McDonald, J. v. CNX Gas Company ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JOHN MCDONALD, SR. AND JAMES J. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PURMAN, IV : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellants :
:
:
v. :
:
:
CNX GAS COMPANY, LLC., AND :
BARRY L. MCCONNELL AND JEFFREY :
W. MCCONNELL : No. 83 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered December 18, 2019
in the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County
Civil Division at No(s): A.D. 769,2015
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2020
John McDonald, Sr. (“McDonald”), and James J. Purman, IV (“Purman”)
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”), appeal from the Order entering summary judgment
against them and in favor of CNX Gas Company, LLC (“CNX”), Barry L.
McConnell (“McConnell”), and Jeffrey W. McConnell (“J. McConnell”)
(McConnell and J. McConnell collectively referred to as “the McConnells”) (all
defendants hereinafter referred to as “the CNX Defendants”). We affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant history underlying the instant
appeal as follows:
McDonald is the owner of an undivided [ninety percent] (90%)
interest in 115+ acres located in Morris Township, Greene County,
Pennsylvania [(“the McDonald Land”)]. [] Purman owns a[n]
undivided [ten percent] (10%) interest in 131+ acres located in
Morris Township, Greene County, Pennsylvania [(“the Purman
Land”)]. The Purman Land includes the McDonald Land.
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[Plaintiffs’] Complaint sets forth claims for Declaratory
Relief, an Accounting, Trespass and Ejectment.
On December 14, 1977, Melvin M. McConnell and Hester L.
McConnell [(collectively, “the Lessors”)] entered into an Oil and
Gas Lease [(“the 1977 Lease” or “the Lease”)] with Consolidation
Coal Company [(“CCC”)]. Defendants [] McConnell and [J.
McConnell] are the heirs of the Lessors. [] CNX [] acquired the
[CCC’s] interest in the Lease.
The primary term of the Lease is twenty-five years and can
be extended by either (1) production or (2) drilling operations.
Moreover, at the end of the primary term, the lessee[, CCC,] can
elect to extend the Lease by an additional twenty-five years by
paying the Lessors a renewal charge of $50.00 per acre. The
Lease also grants specific rights to use the surface and allow[s]
for unitiz[]ation with other properties.
On February 17, 1993, [the Lessors] conveyed a 131+ acre
tract to James F. Kern [(“Kern”)] and Nancy Kern [(collectively,
“the Kerns”)]. The conveyance was subject to the 1977 Lease[,]
and the [Lessors] excepted and reserved from the conveyance all
the oil and gas rentals and royalties associated with the Lease.
On November 15, 2002, [CCC] exercised the option to
extend the 1977 Lease. [The McConnells, as heirs of the Lessors,]
were issued checks in accordance with this option.
On June 18, 2003, [the Kerns] conveyed the property to
[McDonald] and John H. McDonald, Jr. [(“McDonald, Jr.”)
(collectively, “the McDonalds”)].
The conveyance was subject to the 1977 Lease and
excepted and reserved all the oil and gas rentals and royalties
from the 1977 Lease to the heirs of [the Lessors].
On March 26, 2005, [McDonald] and [] McDonald, Jr.[,]
conveyed 131+ acres to [McDonald].
The conveyance was subject to the 1977 Lease and
excepted and reserved all [of] the oil and gas rentals and royalties
from the 1977 Lease to the heirs of [the Lessors].
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On September 30, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint.
[Plaintiffs contested the CNX Defendants[’] oil and gas rights
under the 1977 Lease.] In response to the Complaint, [the CNX
Defendants] have Counter-Claimed seeking Declaratory Relief in
favor of their rights….
Trial Court Opinion, 3/15/18, at 1-3 (unnumbered).
At the close of discovery, the CNX Defendants filed a Motion for partial
summary judgment. On March 15, 2018, the trial court granted the Motion.
Plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal, which this Court quashed on December
10, 2018. See McDonald v. CNX Gas Co., 203 A.3d 304 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(unpublished memorandum).
CNX subsequently filed a Supplemental Motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs also filed their own Motion for summary judgment. On December
18, 2019, the trial court entered an Order denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for
summary judgment, and granting the CNX Defendants’ Supplemental Motion
for summary judgment. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed the instant timely appeal,
followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters
complained of on appeal.
Plaintiffs present eight claims in their Statement of Questions involved,
but set forth five differently-worded claims in the argument section of their
brief:
1. “[Whether] the 1977 Lease Extension was not valid because
A. The Lease Extension charge was paid to the wrong party;
and
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B. CCC failed to record the Lease extension in the Recorder’s
Office.” See Brief for Appellants at 14, 20.
2. “[Whether] McDonald is a bona fide purchaser.” See id. at 32.
3. “[Whether] McDonald’s trespass claims were improperly
dismissed.” See id. at 36.
4. “[Whether] McDonald’s ejectment claims were improperly
dismissed.” See id. at 38.
5. “[Whether] McDonald’s accounting claim was improperly
dismissed.” See id. at 39.
We will address Plaintiffs’ claims in the order set forth above.
Initially, we are cognizant of our scope and standard of review:
Our scope of review of an order granting summary judgment
is plenary. [W]e apply the same standard as the trial court,
reviewing all the evidence of record to determine whether there
exists a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment
be entered.
Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly
implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of his cause of
action. ... Thus, a record that supports summary judgment will
either (1) show the material facts are undisputed or (2) contain
insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of
action or defense and, therefore, there is no issue to be
submitted to the [fact-finder]. Upon appellate review, we are not
bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law, but may reach our
own conclusions. The appellate Court may disturb the trial court’s
order only upon an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
DeArmitt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 73 A.3d 578, 585-86 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Our standard of review for a declaration of rights is also well settled.
Under the Declaratory Judgments Act,[1] the trial court is
empowered to declare the rights and obligations of the parties
involved. Our standard of review in a declaratory judgment action
is limited to determining whether the trial court clearly abused its
discretion or committed an error of law. We may not substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court if the court’s determination
is supported by the evidence.
Robson v. EMC Ins. Cos., 785 A.2d 507, 509 (Pa. Super. 2001) (footnote
added, citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In their first issue, Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in entering
summary judgment in favor of the CNX Defendants, when the evidence
establishes that the 1977 Lease renewal was not valid. Brief for Appellants at
14. Plaintiffs recognize that the Lessors entered into the Lease in 1977, for a
term of 25 years, and that the Lease was recorded at that time. Id. at 15.
Plaintiffs state that in 1993, the McConnells conveyed the [l]eased [l]and” to
the Kerns, but excepted from that conveyance “all the oil and gas rentals and
royalties under the above recited oil and gas lease until the expiration or
termination of the same, whereupon all the oil and gas rights shall revert to
the [Kerns], the Grantees herein, their heirs and assigns.” Id. at 16 (citation
omitted). Plaintiffs posit that the conveyance reserved the rents and royalties
to the McConnells, but not the renewal fee. Id. at 17. According to Plaintiffs,
CNX’s predecessor, CCC, paid the renewal fee to the McConnells, and not the
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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7531-7541.
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Kerns. Id. at 20. Because the renewal fee was not paid to the Kerns, Plaintiffs
argue, the oil and gas lease expired, and they now own the rights to the gas
and oil underlying the property. Id.
Our review of the record discloses that Plaintiffs waived this issue. In
their initial Complaint and in subsequent filings, Plaintiffs claimed that the
Lease renewal was not valid, based solely upon CCC’s failure to record the
renewal in the Greene County Recorder’s Office. See Complaint, 9/30/15, at
¶¶ 7-8 (averring that the renewal or extension of the Lease was not “filed” or
recorded); Response to New Matter and Counterclaim of the McConnells,
1/12/16, at ¶ 6 (averring that notice of an extension of the Lease was not
recorded); Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to CNX’s Preliminary Objections,
1/29/16, at 3 (unnumbered) (asserting that no renewal or extension of the
Lease was recorded). Significantly, in opposing CNX’s October 30, 2017,
Motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs claimed only that CCC “never
confirmed that lease extension by recording a notice thereof in the Recorder’s
Office of Greene County, PA.” Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment, 2/1/18, at 2.
Our review further discloses that on March 15, 2018, the trial court
entered summary judgment against Plaintiffs as to the validity of the Lease
renewal, concluding that the Lease renewal was not void based upon a lack of
recording. Trial Court Opinion and Order, 3/15/18, at 3-4. Following the
quashal of Plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal of that Order, Plaintiffs filed their
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own Motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs first raised their present claim
in that Motion. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ Motion for summary judgment claimed
that the Lease renewal was void, based upon CCC’s alleged payment to the
wrong party. See Motion for Summary Judgment, 5/31/19, at 6.
As this Court has explained,
a non-moving party’s failure to raise grounds for relief in the trial
court[,] as a basis upon which to deny summary judgment[,]
waives those grounds on appeal. … A decision to pursue one
argument over another carries the certain consequence of waiver
for those arguments that could have been raised but were not.
This proposition is consistent with our Supreme Court’s efforts to
promote finality, and effectuates the clear mandate of our
appellate rules requiring presentation of all grounds for relief to
the trial court as a predicate for appellate review.
Walsh v. Borczon, 881 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. 2005) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Harber Philadelphia Center City Office Ltd. v. LPCI Ltd. P’ship,
764 A.2d 1100, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2000)).
Thus, the trial court finally resolved Plaintiffs’ claim of an invalid Lease
renewal based upon the only theory advance by Plaintiffs: the failure to record
the Lease renewal in Greene County. Plaintiffs waived any other basis for
opposing summary judgment, on their claim of an invalid Lease renewal, by
not raising it in opposition to the CNX Defendants’ October 30, 2017, Motion
for summary judgment. See Walsh, supra. Accordingly, we cannot grant
Plaintiffs relief on this portion of their first issue.
Also, in their first issue, Plaintiffs challenge the validity of the Lease
renewal based upon CCC’s failure to record the renewal in Greene County.
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Brief for Appellants at 20. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that CCC’s failure to
record the Lease renewal at the Recorder’s Office, as required by statute,
rendered the renewal void. Id. at 21. Plaintiffs argue that they cannot be
charged with notice of the Lease’s renewal, because no such renewal was
recorded. Id. at 23. Thus, Plaintiffs claim ownership of the oil and gas
underlying their property by virtue of the failure to record the renewal of the
1977 Lease.
Pennsylvania’s recording statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Every such deed, conveyance, contract, or other instrument of
writing which shall not be acknowledged or proved and
recorded … shall be adjudged fraudulent and void as to any
subsequent bona fide purchaser or mortgagee or holder of any
judgment, duly entered in the prothonotary’s office of the county
in which the lands, tenements, or hereditaments are situate,
without actual or constructive notice unless such deed,
conveyance, contract, or instrument of writing shall be
recorded … before the recording of the deed or conveyance or the
entry of the judgment under which such subsequent purchaser,
mortgagee, or judgment creditor shall claim.
21 Pa.C.S.A. § 351.
The purpose of Pennsylvania’s land recording statutes is “to protect
subsequent bona fide purchasers by providing notice of conveyances and any
other restrictions on land and guarding against a fraudulent title.”
MERSCORP, Inc. v. Delaware County, 207 A.3d 855, 866 (Pa. 2019)
(citing, inter alia, Montgomery County, Pa. v. MERSCORP Inc., 795 F.3d
372 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that Pennsylvania recording statutes do not create
a mandatory duty to record every conveyance but, rather provide instructions
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for “preserv[ing] the property holder’s rights as against a subsequent bona
fide purchaser”)). “[A] property owner has the duty to become aware of
recorded restrictions in the chain of title and will be bound to such restrictions
even absent actual notice.” Vernon Twp. Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc. v.
Connor, 855 A.2d 873, 880 (Pa. 2004); see Finley v. Glenn, 154 A. 299,
301 (Pa. 1931) (noting that a “grantee is chargeable with notice of everything
affecting his title which could be discovered by an examination of the records
or other [documentary evidence] of title of his grantor”). “It is always
the duty of a purchaser of real estate to investigate the title of his vendor, and
the purchaser must exercise due diligence in this regard.” Sabella v.
Appalachian Dev. Corp., 103 A.3d 83, 103 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations
omitted).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has explained this due diligence
obligation as follows:
[The purchasers’] title could be affected only with what they
actually or constructively knew at the time of the purchase;
necessarily, as to the latter, by what they could have learned by
inquiry of the person in possession and of others who, they had
reason to believe, knew of facts which might affect the tit[l]e, and
also by what appeared in the appropriate indexes in the office of
the recorder of deeds, and in the various courts of record whose
territorial jurisdiction embraced the land in dispute; but not of that
which they could not have learned by inquiry of those only whom
they had reason to believe knew of the facts.
Nolt v. TS Calkins & Assocs., LP, 96 A.3d 1042, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(quoting Lund v. Heinrich, 189 A.2d 581, 585 (Pa. 1963) (internal citations
omitted)). “Accordingly, a purchaser fulfills his or her due diligence
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requirement when he or she examines the documents recorded in the county
or counties in which the property is situated and when he or she asks the
possessor about title, as well as any other people the purchaser has reason to
believe would know about the status of the property’s title.” Nolt, 96 A.3d at
1048.
Here, the trial court determined that McDonald was not a bona fide
purchaser of the oil and gas rights subject to the 1977 Lease. Trial Court
Opinion, 3/15/18, at 4. In their second issue, Plaintiffs challenge this
determination. See Brief for Appellants at 32. We therefore address the issue
of McDonald’s bona fide purchaser status at this time.
McDonald claims that the language of the deeds in his chain of title did
not place him on notice as to whether the initial term of the Lease had been
extended. Id. However, our review discloses that McDonald’s chain of title
provided ample notice of the exception and reservation of the oil and gas
rights conveyed by the 1977 Lease. Beginning with the 1977 Lease, certain
oil and gas rights were conveyed by the Lessors to CCC. The 1977 Lease was
recorded at Greene County Deed Book Volume (“DBV”) 625, page 1055.2
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2 As this Court has explained, “an oil and gas lease reflects a conveyance of
property rights within a highly technical and well-developed industry, and thus
certain aspects of property law as refined by and utilized within the industry
are necessarily brought into play.” McCausland v. Wagner, 78 A.3d 1093,
1100 (Pa. Super. 2013).
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In 1993, the Lessors conveyed 131+ acres, with some exclusions, to the
Kerns (“the Lessors/Kerns Deed”). The Lessors/Kerns Deed expressly
excepted and reserved the oil and gas rights associated with the 1977 Lease,
providing as follows:
This conveyance is made subject to a certain oil and gas lease
currently in effect on the premises herein conveyed from Melvin
M. McConnell et ux. to [CCC], dated December 14, 1977 and
recorded April 14, 1978 in the Recorder’s Office of Greene County
in Deed Book Vol. 625, page 1055, together with the drilling and
operating rights, no well however to be drilled nearer than two
hundred (200) feet to the house and barn now on said land.
There is EXCEPTED AND RESERVED unto the said Melvin M.
McConnell and Hester Lavonne McConnell, his wife, the Grantors
herein, their heirs and assigns, all oil and gas rentals and royalties
under the terms and provisions of the above recited oil and gas
lease agreement until the expiration or termination of the same,
whereupon all oil and gas rights shall revert to the said James F.
Kern and Nancy Kern, his wife, the Grantees herein, their heirs
and assigns.
Lessors/Kerns Deed, 2/17/93. The Lessors/Kerns Deed was recorded at
Greene County DBV 111, page 1271.
In June 2003, the Kerns conveyed an interest in the property to the
McDonalds, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship (“the
Kern/McDonalds Deed”). The Kerns/McDonalds Deed included the same
exception and reservation stated in the Lessors/Kerns Deed. In addition, the
Kerns/McDonalds Deed expressly provided the following exception and
reservation of rights related to the Lease:
EXCEPTED AND RESERVED unto the said Melvin M. McConnell and
Hester Lavonne McConnell, his wife, the Grantors herein, their
heirs and assigns, all oil and gas rentals and royalties under the
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terms and provisions of the above recited oil and gas [L]ease
agreement until the expiration or termination of the same,
whereupon all oil and gas rights shall revert to the said James F.
Kern and Nancy Kern, his wife, the Grantees herein, their heirs
and assigns. Further, that the said James F. Kern and Nancy Kern,
his wife, the Grantors herein, hereby convey all their right, title
and interest in said oil and gas rentals and lease agreements to
John H. McDonald, Sr. and John H. McDonald, Jr., as their assigns.
Kern/McDonalds Deed, 6/18/03. This deed was duly recorded at Greene
County DBV 281, page 567. Thus, McDonald had notice of the exception and
reservation of rights related to the 1977 Lease by virtue of the 2003
Kern/McDonalds Deed.
In March 2005, the McDonalds executed a quit claim deed (the
“McDonalds/McDonald Deed”) transferring the McDonalds’ property interest
solely to McDonald. McDonalds/McDonald Deed, 3/26/05. Included in that
deed was the following reservation and exception of rights:
This conveyance is SUBJECT to a certain oil and gas lease
currently in effect on the premises herein conveyed from [the
Lessors] to [CCC], dated December 14, 1997[,] and recorded April
14, 1998[,] in the Recorder’s Office of Greene County,
Pennsylvania, in [DBV] 625, Page 1055, together with the drilling
and operating rights, no well however to be drilled nearer than
two hundred (200) feet to the house and barn now on said land.
There is EXCEPTED AND RESERVED unto the said [Lessors] the
Grantors herein, their heirs and assigns, all oil and gas rentals and
royalties under the terms and provisions of the above recited oil
and gas lease agreement until the expiration or termination of the
same, whereupon all oil and gas rights shall revert to the said
[Kerns], the Grantees herein, their heir and assigns. Further, that
the said [Kerns], Grantors, herein convey all their right, title and
interest in said oil and gas rentals and royalties and lease
agreements to [the McDonalds], as their assigns.
….
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SUBJECT to oil and gas rights heretofore granted, excepted or
reserved of record; to rights of way for pipe lines and pole lines of
record, and to building restrictions set forth in prior deeds of
records.
Id. at 2. The McDonalds/McDonald Deed was recorded at Greene County DBV
321, page 349.
Thus, notice of the 1977 Lease was recorded repeatedly in McDonald’s
chain-of-title, up to and including the McDonalds’ conveyance to McDonald.
As McDonald is “chargeable with notice of everything affecting his title[,]” see
Finley, supra, and McDonald had a duty to investigate the status of the oil
and gas Lease disclosed in his deeds, see Nolt, supra, McDonald cannot
establish his status as a bona fide purchaser, as a matter of law. Discerning
no error by the trial court in this regard, we cannot grant McDonald relief on
his first and second issues.
In their third issue, Plaintiffs challenge the entry of summary judgment
as to their trespass claim. Brief for Appellants at 10. Plaintiffs contend that
the CNX Defendants never argued, and provided no facts establishing, that
their alleged “trespassory conduct” was reasonable or “was activity related to
oil and gas development on the McDonald [P]roperty.” Id. at 37. Plaintiffs
argue that “while CNX argued that the ‘reasonable use’ doctrine applies to oil
and gas development, CNX made no effort to establish that the conduct
alleged by McDonald was reasonable and involved oil and gas development.”
Id. at 37-38.
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In their Complaint, Plaintiffs averred a trespass cause of action based
upon CNX’s entry upon the property “without right or privilege[.]” Complaint,
9/30/15, ¶ 27. Plaintiffs did not claim a trespass based upon an unreasonable
use of the property. Thus, a trespass cause of action based upon
“unreasonable use” of the surface of the property is waived. See Garcia v.
Cmty. Legal Servs. Corp., 524 A.2d 980, 982 (Pa. Super. 1987) (holding
that the failure to plead separate causes of action waives any unclaimed cause
of action); see also McShea v. City of Phila., 995 A.2d 334, 340 (Pa. 2010)
(explaining that, although the Rules of Civil Procedure are to be liberally
construed, “liberal construction does not permit unpled elements be pulled
from thin air and grafted onto the pleading; it does not excuse the basic
requirements of pleading. Where a pleading is straightforward, such as here,
there can be no reworking of the claim so as to create a different theory of
recovery.”).
Regarding Plaintiffs trespass claim, we observe that “a trespass occurs
when a person who is not privileged to do so intrudes upon land in
possession of another, whether willfully or by mistake.” Briggs v. Sw.
Energy Prod. Co, 224 A.3d 334, 346 (Pa. 2020) (emphasis added).
Therefore, “[a] right of entry constitutes an absolute defense to an action in
trespass.” Gedekoh v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co., 133 A.2d 283, 284-85 (Pa.
Super. 1957).
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As stated above, CNX had the right of entry by virtue of the 1977 Lease.
Plaintiffs’ claims challenging validity of the Lease lack merit, as discussed in
detail supra. Because the record establishes CNX’s right to enter the property
pursuant to the 1977 Lease, we discern no error by the trial court in dismissing
Plaintiffs’ trespass cause of action premised upon the lack of privilege to enter
the property.
In addition, regarding Purman’s individual trespass claim, the trial court
stated the following: “Plaintiff Purman’s interest in this matter arises from the
Purman Land encompassing the McDonald Land. Since Plaintiff McDonald
cannot sustain his burden as a bona fide purchaser, [] Purman cannot
maintain an action in ejectment against the McConnell Defendants or their
Lessee, Defendant CNX[].” Trial Court Opinion, 3/15/18, at 3 (unnumbered).
Further, in a subsequent Opinion, the trial court explained Purman’s
status as follows:
The chain of title by which [] Purman claims his ownership interest
[(the “Purman Interest”)] includes a quit claim deed dated August
7, 1951[,] recorded at [DBV] 483, Page 14, wherein Hazel
Purman, widow of James Purman, II, quitclaimed any interest she
may have in the subject tract, purporting to include the Purman
Interest, to James J. Purman, III [(“Purman, III”)]. However, the
record indicates that at the time of the aforementioned quit claim
deed, Hazel Purman had no interest in the Purman Interest to
convey.
In an apparent effort to clarify Ownership, Wilma S. Milliken, Helen
Gaylord, John Hook and Sarah Hook, his wife, record owners of
the Purman Interest, subsequently filed a quiet title action … at
No. 39 December Term 1956, [in] the Greene County Court of
Common Pleas [(“the quiet title action”)]. In the [] quiet title
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action, the plaintiffs all claimed title to the Purman Interest by way
of deeds dated July 13, 1951 ….
By Decree entered December 27, 1956, the [trial court]
ordered that [] Purman, III[,] be “forever barred from asserting
any right, lien title[,] or interest in the real estate described in the
[C]omplaint inconsistent with the interests of the plaintiffs …
unless the said defendant commences an action in ejectment
within thirty (30) days. After responsive pleadings by [] Purman,
III, the December 27, 1956[,] Decree became final following the
filing of a praecipe on March 25, 1957[,] entering judgment of the
plaintiffs for failure of [Purman, III] to timely commence an action
of ejection.
Because the August 7, 1951[,] quit claim deed into
Purman’s predecessor did not effectively convey the Purman
Interest, and the record indicates no other source of title into []
Purman, [] Purman never acquired any interest in the subject oil
and gas. As all of [] Purman’s claims rest upon his claim of
ownership in the subject oil and gas, all of his claims are hereby
dismissed, in their entirety.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/19, at 2-3. The record confirms the trial court’s
analysis and conclusion. Consequently, Purman’s trespass action fails for this
reason as well. See id.
In the fourth issue, Plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly entered
summary judgment against McDonald as to his ejectment claim. Brief for
Appellants at 38. In support, McDonald argues that “[b]ecause McDonald’s
ejectment claim involved acti[]vity related to the development by CNX of an
adjacent property for oil and gas drilling, his claim should not be dismissed.”
Id. According to McDonald, “the placing of an embankment on his property
and the placing of a road on his property were unauthorized encroachments,
as the activity related to the development of a drilling pad on an adjacent
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property. Id. McDonald asserts that there was no connection between the
activity on his property and the oil and gas Lease. Id. McDonald does not
direct our attention to any legal authority that would support his claim.
“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim
with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other
meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.” Umbelina v.
Adams, 34 A.3d 151, 161 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs
neither apply relevant, legal authority to the facts of the case, nor present any
basis upon which this Court could conclude that the grant of summary
judgment was inappropriate. Accordingly, this claim is waived. See id.; see
also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that a brief’s argument portion must include
"discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”).
Finally, in their fifth issue, Plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly
entered summary judgment against them as to McDonald’s claim for an
accounting. Brief for Appellants at 39. According to Plaintiffs, “McDonald’s
accounting claim was based on CNX producing oil and gas without a lease.
Because of the above trial court errors, McDonald’s accounting claim should
not have been dismissed.” Id.As set forth above, we find no merit to Plaintiffs’ preceding issues.
Further, we observe that Plaintiffs, again, cite no legal authorities to support
their claim. Thus, this claim not only lacks merit, it is waived. See Umbelina
34 A.3d at 161; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/10/2020
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