In the Interest of: D.C., Appeal of: J.B. ( 2020 )

J-A29042-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.B. :
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: No. 977 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered May 28, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-02-DP-0000117-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF:H.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: J.B. :
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:
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: No. 978 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered May 28, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-02-DP-0000119-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.B. :
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: No. 979 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered May 28, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-02-DP-0000120-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: F.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
J-A29042-19
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APPEAL OF: J.B. :
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: No. 980 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered May 28, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-02-DP-0000121-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: G.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.B. :
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: No. 981 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered May 28, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-02-DP-0000122-2019
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:
FILED JANUARY 31, 2020
In this matter, H.C. alleged that her stepfather, J.B., sexually abused
her from the age of six until the age of ten. She claimed further that Mother
failed to protect her. The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and
Families (CYF) and the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) believed the
allegations. Multiple trained professionals also believed the allegations, none
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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more important than the dependency court. See T.C.O., 8/16/19, at 8* (not
paginated) (citation to the transcript omitted). As a consequence of H.C.’s
disclosures and Mother’s failure to act, the dependency court adjudicated H.C.
and her siblings dependent. However, these disclosures were hearsay. As
the Majority correctly concludes, the dependency court erred by considering
H.C.’s disclosures for the truth of the matter asserted. The hearsay was
admissible, but only to understand “the declarant’s then-existing state of
mind” or “emotional, sensory, or physical condition.” See Pa.R.E. 803(3).
Notwithstanding the error, the Majority concluded that veracity of H.C.’s
allegations was immaterial and affirmed all of the children’s dependency
adjudications.1
I am constrained to join my learned colleagues’ decision regarding H.C.,
and to dissent from their decision regarding the other children. I employ the
term “constrained,” because this panel was boxed into making determination
without being able to consider the truth of these horrific allegations. Although
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1The Majority evidently employs a right-for-any-reason rationale. See, e.g.,
In re E.P., 941 A.2d 128, 130 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“If a trial court gives
specific reasons for its disposition, we may only examine its stated reasons.
Where the trial court leaves open the possibility that reasons other than those
specifically mentioned support its decision we apply a ‘broad scope of review,
examining the entire record for any reason sufficient to justify’ the trial court's
conclusion.”) (Citation omitted).
While the dependency court clearly found sexual abuse, the court also noted
Mother’s non-credible testimony about safety precautions, H.C.’s sexually
suggestive behavior, and her need for psychological treatment. Thus, I
believe the dependency court left open the possibility that this Court could
affirm the dependency adjudications on grounds other than the sexual abuse.
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H.C.’s declarations were hearsay, a clear avenue exists that would have
allowed the dependency court to consider squarely the truth of these
allegations. For reasons unknown, this was a road not taken by either CYF or
the GAL. I am referring to the child-victim hearsay exception, as statutory
prescribed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5986.
The child-victim hearsay exception provides that statements “made by
a child describing acts of indecent contact, sexual intercourse or deviate
sexual intercourse performed with or on the child by another “are admissible
in a dependency proceeding involving that child if the court finds, “in an in
camera hearing, that the evidence is relevant and that the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability,” and the
child either testifies at the proceeding or is found by the court to be
unavailable as a witness. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5986(a). In order to find the
declarant-child “unavailable,” the court must determine that “testimony by
the child as a witness will result in the child suffering serious emotional
distress that would substantially impair the child's ability to reasonably
communicate.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5986(b). To reach that conclusion, the court
may hear testimony from, inter alia, “a person who has dealt with the
declarant-child in a medical or therapeutic setting.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5986(b)(ii).
Upon my review of the record, it appears that H.C.’s allegations would
have properly fallen within the child-victim hearsay exception had either CYF
or the GAL merely asked the dependency court to conduct the required in
camera hearing. First, the dependency court seemed prepared to make the
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requisite findings under Section 5986(a).2 Second, the evidence also
appeared to suggest that H.C. would experience “emotional distress”
impairing her ability to communicate, pursuant to Section 5986(b).3 Both
prongs of the child-victim hearsay exception appeared to have been met.
Perhaps it was not so simple. Perhaps CYF and the GAL could not satisfy
the minimal conditions of the Section 5986. I am not privy to all the strategic
decisions that lie just below the litigation’s surface. But I hope the decision
not to pursue the child-victim hearsay exception was a mindful choice and not
the result an oversight.
Determining whether a child has been sexually abused by a family
member is among the most difficult and consequential determinations a trial
judge can make. Moreover, it is impossible for this Court, given our role and
distance from the proceeding, to ever make that determination for ourselves.
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2 In its Rule 1925 opinion, the dependency court stated:
“Moreover the statements of H.C., who was present but
excused from the April 11, 2019 hearing without objection
by Appellant’s counsel, and was present at the May 23, 2019
hearing, were arguably admissible pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5986[.]”
T.C.O. at 10* (not paginated).
I note, however, the dependency court’s reliance on Commonwealth v.
Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163 (Pa. 2012) was misplaced, as that case concerns
criminal proceedings and the implication of the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause.
3 Sarah Gluzman, the forensic interviewer to whom H.C. disclosed the
allegations, testified that H.C. was so uncomfortable during portions of her
disclosure that she could not speak. See N.T., 4/11/19, at 125.
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But because the admission of the hearsay was not pursued under the child-
victim exception, this Court must now disregard the sober judgment of the
dependency court and set aside the finding that H.C. was repeatedly abused
by her stepfather.
Nevertheless, I must agree with the Majority’s decision to affirm the
adjudication of H.C. The Majority wisely relies on our recent precedent in
Interest of I.R.-R., 208 A.3d 514 (Pa. Super. April 24, 2019), wherein this
Court ruled that similar hearsay disclosures were admissible – not for the truth
of the matter asserted – but for the limited purpose of demonstrating the
child’s state of mind and need for therapy and treatment.
Thus, I am able to consider: H.C.’s allegations strictly in terms of her
state of mind and need for therapy; her sexually explicit behavior; her
Mother’s decision not to seek treatment for her; and perhaps most
importantly, the dependency court’s determination that Mother’s testimony
was not credible.4 Like the Majority, I conclude that the dependency court’s
adjudication of H.C. did not constitute an abuse its discretion.
But I am constrained to do so. Unlike the dependency court, which
explicitly found that the sexual abuse occurred, I can only conclude that that
H.C. is without proper care and control because she is in need of therapy, and
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4 Unlike in Interest of I.R.-R., this record includes ancillary facts allowing us
to affirm the dependency court’s adjudication. And I as mentioned above, I
believe the dependency court’s findings allow for the affirmation of the
adjudications for reasons other than the sexual abuse. See In re E.P., supra,
at n.1.
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that need has gone ignored by her parents for years. To be sure, this is a
significantly more attenuated basis for dependency than sexual abuse. I only
join the Majority, because I believe our adherence to the abuse-of-discretion
standard necessitates it. I opine further that H.C.’s ignored need for
treatment is the only condition that led to H.C.’s removal and thus the only
condition that must be remedied by the parents. See, e.g., 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511 (a)(5) (“Grounds for involuntary termination”). Of course, I recognize
that this situation may change as the dependency court conducts review
hearings and as the criminal court conducts its proceedings.
Regarding the dependency of the other children, I also agree with the
Majority’s reliance on In re M.W., 842 A.2d 425 (Pa. Super. 2004) for the
proposition that a sibling’s dependency adjudication may be evidence of a
genuine risk to all of the parent’s children. Had I been able to consider H.C.’s
allegations for their truth, I would certainly conclude that J.B.’s sexual abuse
of H.C. – and Mother’s failure to protect H.C. – constituted a grave risk, not
only to H.C., but also to her siblings; and I would affirm their dependency
adjudications as well. However, because H.C.’s disclosures were not admitted
under the child-victim exception, I cannot base my decision regarding the
siblings on the truth of these allegations. I can only consider H.C.’s neglected
need for therapy and her resulting behavior. Even still, I agree there is a link
between the harm befallen to H.C. and the risk that the same harm might
befall her siblings. But without a sexual abuse finding, this link does not meet
the clear and convincing evidentiary standard for dependency, and so I cannot
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join my colleagues to conclude that the other children are without parental
care.
Finally, I concur with the Majority’s conclusion that the dependency
court did not err by failing to appoint a separate lawyer to represent the
younger children’s legal interests. However, I depart from the Majority’s
reasoning. In In re Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 669 (Pa. Super.
September 13, 2019) (en banc), this Court concluded that a parent who claims
that the GAL has conflict must raise this issue before the lower court. On
December 9, 2019, our Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to
determine whether this Court can raise the conflict sua sponte. Instantly, it
appears that Mother and J.B. did not raise the conflict before the dependency
court, but did so only for the first time on appeal. Although In re Adoption
of K.M.G. will be reviewed by the Supreme Court, its current operation means
that the parents waived the issue in this case. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
For the aforementioned reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent
in part.
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