and not as a polluting operator, then the pre-existing
    environmental condition giving rise to the damages for
    which indemnification is sought by Conrail was not caused
    by, nor did it grow out of, Conrail’s railroad operations.
    However, where Conrail contributed to that condition, i.e.,
    the contamination, by discharging some of the pollutants
    itself, then the occurrence giving rise to the damages for
    - 28 -
    J-A17045-16
    which Conrail seeks indemnification was caused by and grew
    out of Conrail’s operations.
    The [p]olicies do not require that the damages incurred by
    Conrail arise out of an occurrence caused solely or wholly
    by Conrail. Nor do they expressly provide coverage for
    damages caused in part by Conrail’s operation. However,
    the phrase “growing out of” Conrail’s operations can
    reasonably be interpreted to include contamination caused
    only partially by Conrail. Therefore, where Conrail is liable
    because it caused some of the pollution itself, the insurers
    must provide coverage for the entire amount of damages
    that Conrail must pay, even if some of the damages arose
    out of pollution that was caused by other entities.
    This result is somewhat unusual—where Conrail did nothing
    wrong, it is not covered, but where it is at least partially at
    fault, it is entirely covered. However, that is the result
    dictated by a plain reading of the language of the Operations
    Clause at issue.
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed November 13, 2013, at 1-7) (footnotes omitted).
    Regarding the specific issue of coverage under Stonewall’s policy, the
    trial court applied its analysis of Continental’s similar policy language to the
    facts of the Elkhart site contamination and Stonewall’s policy as follows:
    In this case, Conrail has the burden of proof with respect to
    the general coverage language of the [p]olicies. In other
    words, Conrail must show that it had to pay money damages
    to third parties for physical injury to or destruction of their
    tangible property, which injury or destruction occurred
    during the policy period 1985-1986 and was caused by an
    event, or continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,
    which event or conditions were caused by or grew out of
    Conrail’s operations.
    Conrail has failed to meet its burden with respect to the
    Elkhart [s]ite because the one documented spill of [CCl4]
    occurred before Conrail came into existence and there were
    no specific spills of TCE identified for the [p]olicy year at
    issue here. The evidence regarding the alleged dumping of
    - 29 -
    J-A17045-16
    solvents by Conrail employees at the car shop at Elkhart
    does not identify what solvent/degreaser was purportedly
    spilled, although Conrail speculates that it was something
    “like TCE.” Conrail therefore cannot prove that its dumping
    activities caused the specific contamination that it was
    forced to pay to remediate at Elkhart. Furthermore, no year
    was identified in connection with those vaguely remembered
    occurrence(s). As a result, Conrail cannot show an event,
    or continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which
    caused injury or destruction to a third party’s property
    during the term of the [p]olicies at issue here.
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed October 28, 2014, at 4) (footnotes omitted).
    Regarding the specific issue of coverage under Continental’s policy, the
    trial court applied its analysis of Continental’s policy language to the facts of
    the Hollidaysburg, Elkhart, Douglasville, Conway, Beacon, and Paoli sites as
    follows:
    In this case, Conrail has the burden of proof with respect to
    the Operations Clause and the other general coverage
    language of the [p]olicies. In other words, Conrail must
    show that it had to pay money damages as compensation
    for physical damage to a third party’s property arising out
    of an event, or continuous or repeated exposure to
    conditions, which caused injury or damage during the term
    of the policy, which event or conditions were caused by or
    grew out of Conrail’s operations.
    *     *      *
    Conrail has…failed to meet its burden with respect to the
    Elkhart [s]ite because the one documented spill of [CCl4]
    occurred before Conrail came into existence and there were
    no specific spills of TCE identified for any of the [p]olicy
    years at issue here. The alleged dumping of solvents by
    Conrail employees at the car shop at Elkhart is not covered
    because no year was identified in connection with those
    vaguely remembered occurrence(s). As a result, Conrail
    cannot show “an event, or continuous or repeated exposure
    to conditions which cause injury or damage during the tern
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    J-A17045-16
    of” any of the [p]olicies at issue here. Furthermore, the
    evidence cited by Conrail does not identify what
    solvent/degreaser was purportedly dumped at the car shop,
    although Conrail speculates that it was something “like
    TCE.”
    Conrail failed to meet its burden with respect to the Control
    Tower [a]rea at the Beacon [s]ite because Conrail has not
    shown that any spill occurred at that [s]ite during its tenure
    there.
    Conrail has also failed to show an occurrence caused by its
    operations and causing damage within the term of any
    [p]olicy prior to the 1981 oil spill at the Charles River
    Chamber [a]rea at Beacon [s]ite, prior to the 1977 oil spill
    at the Conway site, and prior to a 1979 PCB spill at the Paoli
    [s]ite, so the [p]olicies for the years prior to those
    occurrences are not implicated at those [s]ites. Douglasville
    is the only [s]ite for which Conrail appears to have met its
    burden of proof regarding relevant occurrences implicating
    all Continental [p]olicies because there is no dispute
    between the parties that Conrail sent its waste oil there
    between 1976 and 1985.
    [Continental] argue[s] with respect to the Douglasville oil
    recycling [s]ite that there is no coverage because Conrail
    did not contribute to the pollution by discharging some of
    the waste there itself. However, the Operations Clause in
    the [p]olicies provides coverage not only for occurrences
    directly “caused by” Conrail’s operations, but also
    occurrences “growing out of the insured’s operations
    anywhere in the world, and all operations incidental
    thereto.” The mistreatment of Conrail’s waste, which it sent
    to a third party for recycling or disposal, necessarily grows
    out of Conrail’s operations and is incidental thereto.
    If Conrail fails to meet its burden of proof as to coverage
    with respect to a specific site, then [Continental’s] summary
    judgment motions must be granted. Summary judgment
    will therefore be granted in favor of [Continental] with
    respect to the Hollidaysburg and Elkhart [s]ites, the Control
    Tower [a]rea at the Beacon [s]ite, the pre-1981 [p]olicies
    at the Charles River Chamber [a]rea of the Beacon [s]ite,
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    J-A17045-16
    the pre-1977 [p]olicies at the Conway site, and the pre-
    1979 [p]olicies at the Paoli [s]ite.
    With respect to the 1981 occurrence at the Charles
    River/Beacon [s]ite, the 1977 and 1979 occurrences at the
    Conway [s]ite, and the multiple occurrences at Paoli
    beginning in 1979, [Continental] contend[s] that Conrail has
    failed to show that the costs it paid for more general site-
    wide clean-up long after each specific spill occurred arose
    out of those occurrences. [Continental] argue[s] that each
    such occurrence was promptly remediated by Conrail at the
    time it happened, or shortly thereafter. In [Continental’s]
    view, those specific, immediately remediated, spills did not
    contribute to the general pollution of the [s]ite which Conrail
    eventually had to pay to remediate.
    [Continental’s] argument raises disputed issues of fact as to
    whether each of the specifically identified occurrences was
    a contributing cause of the larger [s]ite pollution that
    ultimately had to be remediated at great cost to Conrail and
    others. This is a battle for the experts to fight at trial, not
    for the court to resolve now as a matter of law.
    [Continental] also argue[s] that the documented spills at
    the Paoli [s]ite were de minimus compared to the decades
    of PCB burps and drips that preceded Conrail’s take-over of
    the Paoli [s]ite.     Similarly, [Continental] argue[s] that
    Conrail’s oil spills at Conway and Beacon Park [were] de
    minimus compared to the overall pollution at the [s]ites.
    The [p]olicies do not speak to de minimus occurrences.
    Instead, they provide coverage for property damage arising
    out of “any occurrence” arising out of Conrail’s operations.
    Therefore, if the spills that occurred on Conrail’s watch were
    a contributing cause to the environmental damage later
    remediated at the Conway, Beacon Park and Paoli [s]ites,
    then they are covered occurrences under the [p]olicies.
    For now, the court can rule only that Conrail has shown
    occurrence(s) potentially covered by the [p]olicies
    beginning in 1981 at the Charles River/Beacon [s]ite, in
    1977 at the Conway [s]ite, in 1979 at the Paoli [s]ite, and
    in 1976 at Douglasville.
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    J-A17045-16
    With respect to the [s]ites and [p]olicies for which Conrail
    has shown a potentially covered occurrence, the burden
    then shifts to [Continental] to show that each occurrence at
    each [s]ite falls within the “Pollution Exclusion.” Since all
    such occurrences involve the discharge, dispersal, release
    or escape of pollutants, [Continental has] met [its] initial
    burden. With respect to the [p]olicies in effect from 1985-
    1986 and onward, which contain no Exception to the
    Pollution Exclusion, the inquiry ends, and summary
    judgment must be granted in favor of [Continental] with
    respect to all remaining [s]ites and those post-1985
    [p]olicies.
    However, the [p]olicies in effect from 1976-1985 contain a
    “sudden and accidental” or “accidental” Exception to the
    Pollution Exclusion, which this court has previously ruled are
    both synonymous with the term “unexpected and
    unintended.” While the burden of proving an exception to
    an exclusion may fall on the insured, in this case that initial
    burden is easily met with a description of the nature of the
    occurrence and Conrail’s assertion that it did not expect or
    intend the occurrence. Such assertions of innocence are
    subject to the Nanty-Glo rule[1] and preclude a grant of
    summary judgment.
    As a practical matter, the burden then, necessarily, shifts to
    [Continental] to proffer evidence that the polluting
    discharge was expected or intended.          For instance,
    [Continental] contend[s] that the PCB railcar burps that
    occurred at the Paoli site were expected and intended
    because the railcars were designed by General Electric to
    release PCB laden oil in the event of overheating or other
    equipment malfunction, and they regularly did so. The
    question of whether such designer-induced burps were
    expected or intended by Conrail is an issue of fact for trial.
    Furthermore, not all of the spills documented at the Paoli
    site during Conrail’s tenure were burps, so some of these
    ____________________________________________
    1See Borough of Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co. of New York, 
    309 Pa. 236
    , 
    163 A. 523
    (1932) (holding oral testimony of moving party, even if
    uncontradicted, will not afford sufficient basis for entry of summary judgment
    because credibility of testimony is for jury to decide).
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    J-A17045-16
    spills may well prove to have been unexpected and
    unintended.
    [Continental] also argue[s] that the improper disposal of
    waste materials at Douglasville was expected and intended
    because Berks Associates did it deliberately. However, the
    proper test is whether the insured, Conrail, expected or
    intended the release of waste oil at the [s]ite, not whether
    a third party, who is a stranger to the [p]olicies, did. Since
    Conrail’s employees claim they did not know of, expect, or
    intend Berks’ apparently purposeful polluting activities,
    Conrail’s knowledge, expectation, and intent become issues
    of fact for trial.
    [Continental] further argue[s] that coverage is barred at the
    Beacon, Conway and Paoli [s]ites, by the “Known Loss
    Doctrine,” i.e., that Conrail knew the [s]ites were polluted
    when it acquired them and therefore knew that they were
    polluted when it applied for the [p]olicies at issue here.
    Under the Known Loss Doctrine, the question for trial is
    “whether the evidence shows that the insured was charged
    with knowledge which reasonably shows that it was, or
    should have been, aware of a likely exposure to losses which
    would reach the level of coverage” provided by the [p]olicies
    at issue.
    Conrail asserts that it did not know, during the 1976 through
    1985 period when it applied for the [p]olicies here, the
    extent of the loss or damages it would later be required to
    pay for remediation of the contamination, much of which
    was caused by others before Conrail even came into being.
    Whether that is a true statement is for the finder of fact to
    determine.
    [Continental’s] final argument is that any fines and penalties
    Conrail paid in connection with any of the [s]ites are not
    recoverable under the [p]olicies because they do not
    constitute “damages” paid by Conrail as “compensation
    for…damage or destruction of property” and coverage for
    them is barred as a matter of public policy.
    With respect to the [Charles River/Beacon, Conway, Paoli,
    and Douglasville s]ites, Conrail paid approximately $1.2
    million to governmental entities in connection with the
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    J-A17045-16
    clean-up at the Conway [s]ite only.        Of this amount,
    [Continental] contest[s] coverage with respect to $616,000
    in civil penalties Conrail paid to the PaDEP and $91,200 it
    paid to the Borough of Conway.
    Both the state and local fines Conrail paid were assessed as
    “penalties” and were in addition to the costs Conrail was
    required to incur for corrective or remedial action, i.e.,
    clean-up and prevention of further violations. Since the
    state legislature and the municipality termed them
    “penalties,” the intent was to punish Conrail rather than
    compensate other property owners for damage.               The
    [p]olicies allow for the recovery only of amounts paid as
    “compensation.” Furthermore, Pennsylvania law prohibits
    the recovery of punitive or penal damages under insurance
    policies like the ones at issue here. Therefore, Conrail is not
    entitled to recover from [Continental] the civil penalties it
    paid to the PaDEP and the Borough of Conway.
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed October 28, 2014, at 12-19) (footnotes omitted).
    We see no reason to disrupt the court’s sound analysis regarding the
    interpretation of the insurance policy language and the application of the
    language to the sites in question. See 
    Chenot, supra
    ; 
    Wagner, supra
    ; St.
    Paul Mercury 
    Ins., supra
    .          See also Antrim Mining, 
    Inc., supra
    ;
    
    McEwing, supra
    ; Northern Ins. Co. of New 
    York, supra
    . Consequently,
    Conrail’s first issue on appeal merits no relief.
    Regarding Conrail’s second issue, that the trial court incorrectly found
    Conrail did not damage third-party property, even if Conrail did damage third-
    party property by polluting groundwater at the Hollidaysburg site, Conrail is
    still not entitled to relief. As the insured, Conrail bears the burden to prove a
    valid policy claim. See Antrim Mining, 
    Inc., supra
    . We observe nothing in
    the record to indicate the groundwater pollution occurred during any of the
    - 35 -
    J-A17045-16
    policy years at issue in this case. Therefore, assuming without deciding the
    polluted groundwater constituted damage to third-party property, Continental
    would not be responsible for indemnification. See 
    id. Accordingly, Conrail’s
    second issue merits no relief.
    With respect to Conrail’s third claim on appeal, we observe an issue of
    fact arguably exists regarding the existence of a principal-agent relationship
    between Mr. Ambriano and Lloyd: Mr. Ambriano stated that he understood he
    was authorized to sign the Lloyd policy; EWI, Conrail’s broker, dealt with Mr.
    Ambriano; Mr. Ambriano was the sole and exclusive agent for all of PLAR’s
    business in the United States; Lloyd was a PLAR member; the majority of the
    of-record policies issued by PLAR were direct policies; PLAR negotiated policies
    for individual members; and Mr. Ambriano was highly regarded in the
    international insurance industry.     See 
    Chenot, supra
    ; 
    Joyner, supra
    ;
    
    Breslin, supra
    .    Despite the issue of fact, we note the finding of such a
    relationship is irrelevant regarding the Elkhart, Hollidaysburg, Beacon, and
    Conway (prior to the 1977 oil spill) sites. Lloyd’s purported policy only covered
    “occurrences” on all of Conrail’s sites from April 1, 1978, to April 1, 1979, and
    the contamination that occurred at the Elkhart, Hollidaysburg, Beacon, and
    Conway (prior to the 1977 oil spill) sites falls outside of the policy coverage
    based on the court’s foregoing application of its interpretation of Continental’s
    similar policy language to the sites at issue on appeal. Therefore, Conrail’s
    argument regarding the existence of a principal-agent relationship as it
    - 36 -
    J-A17045-16
    pertains to the Elkhart, Hollidaysburg, Beacon, and Conway (prior to the 1977
    oil spill) sites merits no relief.
    With respect to the Douglasville, Paoli, and Conway (after the 1977 oil
    spill) sites, however, Lloyd’s purported policy may be implicated if the
    “occurrences” happened within the policy period.      In order to determine
    whether Lloyd is required to indemnify Conrail for any “occurrences” under a
    binding insurance contract, a finder-of-fact must first decide if a principal-
    agent relationship existed between Mr. Ambriano and Lloyd. Based on this
    record, we observe an issue of fact exists with regard to Mr. Ambriano and
    Lloyd’s alleged principal-agent relationship. See 
    Chenot, supra
    . Because
    the facts regarding the existence of a principal-agent relationship are in
    dispute, this issue is for the fact-finder. 
    Joyner, supra
    ; 
    Breslin, supra
    .
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude Conrail produced sufficient facts to
    defeat summary judgment on the question of whether there was a principal-
    agent relationship between Mr. Ambriano and Lloyd. Accordingly, we reverse
    summary judgment on this claim and remand for further proceedings.
    Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and case remanded for
    further proceedings. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
    - 37 -
    J-A17045-16
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/23/18
    - 38 -