Adoption of K.R.S-P., Appeal of: Z.D.P. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S15029-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF K.R.S-P.            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: Z.D.P.                          :
    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 1712 WDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Dated September 19, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County Orphans' Court at
    No(s): AN-08 of 2019
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                  FILED APRIL 6, 2020
    Appellant, Z.D.P. (“Father”),1 appeals from the order entered on
    September 19, 2019, granting the petition filed by K.L.T. (“Mother”) and
    T.S.T. (“Stepfather”) to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to his
    minor child, K.R.S-P., (“Child”) a female born in December 2010, pursuant to
    the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). On this direct appeal,
    Father’s counsel, Attorney Alan M. Carr (“Counsel”), filed a petition for leave
    to withdraw as counsel and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    (Pa. 2009), and In re V.E., 
    611 A.2d 1267
    , 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992)
    (extending Anders briefing criteria to appeals by indigent parents represented
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 At all relevant times, Father was incarcerated at the State Correctional
    Facility in Greene County (“SCI Greene”). To date, he remains imprisoned.
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    by court-appointed counsel in involuntary termination matters). Upon review,
    we grant Counsel leave to withdraw and affirm.
    The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this case
    as follows:
    The petitioners, [Mother and Stepfather], filed a petition for [the]
    involuntary termination of [Father’s] parental rights on June 25,
    2019. On June 27, 2019, the [trial] court entered a preliminary
    decree scheduling an evidentiary hearing on the petition for
    September 19, 2019, and further directed the petitioners to serve
    upon [F]ather a copy of the preliminary decree, important
    notice - birth parent, a copy of the petition with all attachments,
    and the post-adoption contact agreement notice. Service was
    directed to be made at least ten (10) days prior to [the] hearing
    and in compliance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2513(b) and [Pennsylvania]
    Orphans’ Court Rule 15.6. On July 22, 2019, counsel for the
    petitioners filed a certificate of service indicating that [F]ather was
    served with the above documents at SCI Greene by certified mail,
    restricted delivery, return receipt requested. The domestic return
    receipt indicating service on July 10, 2019, was attached to the
    certificate of service.
    [Father] made no contact with the [trial] court requesting [the]
    appointment of counsel, or for his appearance at the hearing to
    be coordinated. The hearing occurred as scheduled with [Father]
    not appearing. At the conclusion of the hearing[,] the [trial] court
    placed on the record its findings that the petitioners had proven
    by clear and convincing evidence the grounds for termination set
    forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and § 2511(b) and entered a
    decree [involuntarily] terminating [Father’s] parental rights [to
    Child]. On October 3, 2019, [Father] filed a pro se document with
    the [trial] court. The [trial] court deemed this correspondence to
    be a timely notice of appeal from the [trial] court’s decree of
    September 19, 2019, terminating [Father’s] rights, by order dated
    October 8, 2019. That order also granted [Father] in forma
    pauperis status, appointed [Counsel] to represent [Father] and
    directed that the court reporter prepare a transcript of the
    termination hearing.
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    Also[,] the [trial] court entered an order [on October 9, 2019,]
    directing [Counsel] to file a concise statement of [errors]
    complained of on appeal[.]
    Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/2019, at 1-2 (superfluous capitalization omitted).2
    Before reviewing the merits of this appeal, this Court must first
    determine     whether      Counsel     has     fulfilled   the   necessary   procedural
    requirements for withdrawing as counsel. See Commonwealth v. Flowers,
    
    113 A.3d 1246
    , 1248–1249 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). “In order to
    withdraw from appellate representation pursuant to                    Anders, certain
    procedural and substantive requirements must be met.” Commonwealth v.
    Tejada, 
    176 A.3d 355
    , 358 (Pa. Super. 2017). Procedurally, counsel must,
    (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
    making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
    determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) furnish a copy
    of the brief to the defendant; and (3) advise the defendant that
    he or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional
    arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the court's
    attention.
    ____________________________________________
    2  The trial court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on November
    13, 2019. In that opinion, the trial court noted that Counsel had not filed a
    Rule 1925(b) concise statement as directed. However, in an abundance of
    caution, the trial court addressed the sole issue Father presented in his pro se
    correspondence, which it deemed as Father’s notice of appeal.          Therein,
    Father claimed he was not afforded an opportunity to be present, and legally
    represented, at the termination proceeding. It should be noted that Counsel
    filed a statement of intent to file an Anders brief, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(c)(4), with the trial court five days after the trial court issued its
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. As will be discussed, however, the sole potential
    issue in the Anders brief currently on appeal is whether the trial court failed
    to arrange for Father to participate in the termination proceedings. Despite
    the Rule 1925 procedural anomaly in this case, the trial court’s Rule 1925(a)
    opinion squarely addressed the issue identified in the Anders brief and our
    independent review is unhampered.
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    Id. at 359.
    Substantively, counsel must file an Anders brief, in which counsel:
    (1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
    citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in the record that
    counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set[s] forth
    counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
    counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
    Commonwealth v. Hankerson, 
    118 A.3d 415
    , 419–420 (Pa. Super. 2015),
    quoting 
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361
    .
    In this case, it appears that Counsel has complied with the procedural
    requirements of Anders and its progeny. Counsel filed an Anders brief, and
    corresponding petition to withdraw as counsel, on January 15, 2020.          In
    addition to complying with the briefing requirements set forth in Santiago,
    Counsel provided Father with a letter advising him of his rights, which is
    attached to the motion to withdraw, as required.       See Tejada.     To date,
    Father has not filed a pro se response to the motion to withdraw as counsel.
    Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Counsel has complied with
    Anders' procedural and substantive requirements. “Therefore, we now have
    the responsibility ‘to make a full examination of the proceedings and make an
    independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly
    frivolous.’” Commonwealth v. Tukhi, 
    149 A.3d 881
    , 886 (Pa. Super. 2016),
    quoting 
    Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1248
    .
    Counsel's Anders brief raises the following issue for our review:
    Did [Father’s] termination of parental rights hearing lack due
    process, when the [trial c]ourt did not arrange to have [Father]
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    participate in the termination of parental rights hearing either
    personally or via videoconference?
    Anders’ Brief at 5.
    Our standard of review regarding orders terminating parental rights is
    as follows:
    When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental
    rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the
    trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse
    of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support
    for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial
    court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental
    rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge's decision the
    same deference that we would give to a jury verdict. We must
    employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to
    determine whether the trial court's decision is supported by
    competent evidence.
    The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
    presented and is likewise free to make all credibility
    determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. If competent
    evidence supports the trial court's findings, we will affirm even if
    the record could also support the opposite result.
    In re A.R., 
    125 A.3d 420
    , 422 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal quotations and
    citations omitted).
    The appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination
    proceedings is controlled by 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2313(a.1), which states, in
    pertinent part:
    (a.1) PARENT.—The court shall appoint counsel for a parent
    whose rights are subject to termination in an involuntary
    termination proceeding if, upon petition of the parent, the
    court determines that the parent is unable to pay for counsel or if
    payment would result in substantial financial hardship.
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    In re 
    A.R., 125 A.3d at 424
    (emphasis added), citing 23 Pa.C.S.A
    § 2313(a.1). “The appointment of counsel is not an automatic right.”
    Id. An incarcerated,
    indigent parent is entitled to notice of a termination hearing.
    Id. If that
    notice informs the parent that they have the right to counsel and
    includes instructions for notifying the Family/Orphans' Court Administrator to
    obtain a court-appointed attorney, the parent’s subsequent failure to petition
    the trial court for a court-appointed attorney does not amount to an abuse of
    trial court discretion for failing to appoint counsel.
    Id., citing In
    re Adoption
    of J.N.F., 
    887 A.2d 775
    , 780 (Pa. Super. 2005).
    Here, Father “has indicated that he believed that the trial court would
    arrange for him to participate in his termination of parental rights hearing
    either [in] person or by videoconference.” Anders’ Brief at 7. However, there
    is no dispute that Father received the following notice:
    A PETITION HAS BEEN FILED ASKING THE COURT TO PUT AN END
    TO ALL RIGHTS YOU HAVE TO YOUR CHILD, WHOSE NAME
    APPEARS ON THE CAPTION OF THIS IMPORTANT NOTICE. THE
    COURT HAS SET A HEARING TO CONSIDER ENDING YOUR
    RIGHTS TO YOUR CHILD. THAT HEARING WILL BE HELD AS
    INDICATED IN THE PRELIMINARY DECREE ATTACHED TO THIS
    NOTICE. YOU ARE WARNED THAT EVEN IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR
    AT THE SCHELDUED HEARING, THE HEARING WILL GO ON
    WITHOUT YOU AND YOUR RIGHTS TO YOUR CHILD MAY BE
    ENDED BY THE COURT WITHOUT YOUR BEING PRESENT. YOU
    HAVE A RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED AT THE HEARING BY A
    LAWYER. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT
    ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT AFFORD
    ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW TO
    FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP.
    -6-
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    Court Administrator’s Office
    WARREN COUNTY COURTHOUSE
    204 4TH Avenue
    Warren PA 16365
    814-728-3400
    Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/2019, at 2-3.
    The notice clearly instructed Father that a hearing was scheduled and
    would proceed even in his absence. It also notified him to contact the Court
    Administrator’s Office if he did not have an attorney or could not afford one.
    Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Father had proper notice
    of the hearing and his right to counsel, and that he received clear instructions
    regarding how to obtain a lawyer if he could not afford one. However, Father
    failed to take any action to obtain counsel prior to the termination hearing or
    to participate in the hearing.3         As such, we discern no error or abuse of
    discretion by the trial court regarding the appointment of counsel for Father
    ____________________________________________
    3 Mother testified that Father contacted her from prison after receiving notice
    of the petition to terminate his rights. N.T., 9/19/2019, at 19. The trial court
    determined that since Father was able to contact Mother, “[F]ather could have
    taken steps to contact the court administrator by telephone[.]” Trial Court
    Opinion, 11/13/2019, at 3. The record supports this finding. Moreover, Father
    has not complained that he did not receive notice regarding the appointment
    of counsel or that he tried contacting the court administrator to obtain counsel
    to no avail or to make arrangements to participate in the hearing.
    Finally, we note that because Father did not request counsel or otherwise alert
    the trial court that he contested the termination proceeding, the trial court
    was not required to appoint counsel to represent Child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 2313(a) (“The court shall appoint counsel to represent the child in an
    involuntary termination proceeding when the proceeding is being contested
    by one or both of the parents.”).
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    or Father’s non-participation in the termination hearing and conclude that this
    issue is frivolous.
    Finally, we are required to make a full examination of the proceedings
    and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact
    wholly frivolous. Termination of parental rights requires a bifurcated analysis:
    Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
    seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
    termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
    determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his
    or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
    the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
    needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
    of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
    concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
    parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
    of permanently severing any such bond.
    In re L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
    , 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
    Here, Mother and Stepfather petitioned for the involuntary termination
    of Father’s rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b) of the
    Adoption Act, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
    (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
    be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
    grounds:
    (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
    six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
    either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
    parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
    parental duties.
    *        *            *
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    (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
    of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
    of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
    environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
    income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
    control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
    to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
    efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
    which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
    filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).
    In this case, the trial court determined:
    [T]he evidence in this case could not have been more persuasive.
    Even before his incarceration [Father] walked away from all
    contact and communication with [Child]. He was being afforded
    periods of visitation by [Mother] and voluntarily ended those.
    Despite knowing where [Mother] lived and knowing her cell[ular
    tele]phone number, [F]ather stopped all contact and
    communication. He provided no support, cards, letters, gifts or
    anything else to maintain his parental relationship. Well before
    his incarceration, clear and convincing evidence was presented
    regarding his settled intent and failure to perform any parental
    duties. After his incarceration, [Father] made no effort at all to
    avail himself [of] resources available to maintain the relationship.
    The [trial c]ourt also found that the [p]etitioners had met [their]
    burden of proof under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). […] The [trial]
    court found that [Father’s] prolonged absence left [Child] with no
    bond or, at best, a negative bond as the result of [Father’s]
    abandonment. On the contrary, the [trial] court found that [Child]
    had bonded significantly with the petitioner/[S]tep-father and that
    [her] best interests would be clearly served by the termination of
    [Father’s] rights and adoption by [S]tep-father.
    Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/2019, at 5.
    Upon review, we discern no error or abuse of discretion by involuntarily
    terminating Father’s parental rights to Child. Mother testified that, aside from
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    a chance meeting with Father at a store two years prior to the termination
    hearing, Father did not maintain any contact with Child for over three years
    prior to the termination hearing.   N.T., 9/19/2019, at 11-13.      Father was
    incarcerated in April of 2018.
    Id. at 24.
        Child does not have photographs
    or memories of Father.
    Id. at 19.
    She rarely asks about Father.
    Id. at 18-19.
    Child has not maintained contact with Father’s family.
    Id. at 18.
       In May of
    2015, Mother and Stepfather began cohabiting with Child.
    Id. at 14.
    Mother
    and Stepfather were married in January of 2019.
    Id. at 15
    . 
       Mother and
    Stepfather have a three-year-old son together.
    Id. at 22.
    Child has called
    Stepfather “Dad” for several years.
    Id. at 21-22
    and 29.     Stepfather views
    Child as his own daughter.
    Id. at 28-29.
    Mother and Stepfather intend for
    Stepfather to adopt Child.
    Id. at 15
    and 32.
    Based upon the record before us, we also agree with Counsel that
    Father’s issue, as presented in the Anders brief, is frivolous. Moreover, the
    trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion in terminating Father’s
    parental rights. Pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), Father refused or failed to
    perform parental duties for well over six months prior to the filing of the
    petition to terminate Father’s rights.      The trial court also gave primary
    consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
    of Child under Section 2511(b), concluding that no bond worthy of
    preservation existed between Father and Child and that termination was in
    Child’s best interest. We have independently reviewed the record and find no
    other issues of arguable merit that Father could pursue on appeal.
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    Accordingly, we affirm the trial court order and grant Counsel's petition to
    withdraw.
    Order affirmed. Motion to withdraw granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/6/2020
    - 11 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1712 WDA 2019

Filed Date: 4/6/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021