Com. v. Plummer, W. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S61004-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    WILLIAM PLUMMER                            :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 2042 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 19, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0003689-2014,
    CP-51-CR-0003690-2014, CP-51-CR-0015155-2013
    BEFORE:      BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                               April 1, 2020
    William Plummer appeals pro se from the order that dismissed his
    petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) in three
    underlying cases.1 We vacate and remand for further proceedings.
    ____________________________________________
    1 Appellant filed one notice of appeal listing all three docket numbers in
    violation of our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
    (Pa. 2018) (mandating separate notices of appeal at each docket
    implicated by the appealed-from order). However, the PCRA court repeatedly
    advised Appellant that he could appeal its ruling by filing a single notice of
    appeal. See N.T. 6/19/18, at 150, 153 (referencing “an appeal” and “the
    appeal” in discussing Appellant’s appeal rights) (emphases added). We have
    held that “such misstatements as to the manner that [the a]ppellant could
    effectuate an appeal . . . amount to a breakdown in court operations such that
    we may overlook the defective nature of [the] timely notice of appeal rather
    than quash pursuant to Walker.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 
    219 A.3d 157
    , 160 (Pa.Super. 2019). Therefore, we shall address Appellant’s claims
    rather than quash this appeal.
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S61004-19
    The trial court offered the following summary of the facts underlying
    Appellant’s convictions for his direct appeal:
    On September 29, 2013, at around 1:00 a.m., Ronald Elliot
    left his girlfriend, Kandis Fowler’s, home at 3601 Conshohocken
    Avenue and went to the apartment building’s parking lot.
    [Appellant] and two other men, holding fake police badges,
    jumped out of the bushes and yelled “Freeze, Police.” Elliot ran
    out of the parking lot and across the street as the three men
    chased him. [Appellant] stopped pursuing Elliot and acted as a
    lookout standing on the sidewalk on the parking lot side of the
    street while the other two men caught Elliot across the street.
    After the two men hit Elliot four or five times in the head with a
    firearm, cutting him on the head, the two men took Elliot’s watch,
    money and car keys. The men joined back up with [Appellant]
    and all three men ran to the parking lot. Elliot saw [Appellant]
    drive off in Fowler’s Ford Expedition.
    On February 5, 2014, after [Appellant] had been arrested
    and charged with [the] robbery of Elliot, Elliot received multiple
    phone calls from [Appellant].       [Appellant] threatened Elliot,
    explaining that if Elliot attended the next court date [Appellant]
    was going to firebomb the homes of Elliot’s mother, girlfriend, and
    grandparent and kill Elliot. . . .
    On February 9[,] 2014, Valerie and Russell Fowler, Kandis
    Fowler’s parents, were living in a row home on Washington Lane.
    At about 4:00 a.m., Valerie Fowler heard a “bang” and smelled
    smoke. Russell Fowler went downstairs and saw a small fire in
    the back yard. After the fire was extinguished, Russell Fowler
    noted that the first floor back window was broken and saw a bottle
    with a wick in it in the back yard.
    Detective Timothy Brooks of the Philadelphia Police’s Bomb
    Disposal Unit and an expert in arson explosives arrived at the
    Fowler’s home on Washington Lane shortly after the fire was
    extinguished. Outside the back of the house, Detective Brooks
    observed two bottles with wicks in them, one intact and the other
    shattered, which he believed to be Molotov cocktails. Detective
    Brooks observed strike marks on the back window and a broken
    bottle at the bottom of the basement steps that indicated that a
    Molotov cocktail had struck the house and fallen to the ground.
    The intact bottle contained liquid and a cloth wick, which smelled
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    J-S61004-19
    of gasoline. Detective Brooks recovered the bottles, wicks, and
    liquid.
    On February 9, 2014, Detective Kevin Sloan requested that
    Philadelphia prison authorities search [Appellant’s cell]. The
    prison authorities recovered a cell phone in [Appellant’s] cell.
    According to Cricket Communications’ records, the cell phone
    recovered from [Appellant’s] cell had been used to call Elliot four
    times on February 5, 2014.
    [Appellant] testified on his own behalf. [He] asserted that
    in the first week of September 2013, Elliot gave [Appellant]
    $15,000 to purchase drugs for him. [Appellant] kept the money
    but did not purchase the drugs. [Appellant] asserted that on
    September 29, 2013, he was not on Conshohocken Avenue but
    instead was in Norristown. [Appellant] explained that he was
    unable to run because he was shot many years before.
    [Appellant] admitted that he had called Elliot but claimed the call
    was to arrange to return Elliot’s money in exchange for Elliot not
    appearing at trial.
    Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/15, at 2-4 (citations and footnotes omitted).
    Appellant was charged with numerous crimes at the above-captioned
    docket numbers. Ultimately, a jury convicted him of one or more counts each
    of conspiracy, aggravated assault, robbery, robbery of a motor vehicle, arson,
    risking a catastrophe, intimidation of a victim, retaliation against a victim, and
    contraband (non-controlled substance).       Appellant received an aggregate
    sentence of thirty to sixty years of incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court
    affirmed, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of
    appeal. See Commonwealth v. Plummer, 
    153 A.3d 1110
    (Pa.Super. 2016)
    (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 
    159 A.3d 938
    (Pa. 2016).
    Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, and counsel was appointed.
    Counsel filed an amended petition, including only four of the many claims that
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    Appellant raised in his pro se filings. Displeased by the omissions, Appellant
    applied for the appointment of new counsel. Appellant also filed a letter in
    which he contended that PCRA counsel had a duty to pursue each and every
    claim that Appellant wished to raise, or to file “a hybrid Turner/Finley letter”2
    explaining why there was no merit in the claims he chose not to include in the
    amended petition. Case Correspondence, 5/4/18, at 1. Citing Appellant’s lack
    of faith in his representation, counsel sought to withdraw and have the PCRA
    court appoint new counsel or hold a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v.
    Grazier, 
    713 A.2d 81
    , 82 (Pa. 1998) (“When a waiver of the right to counsel
    is sought at the post-conviction and appellate stages, an on-the-record
    determination should be made that the waiver is a knowing, intelligent, and
    voluntary one.”). For reasons not apparent from the certified record, the PCRA
    court denied the request without conducting a Grazier hearing. See Order,
    5/8/18.
    Appellant next filed a motion to proceed pro se, which the PCRA court
    addressed at the outset of the hearing it had scheduled on the claims raised
    in counsel’s amended petition. Appellant informed the court that he did not
    want to represent himself, but rather he desired to have counsel pursue all of
    the claims that he wished to raise. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 6/11/18, at 10. The
    ____________________________________________
    2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
    (Pa. 1988) (explaining procedure
    for PCRA counsel to withdraw from the representation where no meritorious
    issues exist); Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (Pa.Super. 1988) (en
    banc) (same).
    -4-
    J-S61004-19
    PCRA court deferred addressing that issue, instead having PCRA counsel
    conduct the questioning of witnesses in connection with the issues raised in
    the counseled petition.
    Id. at 10-11.
    At the end of the hearing, the PCRA
    court scheduled another date for Appellant to present additional witnesses.
    In between hearings, Appellant filed another motion to proceed pro se,
    citing “irreconcilable differences and the lack of communication on strategy.”
    Motion, 6/14/18, at 1. At the second PCRA hearing, the PCRA court did not
    conduct a Grazier hearing or otherwise address Appellant’s renewed request
    for self-representation. Instead, counsel continued to represent Appellant at
    the second hearing, presenting and cross-examining witnesses. Following the
    close of evidence and the arguments of counsel, the PCRA court invited
    Appellant to state “what it is that you want preserved for the record[.]” N.T.
    PCRA Hearing, 6/19/18, at 143. Appellant indicated, inter alia, that he wanted
    the pro se PCRA claims that counsel omitted from the amended petition to be
    “exhausted.”
    Id. at 143-
    44. 
      At that point, the PCRA court conducted a
    colloquy to determine whether Appellant wished to make a knowing and
    voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 6/19/18, at
    145-51 (quoted in relevant part infra).     The PCRA court concluded that
    Appellant desired to proceed pro se on appeal, and ultimately entered an order
    allowing counsel to withdraw. See Order, 7/13/18.
    Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal. The PCRA court did not
    order him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors on appeal, and none
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    was filed.   The PCRA court nonetheless authored an opinion pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), in which it explained the reasons behind its conclusion that
    the claims raised in counsel’s amended petition merited no relief.
    On appeal, Appellant presents many and varied claims of the ineffective
    assistance of trial, direct appeal, and PCRA counsel, including both allegations
    that were litigated in the PCRA court, and pro se contentions that were
    abandoned by counsel in the amended petition. See Appellant’s brief at 4-8.
    Additionally, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred by accepting PCRA
    counsel’s determination as to the lack of merit in the pro se claims without
    requiring a Turner/Finley letter and conducting an independent review, and
    by failing to allow him to create a proper record as to the merits of the
    abandoned pro se claims by, e.g., opting not to order a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    statement.
    Id. at 18.
    The relief Appellant seeks from this Court is a new trial
    based upon the constitutionally-deficient performance of counsel, or, in the
    alternative, remand to the PCRA court for the proper resolution of his
    unlitigated claims.
    Id. at 11.
    We begin with our standard of review. “The standard of review of an
    order dismissing a PCRA petition is whether that determination is supported
    by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.”     Commonwealth v.
    Williams, 
    220 A.3d 1086
    , 1090 (Pa.Super. 2019). “It is an appellant’s burden
    to persuade us that the PCRA court erred and that relief is due.”
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    J-S61004-19
    Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 
    219 A.3d 157
    , 161 (Pa.Super. 2019)
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    As we find the issue dispositive, we begin with Appellant’s claim that the
    PCRA court erred in its manner of handling Appellant’s requests to pursue all
    of the claims raised in his pro se PCRA petition and supplement thereto.3 The
    following legal principles inform our decision.
    On a first PCRA petition, a petitioner is entitled to the assistance of
    counsel to guarantee that he has “at least one meaningful opportunity to have
    [his] issues reviewed.” Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 
    836 A.2d 940
    , 945
    (Pa.Super. 2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    This Court has admonished, accordingly, that the point in time at
    which a trial court may determine that a PCRA petitioner’s claims
    are frivolous or meritless is after the petitioner has been afforded
    a full and fair opportunity to present those claims. Our [S]upreme
    [C]ourt has recognized that such an opportunity is best assured
    where the petitioner is provided representation by competent
    counsel whose ability to frame the issues in a legally meaningful
    fashion insures the [PCRA] court that all relevant considerations
    will be brought to its attention.
    Commonwealth v. Hampton, 
    718 A.2d 1250
    , 1252 (Pa.Super. 1998)
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When appointed, counsel’s
    duty is to either (1) amend the petitioner’s pro se [p]etition and present the
    petitioner’s claims in acceptable legal terms, or (2) certify that the claims lack
    ____________________________________________
    3The issue is dispositive because, as the Commonwealth correctly notes, the
    vast majority of the issues Appellant seeks to raise in this appeal were not
    preserved for our review. See Commonwealth’s brief at 9-10.
    -7-
    J-S61004-19
    merit by complying with the mandates of Turner/Finley.” Commonwealth
    v. Cherry, 
    155 A.3d 1080
    , 1083 (Pa.Super. 2017).
    If there are any issues of arguable merit, counsel must file an amended
    petition, exercising professional judgment to determine which claims to raise
    therein. This Court has held, in the context of a direct appeal, that a defendant
    may not compel counsel to pursue even “nonfrivolous points requested by the
    client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to present
    those points.”    Commonwealth v. Morrison, 
    173 A.3d 286
    , 292-93
    (Pa.Super. 2017). Further, contrary to Appellant’s argument, counsel may
    not, in the face of a client’s insistence upon pursing claims counsel deems
    unworthy of pursuit, employ a hybrid approach of advancing some claims, but
    arguing against the merits of others.
    Id. Rather, “when
    counsel and an
    appellant disagree on which issues should be raised and/or briefed on appeal,
    counsel must only raise and/or brief the issues that counsel believes,
    consistent with counsel’s ethical duty, to be nonfrivolous.”
    Id. Upon such
    disagreement between attorney and client, the client “is free
    to petition for the withdrawal of counsel in order for the [client] to attempt to
    proceed pro se or with privately-retained counsel.”
    Id. Indeed, a
    “criminal
    defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself” and it is error for a
    court to ignore “a timely and unequivocal request” of a PCRA petitioner to
    proceed pro se.      Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
    970 A.2d 455
    , 457
    (Pa.Super. 2009). A court faced with a PCRA petitioner’s request to proceed
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    J-S61004-19
    pro se must make an on-the-record determination that the waiver of the right
    to PCRA counsel is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.                See
    Grazier, supra at 82.
    We now examine the facts of the instant case as revealed by the certified
    record. After PCRA counsel filed the amended petition abandoning most of
    Appellant’s pro se claims, but before the Commonwealth filed its response to
    the amended petition, Appellant filed a thirteen-page letter disagreeing point-
    by-point with counsel’s explanations for his professional assessment of the
    claims.   See Case Correspondence, 4/24/18, at 1-13.             Appellant promptly
    followed up with an application for new counsel, contending that PCRA
    counsel’s amended petition was “defective” because he only included a
    handful of his claims.   See Application for Relief for Appointment of New
    Counsel and Objections to PCRA Counsel’s Defective Amended PCRA Petition,
    4/27/18, at 3.
    Shortly thereafter, PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw. Therein,
    counsel   noted   Appellant’s   recent    filings   in   which   he   expressed   his
    dissatisfaction with counsel, indicated that he had ceased work on Appellant’s
    case, and requested that the court either appoint new counsel or hold a
    Grazier hearing to ascertain whether Appellant wished to proceed pro se.
    See Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, 5/3/18, at 3-4. On May 8, the PCRA
    court entered an order denying without explanation counsel’s motion to
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    withdraw.    Order 5/8/18.     The PCRA court did not address or reference
    Appellant’s pro se requests for counsel and to represent himself.
    On May 22, 2018, again citing his disagreements with counsel, Appellant
    filed a motion to proceed pro se wherein he requested a Grazier hearing. See
    Application for Relief Seeking Pro Se Status, 5/22/18, at 2-3. At the June 11,
    2018 PCRA hearing, the court acknowledged Appellant’s pending motion, and
    asked him on the record whether he wanted to represent himself. Appellant
    responded “Well, you know . . . .” N.T. PCRA Hearing 6/11/18, at 7. The
    PCRA court cut him off, asked for a yes or no answer.
    Id. Appellant replied
    “No, not at all.”
    Id. The court
    then conducted the hearing with counsel
    representing Appellant, scheduling a second date at its conclusion for
    Appellant to present additional witnesses.
    Before the second hearing, Appellant filed another motion to proceed
    pro se, citing “irreconcilable differences and the lack of communication on
    strategy.” Motion, 6/14/18, at 1. At the June 19, 2018 hearing, the PCRA
    court did not conduct a Grazier hearing or otherwise address Appellant’s
    renewed request for self-representation.       Rather, after the presentation of
    witnesses and arguments of counsel, the PCRA court invited Appellant to state
    “what it is that you want preserved for the record[.]” N.T. PCRA Hearing,
    6/19/18, at 143. Appellant indicated, inter alia, “claims that I filed in my initial
    PCRA and my supplemental PCRA claim, I, J, L, N, O, R, T, U and Y I want
    raised.   I don’t know why my lawyer isn’t raising them.          He is saying he
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    J-S61004-19
    believes there is no legal basis. I want these claims exhausted.”
    Id. at 143-
    44. The following exchange ensued:
    THE COURT: . . . Counsel was appointed to represent you.
    The representation of Counsel for a PCRA is slightly different than
    when Counsel is appointed for trial.
    It is his responsibility to review your initial petition and it is
    his responsibility to litigate the issues that he believes have merit.
    Now, he’s filed the supplemental petition and we’ve had a
    hearing on the issues that he believes, in his professional opinion,
    have no merit. You have your statement on the record.
    If you want to continue, I mean, we already -- well, let me
    backtrack.
    We already went through, earlier last time that I saw you,
    whether or not you wished to represent yourself. So, this is the
    last chance before I send you back if you have a disagreement
    with your Counsel, you are certainly entitled to represent yourself
    and you would then be responsible for any subsequent motion.
    For instance, if I deny this petition then, if you want to
    represent yourself on appeal, you are welcome to do so. But I
    just have to ask you, as I told you before, I would have to ask
    certain questions to make sure that you understand the
    ramifications of representing yourself.
    So, when I last saw you on the 11th, you had indicated that
    you wished to have Counsel handle this hearing. The hearing is
    now over so I’m going to ask you the same question, do you want
    Counsel to continue to represent you or do you wish to represent
    yourself? You are always free to hire someone.
    THE DEFENDANT: Well, if I have him represent me, right,
    and he don’t raise these claims, would these claims be waived if I
    go to Federal Relief Court?
    THE COURT: Well, I’m not an expert on Federal Relief.
    Legally, they are waived for the State.
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    J-S61004-19
    So, I cannot give you advice for the Federal system. I can
    only tell you that what has been preserved right now is what we
    had the hearing on. That’s an argument that you can make in
    Federal Court. You would have the transcript here available to
    you.
    THE DEFENDANT: Well, I have to represent myself.
    THE COURT: You don’t have to represent yourself. You are
    choosing to represent yourself?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Yes.
    ....
    THE COURT: Do you understand that if I dismiss this
    petition, the next step is to file an appeal with Superior Court?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
    THE COURT: Do you understand that if you would have to
    --
    THE DEFENDANT: Hold on. If you dismiss what?
    THE COURT: Your petition.
    THE DEFENDANT: Dismiss mine or [counsel’s]?
    THE COURT: I would be dismissing everything.
    THE DEFENDANT: We have to do all of this over again?
    THE COURT: No. I’m dismissing it. I can tell you right now
    I’m dismissing it. I will give your rights.
    ....
    THE DEFENDANT: Can I ask you one more question? You
    said something would be dismissed. What would be dismissed?
    THE COURT: I am dismissing your entire petition.
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    J-S61004-19
    THE DEFENDANT: My whole PCRA. So, I have to come at
    you with another one?
    THE COURT: No. You would have to file -- that’s what I
    wanted to make sure that you understand.
    You have to file an appeal to Superior Court, would be your
    next step, within 30 days.
    Now, I will be giving you those rights no matter what. The
    only difference is, whether or not Counsel would be doing it for
    you or if he doesn’t do it, whether I have -- I mean Counsel would
    be, because he filed an amended petition, under the rules he
    would have to file the appeal for you.
    But if you want to represent yourself, I will permit him to
    withdraw and then you will be responsible for filing the appeal.
    And I want to make sure that you understand that now, so that
    you can make the necessary steps to file the appeal, to get the
    notes of testimony, and to prepare yourself for the appeal.
    So, it is your decision. Either Counsel continues or you
    represent yourself. Or again, as I told you, you are always free
    to hire another attorney.
    So, you’ve told me that you wish to represent yourself.
    THE DEFENDANT: Now, listen, see, my thing is I don’t want
    nothing waived. I want to exhaust everything.
    THE COURT: I understand that.
    So, you now have a choice. You’ve told me you want to
    represent yourself.
    THE DEFENDANT: I don’t understand. I don’t understand.
    Why would that --
    THE COURT: Sir, I’ve already told you, I am dismissing your
    petition. I find it without merit.
    So, do you wish --
    THE DEFENDANT: Well --
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    J-S61004-19
    THE COURT: No. It is my turn to talk.
    Do you wish to represent yourself on appeal or do you want
    Counsel to continue?
    THE DEFENDANT: If I represent myself, you dismissing this
    petition, his petition?
    THE COURT: I’m dismissing it no matter who represents
    you. I find it has no merit.
    THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Well, I would like to represent
    myself.
    N.T. PCRA Hearing, 6/19/18, at 145-51.
    Comparing the above-referenced case law with the transcript from the
    June 19, 2018 hearing, it is clear that the PCRA court properly informed
    Appellant about his rights and counsel’s obligations. Counsel had no obligation
    to raise claims that he, in his professional judgment, deemed unworthy of
    pursuit. See Morrison, supra at 292-93.      Nor, given his decision to pursue
    a number of issues he determined to have potential merit, was it proper for
    him to file a partial Turner/Finley letter as to the claims he chose to forgo.
    See Morrison, supra at 292-93. Further, the PCRA court properly made an
    inquiry, in accordance with Grazier, as to Appellant’s desire to proceed pro
    se and the rights and responsibilities attendant with self-representation.
    However, we are constrained to conclude that the PCRA court waited
    too long to address Appellant’s repeated requests to represent himself. The
    on-the-record colloquy conducted by the PCRA court at the conclusion of the
    hearing leaves no doubt that, while Appellant preferred to have the assistance
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    of counsel, he would rather represent himself if he could not compel counsel
    to litigate all of the claims he wished to raise.     Appellant’s priority was to
    “exhaust” all of the claims raised in his pro se petition and supplement, and
    he would choose whatever course of action was necessary to avoid waiving
    any of them.
    Had the PCRA court conducted the full Grazier colloquy when Appellant
    and counsel first brought their disagreements to the court’s attention,
    Appellant would have been able to litigate any and all of his issues and
    preserve them for this Court’s review. By waiting to conduct the colloquy until
    the hearing was concluded and only the issues raised in counsel’s amended
    petition had been preserved, the PCRA court placed Appellant in a position to
    achieve none of his goals upon electing to proceed pro se.
    Further, as Appellant contends that PCRA counsel failed to properly
    litigate the claims that he did pursue at the PCRA hearings, we decline to rule
    on the merits of those claims in this appeal.       On remand, Appellant may
    attempt to present the PCRA court with the additional evidence that he claims
    PCRA counsel neglected to offer. See, e.g., Appellant’s brief at 6 (contending
    that PCRA counsel failed to investigate and subpoena an identified alibi
    witness).
    Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court erred in failing to conduct
    a full Grazier hearing when it was first presented with the issue of Appellant’s
    desire to exercise his right to have his day in court as to all of his PCRA claims.
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    We therefore vacate the order dismissing his petition, and remand for
    Appellant to file, pro se,4 an amended petition raising each claim he wishes
    the PCRA court to resolve, including those that may have been litigated prior
    to this appeal. It is for the PCRA court to determine the appropriate procedure
    for resolving any claims in the amended petition that it had not previously
    addressed, and whether an additional hearing is necessary. Should Appellant
    find himself aggrieved after the PCRA court issues a final order resolving
    Appellant’s additional claims, Appellant will be free to appeal from that order
    and challenge the PCRA court’s rulings both prior and subsequent to the
    instant appeal.
    Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings.       Jurisdiction
    relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/1/20
    ____________________________________________
    4 As 
    discussed supra
    , PCRA counsel was under no obligation to pursue all of
    Appellant’s pro se claims in addition to the claims counsel deemed worthy of
    pursuit.   See Commonwealth v. Morrison, 
    173 A.3d 286
    , 292-93
    (Pa.Super. 2017). Thus, Appellant is not entitled to the appointment of new
    counsel on remand, but may either retain private counsel or proceed pro se.
    Id. - 16
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