In the Int. of: X.L.A, Appeal of: L.A. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: X.L.A. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: L.A., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 756 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered June 29, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County Orphans' Court at
No(s): No. 20008 of 2020 O.C.-A
IN THE INTEREST OF: X.L.A. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: L.A., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 757 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered June 30, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County Family Court at
No(s): No. 24 of 2017, D.P.
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JANUARY 06, 2021
L.A. (“Father”) appeals from the June 29, 2020 orphan’s court order
granting the petition filed by Lawrence County Children and Youth Services
(“LCCYS”) to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to his son, X.L.A.
He also appeals the June 30, 2020 juvenile court order that changed X.L.A.’s
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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permanent placement goal from reunification to adoption pursuant to the
Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351.1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the procedural and factual history in the
underlying order terminating parental rights as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
....
3. [X.L.A., born in September 2016,] came into the care of
[LCCYS] on April 10, 2017 when Natural Father was taken into
custody for a parole violation stemming from his use of cocaine.
At that time [R.O.,] Natural Mother[,] was unavailable to care for
[X.L.A.] because she was incarcerated at the Beaver County Jail
and no other caregiver was available to care for [X.L.A.]. Natural
Father has remained incarcerated since April 10, 2017, with a
current max date of April 10, 2021. Natural Father indicated that
a hearing scheduled for August 28, 2020 could result in an earlier
max out date.
4. [X.L.A.] has been in the sole continuous custody of Lawrence
County Children and Youth Services since April 10, 2017.
5. On April 24, 2017, [X.L.A.] was adjudicated dependent[;] the
docket reflects that Natural Father was present at the hearing.
This was [the] last hearing [that] Natural Father participated in
until the termination hearing held on today’s date. Natural Mother
did not appear at the hearing.
6. [X.L.A.] is currently placed in a pre-adoptive foster home where
he is thriving.
....
10. Natural Father never signed a child permanency plan.
Nevertheless, Father’s child permanency plan had six (6) goals:
(1) cooperate with the Agency; (2) secure and maintain a stable,
appropriate residence; (3) have a mental health evaluation and
follow all recommended treatments; (4) have a drug and alcohol
assessment and follow through with any recommended
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1 This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte.
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treatments; (5) complete a parenting class; and (6) submit to
Agency requests for drug screenings. The Agency admitted that
the second, third, fourth and sixth goals were impossible for
Natural Father to comply with while incarcerated and indicated
that those four goals would apply upon [his] release from
incarceration.
11. Natural Father’s progress as to the child permanency plan is
as follows: (1) Natural Father had minimal communication with
the Agency, the extent of his communication consisted of three
letters and one phone call from an individual purporting to be
Natural Father’s girlfriend. At best, Father has participated in two
hearings during the life of this case, the adjudication hearing and
the subject termination hearing; [goals (2) through (4) and goal
(6) were only applicable upon Natural Father’s release from
incarceration]; (5) Natural Father was on a waiting list for a
parenting class for approximately a year but was moved to a new
state correctional facility before he could begin the class[.]
12. Natural Father never requested visits with [X.L.A.] and the
only time he contacted the Agency regarding the well-being of the
child was around September 22, 2017[,] when he inquired as to
whether [X.L.A.] had been moved. Natural Father failed to notify
the Agency when he was transferred from SCI Camp Hill to SCI
Mercer, which transfer happened in excess of a year ago. From
the date of the Adjudication Hearing on April 24, 2017, Natural
Father only sent [X.L.A.] one letter and possibly one card. Natural
Father admitted he has made no attempts to contact [X.L.A.] since
he was transferred to SCI Mercer.
13. [X.L.A.] was less than 7 months old when the [f]ather was
arrested and [X.L.A.] was placed in the care of Lawrence County
Children and Youth Services. [X.L.A.] is now 3 years 9 months of
age and has been in what is now a pre-adoptive foster home for
3 years and 2 months. [X.L.A.] is thriving with this family and it
is in the best interest of [X.L.A.] to remain with the foster parents.
Order, 6/29/20, at 1-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
On February 24, 2020, LCCYS filed a petition for the involuntary
termination of parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1),
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(5), (8), and (b).2 During the ensuing hearing, Father, represented by
counsel, participated via telephone from SCI-Mercer, and testified on his own
behalf. Child was represented by a legal interests counsel as well as a
guardian ad litem.3 Legal interests counsel offered no position as to
termination of Father’s parental rights, stating, “Your Honor, [X.L.A.] is only
three and a half years old and I was unable to ascertain what position he has
in this matter.” N.T., 6/24/20, at 53. The guardian ad litem argued in favor
of terminating Father’s parental rights. Id.
Subsequent to the hearing, the trial court entered the above-referenced
orders terminating Father’s parental rights, and changing X.L.A.’s permanent
placement goal to adoption. Father filed timely notices of appeal and concise
statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
Father raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the lower court erred in finding that Lawrence
County Children and Youth Services proved by clear and
convincing evidence that sufficient grounds existed to terminate
the parental rights of Natural Father[?]
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2 On June 29, 2020, the trial court confirmed Mother’s consent for voluntary
termination of her parental rights. It also approved a post-adoption contact
agreement, between Mother and the pre-adoptive foster parents, that permits
Mother to visit X.L.A. twice per year. See N.T., 6/24/20, at 17.
3 See In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 175, 180 (Pa. 2017)
(pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), a child who is the subject of a contested
involuntary termination proceeding has a statutory right to counsel who
discerns and advocates for the child’s legal interests, defined as a child’s
preferred outcome).
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2. Whether the lower court erred in not finding that Lawrence
County Children and Youth Services failed to provide Natural
Father with reasonable efforts to promote reunification with the
minor child[?]
3. Whether the lower court erred in finding Natural Father by
conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition has evidenced a settled purpose
of relinquishing his parental rights to the minor child and has
refused and failed to perform parental duties[?]
4. Whether the lower court erred in finding that the conditions
which led to the removal of the child continue to exist, Natural
Father cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a
reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to Natural Father are not likely to remedy the conditions
which led to the removal of the child within a reasonable period of
time[?]
5. Whether the lower court erred in finding that it is in the best
interest of the minor child that the goal be changed to adoption[?]
Father’s brief at 7-8 (numbering added).4 Neither the guardian ad litem nor
LCCYS filed a brief. Legal counsel filed a letter with this Court advising that
he had no position because three-year-old X.L.A. was not able to communicate
a preference.
In matters involving the involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
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4 We observe that Father states some of his issues differently than he originally
framed in his Rule 1925(b) statement and he abandoned other issues that he
initially presented. Nevertheless, we find that Father preserved the
arguments that he presents in his brief with respect to § 2511(a)(1) and the
goal change.
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review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or
abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The
trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827.
We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa.
2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G.
& J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption
Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis of the
grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under [§] 2511, the court must
engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs
and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have
defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
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conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (quoting Matter of Adoption
of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).
In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm the
termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to
any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). See In re B.L.W.,
843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s
termination order pursuant to § 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
....
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
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We have explained this Court’s review of a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the involuntary termination of a parent’s rights
pursuant to § 2511(a)(1) as follows:
To satisfy the requirements of [§] 2511(a)(1), the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained
for at least the six months prior to the filing of the termination
petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim
to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental duties. In
addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the parent demonstrate
both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a
child and refusal or failure to perform parental duties.
Accordingly, parental rights may be terminated
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either
demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental
duties.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights,
the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the
parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-
abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3)
consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights
on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
As it relates to the crucial six-month period prior to the filing of the
petition, this Court has instructed:
[I]t is the six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition that is most critical to our analysis. However, the trial
court must consider the whole history of a given case and not
mechanically apply the six-month statutory provisions, but
instead consider the individual circumstances of each case.
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In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa.Super. 1999) (citations omitted). This
requires the court to “examine the individual circumstances of each case and
consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his or her
parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination.” In re B., N.M.,
856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004).
Furthermore, we have stated:
[T]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact must
be steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the
psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious
intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child
relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and capacity
to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to reestablish
his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this
question.
In re Z.P., supra at 1119 (citation omitted); see also In re Adoption of
C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006 (Pa.Super 2008) (en banc).
Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court explained:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental
duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child
needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs,
physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive
interest in the development of the child. Thus, this Court has held
that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires
affirmative performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association with
the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place
of importance in the child’s life.
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Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good
faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order
to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her
ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all
available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in
the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional
needs.
In re B., N.M., supra at 855 (cleaned up).
Incarceration does not relieve a parent of the obligation to perform
parental duties. An incarcerated parent must “utilize available resources to
continue a relationship” with his or her child. In re Adoption of S.P., 47
A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012) (discussing In re Adoption of McCray, 331 A.2d
652 (Pa. 1975)).
Father argues that the orphans’ court erred in finding that LCCYS
established that Father evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish his parental
rights. He further asserts that LCCYS failed to make reasonable efforts
towards reunification of Father and X.L.A. Father frames these arguments as
follows:
[LCCYS] must make reasonable efforts to reunify a parent
with a child prior to filing a petition to terminate a parent’s rights.
[In the Interest of D.C.D., Minor, 91 A.3d 173 (Pa.Super
2014)]. There is no exception to that requirement simply because
the parent is incarcerated. [Id.] The lower court erred in not
finding that [LCCYS] failed to provide reasonable efforts in which
to promote reunification between [Father] and his child. Actions
by an agency directed at preventing the preservation of the
parental relationship cannot be tolerated. [In re: Adoption of
M.S., 664 A.2d 370 (Pa.Super. 1995)]. The record in this case
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clearly evidences that [LCCYS] failed to make reasonable efforts
to reunify [Father] with his minor child.
The caseworker admitted during her testimony that the
goals of housing, mental health evaluation and drug testing
“wouldn’t apply” due to [Father’s] incarceration. The caseworker
never reviewed any of the [Child Permanency Plans (“CPPs”)] with
[Father], never confirmed [Father] received the CPPs, never
explained to [Father] he could visit with his son while
incarcerated, and never specifically explained that he could [send
correspondence] and [advise] where to send cards, gifts and
letters.
[Father] did not evidence a settled purpose to relinquish his
rights. He was limited due to his incarceration. [Father] notified
[LCCYS] that he intended to regain custody of his son upon his
release from incarceration. He has a plan upon his release from
incarceration. [LCCYS] created a child permanency plan and
included elements with full knowledge that [Father] could not
comply with those elements while incarcerated. [LCCYS] then
proceeded to file a termination of [Father’s] parental rights based
upon their allegations that [Father] failed to comply with the
elements of the CPP. The evidence clearly shows that [LCCYS] did
not make reasonable efforts to reunify [Father] with his child prior
to filing the petition for termination of parental rights. The lower
court ignored the testimony of the caseworker which admits
[LCCYS’s] failure to make reasonable efforts to reunify. [LCCYS]
is not relieved of making reasonable efforts or offering reasonable
services to assist an incarcerated parent with meeting the goals
of the CPP. The caseworker failed to even meet with [Father]
either in person or by telephone. [LCCYS] failed to take steps to
ensure [Father] received the CPP, understood the goals of the CPP
and [Father] failed to inquire what [Father] could or could not do
to meet the goals while incarcerated.
Father’s brief at 16-18 (citations to record omitted).
Our review of the certified record supports the trial court’s decision to
terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(1). First, Father
misstates the significance of LCCYS’s alleged failure to demonstrate
reasonable efforts to reunite the family. Indeed, our Supreme Court rejected
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the argument that the provision of reasonable efforts is an element that an
agency must satisfy in order to terminate parental rights. See In the
Interest of: D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. 2014). While the High Court
recognized that an agency cannot deny a parent services and then condemn
him or her for a lack of progress in an area the services would have addressed,
the exertion of reasonable efforts is not a statutory prerequisite to the
severing parental rights under the Adoption Act. Id. (“Neither subsection (a)
nor (b) requires a court to consider the reasonable efforts provided to a parent
prior to termination of parental rights.”). Thus, contrary to Father’s
protestations, our review does not include an evaluation of the agency’s efforts
beyond the possible explanation for his lack of progress in a given area.
Instantly, Father presents the bare assertion that the orphans’ court
“erred in not finding that [LCCYS] failed to provide reasonable efforts in which
to promote reunification between [Father] and his child.” Father’s brief at 16.
Critically, however, Father’s argument acknowledges that while LCCYS
neglected to provide him several services relating to housing, mental health,
and drug testing, the agency did not expect him to attain any goals relevant
to those areas, which it deemed inapplicable due to Father’s incarceration.
Essentially, Father was asked to cooperate with the agency, which the LCCYS
caseworker indicated Father failed to do despite her effort to maintain contact
with him. See e.g., N.T., 6/24/20, at 20 (“I have had very little
communication with him. I have sent him numerous letters, however, he has
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only contacted me three times. One of which was by his girlfriend.”); id. at
22-23, 32 (to caseworkers knowledge, Father did not participate in periodic
permanency review hearings, request visitations with X.L.A., ask about the
child’s wellbeing, or contact the foster parents). Hence, the circumstances of
this case do not implicate the concerns that our High Court noted in In the
Interest of: D.C.D., supra at 672, regarding the agency’s reliance upon the
lack of services as justification for terminating parental rights. Hence, Father’s
claim is without merit.
Furthermore, while Father argues that LCCY failed to establish that he
evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish his parental rights, he discounts his
failure to perform parental duties since his incarceration, a period of over two
and one-half years at the time of the hearing. As indicated supra,
incarceration does not relieve a parent of the obligation to perform parental
duties. Indeed, an incarcerated parent must “utilize available resources to
continue a relationship” with his or her child. In re Adoption of S.P., supra
at 828.
Father has been incarcerated since X.L.A. was seven months old. N.T.,
6/24/20, at 18-19. LCCYS caseworker Amber Pieri testified that, during
Father’s incarceration, he was unable to complete several aspects of the
service plan, which it deemed inapplicable. Id. at 20, 26-27. She
acknowledged that Father completed programs on victim awareness and
violence prevention and attended the Liberty Alliance Community Program
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that was administered by the correctional facility’s drug and alcohol
department. Id. at 22. Likewise, Father testified that he participated in a
volunteer program called Seeking Safety, which he described as a drug and
mental health class, but he was unable to complete it because of his transfer
from SCI-Camp Hill to SCI Mercer. Id. at 40. In addition, Father was on the
waiting list for a parenting class at both SCI-Camp Hill and SCI Mercer. Id.
Notwithstanding Father’s efforts to utilize some of the services available
to him in prison, Father neglected his foremost obligation to his son in this
situation, i.e., maintaining some form of communication. Father never
requested visitation with X.L.A. and only inquired once of Ms. Pieri regarding
his son, specifically X.L.A.’s location, around September 2017. Id. at 23, 27-
28, 30, 35. Moreover, Father only sent one letter and one birthday card for
X.L.A. Id. at 31, 44-48. Moreover, Father confirmed Ms. Pieri’s testimony
that he did not send any cards, notes, gifts, or drawings to and made no
contact with the foster family. Id. at 23, 31, 44. While Ms. Pieri conceded
that she did not specifically advise Father that he could request visitation with
his son at the prison, she encouraged Father to send cards and letters, and
she provided to Father the agency’s address and telephone number as well as
the address and telephone number of Father’s attorney. Id. at 34. Likewise,
X.L.A.’s address at the foster home was included in the Child Permanency
Plans. Id.
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In sum, during the three years that X.L.A. has been in LCCY’s
placement, Father participated in select prison programs and mailed his son
one letter and one card. Apparently dissatisfied with the degree of assistance
provided by LCCY and disappointed that he did not receive a response from
the agency or the foster parent’s following his initial efforts, he ceased
correspondence. As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in
abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume
parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of
progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,
513 (Pa.Super. 2006). This is precisely what Father asked of the orphans’
court in the case at bar. As clear and convincing evidence supports the trial
court’s termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), we find no abuse of discretion.
See In re T.S.M., supra at 267; In re Adoption of T.B.B., supra at 394.
Hence, we affirm the orphans’ court order termination Father’s parental rights
pursuant to § 2511(a) and (b).5
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5 As Father does not challenge the orphans’ court’s decision relevant to
§ 2511(b), we do not address the court’s needs and welfare analysis beyond
highlighting that the record confirms the absence of a meaningful parent-child
bond insofar as: (1) Father has not interacted with his son since April 2017,
when the child was seven month old; and (2) X.L.A. is thriving in his pre-
adoptive foster home. N.T., 6/24/20, at 32-33, 49.
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Finally, to the extent that Father’s argument challenging the goal change
remains justiciable in light of our decision to affirm the termination of his
parental rights, see Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa.Super.
2020) (“even if Father had not waived his goal change claim, it would be moot
in light of our decision to affirm the court’s termination decrees”), the
assertion is waived because Father failed to develop it in his brief. See In re
W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d
884, 897 (Pa.Super. 2010)) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any
discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the
issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is
waived.”).
Instantly, without citation to any case law that is pertinent to goal
changes or reference to the section of the Juvenile Act that govern
permanency plans and placement goals, i.e., 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351, Father baldly
concludes, “The lower court erred in not finding that Appellee failed to provide
Appellant with reasonable efforts to promote reunification and as such erred
in finding that it is in the best interest of the minor child that the goal be
changed to adoption.” Father’s brief at 18. As Father failed to support this
ambitious assertion with any relevant legal argument, it is waived.6
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6 Even if Father had preserved this issue, we would find it fails for the reasons
indicated above with regard to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). Stated
plainly, the record establishes that the goal change served the best interests
of X.L.A.
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For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orphans’ court order that
terminates Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and
(b), and the juvenile court order that changes X.L.A.’s permanent placement
goal from reunification to adoption in accordance with the Juvenile Act.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/06/2021
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