Olson, P. v. Eurofins Environment Testing ( 2020 )


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  • J-A13038-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    PAUL OLSON AND ANDREA OLSON,                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellants                    :
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    EUROFINS ENVIRONMENT TESTING                  :
    US HOLDINGS INC.,                             :
    :
    Appellee                     :      No. 1945 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 17, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2019-03310-MJ
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:                            FILED JULY 24, 2020
    Paul Olson and Andrea Olson (collectively, the Olsons) appeal the
    order entered June 17, 2019, which sustained in part the preliminary
    objections of Eurofins Environment Testing US Holdings Inc. (Eurofins) on
    the basis of improper venue, and ordered the transfer of the matter to a
    state court in Iowa. We vacate the order and remand for further
    proceedings.
    This action involves a dispute over a stock purchase agreement (SPA)
    entered into between the parties. The Olsons seek a declaration that they do
    not owe payments to Eurofins under the SPA and allege breach of contract
    by Eurofins. Briefly, the dispute centers on allegations that Eurofins avoided
    ____________________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A13038-20
    paying contingent consideration to the Olsons under the SPA. On April 4,
    2019, the Olsons, who are residents of Chester County, filed the instant
    action in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County.1 On May 22, 2019,
    Eurofins filed preliminary objections pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1),2
    ____________________________________________
    1 Three actions related to the SPA have been filed between these parties in
    three venues. On January 24, 2019, the Olsons filed a federal complaint
    against Eurofins in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
    making the same allegations and seeking the same relief as the instant
    action. Eurofins filed a motion to dismiss the federal action on March 19,
    2019, for lack of diversity jurisdiction. Also on March 19, 2019, Eurofins filed
    a state complaint against the Olsons sounding in breach of contract in the
    Iowa District Court for Polk County. According to the parties, the state action
    in Iowa is pending. On April 3, 2019, the Olsons moved to dismiss the
    federal action and it was terminated on April 4, 2019, which is the same
    date the Olsons filed the instant action in Chester County, Pennsylvania. See
    Preliminary Objections, 5/22/2019, at Exs. B, C; Memorandum of Law in
    Response to Preliminary Objections, 6/17/2019, at Exs. 1, 3.
    2   Rule 1028(a)(1) provides as follows.
    (a) Preliminary objections may be filed by any party to any
    pleading and are limited to the following grounds:
    (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
    action or person of the defendant, improper venue or
    improper form or service of a writ of summons or a
    complaint[.]
    Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1). Further, “[o]f the three grounds available to challenge
    venue, only improper venue may be raised by preliminary objection as
    provided by Rule 1006(e).”
    Id. (Note). Rule
    1006(e) provides as follows.
    Improper venue shall be raised by preliminary objection and if
    not so raised shall be waived. If a preliminary objection to venue
    is sustained and there is a county of proper venue within the
    State the action shall not be dismissed but shall be transferred
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    arguing, inter alia, that the complaint should be dismissed for improper
    venue.3 It averred that the SPA included a forum selection clause, which
    stated that all litigation arising from the parties’ agreement must be
    contested in the federal or state courts of Iowa.4 On June 11, 2019, Eurofins
    (Footnote Continued) _______________________
    to the appropriate court of that county. The costs and fees for
    transfer and removal of the record shall be paid by the plaintiff.
    Pa.R.C.P. 1006(e).
    3   Eurofins did not file a petition for a change of venue.
    4   The relevant portion of the SPA provides as follows.
    Section 9.4      Choice of Law; Venue and Forum.
    (a)   This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in
    accordance with the internal laws of the State of Iowa
    without giving effect to any choice or conflict of law
    provision or rule (whether of the State of Iowa or any
    other jurisdiction) that would cause the application of Laws
    of any jurisdiction other than those of the State.
    (b)   ANY LEGAL SUIT, ACTION OR PROCEEDING ARISING OUT
    OF OR BASED UPON THIS AGREEMENT OR THE
    TRANSACTIONS    CONTEMPLATED    HEREBY  MAY   BE
    INSTITUTED IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF THE UNITED
    STATES OF AMERICA OR THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF
    IOWA IN EACH CASE LOCATED IN POLK COUNTY, IOWA,
    AND EACH PARTY IRREVOCABLY SUBMITS TO THE
    EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF SUCH COURTS IN ANY
    SUCH SUIT, ACTION OR PROCEEDING. SERVICE OF
    PROCESS, SUMMONS, OR NOTICE OR OTHER DOCUMENT
    BY MAIL TO SUCH PARTY’S ADDRESS SET FORTH HEREIN
    SHALL BE EFFECTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS FOR ANY
    SUIT, ACTION OR OTHER PROCEEDING BROUGHT IN ANY
    SUCH    COURT.   THE  PARTIES  IRREVOCABLY   AND
    UNCONDITIONALLY WAIVE ANY OBJECTION TO THE
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    J-A13038-20
    timely filed its brief in support of preliminary objections, as set forth in Rule
    1028(c) of the Chester County Rules of Civil Procedure.
    Six days later, on June 17, 2019, before the Olsons had responded,
    the trial court sustained in part the preliminary objections on the basis of
    improper venue, and ordered the transfer of the action to the Iowa District
    Court for Polk County, Iowa. Order, 6/17/2019, at 1 .1. Two days later, on
    June 19, 2019, the Olsons filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the
    preliminary objections.5 On June 24, 2019, the trial court issued an order,
    which    treated   the    Olsons’   June       19,   2019   filing   as   a   motion   for
    reconsideration and denied their purported motion, thereby affirming its
    prior June 17, 2019 order. Order, 6/24/2019. Also on June 24, 2019,
    Eurofins filed a reply brief in support of its preliminary objections. This
    timely filed appeal followed.6
    (Footnote Continued) _______________________
    LAYING OF VENUE OF ANY SUIT, ACTION OR ANY
    PROCEEDING IN SUCH COURTS AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVE
    AND AGREE NOT TO PLEAD OR CLAIM IN ANY SUCH
    COURT THAT ANY SUCH SUIT, ACTION OR PROCEEDING
    BROUGHT IN ANY SUCH COURT HAS BEEN BROUGHT IN
    AN INCONVENIENT FORUM.
    Preliminary Objections, 5/22/2019, at Ex. A (SPA, 6/23/2017, at ¶ 9.4).
    5 According to the parties, after the trial court’s ruling, the Olsons sought
    and obtained permission of the trial court to file their response. See Olsons’
    Brief, at 25, 33; Eurofins’ Brief at 8.
    6 Both the Olsons and the trial court complied with the mandates of
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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    The Olsons present the following issues for our review.
    1. The [trial c]ourt erred as a matter of law and abused its
    discretion by issuing its June 17, 2019 order granting Eurofins’
    preliminary objection of improper venue prior to the twenty (20)
    day response period ended [sic], as set forth in Chester County
    Court of Common Pleas Civil Rules, Rule 208.3(b).
    2. The [trial c]ourt erred as a matter of law and abused its
    discretion by granting Eurofins’ preliminary objection of improper
    venue, because the forum selection clause is invalid and
    unenforceable.
    3. The [trial c]ourt erred as a matter of law and abused its
    discretion by granting Eurofins’ preliminary objection of improper
    venue, because the venue is so inconvenient as to be oppressive
    and vexatious, thus denying the Olsons their opportunity to have
    their day in court.
    Olsons’ Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted and party designations
    altered).
    Our well-settled standard of review is as follows. “Generally, this Court
    reviews a trial court order sustaining preliminary objections based upon
    improper venue for an abuse of discretion or legal error.” Lugo v. Farmers
    Pride, Inc., 
    967 A.2d 963
    , 970 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted).
    The Olsons first complain that the trial court erred by ruling
    prematurely on Eurofins’ preliminary objections, thereby causing their
    response to be treated as a motion for reconsideration, which “tainted” the
    trial court’s evaluation and “ultimately hindered” its analysis. Olsons’ Brief at
    34; see also
    id. at 22.
    As a result, the Olsons argue that the trial court
    “missed or ignored entire sections” of their arguments set forth in, and the
    supporting evidence attached to, their response.
    Id. at 34.
    They contend
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    that the trial court failed to “properly take into consideration the evidence
    and caselaw” that supported their arguments that the forum selection clause
    is invalid and unenforceable, and that litigating outside of Chester County,
    Pennsylvania is so oppressive and vexatious that they are effectively denied
    their day in court.
    Id. at 23
    , 
    36. As evidence of the trial court’s improper
    consideration of the Olsons’ response, the Olsons point to the trial court’s
    Rule 1925(a) opinion, which stated that the Olsons “have not responded to
    this objection to venue.”
    Id. at 36,
    quoting Trial Court Opinion, 8/1/2019, at
    5.
    We begin our analysis by addressing the timing of the trial court’s
    order sustaining in part the preliminary objections. C.C.R.C.P. 1028(c)7
    governs preliminary objections in Chester County and provides as follows.
    (1) Except for preliminary objections subject to subparagraph
    (2) below, a brief and praecipe for determination in the form
    described in C.C.R.C.P. 206.6 must be filed by the objecting
    party within twenty (20) days of the filing of the preliminary
    objections. Responsive briefs shall be filed within twenty (20)
    days of the filing of the praecipe for determination. The assigned
    judge may, at his or her discretion, extend the time for filing
    briefs. If the party filing the preliminary objections has failed to
    file a praecipe for determination within twenty (20) days of the
    filing of the preliminary objections, any other party may file a
    praecipe for determination to bring the objections before the
    court, in which event no brief shall be required to be filed with
    the praecipe. If the objecting party fails to file a brief as
    ____________________________________________
    7 As noted by Eurofins in its brief, the Olsons cite C.C.R.C.P. Rule 208.3(b)
    for the 20-day timeframe, but that rule relates to motions, not preliminary
    objections. See Eurofins’ Brief at 8; Olsons’ Brief at 7, 19, 23; In any event,
    as discussed infra, the time to respond is indeed 20 days.
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    aforesaid, the court may dismiss the preliminary objection as
    abandoned. If the objecting party does file a brief, all other
    parties may file briefs within twenty (20) days thereafter.
    (2) Where the preliminary objections properly assert facts not
    otherwise of record and the preliminary objections have been
    endorsed with a notice to plead, no praecipe for determination
    nor brief shall be required until the matter is ready to be
    submitted to the court, either upon the basis of the preliminary
    objections alone, if no answer has been filed, or upon the basis
    of the preliminary objections and answers thereto, or after a
    record has been developed pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2). If
    an answer is filed and any party wishes to develop a record on
    any disputed issues of material fact, depositions shall be
    completed within forty-five (45) days of the date of service of
    the answer to the preliminary objection. The time limit for the
    taking of the depositions may be shortened or extended by
    agreement of the parties or by the Court.
    C.C.R.C.P. 1028(c) (emphasis added); see also C.C.R.C.P. 206.4(c)(3)
    (relating to admissions and providing an answer to preliminary objections
    shall be filed on the date on which answer is due under Pennsylvania Rules
    of Civil Procedure); Pa.R.C.P. 1026(a) (providing 20-day timeframe for filing
    an answer).
    Eurofins admits, and there can be no dispute, that the trial court ruled
    on the preliminary objections before the Olsons filed their response, and
    before the 20-day period for them to respond had lapsed. See Eurofins’ Brief
    at 5-6, 8-10. Pursuant to the aforementioned rules, the Olsons had 20 days
    from the filing of Eurofins’ brief in support of preliminary objections, or until
    July 1, 2019, to file their response. They timely filed their response on June
    19, 2019, but as 
    noted supra
    , the trial court had already filed its order
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    J-A13038-20
    sustaining the preliminary objections two days prior, on June 17, 2019. In its
    Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained as follows.
    Here, [the Olsons] have not responded to this
    objection to venue. As a result, there has been no allegation
    that the inclusion of the forum selection clause was induced by
    fraud or overreaching, no claim that the clause is so unfair or
    inconvenient that is [sic] has deprived [the Olsons] of their
    opportunity to be heard, or an argument that the clause violates
    public policy.
    Trial Court Opinion, 8/1/2019, at 5 (emphasis added). The court went on to
    explain that
    [i]n short, [the Olsons] appeal, claiming they did not have
    enough time to file a brief raising issues over the forum selection
    clause. The [Olsons] seek to violate the parole [sic] evidence
    rule. It matters not what the [Olsons] thought or believed about
    the forum selection clause. [The Olsons] acknowledge that Iowa
    is the agreed forum. Iowa is the forum they agreed to with
    [Eurofins].
    Id. at 6.
    Finally, in addressing the ability to conduct remotely court
    proceedings in Iowa, the trial court stated it found “it hard to believe that
    even if the [Olsons] had filed a meaningful reply that they would have
    addressed the technology of the day,” and that “the delay sought by [the
    Olsons] to file yet another brief on a well-settled issue of law does not …
    create reversible error, but rather raises yet another delay to the eventual
    resolution of the case.”
    Id. (emphasis added).
    -8-
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    Based on the foregoing, we agree with the Olsons that the trial court
    failed to consider their response to the preliminary objections. 8 The trial
    court plainly stated in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that the Olsons did not
    respond to Eurofins’ improper venue objection when the record clearly shows
    they did. Further, contrary to the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion and as
    discussed infra, the Olsons did in fact respond with allegations of fraud,
    overreaching, unfairness, inconvenience, and violation of public policy.
    Eurofins    argues     that,   even     though   the   trial   court   sustained
    prematurely its preliminary objections without giving the Olsons sufficient
    time to respond, the error was harmless. Eurofins’ Brief at 6, 8-10. They
    contend that this Court may “affirm a lower court’s decision regardless of
    any legal error, as long as there was a legal basis for that decision raised in
    the lower court.”
    Id. at 9.
    According to Eurofins, the forum selection clause
    in the SPA is binding and enforceable, and therefore we may affirm the trial
    court’s grant of preliminary objections based on improper venue.
    Id. at 10.
    However, while a challenge to improper venue may be made by filing
    preliminary objections, if an issue of fact is raised by the preliminary
    objections, the court shall take evidence on disputed facts. Pa.R.C.P.
    ____________________________________________
    8 Further, it does not appear the trial court considered Eurofins’ June 24,
    2019 reply brief in support of its preliminary objections. The timestamp on
    the trial court’s June 24, 2019 order, which affirmed its June 17, 2019 order
    sustaining the preliminary objection to venue, shows the order was filed at
    3:59 p.m., while Eurofins’ reply brief was filed at 4:09 p.m. that day.
    -9-
    J-A13038-20
    1028(c)(2) (“The court shall determine promptly all preliminary objections.
    If an issue of fact is raised, the court shall consider evidence by depositions
    or otherwise.”); see also C.C.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2) (same). “In such a situation
    the court may not reach a determination based on its view of controverted
    facts, but must resolve the dispute by receiving evidence thereon through
    interrogatories, depositions or an evidentiary hearing.” Delaware Valley
    Underwriting Agency, Inc. v. Williams & Sapp, Inc., 
    518 A.2d 1280
    ,
    1283 (Pa. Super. 1986) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
    (collecting cases); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2), Note (“Preliminary
    objections raising an issue under subdivision (a)(1) [(lack of subject matter
    or personal jurisdiction, improper venue, or improper form or service)] …
    cannot be determined from facts of record.”). “The failure of the parties to
    provide the evidence necessary for a proper determin[a]tion of the issue
    does not excuse the court from further inquiry. Thus, it [is] incumbent on
    the court below to take evidence to resolve the dispute.” Delaware 
    Valley, 518 A.2d at 1283
    (citations omitted). The moving party bears the burden of
    supporting its objections.
    Id. (citations omitted).
    In its preliminary objection to improper venue and brief in support
    thereof, Eurofins argued that the forum selection clause under the SPA is
    presumptively valid and enforceable, and thus the proper venue is in Iowa,
    not Pennsylvania. Preliminary Objections, 5/22/2019, at 5; Brief in Support
    of Preliminary Objections, 6/11/2019, at 6, citing Patriot Commercial
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    Leasing Co. v. Kremer Rest. Enterprises, LLC, 
    915 A.2d 647
    , 651 (Pa.
    Super. 2006).
    In response, the Olsons contended that a sworn declaration of a
    representative of Eurofins acknowledged that Eurofins’ principal place of
    business is in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and attached his declaration thereto.
    Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Preliminary Objections, 6/19/2019, at
    5, Ex. 2. The Olsons further claimed deception by Eurofins relating to the
    forum selection clause and its nexus to Iowa.
    Id. at 5.
    They argued the
    forum selection clause was “invalid or unenforceable because it was
    procured under false pretenses” and that venue in Chester County,
    Pennsylvania was proper because all the parties and witnesses are located in
    Pennsylvania, and the Olsons suffered harm in and reside in Chester County.
    Id. at 9.
    The Olsons pointed to section 9.8 of the SPA to permit severability
    of provisions of the agreement, thereby allowing the forum selection clause
    to be held invalid or unenforceable without affecting the validity of its
    remaining provisions.
    In addition, the Olsons responded to Eurofins’ argument that the
    forum selection clause is presumptively valid by arguing that such a clause is
    unenforceable when “‘1) the clause itself was induced by fraud or
    overreaching; 2) the forum selected in the clause is so unfair or inconvenient
    that a party, for all practical purposes, will be deprived of an opportunity to
    be heard; or 3) the clause is found to violate public policy.’”
    Id. at 14,
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    quoting Patriot 
    Commercial, 915 A.2d at 651
    . The Olsons claimed the
    forum selection clause lacked a meeting of the minds to form a valid
    contract, and that they could rebut the Patriot Commercial presumption
    under both the first and second tests. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
    Preliminary Objections, 6/19/2019, at 14-19. Specifically, they maintained
    that Eurofins fraudulently and intentionally misrepresented a material fact of
    the corporate entity’s location “by obfuscating the real corporate entity who
    was in charge of negotiations and whom agents of Eurofins were actually
    representing the contract negotiations.”
    Id. at 18.
    Further, citing Morgan
    Trailer Manufacturing Co. v. Hydraroll Ltd., 
    759 A.2d 926
    (Pa. Super.
    2000), where this Court refused to uphold a forum selection clause that
    would “seriously impair” a party’s participation in the litigation due to an
    “extreme distance of the forum,” the Olsons argued that the distance
    between southeastern Pennsylvania and central Iowa is extreme for them
    because they are in their eighties, and have health concerns and travel
    restrictions. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Preliminary Objections,
    6/19/2019, at 19.
    Finally, the Olsons raised an argument of forum non conveniens in
    their memorandum of law in opposition to the preliminary objections,
    arguing that requiring them to proceed with litigation in Iowa is vexatious,
    oppressive, and against public policy.
    Id. at 20-24.
    Specifically, they claimed
    that “Pennsylvania is the only appropriate venue for this litigation, given
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    their advanced age[s,] the difficulty of traveling for them, the location of
    witnesses and evidence, and that [Eurofins] submitted a Declaration by [a
    representative of Eurofins] which admitted that [Eurofins’] Pennsylvania
    office was the critical party in this litigation.”
    Id. at 22.
    Noting that the two
    counties are over 1,000 miles apart and Eurofins’ lack of nexus to Iowa, the
    Olsons maintained that Eurofins was attempting to enforce the forum
    selection clause in an attempt to “vex” the Olsons.
    Id. at 23
    . 
    Lastly, they
    contended that the clause is unenforceable because, for the aforesaid
    reasons, it is “unreasonable at the time of litigation.”
    Id. at 23
    (emphasis
    in original) (citing Midwest Fin. Acceptance Corp. v. Lopez, 
    78 A.3d 614
    ,
    628 (Pa. Super. 2013)). The Olsons attached affidavits and other evidence in
    support of their memorandum of law in opposition to preliminary objections.
    In their reply brief in support of its preliminary objections, Eurofins
    addressed the Olsons’ claims as to venue, explained Eurofins’ nexus to Iowa,
    contested the Olsons’ claims of health concerns and travel restrictions, noted
    the Olsons’ vacation home in Minnesota, and attached affidavits and other
    evidence thereto. Eurofins’ Reply Brief in Support of Preliminary Objections,
    6/24/2019, at 1-4.
    Instantly,   the   trial   court    did     not   order   any   depositions   or
    interrogatories. It is clear from the trial court’s opinion that its June 17,
    2019 order was based solely upon Eurofins’ view of controverted facts stated
    in its preliminary objections and without consideration of the Olsons’ view of
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    those facts. Before any factual determination was made as to venue,
    however, the trial court was required to order the taking of evidence
    pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2) and C.C.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2). See Hamre v.
    Resnick, 
    486 A.2d 510
    , 511 (Pa. Super. 1984) (vacating order sustaining
    preliminary objections based on improper venue and remanding for
    “evidence [to] be taken in this case either by depositions or otherwise in
    order to provide the lower court with a basis upon which to rest a decision
    on venue, and to afford [the appellate court] a background from which to
    conduct [its] review of such a decision”); Delaware 
    Valley, 518 A.2d at 1283
    (vacating and remanding for parties to present evidence to allow a
    determination of factual issues raised by preliminary objections for lack of
    personal jurisdiction); Luria v. Luria, 
    286 A.2d 922
    , 923 (Pa. Super. 1971)
    (holding trial court’s taking of evidence pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2)
    was required before ruling on preliminary objection to jurisdiction, and
    remanding for factual findings by the trial court). Thus, “a remand is
    necessary to allow the parties a reasonable period of time within which to
    present evidence by deposition, interrogatories or otherwise which will allow
    a determination of the factual issues raised by the preliminary objections.”
    Delaware 
    Valley, 518 A.2d at 1283
    (citation omitted).
    In conclusion, the trial court erred by failing to consider the Olsons’
    claims relating to venue in their response to preliminary objections, and
    failing to conduct fact-finding pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2) and
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    C.C.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2), before ruling on the preliminary objection to venue to
    determine the validity and enforceability of the forum selection clause of the
    SPA.9,   10   We therefore vacate the trial court’s order and remand for
    proceedings consistent with this memorandum.
    Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/24/20
    ____________________________________________
    9 As Eurofins points out, the trial court further erred in ordering the transfer
    of the action to a court outside of this Commonwealth, rather than
    dismissing the action. Pa.R.C.P. 1006(e) (“If a preliminary objection to
    venue is sustained and there is a county of proper venue within the State
    the action shall not be dismissed but shall be transferred to the appropriate
    court of that county.); see Eurofins’ Brief at 5, n.1. However, due to our
    disposition, this error is moot.
    10 In light of our disposition, we need not address the Olsons’ remaining
    issues.
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