Com. v. Perry, P. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S09042-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    PAUL J. PERRY                              :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 3701 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the PCRA Order October 11, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0608751-1977
    BEFORE:      SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                                FILED APRIL 13, 2020
    Appellant, Paul J. Perry, pro se, appeals from the order entered
    October 11, 2017, that dismissed his third petition filed under the Post
    Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)1 without a hearing. We affirm.
    The facts and procedural history may be summarized as follows.
    On July 7, 1977 a jury found Mr. Perry guilty of first-degree
    murder, possession of an instrument of crime, and criminal
    conspiracy. Mr. Perry was sentenced to life imprisonment for the
    murder, with consecutive terms of two and one-half (2 ½) to five
    (5) years for the weapons charge and two and one-half (2 ½) to
    ten (10) years for the conspiracy charge. On appeal, this Court
    affirmed the judgment of sentence, and the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania denied his subsequent allocatur petition.
    Commonwealth v. Perry, 
    268 Pa.Super. 136
    , 
    407 A.2d 867
    (1979), allocatur denied.
    On April 22, 1982 Mr. Perry filed his first petition for relief under
    the provisions of the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA)
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
    J-S09042-20
    (subsequently repealed and replaced by the PCRA). The petition
    was dismissed without a hearing, and this Court affirmed the
    Order on appeal. Commonwealth v. Perry, 
    350 Pa.Super. 634
    ,
    
    503 A.2d 457
     (1985).
    On December 12, 1996 Mr. Perry filed his second petition under
    the current provisions of the PCRA. The PCRA court dismissed the
    petition without a hearing by Order dated March 26, 1997.
    Mr. Perry then filed [a] pro se appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Perry, 
    716 A.2d 1259
    , 1260 (Pa. Super. 1998). This
    court “affirm[ed] the trial court’s denial of the second PCRA petition.” 
    Id. at 1260
    .
    On August 24, 2012, Appellant filed his third, pro se PCRA petition. On
    July 26, 2017, the PCRA court entered a notice of intent to dismiss all claims
    without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 (“Rule 907 Notice”). Appellant
    filed a response. The response did not request to amend the PCRA petition.
    On October 11, 2017, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition; the trial
    court simultaneously entered an opinion explaining its decision.              On
    November 7, 2017, Appellant filed this timely appeal.2
    Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
    Do this courts’ precedential decisions holding that Miller v.
    Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
     (2012), does not extend to Appellant
    because he was nineteen years old at the date of commission of
    the crime constitute error as the decisions, infra, were wrongfully
    decided?
    Appellant’s Brief at 2.
    ____________________________________________
    2The trial court did not order and Appellant did not file a statement of errors
    complained of on appeal.
    -2-
    J-S09042-20
    “We review the denial of PCRA relief to decide whether the PCRA court’s
    factual determinations are supported by the record and are free of legal error.”
    Commonwealth v. Medina, 
    209 A.3d 992
    , 996 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Lavar Brown, 
    196 A.3d 130
    , 150 (Pa. 2018)).
    The   timeliness     of    a   post-conviction   petition   is   jurisdictional.
    Commonwealth v. Hackett, 
    956 A.2d 978
    , 983 (Pa. 2008) (timeliness of a
    PCRA     petition   is   a   jurisdictional    requirement);   Commonwealth          v.
    Devon Brown, 
    943 A.2d 264
    , 267 (Pa. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v.
    Robinson, 
    837 A.2d 1157
    , 1161 (Pa. 2003)) (it is “well settled that there is
    no generalized equitable exception to the jurisdictional . . . time bar pertaining
    to post-conviction petitions”); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 
    79 A.3d 649
    ,
    651 (Pa. Super. 2013).            Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA,
    including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the
    date the judgment of sentence is final, unless the petition alleges and the
    petitioner proves one of the three exceptions to the time limitations for filing
    the petition set forth in section 9545(b) of the statute.            See 42 Pa.C.S.
    § 9545(b)(1).3 In the current action, the PCRA court concluded that it lacked
    ____________________________________________
    3   The three exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
    interference by government officials with the presentation of the
    claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
    or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
    -3-
    J-S09042-20
    jurisdiction over Appellant’s third PCRA petition, because the petition was
    untimely and failed to satisfy an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. As this
    Court previously determined:
    The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Mr. Perry’s allocatur
    petition on January 14, 1980. Judgment therefore became final
    on April 13, 1980; the expiration of time for seeking a writ of
    certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.4
    4 Rule 13 of the United States Supreme Court Rules provides
    that “[a] petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a
    judgment of a lower state court that is subject to
    discretionary review by the state court of last resort is timely
    when filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the
    order denying discretionary review.” U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 13,
    28 U.S.C.A.
    Perry, 
    716 A.2d at 1261
    .
    Appellant had one year thereafter to file a PCRA petition – i.e., until
    April 13, 1981. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant filed the current petition
    on August 24, 2012 – more than 31 years late. Therefore, Appellant’s petition
    ____________________________________________
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
    the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
    of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
    by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
    of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
    has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
    -4-
    J-S09042-20
    was patently untimely, and he did not plead a timeliness exception to the
    requirements of the PCRA in his petition.4
    Having discerned no error of law, we affirm the order below.          See
    Medina, 209 A.3d at 996.
    Order affirmed.
    Judge Lazarus joins the Memorandum.
    Judge Shogan Concurs in the Result.
    ____________________________________________
    4Appellant’s pro se response to the Rule 907 Notice contended that his petition
    satisfied the timeliness exception pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).
    However, an assertion of a timeliness exception in a response to a Rule 907
    notice is insufficient to preserve the claim for our review.
    The purpose behind a Rule 907 pre-dismissal notice is to allow a
    petitioner an opportunity to seek leave to amend his petition
    and correct any material defects, the ultimate goal being to permit
    merits review by the PCRA court of potentially arguable claims.
    The response is an opportunity for a petitioner and/or his counsel
    to object to the dismissal and alert the PCRA court of a perceived
    error, permitting the court to discern the potential for
    amendment. The response is not itself a petition and the
    law still requires leave of court to submit an amended
    petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(a).
    Commonwealth v. Rykard, 
    55 A.3d 1177
    , 1189 (Pa. Super. 2012)
    (emphasis added) (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Consequently, in his response to the Rule 907 Notice, Appellant should have
    requested leave to amend his petition to add his contention that the Section
    9545(b)(1)(iii) timeliness exception applied to his petition, and the PCRA court
    still would have had to grant permission for amendment. See 
    id.
     Without an
    amended petition authorized by the PCRA court following Appellant’s response
    to the Rule 907 Notice, his assertion of the applicability of a timeliness
    exception is still waived.
    -5-
    J-S09042-20
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/13/20
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3701 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 4/13/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/13/2020