Com. v. Champagnie, D. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DANIEL CHAMPAGNIE
Appellant No. 3046 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 23, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division at No: CP-45-CR-0001109-2019
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: Filed: July 23, 2020
Appellant, Daniel Champagnie, appeals from his judgment of sentence
of six months’ probation for driving under the influence of alcohol (first
offense) (“DUI”).1 Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain
his DUI conviction. We affirm.
The following evidence was adduced during trial. Appellant is married
to Margie Champagnie, and the couple has a daughter, I., who was ten years
old on the date of the underlying events. On February 22, 2018, Margie
telephoned I.’s school, Clear Run Intermediate School, and informed an officer
at the school that she smelled alcohol on Appellant’s breath, and that
Appellant was driving over to the school to pick I. up. N.T., 8/1/19, at 4-7.
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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802.
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Margie testified that she called the school because she was concerned for I.’s
safety. Id. at 13.
Officer Erica Burk of the Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department,
an eleven-year police officer, is presently assigned to Clear Run Intermediate
School as a resource officer. Id. at 15. Prior to her assignment to the
intermediate school, she made numerous DUI arrests. Id. at 23. On February
22, 2018, Margie notified Officer Burk that Appellant was intoxicated and that
she, Margie, was concerned about Appellant’s demeanor and I.’s safety. Id.
at 18-19. Officer Burk decided to meet Appellant when he arrived at the
school to determine whether he was intoxicated. Id. at 19. When Appellant
arrived, Officer Burk met him outside, and he was “immediately very
combative with me, very irate.” Id. He also was “unsteady on his feet.” Id.
Officer Burk attempted to offer several options to Appellant, including a breath
test, but “he wouldn’t have any of it,” and he “stormed away from us” and
entered his vehicle. Id. at 20. By this point, Officer Healy and Officer Smelas
had arrived on the scene. Id. at 19. Officer Burk testified that “we made the
decision to follow [Appellant].” Id. at 20.
Appellant drove away from the school. Officer Burk testified that
[Appellant’s] driving was indicative of someone that could be
under the influence of alcohol. He was all over the road. He
crossed over the white. He crossed over the yellow. He turned
without using a turn signal. At one point when he turned, he was
actually driving on the wrong side of the road. At that point I
activated my lights and siren to indicate to him to stop. And he
didn’t stop immediately. He continued into a parking lot and then
into a parking spot.
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As soon as I was behind his vehicle, he immediately got out of his
vehicle. I tried to order him back in his vehicle. He didn’t listen.
He was on the phone. He kept yelling that he was going to get
his wife a 302, like get her a mental health evaluation. It was all
very chaotic. The other officers and I—because he was trying to
storm away from us again, the other officers and I kind of corralled
him at that point and told him he wasn’t free to leave.
Id. at 20. As Officer Burk came near Appellant, she smelled alcohol on his
breath and saw that his eyes were glassy. Id. at 21. He refused to perform
field sobriety tests, so Officer Burk took him into custody and read him an
implied consent form. Id.
Officer Burk drove Appellant to the DUI center, a twenty-minute drive.
Id. at 21-22. While en route, Appellant fell asleep and began snoring. Id.
At the DUI center, Appellant refused to undergo a blood test, claiming that
the technician would tamper with his blood sample. Id. at 22. Officer Burk
testified that based on her experience as a police officer, she believed
Appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol. Id.
Officer Daniel Smelas, a resource officer at West Junior High School, is
a seventeen-year officer who has made hundreds of DUI arrests. Id. at 33-
34. On February 22, 2018, Officer Burk notified Officer Smelas that Appellant
was possibly intoxicated and was on his way to Clear Run Intermediate School
to pick up his daughter. Id. at 31. Officer Smelas drove to the intermediate
school to assist Officer Burk. Id. When he arrived, Officer Burk was
attempting to speak to Appellant, but Appellant spoke very loudly and refused
to listen. Id. at 32. Appellant entered his car and drove away, and Officer
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Smelas followed in his patrol vehicle. Id. at 32-33. Appellant’s vehicle
swayed between the center of the road and the fog lane, and he failed to use
his turn signal when making a left-hand turn. Id. at 33. Appellant turned
into a parking lot and stopped his vehicle, but he refused to stay in his vehicle.
Id. at 34. Appellant approached Officer Smelas, who noticed that Appellant
had glassy eyes and alcohol on his breath. Id. He almost fell a couple of
times. Id. at 35. Officer Smelas testified that based on his experience as a
police officer, he believed Appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol.
Id.
The trial court, sitting without a jury, found Appellant guilty of DUI under
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802. Following sentencing, Appellant timely appealed to this
Court, and both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
The trial court wrote that it could not address Appellant’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence because he failed to order the trial transcript. We
have found the trial transcript in the record, so we will address Appellant’s
sufficiency argument below.
Appellant raises a single issue in this appeal: “Did the Court err by
finding that there was sufficient evidence to convict [Appellant] of driving
under the influence, general impairment?” Appellant’s Brief at 4.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
determine “whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
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verdict winner, are sufficient to support all the elements of the offense.”
Commonwealth v. Cline, 177 A.3d 922, 925 (Pa. Super. 2017). “This
standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial
rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused
to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Stokes, 78
A.3d 644, 649 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Section 3802(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code provides that “an individual may
not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle
after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is
rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical
control of the movement of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1). Section
3802(a)(1) is an “at the time of driving” offense, i.e., an offense requiring
proof that the defendant was “driving, operating, or in actual physical control
of the movement of a vehicle during the time when he or she was rendered
incapable of safely doing so due to the consumption of alcohol.”
Section 3802(a)(1) permits multiple types of evidence to prove DUI-
general impairment, including BAC evidence:
The types of evidence that the Commonwealth may proffer in a
subsection 3802(a)(1) prosecution include but are not limited to,
the following: the offender’s actions and behavior, including
manner of driving and ability to pass field sobriety tests;
demeanor, including toward the investigating officer; physical
appearance, particularly bloodshot eyes and other physical signs
of intoxication; odor of alcohol, and slurred speech. Blood alcohol
level may be added to this list, although it is not necessary and
the two hour time limit for measuring blood alcohol level does not
apply. Blood alcohol level is admissible in a subsection 3801(a)(1)
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case only insofar as it is relevant to and probative of the accused’s
ability to drive safely at the time he or she was driving. The weight
to be assigned these various types of evidence presents a question
for the fact-finder, who may rely on his or her experience,
common sense, and/or expert testimony. Regardless of the type
of evidence that the Commonwealth proffers to support its case,
the focus of subsection 3802(a)(1) remains on the inability of the
individual to drive safely due to consumption of alcohol—not on a
particular blood alcohol level.
Id. at 879.
Construed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was
intoxicated at the time he drove his vehicle away from the intermediate school
on February 22, 2018. Numerous facts, viewed together, firmly establish
Appellant’s guilt, including: (1) his wife’s testimony that he smelled of alcohol
when he left the house that morning; (2) his loud and aggressive behavior
towards Officer Burk at the intermediate school; (3) his erratic driving after
leaving the intermediate school; (4) his refusal to remain in his vehicle when
Officer Burk stopped his vehicle in the parking lot; (5) his combative behavior,
glassy eyes, alcohol on his breath and lack of balance at the scene of the
traffic stop; (6) his falling asleep during the twenty-minute ride to the DUI
center; and (7) his refusal to take a blood test at the DUI center because of
his belief that the technician would tamper with the blood sample. This
combination of facts is similar to other cases in which we have found the
evidence sufficient to establish DUI-general impairment. See
Commonwealth v. Teems, 74 A.3d 142, 146 (Pa. Super. 2013) (evidence
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sufficient to establish DUI-general impairment where officer responding to call
reporting disabled vehicle observed defendant sitting in driver’s seat of
vehicle, in lane of traffic, depressing the brakes, car had lost its tires,
defendant could not recall if he struck anything or when or where accident
might have occurred, officer noticed strong odor of alcohol from defendant,
defendant had red, glassy eyes and slurred speech, defendant failed to blow
properly into portable alcohol breath test machine, and blood test at hospital
revealed that he had BAC of .143%); Commonwealth v. O’Bryon, 820 A.2d
1287, 1291-92 (Pa. Super. 2003) (evidence supported defendant’s DUI
conviction where officer testified that defendant ran her car into parked car
and left scene, was confused and staggering, had alcohol on her breath, and
could not maintain balance or locate her license and registration);
Commonwealth v. Leighty, 693 A.2d 1324, 1327 (Pa. Super. 1997) (glassy
and bloodshot eyes, admittance of alcohol consumption, failure of two field
sobriety tests and minor accident before arrest sufficient to support conviction
under former DUI statute).
Appellant claims that his wife lied to the police that he was intoxicated
because he and his wife were involved in a custody dispute over their
daughter, I. Appellant’s Brief at 8. When he arrived at the school and Officer
Burk refused to allow him to have his daughter, he became angry because he
thought his wife was trying to seize custody of his daughter and leave
Pennsylvania. Id. at 9. Therefore, he drove directly to the nearest lab so that
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he could have his blood drawn to prove that he was not under the influence.
Id. Not only is Appellant’s version of events illogical and self-serving, but he
ignores key evidence, particularly the officers’ observations of his erratic
driving, combative demeanor, glassy eyes and odor of alcohol on his breath.
The law requires us to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner. Appellant would have us view the
evidence in the light most favorable to himself. This we cannot do.
Construed in the proper light, the evidence clearly demonstrates
Appellant’s guilt for DUI-general impairment. Appellant’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence is devoid of merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/23/20
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