Wakefield, D. v. Gilmore, R. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S21019-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    DALE MICHAEL WAKEFIELD                  :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant             :
    :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    ROBERT GILMORE                          :    No. 1371 WDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Entered August 26, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County Civil Division at
    No(s): 517 Civil 2019
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                              FILED JUNE 03, 2020
    Appellant, Dale Michael Wakefield, appeals pro se from the August 26,
    2019 Order entered in the Somerset County Court of Common Pleas Civil
    Division dismissing his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and denying his
    request to proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). After careful review, we affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history are, briefly, as follows. Since
    2014, Appellant has been serving a life sentence at SCI-Somerset imposed
    after he pleaded guilty to Murder and Aggravated Assault.
    In early 2018, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count
    each of Criminal Homicide, Assault by Prisoner, and Aggravated Assault after
    prison staff discovered Appellant’s cellmate dead in their shared cell in the
    Restricted Housing Unit. On May 14, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a notice
    of aggravating circumstances and intent to seek the death penalty. Appellant
    waived his right to counsel and filed pro se numerous pretrial motions.
    J-S21019-20
    On May 2, 2018, Appellant filed pro se1 a Request to Proceed IFP and a
    Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in which he claimed that Criminal Homicide
    is not a valid charge and that it, therefore, fails to confer necessary subject
    matter jurisdiction over his case to the court of common pleas.        The civil
    division of the Somerset County Court of Common Pleas transferred the
    Petition to the criminal division for disposition.
    On January 25, 2019, the criminal trial court held a hearing on
    Appellant’s Petition, and thereafter denied it.2
    Relevant to this Appeal, on August 15, 2019, Appellant again filed pro
    se in the civil division a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and request to
    proceed IFP raising the same issues and presenting the same arguments as
    in his May 2, 2018 Petition, i.e., that Criminal Homicide is a non-existent
    offense and that the criminal division of the court of common pleas, therefore,
    lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The civil division declined to transfer this
    Petition to the criminal division and, instead, denied Appellant’s request to
    ____________________________________________
    1   See Docket Number 249 Civil 2018.
    2 The certified record for the instant appeal contains the Notes of Testimony
    from the January 25, 2019 hearing on Appellant’s first Petition for Habeas
    Corpus and a copy of the Petition, admitted as an Exhibit.
    -2-
    J-S21019-20
    proceed IFP and dismissed Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.3
    This appeal followed.4
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    [1.] Whether the lower court judge abused his discretion in
    denying the Writ of Habeas Corpus by ignoring lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction?
    [2.] Whether the lower court judge abused his discretion in
    denying the Writ of Habeas Corpus by ignoring and disregarding
    settled law and intervening binding precedent in the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Kemmerer, []
    
    584 A.2d 940
    ([Pa.] 1991)?
    [3.] Whether the lower court judge abused his discretion by
    unlawfully suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
    [4.] Whether the lower court judge abused his discretion and
    obstructed justice by violating [] Appellant’s state and federal
    constitutional rights by suspending the writ of habeas corpus?
    [5.] Whether the lower court judge abused his discretion and
    willfully disregarded substantive due process, along with
    procedural due process of Pa.R.Crim.P. 502?
    [6.] Whether the lower court judge abused his discretion and
    cause[d] a miscarriage of justice by denying the writ of habeas
    corpus where there was no lawful authority to arrest and
    subsequently detain Appellant?
    [7.] Whether the lower court judge abused his discretion and
    violated his oath of office by denying the writ of habeas corpus to
    an innocent petitioner?
    ____________________________________________
    3 The trial court ruled that Appellant’s reliance on Commonwealth v.
    Kemmerer, 
    584 A.2d 940
    (Pa. 1991), discussed infra, was misplaced and,
    therefore, his substantive claims were frivolous.
    4 Appellant complied with the trial court’s Order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    Statement. The trial court did not file a Rule 1925(a) Opinion.
    -3-
    J-S21019-20
    [8.] Whether the lower court judge abused his discretion by
    suspending the writ of habeas corpus in violation of separation of
    powers?
    Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.
    Each of Appellant’s issues challenges the trial court’s Order dismissing
    his second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
    We review the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus for an abuse
    of discretion. Rivera v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
    837 A.2d 525
    , 528 (Pa. Super.
    2003).
    Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claims, we consider whether
    Appellant’s Petition was properly before the trial court.
    Pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, once a court of competent
    jurisdiction considers and decides an issue, the court’s final judgment
    constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim.
    Mariner Chestnut Partners, L.P. v. Lenfest, 
    152 A.3d 265
    , 286 (Pa. Super.
    2016).     The application of res judicata “reflects the refusal of the law to
    tolerate    a   multiplicity   of   litigation.”   Day   v.   Volkswagenwerk
    Aktiengesellschaft, 
    464 A.2d 1313
    , 1316 (Pa. Super. 1983). The doctrine
    bars a subsequent action when both lawsuits contain the following elements
    in common:
    (1) identity of the thing sued upon; (2) identity of the cause of
    action; (3) identity of the parties; (4) identity of the capacity of
    the parties.
    -4-
    J-S21019-20
    Robinson Coal Co. v. Goodall, 
    72 A.3d 685
    , 689 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations
    and internal punctuation omitted). Moreover,
    [i]n determining whether res judicata should apply, a court may
    consider whether the factual allegations of both actions are the
    same, whether the same evidence is necessary to prove each
    action and whether both actions seek compensation for the same
    damages. If the acts or transactions giving rise to causes of action
    are identical, there may be sufficient identity between two actions
    for the [holding] in the first action to be res judicata in the second.
    Dempsey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 
    653 A.2d 679
    , 681 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en
    banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    As noted above, Appellant had previously filed a Petition for Writ of
    Habeas Corpus in which, relying on Kemmerer, supra,5 as he does here, he
    challenged the “existence” of the offense of Criminal Homicide and asserted
    that its “non-existence” resulted in the court’s lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction over his case.        See N.T., 1/25/19 at 14-20.       After hearing
    argument, the criminal division of the Somerset County Court of Common
    Pleas dismissed Appellant’s Petition.6
    Id. at 20.
    ____________________________________________
    5 In Kemmerer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Pa.R.Crim.P.
    1120(d) did not preclude the Commonwealth from reprosecuting the
    defendant for second-degree murder, third-degree murder, and voluntary
    manslaughter after a jury found the defendant not guilty of first-degree
    murder and voluntary manslaughter. 
    Kemmerer, 584 A.2d at 945
    . In so
    holding, the Court rejected the defendant’s claim that because the various
    degrees of manslaughter and murder fell under the umbrella of criminal
    homicide, they are necessarily included in one another.
    Id. at 944-45.
    6 The trial court concluded that 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501(a), defining Criminal
    Homicide, is a constitutionally appropriate charge, and, therefore, Appellant’s
    claims lacked merit.
    -5-
    J-S21019-20
    In the instant Petition, filed at a separate civil docket number, Appellant
    raised the same claims and presented the same arguments as those
    previously adjudicated by the criminal division of the Court of Common Pleas.
    In particular, the factual allegations in the Petitions are the same, the acts
    giving rise to the relief sought by Appellant are the same, the identity and
    capacity of the parties are the same, and the relief sought is the same.
    Following our review, we conclude that the doctrine of res judicata
    barred Appellant from seeking the same relief in the instant Petition.
    Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
    Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
    Order affirmed.7
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/3/2020
    ____________________________________________
    7 It is well-settled that we may affirm on different grounds than those
    advanced by the trial court. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 
    778 A.2d 1215
    ,
    1223 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2001).
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1371 WDA 2019

Filed Date: 6/3/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/3/2020