Com. v. Goodin, T. ( 2021 )


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  • J-A04032-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant               :
    :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    TYREEK GOODIN                              :   No. 1771 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 4, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0001943-2019
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                          FILED: FEBRUARY 8, 2021
    The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order entered in
    the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) denying its
    motion to refile the charges of attempted robbery and conspiracy brought
    against Tyreek Goodin (Goodin) and co-defendant Tyreek Jackson (Jackson).
    We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for trial.1
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 The Commonwealth has also appealed the trial court’s order as it relates to
    Jackson. We have issued a nearly identical Memorandum in that case, J-
    S04033-21.
    J-A04032-21
    I.
    A.
    On March 2, 2019, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Philadelphia Police
    Officer George Soto and his partner, Officer Pavone,2 were on routine patrol
    near the 5600 block of Haverford Avenue. (See N.T. Preliminary Hearing,
    3/18/19, at 4, 6). The officers observed two men dressed in ski masks and
    dark clothing, later identified as Goodin and Jackson, at a laundromat. (See
    id. at 5). Goodin was inside of the laundromat and Jackson was standing
    outside. (See id.).
    As the officers approached, Jackson fled the scene and Officer Pavone
    pursued him on foot. (See id. at 6). Goodin started to exit the laundromat
    and Officer Soto directed him to stop and show his hands. (See id.). Goodin
    ignored this command and put his hands into his waist band. (See id.). After
    a brief struggle, Officer Soto was able to handcuff Goodin. (See id.). He
    recovered a black handgun from Goodin’s person and women’s jewelry from
    his book bag. (See id. at 6-7).
    Police Officer Sergio Diggs responded to assist Officer Pavone in pursuit
    of Jackson. (See id. at 12). During the chase, Officer Diggs observed Jackson
    continuously grasp at the front of his waist band. (See id. at 13). Jackson
    pulled out a silver handgun and threw it over a fence when Officer Diggs
    ____________________________________________
    2   Officer Pavone’s first name is not apparent from the record.
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    ordered him to drop it. (See id.). The officers took Jackson into custody and
    recovered the handgun.          (See id. at 13-14, 18).   Both defendants gave
    videotaped statements to Philadelphia Police Detective Jeffrey Opalski and
    Detective Francesco Campbell. (See id. at 20-21, 26, 28).
    B.
    The Commonwealth filed charges of attempted robbery, criminal
    conspiracy, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying a firearm on
    a public street in Philadelphia and possession of an instrument of a crime
    against Goodin and Jackson.3 At the March 18, 2019 preliminary hearing in
    the Philadelphia Municipal Court, Detective Opalski testified that Jackson
    “admitted to possessing the firearm that was recovered during his arrest. And
    he also admitted to attempting or taking part in robbing the Laundromat at
    56th and Vine.” (N.T. Preliminary Hearing, at 20).4 Jackson indicated that he
    ____________________________________________
    3   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 3701(a)(1)(ii), 903(c), 6106(a)(1), 6108 and 907(a).
    4 At the hearing, counsel for Goodin requested the court to recognize that
    Jackson’s statement to detectives was inadmissible against Goodin and the
    court agreed. (See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, at 21). This rule prohibiting the
    use of a co-defendant’s statement is “narrow, however, and does not apply
    when a co-defendant’s confession is redacted to omit any specific reference
    to the defendant and can be linked to the defendant only by inferential
    incrimination. See Commonwealth v. James, 
    66 A.3d 771
    , 777 (Pa. Super.
    2013) (concluding that appellant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were
    not violated by admission of his co-defendant’s statement at their joint trial
    where all references to appellant were replaced with the neutral phrase ‘the
    other guy’ and the court issued appropriate cautionary instruction).”
    Commonwealth v. Epps, 
    240 A.3d 640
    , 650 (Pa. Super. 2020).
    -3-
    J-A04032-21
    had gone inside of the laundromat and “admitted to . . . either a robbery or
    an attempted robbery of a Laundromat[.]” (Id. at 25.).
    Regarding   Goodin,    Detective   Opalski   testified,   “he   admitted   to
    possessing the firearm that was recovered during his arrest. He also admitted
    to taking part in a home invasion that occurred on 61st Street.” (Id. at 21;
    see id. at 23, 26).
    Detective Campbell testified that Goodin “told me pretty much they were
    attempting to rob this establishment [the laundromat].” (Id. at 29). When
    asked if he could be more specific, Detective Campbell explained:
    [Goodin] told me that they were going into the Laundromat with
    the intention to rob the Laundromat. During the incident, there
    was some kind of conflict between him and the other defendant.
    They exited the store and police were on location. He pretty
    much─one of them ran, a firearm was recovered and they were
    brought to Southwest Detectives.
    (Id. at 30). Detective Campbell also agreed with defense counsel that Goodin
    essentially represented that he “backed out” of the robbery. (Id. at 31-32).
    At the conclusion of the hearing, the municipal court dismissed the
    attempted robbery and conspiracy charges and held the defendants for trial
    on the remaining offenses. On March 21, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a
    motion in the trial court seeking to refile the charges. The court held a hearing
    on June 4, 2019, and it dismissed the motion after considering the parties’
    -4-
    J-A04032-21
    arguments and the notes of testimony from the preliminary hearing. 5 The
    court found the        Commonwealth’s introduction of Goodin’s statement
    recounting a disagreement with Jackson in the laundromat showed they
    renounced their planned robbery before taking a substantial step to carry it
    out.   (See Trial Ct. Op., at 7-10).                 This timely appeal followed.   The
    Commonwealth and the trial court complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(a)-(b).6
    II.
    A.
    The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant
    its motion to refile the attempted robbery and criminal conspiracy charges
    against Goodin where the evidence at the preliminary hearing established
    probable cause that he committed the offenses.7 The Commonwealth further
    claims any evidence of renunciation was not relevant at the preliminary
    ____________________________________________
    5 The Commonwealth did not reopen the record or present additional evidence
    such as videotape surveillance footage from the laundromat or a 911 call
    transcript. (See Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/19, at 2, 9). However, the record
    reflects that videotape surveillance footage from the laundromat was
    preserved for trial and the defendants’ statements to detectives were
    videotaped. (See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, at 24, 26-27, 29, 31-32).
    6 The Commonwealth has certified that the trial court’s order terminates or
    substantially handicaps the prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
    7 A trial court’s decision regarding evidentiary sufficiency, or lack thereof, of
    the Commonwealth’s prima facie case for a charged crime, is a question of
    law as to which our review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Montgomery,
    
    234 A.3d 523
    , 533 (Pa. 2020).
    -5-
    J-A04032-21
    hearing, as it is a defense and not one of the material elements of the crimes
    the Commonwealth was required to establish.
    A preliminary hearing is not a trial and its principal function is to protect
    an individual’s right against an unlawful arrest and detention.               See
    Montgomery, supra at 533. “The Commonwealth bears the burden at the
    preliminary hearing of establishing a prima facie case that a crime has been
    committed and that the accused is probably the one who committed it.” Id.
    (citation omitted).    “The evidence supporting a prima facie case need not
    establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must only
    demonstrate that, if presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge would
    be warranted in permitting the case to proceed to a jury.”           Id. (citation
    omitted).   “The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case where it
    produces evidence of each of the material elements of the crime charged and
    establishes probable cause to warrant the belief that the accused committed
    the offense.” Id. (citation omitted). At the preliminary hearing stage, the
    court must view the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in
    the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See id. at 537.
    Regarding the attempted robbery charge in the instant case, the
    Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides that a defendant is guilty of robbery if “in
    the course of committing a theft, he . . . threatens another with or intentionally
    puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury.”                 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 3701(a)(1)(ii).     Additionally, “a person commits an attempt when, with
    -6-
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    intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a
    substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).
    “The elements of criminal attempt are: (1) an intent to commit a specific
    crime; and (2) any act constituting a substantial step toward the commission
    of that crime.” Commonwealth v. Zingarelli, 
    839 A.2d 1064
    , 1069 (Pa.
    Super. 2003).   “The substantial step test broadens the scope of attempt
    liability by concentrating on the acts the defendant has done and does not any
    longer focus on the acts remaining to be done before the actual commission
    of the crime.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). “The defendant need not actually be
    in the process of the crime when arrested in order to be guilty of criminal
    attempt.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted; emphasis added).
    The offense of criminal conspiracy requires proof of three elements:
    “1) an agreement, 2) shared criminal intent, and 3) an overt act.”
    Commonwealth v. Jordan, 
    212 A.3d 91
    , 96 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation
    omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 903. Because conspiracy by its nature is
    often difficult to prove due to a lack of direct evidence, courts look to the
    conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances to link the accused
    to the alleged conspiracy. See Jordan, supra at 97. Circumstances relevant
    to this analysis include an association between the alleged conspirators;
    knowledge of the crime and presence at the scene; and post-crime conduct
    such as flight, as it tends to demonstrate consciousness of guilt. See id.
    -7-
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    Central to the trial court’s disposition in this case is the defense of
    renunciation to the crime of criminal attempt. It provides in relevant part as
    follows:
    (c) Renunciation.—
    (1) In any prosecution for an attempt to commit a crime, it
    is a defense that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary
    and complete renunciation of his criminal intent, the defendant
    avoided the commission of the crime attempted by abandoning
    his criminal effort and, if the mere abandonment was insufficient
    to accomplish such avoidance, by taking further and affirmative
    steps which prevented the commission thereof.
    (2) A renunciation is not “voluntary and complete” within
    the meaning of this subsection if it is motivated in whole or part
    by:
    (i) a belief that circumstances exist which
    increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the
    defendant or another participant in the criminal enterprise,
    or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal
    purpose[.]
    18 Pa.C.S. § 901(c)(1),(2)(i) (emphasis added).
    B.
    Applying this construct to the instant appeal, we conclude that it is clear
    the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing
    to establish a prima facie case of attempted robbery and conspiracy.
    Specifically, the evidence showed that Goodin and Jackson were armed when
    the entered the laundromat, wore ski masks and dark clothing to conceal their
    identities and blatantly disregarded police officers’ commands.              The
    inculpatory statements Goodin and Jackson made to police detectives indicate
    -8-
    J-A04032-21
    that they entered the laundromat with an agreement to rob it. Additionally,
    Jackson immediately fled from the laundromat upon the arrival of police,
    signaling consciousness of guilt.
    Concerning the defense of renunciation raised by Goodin’s statement
    that he and Jackson had a disagreement and backed out of the robbery, while
    the co-defendants may offer into evidence at trial and argue to the jury that
    they had a disagreement and abandoned the planned robbery, this defense
    theory does not negate the fact that the Commonwealth established a prima
    facie case of attempted robbery and conspiracy at the preliminary hearing.
    Moreover, to consider this defense would require the fact-finder at the
    preliminary hearing to resolve questions regarding the weight and credibility
    of the evidence, which we have stated must be resolved by the fact-finder at
    trial. See Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 
    72 A.3d 5
    , 14 (Pa. Super. 2017);
    Commonwealth v. Landis, 
    48 A.3d 432
    , 448 (Pa. Super. 2012).
    Because   we    conclude      the    trial   court   erred   in   rejecting   the
    Commonwealth’s motion to reinstate the charges, we reverse its order and
    remand the case for trial.
    Order reversed. Case remanded for trial. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    -9-
    J-A04032-21
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/8/21
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1771 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 2/8/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/8/2021