Com. v. Williams, A. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S05037-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    ALPHONSO WILLIAMS,                         :
    :
    Appellant               :      No. 1230 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 21, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004668-2018
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                              FILED APRIL 17, 2020
    Alphonso Williams (“Williams”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered following his conviction of escape.1 We affirm.
    In its Opinion, the trial court summarized the facts underlying the
    instant appeal as follows:
    Lester Smith [(“Smith”)], a shift supervisor at [] Keystone
    Correctional Services [(“Keystone”)], testified that Keystone is a
    secured facility that serves as “a halfway house and work release
    center.” Residents of Keystone are “getting released from jail and
    they come there on parole, or else they come back…. They’re
    brought back from [a] parole violation. So[,] they stay with us
    until parole sees them, and then they get a home plan and go
    back out.” The doors are locked[,] and the property is surrounded
    by fences with barbed wire.
    On June 8, 2018, [Williams], a resident at Keystone, was
    out on a job search. When he returned to the facility, [] Smith
    was instructed to strip search [Williams] due to a suspected drug
    offense. During the search, [] Smith found two bags of synthetic
    ____________________________________________
    1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5121.
    J-S05037-20
    marijuana in [Williams’s] underwear. [Williams] was then given
    a urine test and tested positive for synthetic [marijuana]. The
    facility director was notified, as was the Pennsylvania State Police.
    [] Smith testified that [Williams] returned to the housing unit
    [but], after a formal count of residents was conducted, it was
    determined that [Williams] was missing. [] Smith was able to
    view Keystone surveillance footage and observed [Williams] going
    over the fence with a sheet on top of the barbed wire.
    Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/19, at 1-2 (citations omitted; paragraph break
    added). Williams was apprehended on August 4, 2018.
    Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Williams of escape. The
    trial court subsequently sentenced Williams to one to three years in prison,
    plus fines and costs.       Thereafter, Williams filed the instant timely appeal,
    followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters
    complained of on appeal.
    Williams presents the following issue for our review:
    Whether the evidence was insufficient to prove [Williams] guilty
    of escape[,] when the Commonwealth’s witness testified that
    Keystone Correctional Facility houses individuals who are released
    from jail and paroled[,] and failed to provide evidence to refute
    that he was on parole status at Keystone Correctional Facility?
    Brief for Appellant at 4.
    Williams claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction
    of escape.     See
    id. at 11.
              Specifically, Williams argues that the
    Commonwealth presented no evidence regarding his “resident status” at
    Keystone.
    Id. According to
    Williams, the Commonwealth failed to present
    evidence that he was at Keystone “for one of the reasons delineated for official
    detention under [18 Pa.C.S.A.] § 5121(e)[,] nor was testimony presented that
    -2-
    J-S05037-20
    he was committed to Keystone under any court order.” Brief for Appellant at
    11-12. Further, Williams argues that there was no evidence that his status
    was anything other than a “parolee.”
    Id. at 12.
    In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Williams’s claim and concluded
    that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/19, at 3-7. We agree with
    the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm
    on this basis as to Williams’s claim. See
    id. We additionally
    observe the
    following.
    In Commonwealth v. Davis, 
    852 A.2d 392
    (Pa. Super. 2004), this
    Court addressed a similar issue. The defendant in Davis claimed that he had
    been paroled, and was therefore no longer subject to “official detention,” as
    defined by the escape statute.
    Id. at 396.
       In considering whether the
    defendant remained in “official detention,” this Court opined that “the term
    ‘prerelease’ essentially translates into ‘prior to release’ and begs the question,
    prior to release on what? Given that the provisions for ‘prerelease programs’
    are found in the provisions for parole, it logically follows that the term
    ‘prerelease program’ refers to a program that predates release on parole.”
    Id. at 396.
    In Commonwealth v. Scott, 
    967 A.2d 995
    (Pa. Super. 2009), this
    Court applied Davis in addressing a similar claim. The defendant in Scott
    was on “prerelease.”
    Id. at 998.
          Id.   However, the 
    defendant was not
    required to serve a minimum period in the prerelease program.
    Id. at 999.
    -3-
    J-S05037-20
    The defendant argued that the evidence had failed to establish that he was in
    “official detention,” as he was on parole at the time he left the facility.
    Id. at 998.
       The defendant’s argument was based upon his receipt of a letter
    indicating his parole status, “and the apparent presumption that [the]
    issuance of the letter commenced his release on parole.”
    Id. at 998.
    The
    defendant argued, in the alternative, that, even assuming he was not yet
    paroled, the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to establish that he remained in
    official detention.
    Id. The defendant
    relied upon Davis as supporting this
    proposition. See
    id. This Court
    rejected the defendant’s assertions: “Unfortunately, the
    authority upon which [the defendant] relies does not establish that his parole
    commenced before he left [the facility,] or that the Commonwealth is
    compelled to disprove his assertion that parole had been granted.”
    Id. [T]he record
    verifies only that [the defendant] was serving a
    period of prerelease when he absconded from Kintock Broad,[2]
    not that he was on parole. Commonwealth witness Roberta
    Albany, a [Department of Corrections (“DOC”)] records custodian,
    testified that she was familiar with the letter [the defendant] had
    received from the [Pennsylvania] Board of Probation and Parole.
    She also testified, however, that [the defendant’s] parole
    remained to be confirmed before a DOC public hearing officer[,]
    who would issue a release order following [the defendant’s]
    agreement to the terms of the probation[,] and that the order
    would then be included in [the defendant’s] DOC file.
    Id. [The defendant]
    never attended a DOC hearing and no release order
    [was] ever issued for his parole.
    Id. Accordingly, his
    “prerelease”
    status remained unchanged and he continued in “official
    ____________________________________________
    2 Kintock Broad was a Community Correction Center then in operation in
    Philadelphia. See
    id. at 997.
    -4-
    J-S05037-20
    detention” while at Kintock Broad. As the trial court recognized,
    [the defendant] was not on parole and, consequently, was
    properly subject to a charge of [e]scape upon leaving the Kintock
    facility. As [the defendant] does not dispute his conduct in leaving
    the facility without authorization, we find the evidence legally
    sufficient to sustain his conviction for [e]scape….
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Thus, in Davis and Scott, the use of the term “parole” was not
    dispositive of the defendant’s status for purposes of the escape statute.
    Rather, the Court looked to whether the defendant was in “confinement” or
    “official detention.” See 
    Davis, 852 A.2d at 396
    ; 
    Scott, 967 A.2d at 998-99
    .
    Here, the evidence established that Williams was confined in a secure
    facility. See N.T., 6/21/19, at 9 (wherein Smith testified that the facility was
    a secured facility where the “doors are locked[,] and the property is
    surrounded by fences with barbed wire”).         Further, as defense counsel
    conceded to the trial court, Williams would need a “home plan … before he
    [could] be officially released out onto the street.”      N.T., 6/21/19, at 27
    (emphasis added). Thus, the evidence established that Williams had not yet
    been “released” from “official detention.” See
    id. Therefore, based
    upon the
    analysis set forth in the trial court’s Opinion, and our review set forth above,
    we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Williams’s conviction of
    escape.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    -5-
    J-S05037-20
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 04/17/2020
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1230 MDA 2019

Filed Date: 4/17/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2020