Com. v. Crockett, M. ( 2020 )

J-S25031-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
MARIELIZABETH CROCKETT :
:
Appellant : No. 1851 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 30, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-SA-0000278-2019
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED JUNE 30, 2020
Appellant, Marielizabeth Crockett, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas, following her
bench trial conviction for driving with a suspended license.1 We affirm.
The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts and procedural history
of this appeal as follows:
On June 11, 2019, [Appellant] was at the home of Terri
Hake…. [Appellant] was visiting her son, Hake’s grandson.
[Appellant] left Hake’s home abruptly after an argument
about the ownership of a sign in Hake’s home. Hake
watched [Appellant] go to her car and pull away.
[Appellant’s] car was parked in front of Hake’s home.
[Appellant’s] car was parked so that the passenger side of
the vehicle was visible to Hake. Hake testified that she had
a clear view of [the] car. Hake testified that she was able
to see that [Appellant] “went to the other side of the vehicle,
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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i).
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and pulled away.” As [Appellant] was not standing in the
street when the vehicle left, she must have gotten into the
vehicle on the driver’s side. Aside from [Appellant’s] son
and Terri Hake, there were no other people present during
the visitation. Hake testified that she did not see anybody
else in the vehicle as it was pulling away.
Hake called the police after [Appellant] left because of the
argument about the sign. Officer Tanner Tyson of Northern
York County Regional Police Department responded to
Hake’s call. Officer Tyson conducted a routine license and
warrant search of [Appellant], at which point he found out
that [Appellant’s] license was suspended; when asked by
Officer Tyson, Hake was unaware of the license suspension.
After Officer Tyson discovered the license suspension, he
confirmed with Hake that she had observed [Appellant]
enter the vehicle on the driver’s side and the vehicle leave.
Officer Tyson followed up with [Appellant] about the incident
at Hake’s home. Officer Tyson testified that in response to
his question about how she had gotten to work, [Appellant]
“she kind of, you know, paused, stuttered and said that her
boyfriend drove her.” [Appellant] declined to identify her
boyfriend to Officer Tyson. Officer Tyson was unable to
corroborate [Appellant’s] version of events with Derrick
McLain as she refused to identify him at the time.
Derrick McLain, [Appellant’s] boyfriend, testified that he was
the one who was driving on June 11, 2019. McLain also
testified that [Appellant] got into the vehicle in the
passenger side.
* * *
On June 14, 2019, Officer Tyson filed a traffic citation for
Driving While BAC .02 or Greater While License Suspended.
A summary trial was held on August 19, 2019, … at the
conclusion of which [Appellant] was found guilty of the
offense. [Appellant] was sentenced to 60 days of house
arrest.
On September 9, 2019, [Appellant] filed a Summary Appeal
with the York County Court of Common Pleas. … A
Summary Conviction Appeal Hearing was held on October
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30, 2019…. At the Hearing, the Commonwealth amended
the charge from 1543(b)(1.1) to 1543(b)(1)[(i)], Driving
While Operating Privileges Were Suspended—DUI Related,
as there was no evidence that [Appellant] was intoxicated
during this incident.
At the conclusion of the Hearing, [Appellant] was found
guilty of Driving While Operating Privileges Were
Suspended—DUI Related. The sentence of 60 days of house
arrest was reimposed.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed December 11, 2019, at 1-4) (internal footnotes
omitted).
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on November 12, 2019. On
November 18, 2019, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed
her Rule 1925(b) statement on December 9, 2019.
Appellant now raises one issue for our review:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion where the weight of
the evidence was against the notion that [Appellant]
entered the driver’s seat and drove away from the witness’s
home while her license was suspended?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).2
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2 “Ordinarily, a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived unless it is
presented in the first instance to the trial court. Preservation of this type of
claim normally takes the form of a post-sentence motion. However, a
defendant convicted of a summary offense is precluded from filing any post-
sentence motions.” Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 679 A.2d 779, 784
(Pa.Super. 1996). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D) (stating there shall be no
post-sentence motion in summary case appeals following trial de novo). Here,
Appellant did not have the opportunity to file a post-sentence motion following
the trial court’s de novo review of her summary appeal. Consequently, we
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On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court should have credited Mr.
McLain’s testimony that he was the driver of the vehicle that departed from
Ms. Hake’s residence. In support of this assertion, Appellant emphasizes the
court’s statement that it did not find either witness lacking credibility.3
Appellant also insists the trial testimony demonstrated that Ms. Hake could
not fully see the vehicle. Further, Appellant claims Ms. Hake had an ulterior
motive to lie. Specifically, Appellant notes she had been in a relationship with
Ms. Hake’s son, and they had a child together. Appellant contends Ms. Hake’s
son is now incarcerated, and Ms. Hake stood to gain custody of the child if
Appellant was also incarcerated. Under these circumstances, Appellant
concludes the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and this Court
must vacate her conviction. We disagree.
Our standard of review regarding challenges to the weight of the
evidence is as follows:
A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.
Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the exercise of the
trial court’s discretion; it does not answer for itself whether
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decline to find Appellant’s issue waived on this basis. See Dougherty, supra
at 784-85 (declining to find weight issue waived on appeal following de novo
review of summary offense; noting it would be unjust to deprive appellant of
right to raise weight issue on grounds he failed to file motion he was not
entitled to file; moreover, trial court explicitly addressed credibility and weight
of evidence in its written opinion).
3 Prior to announcing the verdict, the court stated, “I don’t find anybody
particularly lacking in credibility in this case, … neither Ms. Hake nor Mr.
McLain.” (N.T. Trial, 10/30/19, at 49).
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the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is well
settled that the [fact-finder] is free to believe all, part, or
none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses, and a new trial based on a weight of the evidence
claim is only warranted where the [fact-finder’s] verdict is
so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of
justice. In determining whether this standard has been met,
appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge’s
discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be
granted where facts and reference of record disclose a
palpable abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 699 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
We have further explained:
A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict
in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the
role of the trial court is to determine that notwithstanding
all the evidence, certain facts are so clearly of greater
weight that to ignore them, or to give them equal weight
with all the facts, is to deny justice. A motion for a new trial
on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of
the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence to
sustain the verdict; thus the trial court is under no obligation
to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner.
Id. (citation omitted).
Additionally, the Motor Vehicle Code provides the following definition for
driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked:
§ 1543. Driving while operating privilege is
suspended or revoked
* * *
(b) Certain offenses.—
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(1) The following shall apply:
(i) A person who drives a motor vehicle on a
highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time
when the person’s operating privilege is suspended or
revoked as a condition of acceptance of Accelerated
Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section
3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or
controlled substance) or the former section 3731,
because of a violation of section 1547(b)(1) (relating
to suspension for refusal) or 3802 or former section
3731 or is suspended under section 1581 (relating to
Driver’s License Compact) for an offense substantially
similar to a violation of section 3802 or former section
3731 shall, upon a first conviction, be guilty of a
summary offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine
of $500 and to undergo imprisonment for a period of
not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1).
Instantly, Mr. McLain testified that he drove Appellant to Ms. Hake’s
residence on the date in question, and he waited in the vehicle while Appellant
was inside. (See N.T. Trial at 32). Mr. McLain claimed that Appellant exited
the residence, re-entered the passenger side of the vehicle, and he drove
them away. (Id. at 33). In comparison, Ms. Hake testified that she watched
Appellant leave the residence, walk around the vehicle to the driver’s side,
enter, and drive away. (Id. at 6). Ms. Hake saw no one else inside the
vehicle, and she made her observations while looking out her garage window.
(Id. at 6, 9).
Officer Tyson testified that he responded to a call regarding the incident
at Ms. Hake’s residence. (Id. at 17). Once he arrived at the scene, Ms. Hake
told Officer Tyson that she saw Appellant drive away. (Id. at 19). Officer
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Tyson conducted a routine license and warrant search and discovered that
Appellant’s license was suspended. (Id. at 18). Officer Tyson subsequently
contacted Appellant by telephone. (Id. at 19). During this conversation,
Appellant paused and stuttered when the officer asked the circumstances of
her departure from Ms. Hake’s residence. (Id.) Although Appellant claimed
her boyfriend drove her to and from Ms. Hake’s home, she would not provide
her boyfriend’s name. (Id. at 20).
In light of the conflicting testimony, the trial court evaluated the
credibility of the witnesses. Ultimately, the court found the testimony of Ms.
Hake and Officer Tyson more credible than the testimony of Mr. McLain. (See
Trial Court Opinion at 9). Following our review, we discern no abuse of
discretion in the court’s decision regarding the weight it placed on the evidence
presented at trial. See Landis, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 06/30/2020
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