Com. v. Lamphere, N. ( 2020 )

J-A03029-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
NICHOLAS RYAN LAMPHERE
Appellant No. 558 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 6, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No: CP-36-SA-0000313-2018
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: APRIL 6, 2020
Appellant, Nicholas Ryan Lamphere, appeals from his judgment of
sentence of $25.00 plus court costs for driving at an unsafe speed.1 Appellant
raises challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence.
We affirm.
The trial court accurately summarized the factual and procedural history
as follows:
On May 9, 2018, a vehicle crash occurred at the intersection of
West Swartzville Road and North Reading Road in East Cocalico
Township. Prior to the crash, Thomas Rupp was driving his Ford
F-350 down Swartzville Road when [Appellant], driving a
motorcycle, pulled out in front of him very quickly. Mr. Rupp was
forced to slam on his brakes to prevent a crash. [Appellant] sped
down the road in the same direction Mr. Rupp had been travelling.
Angry, Mr. Rupp sped after [Appellant] “hoping [to] catch him at
the light” and “give [him] a piece of [his] mind.” Although the
speed limit on Swartzville Road is 40 miles per hour[,] and despite
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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361.
J-A03029-20
traveling at 50 miles per hour, Mr. Rupp was unable to catch up
with [Appellant] and in fact fell further and further behind. Mr.
Rupp saw [Appellant] crest the hill just before the intersection
with North Reading Road and then lost sight of him.
Kristy Hernandez was driving the opposite direction on Swartzville
Road and moved into the turning lane to turn left at the
intersection with North Reading Road. On the other side of the
intersection, there is a slight hill that levels out before the light.
Mrs. Hernandez waited in the intersection for several oncoming
cars to pass. As the light turned yellow, Mrs. Hernandez checked
to ensure the roadway, including the hill, was clear before turning
left. The road was clear and nothing obstructed her view. After
she began her turn, [Appellant] crested the hill, sped toward the
intersection, and crashed into the rear passenger side of Mrs.
Hernandez’s vehicle. Police were called to the scene and
emergency medical personnel attended to [Appellant]. After
speaking with three witnesses, Officer Steven Walsh of the East
Cocalico Township Police Department issued a citation to
[Appellant] for Driving at Safe Speed.
A hearing was held in front of Magisterial District Judge Nancy
Hamill who found [Appellant] guilty of the offense. [Appellant]
subsequently filed a summary appeal and following a hearing on
the same, confirmed Judge Hamill’s decision. [Appellant]
thereafter filed a timely appeal of my decision.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/19, at 1-2 (citations omitted). Both Appellant and
the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues in this appeal:
A. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN FINDING [APPELLANT] GUILTY
OF 75 PA.C.S.A. § 3361, DRIVING VEHICLE AT SAFE SPEED,
WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
TO ESTABLISH BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT [HE]
OPERATED HIS VEHICLE AT A SPEED GREATER THAN WAS
REASONABLE AND PRUDENT UNDER THE CONDITIONS AT WEST
SWARTZVILLE ROAD AT NORTH READING ROAD, AS ALLEGED IN
THE CITATION, WHERE THE ONLY EVIDENCE CONCERNING [HIS]
SPEED AT THAT LOCATION ESTABLISHED THAT [HE] WAS
DRIVING CAREFULLY, AT “NORMAL SPEED,” AND THE OPPOSING
VEHICLE TURNED ACROSS [HIS] TRAVEL LANE?
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B ALTERNATIVELY, DID THE LOWER COURT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN REVIEWING THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BY
RENDERING CONCLUSIONS THAT WERE MANIFESTLY
UNREASONABLE, NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE
AND RESULTED IN A VERDICT THAT SHOCKS ONE’S SENSE OF
JUSTICE?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
conviction for driving at an unsafe speed. In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83
A.3d 119, 126 (Pa. 2013). “[T]he facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.”
Commonwealth v. Colon-Plaza, 136 A.3d 521, 525–26 (Pa. Super. 2016).
It is within the province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be
accorded to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence. Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792–93 (Pa. Super.
2015). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element
of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth
v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 767 (Pa. Super. 2018). As an appellate court, we
may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the
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fact-finder. Commonwealth v. Rogal, 120 A.3d 994, 1001 (Pa. Super.
2015).
The Vehicle Code prescribes:
No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is
reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard
to the actual and potential hazards then existing, nor at a speed
greater than will permit the driver to bring his vehicle to a stop
within the assured clear distance ahead. Consistent with the
foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate
speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or
railroad grade crossing, when approaching and going around a
curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any
narrow or winding roadway and when special hazards exist with
respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or
highway conditions.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361 (emphasis added). It is well-settled that
drivers owe each other a duty to drive carefully, and the “assured
clear distance rule,” based upon 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361, requires a
driver to be able to stop safely within the distance the driver can
clearly see. Levey v. DeNardo, 725 A.2d 733, 735 ([Pa.] 1999)
(“[T]he assured clear distance ahead rule ... requires a driver to
control the speed of his or her vehicle so that he or she will be
able to stop within the distance of whatever may reasonably be
expected to be within the driver's path”).
Davis v. Wright, 156 A.3d 1261, 1271 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence
demonstrates that Rupp was driving behind Appellant at fifty miles per hour,
ten miles per hour over the speed limit, yet he fell further and further behind
Appellant. Rupp last saw Appellant as Appellant’s motorcycle crested the hill
and continued toward the intersection. Officer Walsh of the East Cocalico
Police Department testified that the distance from the crest of the hill to the
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intersection was 200 to 250 feet. At the intersection, Hernandez checked that
the roadway, including the hill approaching the intersection, was clear before
turning left. Despite Hernandez’s precautions, Appellant crashed into the rear
of her vehicle, causing substantial vehicle damage.
This evidence demonstrates a clear violation of Section 3361. Rupp’s
testimony establishes that Appellant was driving well above the speed limited
as he crested the hill. Hernandez’s testimony establishes that the oncoming
lane (Appellant’s lane of travel) was clear when she began her turn at the
intersection. Despite Hernandez’s precautions, Appellant’s motorcycle struck
her vehicle, causing substantial vehicle damage. This evidence shows that
Appellant was not “able to stop safely within the distance [he could] clearly
see” when he crested the hill and approached the intersection. Davis, 156
A.3d at 1271. Under Section 3361, he was not driving at a “safe and
appropriate speed when approaching . . . [the] intersection.” Id.
Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
fails.
Appellant also contends that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. We disagree.
Preliminarily, we address whether Appellant preserved his weight claim
for appeal. Pa. R.Crim.P. 607(A) provides that a claim a verdict was against
the weight of the evidence shall be raised a) orally, on the record, at any time
before sentencing, b) by a written motion at any time before sentencing, or
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c) in a post-sentence motion. However, Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D) provides that
there shall be no post-sentence motions in summary case appeals following a
trial de novo in the court of common pleas. The imposition of sentence
immediately following a guilt determination at the conclusion of the trial de
novo constitutes a final order for purposes of appeal. Id. Here, Appellant had
no opportunity to challenge the weight of the evidence prior to or during
sentencing, because at the conclusion of trial, the court announced the
verdict, immediately imposed sentence, and adjourned the proceedings. N.T.,
3/6/19, at 67 (“I've come to the conclusion that based on the circumstances
then and there existing that the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt for a violation of the unsafe speed statute, and the fine is
$25. Fine plus costs. Thank you”). Appellant challenged the weight of the
evidence in his concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, the first
opportunity he had to raise this challenge. The trial court proceeded to
address this weight claim in its 1925(a) opinion, thus providing this Court a
basis for appellate review. Under these circumstances, principles of
fundamental fairness and equal administration of justice demand that
Appellant, like similarly situated litigants in other criminal cases, be treated in
the same fashion and be afforded an opportunity to raise a weight claim before
the trial court. See In re J.B., 106 A.3d 76 (Pa. 2014)(appellant did not
waive his weight claim in juvenile court proceedings where juvenile rules were
utterly silent as to how the claim must be presented to a juvenile court and
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the weight claim was raised in appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement). It
would be unjust to deprive appellant of the right to raise his weight claim
following conviction at a trial de novo for summary offense on grounds he
failed to file a motion he was not entitled to file. Commonwealth v.
Dougherty, 679 A.2d 779 (Pa. Super. 1996). Accordingly, we conclude that
Appellant preserved his objection to the weight of the evidence.
Our Supreme Court has instructed:
An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a
weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
applied by the trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise
of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the
trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the
evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the
trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the
least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial
is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was
not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial
should be granted in the interest of justice.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citing
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000)).
The trial court stated in its opinion:
Here, the verdict does not shock any sense of justice. Testimony
from two civilian witnesses corroborate that [Appellant] was
driving faster than was safe on West Swartzville Road. Based on
Mr. Rupp’s testimony, shortly before the accident [Appellant] was
driving over 50 miles per hour, 10 miles per hour over the speed
limit. Mrs. Hernandez checked for a clear road before making her
turn, and the severe damage to her vehicle supports the finding
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that [Appellant] was driving at an unsafe speed. The only
evidence presented in support of [Appellant]’s claim was that of
Mr. DiMatteo, who did not have a clear view of the road before
witnessing the crash. Based on this, and all other evidence
presented at trial, my finding that [Appellant] was not driving at
a safe speed is reasonable and does not shock any sense of justice
such that the verdict should be overturned.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/19, at 5.
Having considered the trial court’s findings and reasoning, we conclude
that it acted within its discretion by rejecting Appellant’s challenge to the
weight of the evidence. Appellant’s second issue fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 04/06/2020
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