Com. v. Cruz, M. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S14005-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    MICHAEL CRUZ                               :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 3653 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 6, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0009281-2017
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                   FILED MAY 26, 2020
    Michael Cruz appeals from his December 6, 2018 judgment of sentence
    of seven and one-half to fifteen years of incarceration, which was imposed
    after a jury convicted him of conspiracy to commit kidnapping.1 He alleges
    that a new trial is warranted because the trial court erred in refusing to give
    a Kloiber charge.2 After careful review, we affirm.
    We summarize the relevant facts from the trial court’s opinion:
    On January 30, 2017, during late afternoon[,] Agent Louis
    Schmidt of the Drug Enforcement Agency of the Federal
    Government was conducting an investigation in the area of a
    Metro PCS Cell Phone store situated on Frankford Avenue in
    Philadelphia when he observed Appellant and his three co-
    ____________________________________________
    1 Appellant was tried jointly with Reginald Carroll, Mario Torres, and Tashira
    Rodriguez. All four defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit
    kidnapping.
    2   See Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 
    106 A.2d 820
     (Pa. 1954).
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    defendants exit the store and enter a red Jeep Cherokee. When
    the Jeep drove away, the agent followed the vehicle to Erie
    Avenue but lost it in traffic. Upon losing visual contact with the
    vehicle, the agent contacted Officer Torres of the Philadelphia
    Police Department’s Narcotics Enforcement Team so that Officer
    Torres could advise other police personnel of what the agent had
    just observed. At the time, the agent was using a video camera
    and recorded the defendants leaving the store and entering the
    Jeep.
    Agent Schmidt also informed Philadelphia Police Sergeant Wali
    Shabazz, assigned to the 25th District’s Narcotics Enforcement
    Team, about what he had observed and that he thought that there
    was a good chance that a woman was going to be kidnapped.
    Based upon that information, Sgt. Shabazz and members of his
    team proceeded to the 2400 block of Aramingo Avenue, the
    location of a shopping plaza, where the sergeant had two
    members of his team watch the store in which the alleged victim
    worked. While driving around the lot, the sergeant saw a red Jeep
    that matched a description of the vehicle mentioned by Agent
    Schmidt driving in the parking lot of the shopping center and a
    black male later identified as [co-defendant] Reginald Carroll, who
    had been described by the agent. He informed the officers
    conducting the surveillance of the store about what he observed
    and left the lot to avoid the suspects from identifying his vehicle
    as a police vehicle.
    ...
    In January of 2017, Ms. Reyes, who, at the time knew each of the
    defendants, worked at a dental office located in the shopping mall
    at 2400 Aramingo Avenue. On January 31, 2017, Ms. Reyes was
    at work and noticed a burgundy Jeep driving back and forth
    outside the dental office. When Ms. Reyes left work that day at
    about 7:45 p.m., she observed a male wearing clothes that
    covered him from head to toe walking toward her and another
    male wearing gray clothing that also covered his entire body get
    out of the Jeep and approach her. She also saw the Jeep she had
    seen earlier in the day parked outside another store. The two
    males forced Ms. Reyes to get into her car, a silver Toyota that
    belonged to her paramour, at which time the males, who, were in
    phone contact with Torres and who was giving them directions,
    took Ms. Reyes’ cell phone and purse and told Ms. Reyes to be
    quiet and cooperate with them because they had her children.
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    One of the males then began driving the Toyota but almost
    immediately police vehicles drove up to the Jeep and Ms. Reyes’
    vehicle and unsuccessfully attempted to box in the Jeep, which
    was occupied by Torres and co-defendant Rodriguez, and the
    Toyota containing Ms. Reyes and the two other males. After a
    short pursuit[,] the car containing Ms. Reyes crashed and the two
    men inside it fled. Police came up to the car and directed Ms.
    Reyes to stay inside it. Other officers chased after Carroll and
    Appellant and Carroll was apprehended shortly thereafter
    following a short pursuit but Appellant avoided apprehension.
    ...
    Shortly after the Toyota crashed, the police brought Carroll to Ms.
    Reyes and in Sergeant Shabazz’s presence, she identified Carroll
    as being the male who was wearing the gray sweater when she
    was abducted and who forced her into the Toyota. Subsequent
    thereto, Ms. Reyes was interviewed by police and told them about
    what happened to her when she left work. During the interview,
    she identified photographs depicting co-defendants Torres and
    Rodriguez.
    On February 1, 2017, police interviewed Ms. Reyes. During [the
    interview] she indicated that after the car crashed, she began
    driving the car and threw a gun into a flowerpot that Carroll left
    in the Jeep when he fled. She also identified a photograph of
    Appellant. She added that after giving her first statement to police
    she told her paramour about the gun she hid in the flowerpot and
    that he retrieved and ultimately brought [it] to the police. She
    also stated that Carroll showed her a gun when he and Appellant
    accosted her and that Appellant was the person who took her
    purse and cell phone from her.
    Mr. Elin Gonzalez-Ramirez was working as a cab driver the
    evening when the incident herein occurred. At about 8:15 p.m.,
    he went to 1100 Belgrade Street in Philadelphia, which was near
    where the Jeep was found, and picked up Torres and Rodriguez
    and drove them to the 4000 block of I Street in Philadelphia.
    Authorities also recovered a video from inside a bar near where
    the Jeep was located. It depicted Torres and Rodriguez together
    inside the bar.
    A search of the Jeep resulted in the recovery of a driver’s license
    in the name of Tashira Marie Rodriguez and a vehicle registration
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    that indicated that the Jeep was registered to someone with the
    same name. They also recovered some photographs depicting
    Torres and Rodriguez and an unknown prison inmate and another
    depicting [Cruz] with the same inmate. Four empty cell phone
    boxes and purchase receipts connected thereto, which showed
    that the phones had been purchased on January 31, 2017, were
    also seized. Police later matched cell phones found by police on
    the night of the incident and inside of a residence in the 3900
    block of I Street to two of the empty boxes found inside the Jeep.
    One of the receipts listed Rodriguez as a purchaser and another
    the complainant, Crystal Reyes.
    Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/19, at 2-7 (footnotes and citations to record
    omitted).
    Appellant was charged with robbery of a motor vehicle, conspiracy to
    commit robbery of a motor vehicle, kidnapping, conspiracy to commit
    kidnapping, unlawful restraint, and terroristic threats.    On May 30, 2018,
    following a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of conspiracy to commit
    kidnapping only. He filed a post-verdict motion challenging the trial court’s
    refusal to give a Kloiber instruction, which the trial court denied prior to
    sentencing Appellant.3 On December 6, 2018, the court sentenced him to a
    term of seven-and-one-half to fifteen years of incarceration.      He filed the
    instant appeal on December 20, 2018, complied with the trial court’s order to
    ____________________________________________
    3 In the post-verdict motion, Appellant alleged that the court’s refusal to give
    a Kloiber instruction was prejudicial “as Ms. Reyes was the only witness who
    put [Appellant] in the criminal action and the jury should have been instructed
    on how they were to consider her identification testimony regarding”
    Appellant. Post-Verdict Motion, 8/14/18, at 2 ¶8.
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    file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal,
    and the trial court penned its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
    Appellant presents one issue that he contends warrants relief in the
    nature of a new trial:
    Did not the lower court abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s
    request for a Kloiber charge to the jury where the complaining
    witness had little opportunity to observe her abductor, was
    inconsistent in her identification, and did not seem to fear
    retribution for making an identification?
    Appellant’s brief at 3.
    In reviewing a challenge based on the trial court’s refusal to give a
    specific jury instruction, it is our function
    to determine whether the record supports the trial court’s
    decision. In examining the propriety of the instructions a trial
    court presents to a jury, our scope of review is to determine
    whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or
    an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. A jury
    charge will be deemed erroneous only if the charge as a whole is
    inadequate, not clear or has a tendency to mislead or confuse,
    rather than clarify, a material issue. A charge is considered
    adequate unless the jury was palpably misled by what the trial
    judge said or there is an omission[,] which is tantamount to
    fundamental error.      Consequently, the trial court has wide
    discretion in fashioning jury instructions. The trial court is not
    required to give every charge that is requested by the parties and
    its refusal to give a requested charge does not require reversal
    unless the Appellant was prejudiced by that refusal.
    Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 
    77 A.3d 663
    , 667 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
    904 A.2d 964
    , 970 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal
    citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)).         Hence, we must
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    determine whether the court's refusal to give a Kloiber instruction constituted
    an abuse of discretion, and if so, whether Appellant suffered prejudice.4
    ____________________________________________
    4   The Kloiber instruction is set forth in the Pa.S.S.J.I. (Crim.) 4.07B:
    4.07B - IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY--ACCURACY IN DOUBT
    1. In [his] [her] testimony, [name of witness] has identified the
    defendant as the person who committed the crime. There is a
    question of whether this identification is accurate.
    2. A victim or other witness can sometimes make a mistake when
    trying to identify the criminal. If certain factors are present, the
    accuracy of identification testimony is so doubtful that a jury must
    receive it with caution. Identification testimony must be received
    with caution [if the witness because of bad position, poor lighting,
    or other reasons did not have a good opportunity to observe the
    criminal] [if the witness in [his] [her] testimony is not positive as
    to identity] [if the witness’s positive testimony as to identity is
    weakened [by qualifications, hedging, or inconsistencies in the
    rest of [his] [her] testimony] [by [his] [her] not identifying the
    defendant, or identifying someone else, as the criminal [at a
    lineup] [when shown photographs] [give specifics] before the
    trial]] [if, before the trial, the defendant's request for a [lineup]
    [specify request] to test the ability of the witness to make an
    identification was denied and the witness subsequently made a
    less reliable identification] [if, [give specifics]].
    [First Alternative: Court rules as a matter of law that caution is
    required:]
    3. If you believe that [this factor is] [one or more of these factors
    are] present, then you must consider with caution [name of
    witness]’s testimony identifying the defendant as the person who
    committed the crime. If, however, you do not believe that [this
    factor] [at least one of these factors] is present, then you need
    not receive the testimony with caution; you may treat it like any
    other testimony.
    4. You should consider all evidence relevant to the question of who
    committed the crime, including the testimony of [name of victim
    or witness], [any evidence of facts and circumstances from which
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    The Kloiber charge is appropriate
    where the witness is not in a position to clearly observe the
    assailant or he is not positive as to identity, or his positive
    statements as to identity are weakened by qualification, or by the
    failure to identify the defendant on one or more prior occasions,
    the accuracy of the identifications is so doubtful that the Court
    should warn the jury that the testimony as to identity must be
    received with caution.
    Kloiber, supra at 826-27. Accord Commonwealth v. Ali, 
    10 A.3d 282
    ,
    303 (Pa. 2010). However, “[w]here the opportunity for positive identification
    is good and the witness’[s] identification is not weakened by prior failure to
    identify, but remains, even after cross-examination, positive and unqualified,
    the testimony as to identification need not be received with caution.” Kloiber,
    supra at 826. The charge is intended for situations where a witness did not
    have the opportunity to clearly view the defendant, equivocated in his
    identification, or had difficulty making an identification in the past.
    Commonwealth v. Reid, 
    99 A.3d 427
    , 448 (Pa. 2014).
    Appellant argues that Ms. Reyes’s ability to observe the person in the
    backseat with her during the kidnapping attempt was poor because that
    ____________________________________________
    identity, or non-identity, of the criminal may be inferred] [give
    other circumstances]. You cannot find the defendant guilty unless
    you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt by all the evidence,
    direct and circumstantial, not only that the crime was committed
    but that it was the defendant who committed it.
    Pa.S.S.J.I. (Crim.) 4.07B.
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    person was wearing a baggy top and his face was completely obscured. He
    points to the fact that she did not identify Appellant in her first statement to
    police or at trial, and disputes the trial court’s finding that the Complainant’s
    failure to identify him was motivated by fear of retribution. Appellant also
    argues that when Ms. Reyes identified him in her second statement to police,
    she had just recently heard that he had assaulted her husband a week before.
    Appellant characterizes the latter identification as equivocal.
    The trial court maintained that Appellant waived any objection to its
    refusal to give a Kloiber charge when he failed to renew his objection to the
    charge at trial. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/19, at 12. The court relied upon
    Commonwealth v. Pressley, 
    887 A.2d 220
    , 225 (Pa. 2005), which
    construed Pa.R.Crim.P. 603 and 647(b) as requiring a party to also object or
    take an exception to the charge. See also Commonwealth v. Hitcho, 
    123 A.3d 731
    , 756 (Pa. 2015) (relying upon Pressley, supra at 225, that “a
    specific objection or exception to the charge or the trial court’s ruling
    respecting the points” is necessary to preserve a claim of error).
    The trial court also found that, even if not waived, Appellant’s claim
    lacked merit.   It found that Ms. Reyes knew Appellant, as well as his co-
    defendants. While Ms. Reyes first represented that she could not see the faces
    of her assailants, she subsequently testified that she initially refused to
    identify them to police for fear of reprisal, not because she could not identify
    them. The trial court, relying upon Reid, supra, held that it was not error to
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    refuse to give a Kloiber charge “where the witness knew defendant prior to
    trial and failure to identify rested on witness’s fear to do so.”     Trial Court
    Opinion, 6/26/19, at 13 (summarizing holding in Reid, supra at 448-50).
    After our review of the certified record, we agree with the trial court’s
    conclusion that Appellant failed to object or take an exception to the court’s
    denial of the Kloiber charge. The court discussed its proposed jury instruction
    with all counsel on May 29, 2018. Counsel for Appellant argued in support of
    his requested point for charge pursuant to Kloiber, and the trial court took
    the request under advisement. See N.T., 5/ 29/18, at 20. Shortly thereafter,
    the court advised counsel that it would not give the Kloiber charge, and stated
    its reasons. See id. at 42. Counsel for Appellant did not object or take an
    exception at that time. Id. Additionally, after the court charged the jury,
    counsel was asked whether there were any objections, and Appellant’s counsel
    responded in the negative. Id. at 204-05. Hence, he failed to preserve that
    claim for appellate review. See Pressley, supra.5
    ____________________________________________
    5 Absent waiver, we note the following. There is evidence that Ms. Reyes knew
    Appellant and his co-conspirators, and that she initially feigned the inability to
    identify them for fear of reprisal. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 
    99 A.3d 427
    (Pa. 2014) (holding no error in refusing Kloiber charge where witness knew
    defendant prior to trial and failure to identify was based on fear); see also
    Commonwealth v. Lee, 
    585 A.2d 1084
    , 1087 (Pa.Super. 1991) (finding fear
    of identifying defendant is not failure to make identification for purposes of
    propriety of Kloiber instruction); Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    495 A.2d 543
    ,
    548-49 (Pa.Super. 1985) (where rape victim initially told police that she did
    not see her attacker’s face because she was scared, but later identified him at
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    ____________________________________________
    the preliminary hearing and trial, refusal to give a Kloiber charge did not
    require reversal).
    At trial, Ms. Reyes testified that she could not remember much about the
    kidnapping incident. N.T., 5/23/18, at 44. Consequently, her statements to
    police were admitted into evidence. In her first statement, she told police
    that, “Two unknown males tried to kidnap me.” Id. at 47. She initially did
    not identify any of the defendants. As she recounted the events when she
    was taken to the scene of co-defendant Carroll’s apprehension, Ms. Reyes told
    the officer that she “could identify the gray sweater, but to be honest with you
    I was scared. I didn’t want to tell them it was the guy.” Id. at 53. She
    added, “The guy the police showed me is my husband’s friend,” known to her
    as “Spaz,” later identified as co-defendant Carroll. Id. In response to
    subsequent police questioning, Ms. Reyes identified the man on the phone as
    Mario Torres. Id. at 54. She recognized his voice. Id. She stated she did
    not tell the police initially because she “was scared to give him up. I’m scared
    for my kids also.” Id. She was shown two pictures and she identified them
    as Mario Torres and Tashira Rodriguez. Id. After Complainant expressed her
    fear of retribution to police, and began to identify the people involved, police
    did not revisit with her the identity of the backseat abductor.
    In response to police questioning the next day, however, Ms. Reyes identified
    Appellant as “one of the males who tried to kidnap me last night.” Id. at 61-
    62. She said “[h]e was the one behind me that pushed me to my car, took
    my purse and phone” and she heard him on the phone with Torres. Id. at 62.
    Ms. Reyes also stated that Appellant told her that they had her children and
    to get in the car. Id. at 63. She identified a photograph of Appellant, signed
    her name, and wrote the word “kidnap” under the photograph, and
    acknowledged that identification at trial. Id. at 65.
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    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/26/2020
    ____________________________________________
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Document Info

Docket Number: 3653 EDA 2018

Filed Date: 5/26/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/26/2020