Com. v. Sheldon, T. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TODD SHELDON :
:
Appellant : No. 1854 MDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 8, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0000839-2009
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED JULY 06, 2020
Todd Sheldon appeals, pro se, from the order dismissing his petition for
writ of habeas corpus, which the court treated as his second petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541-
9546. After careful review, we affirm.
Sheldon entered a plea of no contest to two counts of Rape of a Child.
In accordance with his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Sheldon to
10-20 years’ imprisonment followed by 20 years’ probation. Sheldon did not
file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal.
Several years later, Sheldon filed a pro se PCRA petition alleging that
his mandatory minimum sentence under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9718 is
unconstitutional based upon Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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and its Pennsylvania progeny. The PCRA court appointed counsel to represent
him. Upon review, the court concluded Sheldon’s petition was untimely, and
he failed to plead any exception to the PCRA’s time bar. As a result, the PCRA
court dismissed the petition without a hearing.
Sheldon later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, again claiming
his sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to Alleyne. He also maintained
that his claim was not cognizable under the PCRA.
After reviewing his petition, the PCRA court concluded that Sheldon
challenged the legality of his sentence. As such, the court treated his habeas
petition as a PCRA petition subject to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement. On
that basis, the court determined that Sheldon’s second PCRA petition was also
untimely. The court notified Sheldon, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, of its
intention to dismiss his petition. Sheldon did not file a response. The PCRA
court then issued an order dismissing Sheldon’s petition. This timely appeal
followed.
Sheldon’s sole issue on appeal is that the PCRA court erred in treating
his habeas corpus petition as an untimely PCRA petition and dismissing the
petition on that basis. See Appellant’s Brief, at 7.
“Our standard of review for issues arising from the denial of PCRA relief
is well settled. We must determine whether the PCRA court’s ruling is
supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Presley,
193 A.3d 436, 442 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
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Sheldon argues that Alleyne renders his mandatory minimum sentence
constitutionally infirm. See Appellant’s Brief, at 8. Alleyne held that any fact
that imposes a mandatory minimum sentence beyond the prescribed statutory
minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111-113. He asserts that his
sentence, imposed pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9718, is unconstitutional
because it does not conform to the requirements set forth in Alleyne. See
id., at 8 and 15. Further, he contends that, because his claim implicates the
constitutionality of his sentence, it is not cognizable under the PCRA and
therefore is not subject to its time limitations. See id., at 12.
At the outset, we must address whether the PCRA court properly
addressed Sheldon’s habeas petition under the PCRA. If “a defendant's post-
conviction claims are cognizable under the PCRA, the common law and
statutory remedies now subsumed by the PCRA are not separately available
to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001)
(citations omitted). The PCRA incorporates the remedy of habeas corpus if it
offers the petitioner a remedy pursuant to that Act. See Commonwealth v.
West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007). Similarly, the writ of habeas corpus
is not an available remedy if relief could be obtained via a post-conviction
hearing proceeding. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6503. Therefore, regardless of how
the petition is styled, “a defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling
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his motion as a writ of habeas corpus.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d
462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (footnote omitted).
Here, we agree with the PCRA court that Sheldon’s sentencing claim is
cognizable under the PCRA as a challenge to the legality of the sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Beck, 848 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 2004). The PCRA
states that “[t]his subchapter provides for an action by which . . . persons
serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9542
(emphasis added). Furthermore, we have held that claims pursuant to
Alleyne implicate the legality of the sentence and, therefore, fall within the
scope of the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86, 90 (Pa.
Super 2014) (en banc). Accordingly, habeas relief is not available for
Sheldon’s petition, and the PCRA court properly addressed his petition under
the PCRA. As such, Sheldon’s petition is subject to the PCRA’s explicit time
limitations.
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed
within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes
final. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16 (Pa. 2012). A judgment
of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, or at the
expiration of time for seeking such review. See id., at 17. After the expiration
of the one-year period, a petitioner must plead and prove one of three
enumerated exceptions to the time bar in order to establish jurisdiction under
the PCRA. See id.
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As Sheldon sought no further review of his judgment of sentence, it
became final thirty days after sentence was imposed. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
The instant petition, filed almost 10 years later, is patently untimely. Further,
given his belief that his petition is not subject to the PCRA, Sheldon has not
asserted that his petition falls within any of the timeliness exceptions provided
in the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Even if Sheldon had argued that his petition was timely pursuant to the
newly recognized constitutional right exception to the PCRA’s time bar, we
note that Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review in
Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 820 (Pa.
2016). He is therefore due no relief in any event.
In sum, the PCRA court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider Sheldon’s request for relief because his petition was untimely and
failed to assert an exception to the PCRA time bar. Accordingly, we affirm the
PCRA court’s order dismissing the petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 07/06/2020
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