In the Int. of: C.J.C., Appeal of: C.J.C ( 2020 )

J-A15035-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.J.C, A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
:
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.J.C., A MINOR : No. 3513 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered August 30, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-45-JV-0000092-2019
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KING, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2020
Appellant, C.J.C., a minor, appeals from the dispositional order entered
in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, following his
adjudications of delinquency for rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
(“IDSI”), aggravated indecent assault without consent, aggravated indecent
assault by forcible compulsion, indecent assault without consent, indecent
assault by forcible compulsion, sexual assault, and false imprisonment of a
minor.1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
April 29, 2019, Appellant raped and sexually assaulted A.T., a minor. At the
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1); 3123(a)(1); 3125(a)(1); 3125(a)(2);
3126(a)(1); 3126(a)(2); 3124.1; and 2903(b), respectively.
J-A15035-20
time, Appellant was approximately 16 years old. Following a hearing on
August 12, 2019, the court adjudicated Appellant delinquent of the
aforementioned offenses. On August 30, 2019, the court entered a
dispositional order placing Appellant in a residential facility and requiring him
to pay fees, costs, and restitution.
Appellant timely filed a post-dispositional motion on September 8, 2019.
On October 4, 2019, the court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s motion and
granted Appellant’s request for a 30-day extension of time for the court to
dispose of the motion. The court denied Appellant’s post-dispositional motion
on November 6, 2019. On December 5, 2019, Appellant filed a timely notice
of appeal2 and a voluntary concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
Whether Pennsylvania’s Criminal History…Record
Information Act (“CHRIA”) Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9123[](a.1)
“Exceptions” to expungement violate Pa. Const. Art. I, § 1
and Article I § 11 by imposing a lifetime non-expungable
conviction upon a juvenile/adult’s reputation[?]
Whether 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9123(a.1) is inherently
unconstitutional given the holding of our Supreme Court in
[In re] J.B., 630 Pa. 408, 107 A.3d 1 (2014) by creating an
irrebuttable presumption of guilt over a perpetrator’s
____________________________________________
2 See Pa.R.J.C.P. 620(B)(1), (2) (stating if post-dispositional motion is filed,
it shall be filed within 10 days of date of entry of dispositional order; if timely
post-dispositional motion is filed, notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days
of date of entry of post-dispositional order deciding motion); (D)(2) (stating
upon motion of party and good cause shown, prior to expiration of 30-day
decision period, judge may grant one 30-day extension to decide motion).
-2-
J-A15035-20
lifetime in derivation of the stated purpose of juvenile law
to rehabilitate the minor child[?]
Whether 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9123[](a.1) violates the 6th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because it imposes a
criminal lifetime sanction in juvenile court in derivation of a
person’s right to trial by jury[?]
(Appellant’s Brief at 6-7).
In his issues combined, Appellant argues Section 9123(a.1) of CHRIA is
unconstitutional. Appellant suggests his inability to expunge his juvenile
record per Section 9123(a.1) is similar to lifetime registration under the
Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) as applied to
juveniles. Appellant asserts Section 9123(a.1) creates an irrebuttable
presumption that he is incapable of rehabilitation, vitiating his right to
reputation. Appellant avers Section 9123(a.1) deprives him of an opportunity
to restore his reputation, in violation of his rights to due process and a jury
trial. Appellant adds that his virtual lifetime juvenile record precludes him
from legally possessing a firearm. Appellant concludes this Court should deem
Section 9123(a.1) of CHRIA unconstitutional. We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, “[i]ssues not raised in the [juvenile] court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
See also In Interest of M.W., 194 A.3d 1094, 1099 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2018),
appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 202 A.3d 687 (2019). Additionally, issues not
raised in a Rule 1925(b) concise statement of errors will be deemed waived.
Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 403, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (2005).
-3-
J-A15035-20
See also In re D.M., 556 Pa. 160, 162 n.1, 727 A.2d 556, 557 n.1 (1999).
Where the court does not order an appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement,
and an appellant files one on his own accord, he is limited on appeal to raising
only those issues he presented in his voluntary Rule 1925(b) statement.
Commonwealth v. Nobles, 941 A.2d 50 (Pa.Super. 2008).
Here, Appellant raises for the first time on appeal arguments
concerning: (1) inexpugnability of his juvenile record barring him from ever
legally possessing a firearm, thus eliminating some future employment
opportunities; and (2) his right to a trial by jury. Appellant also failed to
include his assertion concerning gun possession in his Rule 1925(b)
statement. Therefore, Appellant’s claims regarding possession of firearms and
jury trial rights are waived, and we give them no further attention. See
Castillo, supra; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). See also Commonwealth v. Watley,
81 A.3d 108, 117 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 626 Pa. 684,
95 A.3d 277 (2014) (explaining that constitutional claims can be waived).
Claims that a statute is unconstitutional implicate the following
principles:
When an appellant challenges the constitutionality of a
statute, the appellant presents this Court with a question of
law. Our consideration of questions of law is plenary. A
statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be
declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and
plainly violates the constitution. Thus, the party challenging
the constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden of
persuasion.
Commonwealth v. Howe, 842 A.2d 436, 441 (Pa.Super. 2004) (internal
-4-
J-A15035-20
citations omitted). “While the General Assembly may enact laws which
impinge on constitutional rights to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
society, any restriction is subject to judicial review to protect the constitutional
rights of all citizens.” In re J.B., supra at 429, 107 A.3d at 14.
Section 9123 of the CHRIA provides in relevant part as follows:
§ 9123. Juvenile records
(a) Expungement of juvenile records.—
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9105 (relating to
other criminal justice information) and except as provided
under subsection (a.1), expungement of records of juvenile
delinquency cases and cases involving summary offenses
committed while the individual was under 18 years of age,
wherever kept or retained, shall occur after 30 days’ notice
to the district attorney whenever the court upon its own
motion or upon the motion of a child or the parents or
guardian finds:
* * *
(a.1) Exceptions.—Subsection (a) shall not apply if any of
the following apply:
(1) The individual meets all of the following:
(i) Was 14 years of age or older at the time the
individual committed an offense which, if committed
by an adult, would be classified as:
(A) An offense under section 3121 (relating to
rape), 3123 (relating to [IDSI]) or 3125 (relating
to aggravated indecent assault).
* * *
(ii) Was adjudicated delinquent for the offense under
subparagraph (i).
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9123(a), (a.1)(1)(i)(A), (1)(ii).
-5-
J-A15035-20
Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution establishes the fundamental
right to reputation:
§ 1. Inherent rights of mankind
All men are born equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of
acquiring, possessing and protecting property and
reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.
Pa. Const. Art. I § 1.
§ 11. Courts to be open; suits against the
Commonwealth
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done
him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be
brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such
courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law
direct.
Pa. Const. Art. I § 11.
“[I]rrebuttable presumptions are violative of due process where the
presumption is deemed not universally true and a reasonable alternative
means of ascertaining that presumed fact are available.” In re J.B., supra
at 430, 107 A.3d at 14-15 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he essential requisites of due process are notice and meaningful
opportunity to be heard[;] a hearing which excludes consideration of an
element essential to the relevant decision does not comport with due process.”
Id. at 430, 107 A.3d at 15 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
When applying the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, courts consider whether
-6-
J-A15035-20
the challenging party asserted “an interest protected by the due process
clause that is encroached by an irrebuttable presumption, whether the
presumption is not universally true, and whether a reasonable alternative
means exists for ascertaining the presumed fact.” Id. at 432, 107 A.3d at
15-16) (employing irrebuttable presumption doctrine to hold lifetime SORNA
registration for juvenile sexual offenders created irrebuttable presumption of
juvenile offenders’ inability to rehabilitate, which impinged upon their right to
reputation; SORNA is premised upon presumption that all sexual offenders
pose high risk of recidivating and provides no opportunity to challenge that
presumption; presumption that juvenile sexual offenders are likely to commit
additional sexual offenses is not universally true; reasonable means exist to
determine if juvenile sexual offender is likely to recidivate).
Instantly, Appellant sexually abused A.T. in April 2019, when Appellant
was approximately 16 years old. In August 2019, the court adjudicated
Appellant delinquent for, inter alia, rape, IDSI, and aggravated indecent
assault. As applied to Appellant, Section 9123(a.1) of CHRIA bars
expungement of his juvenile record related to the April 2019 offenses, because
he was older than 14 when he committed rape, IDSI, and aggravated indecent
assault and the court adjudicated him delinquent of those offenses. See 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 9123(a.1)(1)(i)(A), (1)(ii).
Although Appellant insists Section 9123(a.1) of CHRIA violates his right
to reputation upon application of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, he
-7-
J-A15035-20
merely summarizes the Supreme Court’s holding in In re J.B. regarding the
unconstitutionality of lifetime SORNA registration for juvenile sexual offenders
and asks this Court to apply the rationale in In re J.B. to his inability to
expunge his record. Appellant, however, does not illustrate how In re J.B.
pertains to his juvenile record, and only vaguely suggests his inexpungible
juvenile record is commensurate with juvenile sexual offenders’ life-long
SORNA registration.
As well, Appellant fails to explain how the statutory prohibition on
expungement of his juvenile record communicates that he is incapable of
rehabilitation. Significantly, whereas the In re J.B. Court relied heavily on
the purposes and legislative findings of SORNA to determine it is grounded
upon a presumption of incorrigibility, Appellant makes no reference to the
goals of CHRIA. See In re J.B., supra. Rather, Appellant baldly asserts that
Section 9123(a.1) of CHRIA creates an irrebuttable presumption that juveniles
adjudicated delinquent of rape, IDSI, or aggravated assault are unable to
reform. Thus, Appellant fails to present adequate argument regarding the
protected interest prong of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. See
Commonwealth v. Tha, 64 A.3d 704 (Pa.Super. 2013) (explaining
arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived);
Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 596 Pa. 703, 940 A.2d 362 (2008) (stating: “[I]t is an appellant’s duty
to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief
-8-
J-A15035-20
must support the claims with pertinent discussion….”); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
Further, Appellant fails to address the second and third prongs of the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine. Appellant includes no representations
regarding the universality of the presumption that juveniles who have been
adjudicated delinquent of certain sexual offenses cannot rehabilitate. He
likewise suggests no alternative mechanisms to determine if juveniles
adjudicated delinquent of rape, IDSI, or aggravated indecent assault are
incapable of reform. Thus, Appellant’s claim that Section 9123(a.1) creates
an irrebuttable presumption of the inability to rehabilitate violating his right
to reputation, is not adequately developed on appeal. See Tha, supra;Hardy, supra. See also Watley, supra. Accordingly, Appellant’s
constitutional challenge to Section 9123(a.1) of CHRIA merits no relief, and
we affirm. See Howe, supra.Dispositional order affirmed.
Judge Lazarus concurs in the result.
Judge Strassburger concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/15/2020
-9-