Com. v. Greenawalt, L. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S05045-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    LANCE PATRICK GREENAWALT,                  :
    :
    Appellant               :       No. 892 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 19, 2019
    n the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0000347-2011
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                              FILED APRIL 21, 2020
    Lance Patrick Greenawalt (“Greenawalt”) appeals from the Order
    denying his first Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
    Act (“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    On April 30, 2006, Greenawalt broke into the home of Daniel Keys
    (“Keys”) and assaulted Keys by throwing boiling water on his face and striking
    him numerous times in the head, arms, and torso with a baseball bat. 1 As a
    result of the attack, Keys suffered injuries to his eyes, lacerations to his head
    that required 103 stitches, three broken fingers on each hand, a broken wrist,
    broken hand, and burns to his head and the surrounding area. Keys only
    ____________________________________________
    1Keys was not at his home when Greenawalt broke in. Greenawalt attacked
    Keys when Keys returned home and entered through the front door.
    J-S05045-20
    briefly saw his attacker, who was wearing a mask, and was unable to identify
    him to police.
    Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Benjamin Wilson (“Trooper Wilson”)
    investigated Keys’s assault. On September 7, 2010, Trooper Wilson was at
    Camp Hill State Correctional Institution and was informed by prison personnel
    that Greenawalt, who was incarcerated there on unrelated convictions, had
    been soliciting a fellow inmate, Timothy Bryce (“Bryce”), to commit murder
    for Greenawalt. Trooper Wilson and Pennsylvania State Trooper Shaun Pugh
    (“Trooper Pugh”) interviewed Bryce, who stated that Greenawalt had solicited
    Bryce to murder John Lloyd (“Lloyd”) and Adams County Court of Common
    Pleas Judge Michael George (“Judge George”). Lloyd is Keys’s brother. Judge
    George had presided over Greenawalt’s previous criminal trial on unrelated
    charges. Bryce also stated that Greenawalt had admitted to committing the
    April 20, 2006, burglary of and assault on Keys.
    After substantiating Bryce’s claims, Trooper Wilson filed with this Court
    an Application for the interception of communications (the “Wiretap
    Application”), in order to install a recording device in the prison cell shared by
    Greenawalt and Bryce. This Court found that there was probable cause to
    believe that communications would take place between Greenawalt and Bryce
    regarding the planning and commission of illegal acts, and issued an Order
    Authorizing Interception of Communications (the “Wiretap Order”).
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    Between October 5, and November 24, 2010, Greenawalt and Bryce
    engaged in several conversations relating to Greenawalt’s prior solicitations to
    kill Judge George and Lloyd, and Greenawalt also solicited Bryce to murder
    Keys.    Trooper Wilson subsequently interviewed Greenawalt, and advised
    Greenawalt that his incriminating statements had been recorded. Greenawalt
    admitted to engaging in these conversations, but claimed that they were just
    “jail house talk,” and not meant to be taken seriously.
    Greenawalt was subsequently charged, in relevant part, with one count
    each of attempt to commit criminal homicide, aggravated assault and
    burglary, and three counts of criminal solicitation to commit criminal homicide.
    Greenawalt filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion, which contained, inter alia,
    Motions to (1) suppress the incriminating statements made to Trooper Wilson;
    (2) sever the three counts of criminal solicitation to commit criminal homicide
    from the charges relating to Greenawalt’s assault of Keys; and (3) suppress
    the recordings taken from the recording device that was planted in
    Greenawalt’s prison cell. Following a hearing and the submission of briefs,
    the trial court granted in part Greenawalt’s Motion to sever charges, and
    denied the two Motions to suppress. The trial court severed the charge of
    solicitation to commit homicide relating to Judge George from the remaining
    charges.
    On March 14, 2013, the Commonwealth and Greenawalt filed a
    Stipulation, wherein they agreed that Bryce had been previously convicted of
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    certain enumerated crimes, including obstruction of justice and false reports,
    and that this evidence would be admissible at trial for crimen falsi purposes.
    On March 15, 2013, Greenawalt filed a Motion in limine, seeking to prevent
    Bryce from testifying at trial based on these crimes, which purportedly made
    his testimony unreliable. On March 18, 2013, the trial court denied the Motion.
    Following the two severed jury trials, Greenawalt was found guilty of
    one count each of attempt to commit criminal homicide, aggravated assault,
    criminal attempt to commit aggravated assault and burglary, and three counts
    of solicitation to commit criminal homicide.2 Greenawalt was sentenced to an
    aggregate term of 40 to 90 years in prison.3
    This Court affirmed Greenawalt’s judgment of sentence.                See
    Commonwealth v. Greenawalt,                    
    106 A.3d 176
       (Pa. Super. 2014)
    (unpublished memorandum).4 Greenawalt did not seek allowance of appeal
    with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
    ____________________________________________
    2 Greenawalt’s trial regarding the charge for criminal solicitation to commit
    criminal homicide relating to Judge George occurred over a year after the trial
    for the other charges.
    3 Greenawalt was sentenced to serve 10 to 20 years in prison on the charge
    for solicitation to commit criminal homicide relating to Judge George, and 30
    to 70 years in prison on the remaining charges. The sentences were ordered
    to run consecutively.
    4Greenawalt filed his Notice of Appeal following his first trial, and he did not
    appeal his judgment of sentence for his conviction of criminal solicitation to
    commit criminal homicide relating to Judge George.
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    On August 25, 2015, Greenawalt filed the instant timely PCRA Petition.
    Greenawalt subsequently filed two Amended PCRA Petitions, with the second
    Amended Petition being filed on June 28, 2017. Greenawalt claimed in his
    second Amended Petition several allegations of ineffective assistance of
    counsel, including the claims discussed herein, and trial counsel’s failure to
    request a pre-sentence mental health examination. Following a hearing, the
    PCRA court granted Greenawalt’s PCRA Petition on the claim regarding trial
    counsel’s failure to request a pre-sentence mental health examination, and
    denied his Petition in all other respects. The PCRA court vacated Greenawalt’s
    judgment of sentence; ordered that he undergo a mental health examination;
    and directed the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report, to include
    the results of Greenawalt’s mental health examination.     Greenawalt filed a
    timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise
    Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
    On appeal, Greenawalt presents the following questions for our review:
    I. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in denying [Greenawalt] relief
    based upon [Greenawalt’s] claims that trial counsel was
    ineffective by failing to file a motion to exclude and suppress the
    [W]iretap [A]pplication used to intercept [Greenawalt’s] oral
    communications pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and
    Electronic Surveillance Control Act?
    II. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in denying [Greenawalt] relief
    based on [Greenawalt’s] claim that trial counsel was ineffective by
    failing to conduct a pretrial mental health examination of
    [Greenawalt] to determine whether [Greenawalt] could form the
    specific intent to commit the criminal acts of which he was
    accused?
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    III. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in denying [Greenawalt] relief
    based upon [Greenawalt’s] claim that trial counsel was ineffective
    by failing to investigate and present character evidence at trial?
    IV. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in denying [Greenawalt] relief
    based upon [Greenawalt]’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective
    by failing to request severance of the crimes of violence that
    prejudiced [Greenawalt] at trial by presenting evidence of
    aggressive and assaultive behavior to the jury?
    Brief for Appellant at 4.
    “The standard of review of an order [denying] a PCRA petition is whether
    that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal
    error.”    Commonwealth v. Weimer, 
    167 A.3d 78
    , 81 (Pa. Super. 2017).
    “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for
    the findings in the certified record.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
    must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel’s
    ineffectiveness “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
    adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.”          42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Specifically, a petitioner must establish that “the underlying
    claim has arguable merit; second, that counsel had no reasonable basis for
    his action or inaction; and third, that [the a]ppellant was prejudiced.”
    Commonwealth v. Charleston, 
    94 A.3d 1012
    , 1020 (Pa. Super. 2014). “A
    PCRA      petitioner   must   address   each   of   these   prongs   on   appeal.”
    Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 
    177 A.3d 136
    , 144 (Pa. 2018).
    A court is not required to analyze the elements of an
    ineffectiveness claim in any particular order of priority; instead, if
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    a claim fails under any necessary element of the ineffectiveness
    test, the court may proceed to that element first. Finally, counsel
    cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.
    Commonwealth v. Tharp, 
    101 A.3d 736
    , 747 (Pa. 2014).
    In his first claim, Greenawalt alleges that his trial counsel, Michael D.
    Rentschler, Esquire (“Attorney Rentschler”), was ineffective in failing to file a
    motion to exclude the evidence obtained from the recording device. See Brief
    for Appellant at 19-25. Greenawalt purports to challenge this Court’s Wiretap
    Order under Section 5721.1(b)(2) of the Wiretap Act, see 18 Pa.C.S.A.
    §§ 5701-5782.     Greenawalt claims that the Wiretap Application and the
    Affidavit of Probable Cause, which was attached thereto, were defective
    because they did not disclose (1) Bryce’s criminal history; (2) the fact that the
    Pennsylvania State Police had been investigating a claim that a third-party
    had previously solicited Bryce to kill a state trooper; and (3) an indication as
    to whether the personnel who intended to set up and use the recording device
    were “B” certified.   Id. at 20-25.     Greenawalt argues that had Attorney
    Rentschler filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the recording
    device on these grounds, the trial court would have likely suppressed the
    evidence, and Greenawalt would have been acquitted. Id. at 25.
    Section 5721.1 of the Wiretap Act provides that an
    aggrieved party may move to exclude the contents of a wiretap or
    evidence derived therefrom on six grounds. This creates a
    situation where a Common Pleas judge can rule that a Superior
    Court judge erred when determining that there was a legal basis
    to authorize a wiretap. Section 5721.1 further provides that the
    only judicial remedies and sanctions for non-constitutional
    violations of the wiretap provisions are those exclusively found in
    5721.1.     The plain language of section 5721.1 limits the
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    availability of suppression as a remedy for non-constitutional
    violations to six grounds specifically enumerated.
    Commonwealth v. Steward, 
    918 A.2d 758
    , 760 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
    omitted).
    Section 5721.1(b)(2) provides that a recording may be suppressed
    where “[t]he order of authorization … was not supported by probable cause
    with respect to the matters set forth in section 5710(a)(1) and (2) (relating
    to grounds for entry of order).” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5721.1(b)(2).
    Subsections 5710(a)(1) and (2) of the Wiretap Act state as follows:
    (a) Application.--Upon consideration of an application, [a
    Superior Court] judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested
    or as modified, authorizing the interception of wire, electronic or
    oral communications anywhere within the Commonwealth, if the
    judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the
    applicant that there is probable cause for belief that all the
    following conditions exist:
    (1) the person whose communications are to be intercepted
    is committing, has or had committed or is about to commit
    an offense as provided in section 5708 (relating to order
    authorizing interception of wire, electronic or oral
    communications);
    (2) particular communications concerning such offense may
    be obtained through such interception;
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5710(a)(1), (2). Aggravated assault and burglary are included
    offenses under Section 5708. See id. § 5708(a)(1).
    The standard for determining whether probable cause
    existed for an order authorizing interception of telephone
    communications is the same as that used to determine probable
    cause for search warrants.
    ….
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    [I]n an application for a wiretap, the Commonwealth must
    establish probable cause to believe that (1) the person whose
    communication is to be intercepted has committed an offense as
    provided in the state wiretap law, 18 Pa.C.S.[A. §§ 5701-5782],
    (2) communications concerning that offense will be transmitted,
    and (3) such communications will be intercepted on the facility
    under surveillance. In reviewing the adequacy of the application
    to support the issuance of an order of authorization, we will
    interpret the application in a common sense manner, not overly
    technical, with due deference to the findings of the issuing
    authority.
    Commonwealth v. Birdseye, 
    637 A.2d 1036
    , 1042 (Pa. Super. 1994)
    (quotation marks and some citations omitted).
    Here, the Affidavit of Probable Cause indicates that Bryce described to
    Troopers Wilson and Pugh, in detail, how Greenawalt had repeatedly asked
    Bryce to kill two people for Greenawalt, and how Greenawalt had admitted to
    assaulting Keys with a baseball bat at Keys’s home. See Wiretap Application,
    9/17/10, at Exhibit A (admitted into evidence at 10/3/11 pre-trial hearing as
    Commonwealth Exhibit 1). Bryce told the troopers that Greenawalt described
    how Bryce should conduct the murders, including detailed descriptions of the
    homes of the two targets. 
    Id.
     The Affidavit further states that Trooper Wilson
    corroborated the details provided by Bryce, including the location and
    description of the homes of Greenawalt’s targets, which were accurate “even
    though [Bryce] has no familiarity with the [city where the homes were
    located].” 
    Id.
     Finally, Trooper Wilson stated in the Affidavit that he believed
    further evidence of the solicitation to commit murder would be gathered
    through use of a recording device. 
    Id.
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    Our review of the Wiretap Application reveals that it contains facts
    sufficient to establish probable cause to support the issuance of the Wiretap
    Order. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5710(a); Birdseye, 
    supra.
     Therefore, because
    Greenawalt’s underlying claim lacks merit, his ineffectiveness claim fails.5, 6
    See Tharp, supra.
    In his second claim, Greenawalt alleges that Attorney Rentschler was
    ineffective in failing to seek a pretrial mental health examination, and in failing
    to present the result of said examination as evidence at trial. Id. at 25-30.
    Greenawalt points to the testimony of clinical and forensic psychologist Frank
    M. Dattilio, Ph.D. (“Dr. Dattilio”), from Greenawalt’s PCRA hearing, that
    ____________________________________________
    5 To the extent that Greenawalt claims that his counsel was ineffective for
    failing to file a motion for suppression under Section 5721.1(a)(3) and on
    constitutional grounds, Greenawalt fails to explain how this Court’s Wiretap
    Order granting placement of the recording device was materially insufficient,
    and how Greenawalt’s constitutional rights were violated, with pertinent
    citations to case law and relevant argument. See Commonwealth v.
    Johnson, 
    985 A.2d 915
    , 924 (Pa. 2009) (stating that “where an appellate
    brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant
    authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable
    of review, that claim is waived.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119. Accordingly,
    these claims are waived.
    6 We acknowledge Greenawalt’s citation to Commonwealth v. Hashem, 
    584 A.2d 1378
     (Pa. 1991) (holding that a violation of any provision of the Wiretap
    Act is grounds for suppression of evidence), and his claim that the Wiretap
    Application was defective under Section 5710 of the Wiretap Act. However,
    “the Hashem case interpreted the Wiretap Act before it was amended to
    include the exclusive remedy provision,” Commonwealth v. Steward, 
    918 A.2d 758
    , 760 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Donahue,
    
    630 A.2d 1238
    , 1248 n.11 (Pa. Super. 1993)), and a violation of Section 5710
    is not an included ground for suppression. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5721.1(a);
    Steward, 
    supra.
     Accordingly, this claim fails.
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    Greenawalt suffers from major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety
    disorder.   Id. at 26.    According to Greenawalt, Dr. Dattilio’s testimony
    regarding Greenawalt’s mental disorders may have convinced the jury that he
    lacked the necessary intent to be convicted of criminal attempt and criminal
    solicitation. Id. At 27-29. Greenawalt argues that Attorney Rentschler lacked
    any reasonable basis for not subjecting him to a mental health examination
    prior to trial, and that had an expert conducted a pretrial examination and
    testified at his trial, the jury may have found him not guilty. Id. at 29-30.
    Here, Greenawalt conflates two claims: (1) Attorney Rentschler should
    have noticed, before trial, that Greenawalt suffered from mental illness and
    submitted Greenawalt to a mental health examination; and (2) Attorney
    Rentschler should have had an expert witness testify at Greenawalt’s trial.
    Greenawalt fails to explain, on both grounds, how his particular diagnoses of
    generalized anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder are relevant to his
    ability to form intent. See Johnson, 985 A.2d at 924; see also Pa.R.A.P.
    2119. Accordingly, this claim is waived.
    In his third claim, Greenawalt alleges that Attorney Rentschler was
    ineffective in failing to investigate, and present at trial, character evidence of
    his reputation for peacefulness and non-violence. See Brief for Appellant at
    30-35. Greenawalt argues that had his trial counsel “succeeded in presenting
    relevant character testimony, there is a reasonable probability that the
    outcome of the trial would have been different.” Id. at 35.
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    Counsel has a general duty to undertake reasonable
    investigations or make reasonable decisions that render particular
    investigations unnecessary. Commonwealth v. Basemore, …
    
    744 A.2d 717
    , 735 ([Pa.] 2000) (citing [Strickland v.
    Washington], 466 U.S. [668,] 691 … [(1984)]). … The duty to
    investigate, of course, may include a duty to interview certain
    potential witnesses; and a prejudicial failure to fulfill this duty …
    may lead to a finding of ineffective assistance.
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    966 A.2d 523
    , 535-36 (Pa. 2009).
    When raising a failure to call a potential witness claim, the
    PCRA petitioner satisfies the performance and prejudice
    requirements of the Strickland test by establishing that:
    (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available
    to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or
    should have known of, the existence of the witness;
    (4) the witness was willing to testify for the defense;
    and (5) the absence of the testimony of the witness
    was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a
    fair trial.
    Id. at 536.
    Here, Greenawalt fails to establish that a witness was available to testify
    at his trial. See Johnson, 966 A.2d at 536. Accordingly, Greenawalt has
    failed to satisfy the performance prong of the Strickland test, and his third
    ineffectiveness claim fails. See Charleston, supra.
    In his fourth claim, Greenawalt argues that Attorney Rentschler was
    ineffective in failing to request severance of the charges relating to his assault
    of Keys from the charges relating to his solicitation to commit homicide. See
    Brief for Appellant at 36-39.     However, our review discloses that Attorney
    Rentschler filed a Motion to sever the charges relating to the separate
    incidents. Indeed, as stated by the trial court,
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    [p]rior to trial, [Attorney Rentschler] filed an [O]mnibus [P]retrial
    [M]otion. The [M]otion … sought to sever the trial on the burglary,
    aggravated assault, and attempt to commit criminal homicide
    charges arising out of the incident in 2006 … from trial on the
    three counts of solicitation to commit criminal homicide arising out
    of the prison events in 2010 … citing the prejudicial effect of the
    former charges, involving actual violence, upon the defense of the
    latter charges, which did not.
    See Trial Court Opinion, 2/19/19, at 3 (footnotes omitted).         Accordingly,
    because Greenawalt’s underlying claim lacks arguable merit, his fourth
    ineffectiveness claim fails.
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm the PCRA court’s Order.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 04/21/2020
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Document Info

Docket Number: 892 MDA 2019

Filed Date: 4/21/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/21/2020