Com. v. Gibson, R. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S30013-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    RUSSELL PHILIP GIBSON                      :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1600 WDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 10, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-17-CR-0001141-2017
    BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                 FILED JULY 30, 2020
    Russell Philip Gibson (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed following remand from this Court. Additionally, Appellant’s counsel
    (Counsel), seeks to withdraw from representation pursuant to Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    , 361 (Pa. 2009).           Upon review, we grant Counsel’s petition to
    withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
    A prior panel of this Court summarized the facts and procedural history:
    This case arises out of an argument and altercation between
    Appellant and his girlfriend, Dawn Hannold, on December 7, 2017.
    Appellant was charged with terroristic threats, simple assault, and
    harassment.[FN] 1 On October 19, 2018, the case proceeded to
    trial, with the terroristic threats and simple assault charges tried
    to a jury and the harassment charge, a summary offense, tried to
    the trial judge.
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S30013-20
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2706(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), and
    [FN]1
    2709(a)(1).
    Both Hannold and Appellant testified at trial that they had been
    drinking beer and got into an argument when Hannold became
    upset over a phone call that Appellant received from a girl and
    took Appellant’s cell phone. Both Hannold and Appellant also
    testified that Appellant took his phone back and that Hannold
    packed up her belongings and left Appellant’s trailer with the dog
    that they jointly owned. Hannold testified that Appellant struck
    her on the back with a dog leash two or three times and told her
    as she was leaving that if “[y]ou take my dog, I’m going to smash
    your head in.” N.T. Trial at 37-39. Appellant testified that Hannold
    pushed him and that he pushed her back and told her “to get the
    hell out,” and denied that he hit Hannold with a dog leash. Id. at
    77-85.
    The jury acquitted Appellant of the terroristic threats and simple
    assault charges. N.T. Trial at 123-24. Immediately following the
    jury verdict, the trial court found Appellant guilty of harassment.
    Id. at 124. On December 4, 2018, the trial court sentenced
    Appellant to 90 days’ probation for the harassment conviction.
    N.T. Sentencing at 10; Sentencing Order at 1. In this sentence,
    the trial court imposed as conditions of Appellant’s probation that
    he have no contact with Hannold and refrain from the
    consumption of alcoholic beverages and also required that
    Appellant “shall remove any excess scrap, garbage and other
    debris from his property . . . such that the property shall meet the
    conditions of all Sandy Township Code requirements.” N.T.
    Sentencing at 10-11; Sentencing Order at 1-2. This latter
    condition was imposed based on a township code violation of
    which the trial court had found Appellant guilty in a separate,
    unrelated proceeding.       N.T. Sentencing at 5-9.      Appellant’s
    counsel objected to imposition of this condition at the sentencing.
    Id. at 4-5. This timely appeal followed. The trial court stayed
    Appellant’s sentence pending the appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Gibson, 119 WDA 2019, at *1-3 (Pa. Super. Aug. 16,
    2019) (unpublished memorandum).
    On appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, but
    vacated the condition of Appellant’s probation requiring him to “remove any
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    excess scrap, garbage and other debris from his property . . . such that the
    property shall meet the conditions of all Sandy Township Code requirements.”
    Id. at 2, 9-11. Because vacating the condition of probation upset the trial
    court’s sentencing scheme, the case was remanded to the trial court for
    resentencing. Id. at 11.
    On September 10, 2019, the trial court resentenced Appellant to 90
    days of probation.     As a condition of probation, the trial court ordered
    Appellant to successfully complete 200 hours of community service under the
    standard terms and conditions of the Clearfield County Community Service
    Program, have no contact with Hannold, and refrain from consuming alcoholic
    beverages. On October 9, 2019, Appellant filed a timely appeal. Counsel filed
    a statement of intent to file an Anders brief pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 1925(c)(4), and the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a)
    opinion on January 17, 2020.
    On March 2, 2020, Counsel filed an Anders brief, in which he argues
    that Appellant’s appeal is frivolous and requests permission from this Court to
    withdraw as counsel. Appellant did not file a response to Counsel’s Anders
    brief or raise any additional claims.
    At the outset, we note the particular mandates that counsel seeking to
    withdraw pursuant to Anders must follow.           These mandates and the
    significant protection they provide arise because a criminal defendant has a
    constitutional right to a direct appeal and to counsel on that appeal.
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    Commonwealth v. Woods, 
    939 A.2d 896
    , 898 (Pa. Super. 2007). We have
    summarized the requirements as follows:
    Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders must file
    a petition averring that, after a conscientious examination of the
    record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly frivolous. Counsel
    must also file an Anders brief setting forth issues that might
    arguably support the appeal along with any other issues necessary
    for the effective appellate presentation thereof.
    Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders petition
    and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the right to
    retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points
    worthy of this Court’s attention.
    If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical requirements of
    Anders, this Court will deny the petition to withdraw and remand
    the case with appropriate instructions (e.g., directing counsel
    either to comply with Anders or file an advocate’s brief on
    Appellant’s behalf).
    
    Id.
     (citations omitted).
    Additionally, there are requirements as to the content of an Anders
    brief:
    [T]he Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s
    petition to withdraw … must: (1) provide a summary of the
    procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer
    to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports
    the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
    frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the
    appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
    record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have
    led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. When faced with a purported Anders brief, we
    may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first deciding
    whether      counsel    has   properly    requested    permission    to   withdraw.
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    Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 
    951 A.2d 379
    , 382 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
    omitted). If counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is this Court’s
    duty to review the trial court proceedings to determine whether there are any
    other non-frivolous issues that the appellant could raise on appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Dempster, 
    187 A.3d 266
    , 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en
    banc).
    Instantly, we conclude that Counsel has complied with the requirements
    of Anders. Counsel filed a petition with this Court stating that after reviewing
    the record, he finds this appeal to be wholly frivolous. Petition to Withdraw
    as Counsel, 3/2/20, at ¶ 3. In conformance with Santiago, Counsel’s brief
    includes summaries of the facts and procedural history of the case, and
    discusses the issues he believes might arguably support Appellant’s appeal.
    See Anders Brief at 4-6, 8-14. Counsel’s brief sets forth his conclusion that
    the appeal is frivolous and includes citation to relevant authority. 
    Id.
     Finally,
    Counsel has attached to his petition to withdraw the letter he sent to
    Appellant, which enclosed Counsel’s petition and Anders brief. Petition to
    Withdraw as Counsel, 3/2/20, Ex. F. Counsel’s letter advised Appellant of his
    right to proceed pro se or with private counsel, and to raise any additional
    issues that he deems worthy of this Court’s consideration.        
    Id.
       We thus
    proceed to review the merits of Appellant’s claims.
    Counsel’s Anders brief raises two issues for our review:
    I.    Whether the [c]ourt of [c]ommon [p]leas of Clearfield
    County . . . imposed an illegal sentence in its September 10,
    2019 Order[?]
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    II.   Whether it was an abuse of discretion by the [c]ourt to
    sentence Appellant to complete 200 hours of community
    service under the direction of the Clearfield County
    Community Service Program[?]
    Anders Brief at 4.
    In his first issue, Appellant claims the trial court imposed an illegal
    sentence. In particular, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing
    to award him credit for the time he spent on probation while his first appeal
    was   pending   before   this   Court.     Anders    Brief   at   10;   see   also
    Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 
    181 A.3d 1165
    , 1166 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“A claim
    asserting that the trial court failed to award credit for time served implicates
    the legality of the sentence.”). Issues relating to the legality of a sentence
    are questions of law. Commonwealth v. Aikens, 
    139 A.3d 244
    , 245 (Pa.
    Super. 2016). Our standard of review over such questions is de novo and the
    scope of review is plenary. 
    Id.
    The Pennsylvania Sentencing Code, with regard to awarding credit for
    time served, provides in relevant part as follows:
    § 9760. Credit for time served
    After reviewing the information submitted under section 9737
    (relating to report of outstanding charges and sentences) the
    court shall give credit as follows:
    (1) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term shall
    be given to the defendant for all time spent in custody as a result
    of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or
    as a result of conduct on which such a charge is based. Credit shall
    include credit for the time spent in custody prior to trial, during
    trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.
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    *   *       *
    (4) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later
    prosecuted on another charge growing out of an act or acts that
    occurred prior to his arrest, credit against the maximum term and
    any minimum term of any sentence resulting from such
    prosecution shall be given for all time spent in custody under the
    former charge that has not been credited against another
    sentence.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1), (4).
    Appellant seeks credit for the 90 days he purportedly spent on probation
    after the trial court imposed its original sentence on December 4, 2018.
    Appellant asserts that:
    he checked in with probation for two months and made payments,
    which [he] can verify through the probation department. On the
    third month of checking in . . . the probation officer became aware
    that this case was on appeal and then told [Appellant], I don’t
    believe I’m supposed to be meeting with you, and sent him away.
    N.T., 9/10/19, at 5. Appellant alleges that because he made payments toward
    his fines and costs and appeared for monthly check-ins following the
    imposition   of   his   original   sentence,   he   satisfactorily   completed   the
    probationary period of his sentence. Anders Brief at 10.
    The certified record belies Appellant’s argument. After Appellant filed
    his appeal from the trial court’s December 4, 2018 judgment of sentence, the
    trial court issued the following order:
    NOW, this 9th day of January, 2019 the Court notes that the
    [Appellant] filed an appeal to the Superior Court in the above-
    captioned case; therefore, it is the ORDER of this Court that the
    sentence and probationary period issued by this Court’s
    Order of December 4, 2018 be and is hereby STAYED
    pending the outcome of the [Appellant’s] appeal.
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    Order, 1/9/19 (emphasis added). Also, at Appellant’s resentencing, the trial
    court credited Appellant for money paid while the appeal was pending. See
    N.T., 9/10/19, at 6 (“[Appellant] will receive financial credit for any monies
    that he had previously paid.”). Therefore, Appellant’s probationary sentence
    was not in effect while his prior appeal was pending, and he is not entitled to
    credit for time served. Appellant’s first issue is frivolous.
    In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its
    discretion by ordering, as a condition of probation, that he successfully
    complete 200 hours of community service under the standard terms and
    conditions of the Clearfield County Adult Probation Community Service
    Program.    Although framed as a challenge to the trial court’s sentencing
    discretion, this issue challenges the legality of the sentence and is a question
    of law subject to this Court’s plenary review. Commonwealth v. Hall, 
    80 A.3d 1204
    , 1211 (Pa. 2013) (stating that whether the trial court has the power
    to impose a challenged condition under the Sentencing Code concerns the
    legality of sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Melvin, 
    103 A.3d 1
    , 52
    (Pa. Super. 2014) (same).
    Section 9754 of the Sentencing Code provides that in imposing a
    sentence of probation “[t]he court shall attach such of the reasonable
    conditions authorized by section 9763 (relating to conditions of probation) as
    it deems necessary to insure or assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding
    life.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(b). Section 9763(b) states:
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    (b) Conditions generally.--The court may attach any of the
    following conditions upon the defendant as it deems necessary:
    *     *      *
    (3) To participate in a public or nonprofit community service
    program.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b)(3).
    A probation order is unique and individualized. It is constructed
    as an alternative to imprisonment and is designed to rehabilitate
    a criminal defendant while still preserving the rights of law-abiding
    citizens to be secure in their persons and property. When
    conditions are placed on probation orders they are formulated to
    insure or assist a defendant in leading a law-abiding life.
    Commonwealth v. Koren, 
    646 A.2d 1205
    , 1208–09 (Pa. Super. 1994)
    (citations omitted). Moreover, as long as conditions placed on probation are
    reasonable, it is within a trial court’s discretion to order them. 
    Id.
    Here, the condition of probation requiring Appellant to successfully
    complete 200 hours of community service is authorized under Section 9763
    of the Sentencing Code without regard to whether the community service has
    any connection to the defendant’s crime. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b)(3).           The
    trial court was free to impose conditions on Appellant’s probation that are
    specifically authorized by Section 9754 of the Sentencing Code, or those that
    are sufficiently connected to the conviction and within the trial court’s
    authority under Section 9763 of the Sentencing Code. Hall, 80 A.3d at 1211.
    Thus, Appellant’s second issue is frivolous.
    Finally, our independent review reveals no other non-frivolous issues
    that Appellant could raise on appeal. See Dempster, 187 A.3d at 272. We
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    therefore grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment
    of sentence.
    Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/30/2020
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1600 WDA 2019

Filed Date: 7/30/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/30/2020