Com. v. Gillespie, M. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S28029-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    :
    MARQUISE CORNELL GILLESPIE            :
    :
    Appellant           :   No. 1503 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 1, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-36-CR-0005481-2018
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    :
    MARQUISE CORNELL GILLESPIE            :
    :
    Appellant           :   No. 1614 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 1, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-36-CR-0005473-2018
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    :
    MARQUISE CORNELL GILLESPIE            :
    :
    Appellant           :   No. 1615 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 1, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-36-CR-0005480-2018
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    J-S28029-20
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                 FILED JULY 07, 2020
    Appellant, Marquise Cornell Gillespie, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence entered August 1, 2019, as made final by the denial of his
    post-sentence motion on August 16, 2019, following his guilty pleas to three
    counts of possession with intent to deliver1 and three counts of criminal use
    of a communication facility.2 We affirm.
    The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. In January
    2018, on three separate occasions, Appellant delivered heroin to individuals
    in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 5/3/19, at *6
    (un-paginated). In each transaction, Appellant utilized a cellular telephone to
    facilitate the delivery.
    Id. Thereafter, the
    Commonwealth filed criminal
    charges against Appellant.
    On May 3, 2019, Appellant pled guilty to the aforementioned crimes.
    The trial court sentenced Appellant on August 1, 2019, following the
    completion of a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”). The trial court issued the
    following sentence:
    [Appellant] was sentenced to eight [months] to two [] years’
    incarceration for each of his six [] counts. While the sentences for
    each of the counts within the three [] dockets were ordered to be
    served concurrently, the sentences at each docket were ordered
    to be served consecutively. The aggregate sentence [was,]
    therefore, [two] to six [] years of incarceration.
    ____________________________________________
    1   35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(30).
    2   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a).
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    J-S28029-20
    Trial Court Opinion, 11/12/19, at 2.
    On August 12, 2019, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion requesting
    the trial court to reconsider his sentence and “mak[e] the [s]entences on [the
    three] dockets . . . concurrent with each other” so that his aggregate sentence
    would be 8 months to 2 years’ incarceration.           Appellant’s Post-Sentence
    Motion, 8/12/19, at 2. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion on August
    16, 2019. This timely appeal followed.3
    Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:
    Whether an aggregate sentence of two to six years[’]
    incarceration in a state correctional facility is manifestly excessive
    and clearly unreasonable under the circumstances of this case?
    Appellant’s Brief at 5.
    Herein, Appellant challenges the trial court’s decision to run his
    sentences at each docket consecutively, rather than concurrently. Appellant’s
    Brief at 10-12. Specifically, Appellant claims that, by doing so, the trial court
    imposed an unduly harsh aggregate sentence and failed to consider the
    “non[-]violent nature of Appellant’s violations, his non[-]violent criminal
    record, and his strong need for drug treatment.”
    Id. at 10.
    ____________________________________________
    3  Appellant filed separate notices of appeal at each docket on September 13,
    2019. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
    (Pa. 2018). On
    September 16, 2019, the trial court entered an order directing Appellant to
    file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1). Appellant timely complied. The trial court issued an
    opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on November 12, 2019. This Court
    consolidated Appellant’s appeals on October 29, 2019. Order, 10/29/19; see
    also Pa.R.A.P. 513.
    -3-
    J-S28029-20
    Appellant’s issue implicates the discretionary aspects of sentencing. As
    this Court previously explained:
    Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
    entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant challenging
    the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court's
    jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
    We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
    appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
    902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
    at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
    sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's
    brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether
    there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed
    from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
    Commonwealth v. Griffin, 
    65 A.3d 932
    , 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
    case citations omitted).
    Appellant has fulfilled the first, second, and third requirements of the
    above-mentioned four-part test. A challenge to the imposition of consecutive
    sentences, however, does not usually raise a substantial question. Indeed,
    this Court previously explained:
    Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721, the court has discretion to impose
    sentences consecutively or concurrently and, ordinarily, a
    challenge to this exercise of discretion does not raise a substantial
    question. Commonwealth v. Pass, 
    914 A.2d 442
    , 446–447 (Pa.
    Super. 2006).      The imposition of consecutive, rather than
    concurrent sentences may raise a substantial question in only the
    most extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate
    sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and
    the length of imprisonment.
    Id. (holding challenge
    to court's
    imposition of sentence of six [] to [23] months['] imprisonment
    and sentence of one [] year probation running consecutive, did
    not present substantial question). Compare [Commonwealth
    v. Dodge, 
    957 A.2d 1198
    (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 980
    -4-
    J-S28029-20
    A.2d 605 (Pa. 2009)] (holding imposition of consecutive sentences
    totaling 58 ½ to 124 years['] imprisonment for [37] counts of
    theft-related offenses presented a substantial question because
    total sentence was essentially life sentence for [a 42-year-old]
    defendant who committed non-violent offenses with limited
    financial impact).
    Commonwealth v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    , 169 (Pa. Super. 2010)
    Following our decision in Dodge, we have made clear that a challenge
    to the consecutive nature of standard sentences does not always raise a
    substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez–Dejesus, 
    994 A.2d 595
    , 598 (Pa. Super. 2010) (imposition of consecutive as opposed to
    concurrent sentences does not ordinarily raise a substantial question that
    justifies allowance of appeal).      Instead, we examine such claims on a
    case-by-case basis.
    Id. This Court
    has determined that “the key to resolving
    the preliminary substantial question inquiry is whether the decision to
    sentence consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears on its
    face to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at issue in the
    case.”
    Id. at 598–599.
    Based upon our review, Appellant's sentence is not
    facially excessive in light of his criminal conduct.
    Our conclusion is based primarily on the trial court’s imposition of
    standard-range sentences following its review of a PSI report. “[W]here the
    sentencing court imposed a standard-range sentence with the benefit of a
    [PSI] report, we will not consider the sentence excessive.” Commonwealth
    v. Corley, 
    31 A.3d 293
    , 298 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “In those
    circumstances, we can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant
    -5-
    J-S28029-20
    information   regarding   the   defendant's   character   and    weighed   those
    considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”
    Id. (citation and
    internal quotation omitted). In this case, the trial court had the benefit of a
    PSI report before fashioning standard range, consecutive sentences.
    Accordingly, based upon all of the foregoing, Appellant has failed to raise
    a substantial question and, thus, his petition for review of the discretionary
    aspects of his sentence must be denied.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 07/07/2020
    -6-