Com. v. Cook, R. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S15038-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant               :
    :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    ROBERT KEVIN COOK                          :   No. 1628 WDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Entered October 9, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-04-CR-0000899-2019
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                           FILED APRIL 22, 2020
    The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the Order entered in
    the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County on October 9, 2019, granting
    Appellee Robert Kevin Cook’s motion for habeas corpus relief for lack of prima
    facie evidence with regard to charges of possession with intent to deliver a
    controlled substance and conspiracy to commit possession with intent to
    deliver a controlled substance.1 These charges stemmed from the execution
    ____________________________________________
    *Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 The Commonwealth refers to the aforementioned charges as Counts 3 and
    4 respectively; however, the trial court denied Appellee’s petition for habeas
    corpus in regard to Count 4, which it listed as Intentional Possession of a
    Controlled Substance. See Opinion and Order, 10/9/19, at 5.
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    of a search warrant on February 1, 2019. Following a careful review, we
    reverse and remand for further proceedings.2
    Our review of the certified record reveals that following an investigation
    of three individuals: Donald Williams, Jeremiah Irving, Appellee, Trooper
    Joshua Fachet obtained and executed a search warrant for the area of 4600
    4th Avenue, Apartments 3 and 4, in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania.            At the
    Preliminary Hearing held on April 30, 2019, Trooper Fachet testified that upon
    entering Apartment 4 after executing that warrant on February 1, 2019, the
    Pennsylvania SERT team located several individuals.            N.T. Preliminary
    Hearing, 4/30/19, at 8. When he ultimately arrived, Trooper Fachet observed
    several individuals in the dining room; Although the Pennsylvania State Police
    Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) already had taken Appellee from
    the scene, Trooper Fachet learned Appellee and Irving had been found in the
    dining room, and Williams was lying in the doorway between the dining room
    and kitchen. Id. at 9, 12.
    A Vice Unit police officer on the scene notified Trooper Fachet that two,
    clear, knotted baggies, one of which contained suspected crack cocaine and
    the other of which contained two baggies of a white, powdery substance that
    was believed to be cocaine, were found in the toilet. Id. at 10. Trooper Fachet
    ____________________________________________
    2 The Commonwealth has perfected its interlocutory appeal from the Order
    granting Appellee’s suppression motion in that its notice of appeal contains
    the requisite statement certifying that the Order would “substantially handicap
    the prosecution” pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) and 904(e).
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    estimated a total amount of two to three ounces of cocaine was contained in
    the baggies. Id.
    On the kitchen countertop, Trooper Fachet observed a Pyrex cup and
    baking soda along with a stainless steel knife stained with white residue. In
    Trooper Fachet’s experience, such items are used to make crack cocaine. Id.
    at 11. A scale with a small piece of a white chunky substance on it was found
    near Appellee and Irving in the dining room.      Id. In addition to a stolen
    handgun found in the living room, Trooper Fachet recovered $1,700 from
    Irving and $1,800 from Williams. Id. at 12.
    In the only bedroom of the home, Trooper Fachet observed a small,
    knotted baggie containing suspected crack cocaine and a crack pipe in the top,
    right dresser drawer. Id. at 13. Also therein were items bearing Appellee’s
    name and the address of the apartment. Id.
    Trooper Fachet filed a criminal complaint on February 1, 2019, charging
    Appellee with the following five counts: Receiving Stolen Property; Conspiracy
    to Commit Receiving Stolen Property; Possession with Intent to Deliver;
    Conspiracy to Commit Possession with Intent to Deliver; and Possession. On
    June 10, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information charging
    Appellee with the same five counts.      On July 19, 2019, Appellee filed a
    counselled Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion for Relief wherein he requested a grant
    of habeas corpus due to a lack of sufficient evidence.
    On October 1, 2019, the trial court held a Pre-Trial hearing at which
    time Trooper Fachet provided additional testimony. Specifically, he explained
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    that surveillance at 4600, 4th Avenue, Apartment 4 identified Irving entering
    and exiting the residence, and photographs of him were taken on January 22-
    23, 2019. N.T. 10/1/19, at 9-10. Also, the search of the apartment revealed
    a court document and a shipping label bearing Appellee’s name and the
    Apartment 4 address. Id. at 12. In fact, while detained, Appellee admitted
    he resided in the apartment. Id. at 13.
    Trooper Fachet also commented upon the approximately $1700 and
    $1800 found on Irving and Williams respectively. In doing so, he noted that
    based upon his training and experience “individuals will allow dealers or drug
    traffickers to utilize their apartment for many reasons, for payment or also
    through controlled substances, various reasons, so it’s not unusual that the
    owner of the residence is not holding a lot of money.” Id. at 38.
    In its October 9, 2019, Order the trial court granted, in part, Appellee’s
    suppression motion. The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal on
    November 1, 2019. Although the trial court did not direct the Commonwealth
    to file a concise statement of the matters complained of on appeal pursuant
    to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) Opinion on October
    9, 2019.
    In its appellate brief, the Commonwealth presents the following question
    for our review:
    Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the evidence was
    insufficient for a prima facie case at to possession with intent to
    deliver and conspiracy to commit [sic] possession with intent to
    deliver.
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    Brief of Appellant at 7.
    The Commonwealth argues the trial court erred in finding Appellee
    lacked the requisite control of the contraband to establish possession
    because other occupants also were present in the apartment, for the
    fact that additional individuals were there at the time of the execution
    of the search warrant is not dispositive of whether Appellee had
    constructive possession of the contraband. Brief of Appellant at 19. In
    addition, the Commonwealth urges that the quantity of drugs police
    discovered in the apartment was sufficient to establish a prima facie
    case of possession with intent to deliver the same. Id. at 21-23. The
    Commonwealth further posits that in light of existing caselaw, at a
    minimum, the evidence established Appellee had a shared criminal
    intent with his cohorts to commit possession with intent to deliver. Id.
    at 26.
    At the outset, we recognize:
    In reviewing a trial court’s order granting a defendant’s petition
    for writ of habeas corpus, we must generally consider whether the
    record supports the trial court’s findings, and whether the
    inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings are
    free from error. A trial court may grant a defendant’s petition for
    writ [of] habeas corpus after a preliminary hearing where the
    Commonwealth has failed to present a prima facie case against
    the defendant.
    Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 
    172 A.3d 5
    , 10 (Pa.Super. 2017) (quotation
    marks and citations omitted). Further:
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    The evidentiary sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s case, or lack
    thereof, is a question of law; as such, our scope of review is
    plenary. Commonwealth v. Karetny, [ ] 
    880 A.2d 505
    , 528 (
    [Pa.] 2005). We have previously described the well-settled
    principles governing preliminary hearings, as well as the
    Commonwealth’s concomitant burden, as follows:
    The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to
    determine whether the Commonwealth has made out a
    prima facie case for the offenses charged. A prima facie
    case consists of evidence, read in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, that sufficiently
    establishes both the commission of a crime and that the
    accused is probably the perpetrator of that crime.
    The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case
    when it produces evidence that, if accepted as true,
    would warrant the trial judge to allow the case to go to
    a jury. The Commonwealth need not prove the elements
    of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the
    prima facie standard requires evidence of the existence
    of each and every element of the crime charged.
    Moreover, the weight and credibility of the evidence are
    not factors at this stage, and the Commonwealth need
    only demonstrate sufficient probable cause to believe
    that the person charged has committed the offense.
    Commonwealth v. Ouch, 
    199 A.3d 918
    , 923 (Pa. Super. 2018)
    [ ].
    Commonwealth v. Perez, 
    220 A.3d 1069
    , 1075 (Pa.Super. 2019) (en banc)
    (emphasis and footnote omitted), appeal granted on other grounds, March 2,
    2020.
    Furthermore, “[t]o demonstrate that a prima facie case exists, the
    Commonwealth must produce evidence of every material element of the
    charged     offense(s)   as   well   as   the   defendant’s   complicity   therein.”
    Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 
    135 A.3d 1109
    , 1112 (Pa.Super. 2016)
    (citation omitted). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
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    every element of the crime(s) by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Hansley, 
    24 A.3d 410
    , 416 (Pa.Super. 2011). However,
    “we have also noted that suspicion and conjecture are not evidence and are
    unacceptable as such.” Commonwealth v. Holston, 
    211 A.3d 1264
    , 1269
    (Pa.Super. 2019) (en banc) (citation omitted). “Where the Commonwealth’s
    case relies solely upon a tenuous inference to establish a material element
    of the charge, it has failed to meet its burden of showing that the crime
    charged was committed.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted, emphasis in original). “To
    meet its burden, the Commonwealth may utilize the evidence presented at
    the preliminary hearing and also may submit additional proof.” Dantzler, 135
    A.3d at 1112 (citation omitted).
    The Crimes Code defines Possession with Intent to Deliver (PWID) as
    follows:
    Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture, delivery, or
    possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled
    substance by a person not registered under this act, or a
    practitioner not registered or licenses by the appropriate State
    board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with intent
    to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.
    35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). This Court has explained the evidence necessary
    to sustain a PWID conviction under 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) as follows:
    The Commonwealth establishes the offense of [PWID] when
    it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed
    a controlled substance with the intent to deliver it.
    To determine whether the Commonwealth presented
    sufficient evidence to sustain [a defendant’s] conviction for
    [PWID], all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
    possession are relevant and the elements of the crime may be
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    established by circumstantial evidence. Furthermore, possession
    with intent to deliver can be inferred from the quantity of the
    drugs possessed along with the other surrounding circumstances.
    Commonwealth v. Little, 
    879 A.2d 293
    , 297 (Pa.Super. 2005) (internal
    citations omitted).
    Possession may be proved “by showing actual possession,
    constructive possession, or joint constructive possession.”
    Commonwealth v. Hall, 
    199 A.3d 954
    , 960 (Pa.Super. 2018).
    Constructive possession is the ability to exercise a conscious
    dominion over the contraband. It usually comes into play when
    police find contraband somewhere other than on the defendant's
    person. Constructive possession requires proof that the defendant
    had knowledge of the existence and location of the item. The
    Commonwealth may prove such knowledge circumstantially. That
    is, it may prove that the defendant had knowledge of the existence
    and location of the items at issue from examination of the totality
    of the circumstances surrounding the case, such as whether the
    contraband was located in an area usually accessible only to the
    defendant.
    For the Commonwealth to prove constructive possession
    where more than one person has access to the contraband, the
    Commonwealth must introduce evidence demonstrating either the
    defendant’s participation in the drug-related activity or evidence
    connecting the defendant to the specific room or areas where the
    drugs were kept.
    Id. at 961 (cleaned up).
    In addition, Conspiracy requires:
    A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person to
    commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its
    commission he (1) agrees with such other person or persons that
    they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which
    constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such
    crime; or (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the
    planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or
    solicitation to commit such crime.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a).
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    In its Opinion, the trial court provides the following, brief rationale in
    support of its finding that the evidence has been legally insufficient to show
    PWID or conspiracy to PWID:
    “Factors in determining whether a defendant intended to deliver a
    controlled substance include the manner in which the controlled
    substance was packaged, the behavior of the defendant, the
    presence of drug paraphernalia, and large sums of cash found in
    possession of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Sherrell, 
    607 A.2d 767
    , 769 (Pa.Super. 1992). Trooper Fachet stated that the
    crack cocaine found in [Appellee’s] dresser was an amount
    packaged that is commonly used for personal use and that no
    money was found on [Appellee] at the time of the search. PHT,
    33, 30. “The quantity of the controlled substance is but one factor
    that courts look to in analyzing whether a defendant had the
    necessary     intent   to   deliver   a   controlled    substance.
    Commonwealth v. Pagan, 
    461 A.2d 321
    , 322 (Pa.Super. 1983). A
    scale was found near [Appellee] and the scale had less than a
    gram of residue on it. PHT, 17, 33. Possession of a small quantity
    of drugs, by itself, will not establish possession with intent to
    deliver…” Commonwealth v. Smagala, 
    383 Pa.Super. 466
    , 
    557 A.2d 347
     (1989). There has been nothing further provided and
    based on the above reasoning, [Appellee’s] Petition for Habeas
    Corpus in regards to not only Count 3, but also allegations of
    Conspiracy to PWID, is GRANTED.
    Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/9/19, at 4 (emphasis in original). Following our
    review of the record, we disagree.
    As stated previously, when executing a search warrant at 4600 4th
    Avenue Apartment 4, police observed Appellee in the dining room with Irving
    and Williams. A scale with suspected cocaine on top was located on the dining
    room table, and two to three ounces of cocaine were found in a nearby toilet.
    In addition to Appellee’s own admission that he resided there, police
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    discovered a court document and packing slip bearing his name in the only
    bedroom in the apartment.
    In light of this evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth and under the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the
    Commonwealth that “[i]t cannot be argued that [Appellee] was merely present
    in the apartment and didn’t have the requisite control because there were
    other occupants in the apartment.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. To the contrary,
    we find that, at a minimum, such evidence establishes a prima facie case for
    the constructive and joint possession of the contraband found in the dining
    room, kitchen and toilet. See Little, 
    supra.
     Accord Hall, supra at 961-62
    (holding evidence was sufficient to establish constructive possession where
    police    recovered   drugs,   scales,    packaging   material,   and   defendant’s
    documents in a one-bedroom apartment).
    The same holds true with regard to the possession with intent to deliver
    charge. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court disregarded the two to three
    grams of cocaine found in the toilet in Appellee’s apartment and considered
    only the quantity of drugs found in the dresser drawer and on the scale.
    However, this evidence, along with the scale and other manufacturing
    materials found in the kitchen, the large quantity of cash discovered on Irving
    and Williams, and the proof of Appellee’s residency, establish a prima facie
    case that Appellee constructively possessed a quantity of cocaine with an
    intent to deliver the same. Id.
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    Finally, the trial court’s analysis is essentially devoid of any discussion
    pertaining to whether or not a conspiracy existed between Appellee and his
    codefendants.    However, from the aforementioned web of evidence, viewed
    in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we find the Commonwealth
    established a prima facie case that Appellee, Irving and Williams had a shared
    criminal intent to sell the cocaine over which the three men exercised
    conscious dominion and control.
    Prior to the execution of the search warrant, police observed Irving
    entering and exiting numerous areas of the apartment building as well as
    Appellee’s residence. When officers entered Apartment 4, Appellee’s admitted
    residence, Irving, Williams and he were found in the same room and in close
    proximity to the drugs and other contraband. Although Appellee did not have
    a large sum of cash on his person, Trooper Fachet explained that in his training
    and experience he had learned that an individual often allows a drug dealer to
    utilize his or her apartment to further the illegal enterprise. This circumstantial
    evidence establishes, at a minimum, that the Commonwealth put forth a prima
    facie case of conspiracy to commit possession with intent to deliver.         See
    Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    874 A.2d 108
    , 122 (Pa.Super. 2005) (ruling
    circumstantial evidence of relationship with other occupant of a vehicle and
    joint access to contraband was sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction).
    Accordingly, we reverse the Order granting Appellee habeas corpus
    relief and remand for trial.
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    Order Reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/22/2020
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