Lagbara, S. v. Lagbara, N. ( 2020 )

J-A15015-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
SHEMSTCHAAS LAGBARA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
NAJUMA-MAAT LAGBARA :
:
Appellant : No. 1403 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered May 3, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): 01377 June Term, 2018
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KING, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2020
Appellant, Najuma-Maat Lagbara, appeals from the order entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, denying her petition to strike the
judgment entered in favor of Appellee, Shemstchaas Lagbara, in this quiet
title action. Because the order is without legal effect, we lack jurisdiction to
address this matter and quash the appeal.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
Appellant and Appellee are siblings. On January 14, 2014, their grandfather
(“Decedent”) died. In his will, Decedent bequeathed real property, located at
1618 East Duval Street in Philadelphia, to the parties in equal parts. On May
17, 2018, Appellant recorded a fraudulent deed to the property, which was
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A15015-20
allegedly signed by Decedent on December 27, 2013. The fraudulent deed
gave sole possession of the property to Appellant, notwithstanding the
provisions in Decedent’s will. Another party, Walter Moody, notarized the
fraudulent deed.
On June 13, 2018, Appellee filed a complaint against Appellant and Mr.
Moody, including claims for quiet title, fraud, unjust enrichment, and violations
of the statute governing the transfer of real property.1 Appellee served
Appellant with the complaint and a notice to defend on June 18, 2018. On
August 17, 2018, Appellee filed a motion for entry of default judgment,
alleging Appellant had failed to answer the complaint. That same day,
Appellant filed a pro se answer, responding “N/A” to each paragraph in the
complaint.
Following a case management conference, the trial court entered
judgment on the pleadings against Appellant on September 13, 2018. The
court also required the execution of a new deed to give each of the parties a
one-half interest in the property, pursuant to the directive in Decedent’s will.
On September 27, 2018, the docket indicates the case was “reactivated,”
because the order entering judgment did not address Appellee’s claims against
Mr. Moody. Appellee subsequently filed a praecipe to dismiss Mr. Moody from
the case on October 5, 2018. Thereafter, the docket includes an entry on
____________________________________________
1 12 Pa. C.S.A. § 5105.
-2-
J-A15015-20
February 13, 2019, confirming the September 13, 2018 entry of judgment
against Appellant.2
In the meantime, counsel entered an appearance on behalf of Appellant.
On March 4, 2019, counsel filed a petition to vacate the judgment on
Appellant’s behalf. On April 3, 2019, a second attorney filed a petition to
strike or open the judgment on Appellant’s behalf. The court denied
Appellant’s petition to vacate the judgment on April 15, 2019, and it denied
the petition to strike or open the judgment on May 3, 2019.
On May 6, 2019, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the order
denying the petition to strike or open the judgment. The court ordered
Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal on May 8, 2019. On May 16, 2019, Appellant timely filed a Rule
1925(b) statement.
As a prefatory matter, we must first consider the timeliness of this
appeal. “It is well-established that timeliness is jurisdictional, as an untimely
appeal divests this Court of jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case.”
____________________________________________
2 “Although the trial court docket is part of the official record, when it is at
variance with the certified record it references, the certified record controls.”
Shelly Enterprises, Inc. v. Guadagnini, 20 A.3d 491, 494 (Pa.Super.
2011). Here, the February 13, 2019 docket entry refers to the judgment as
a “court ordered default judgment.” Nevertheless, the order entering
judgment against Appellant explicitly granted judgment “[u]pon review of the
[p]leadings.” (Trial Court Order, filed 9/13/18, at ¶1). Consequently, the
erroneous docket entry in this case does not create a default judgment where
the certified record indicates otherwise.
-3-
J-A15015-20
Affordable Outdoor, LLC v. Tri-Outdoor, Inc., 210 A.3d 270, 274
(Pa.Super. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the court may
enter default judgment, on motion of a party, when a defendant fails to timely
respond to a complaint. Pa.R.C.P. 1037(c). The Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure allow appeals as of right from interlocutory orders
“refusing to open, vacate, or strike off a judgment.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1).
In comparison, “[e]ntry of judgment on the pleadings is appropriate
when there are no disputed issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Okeke-Henry v. Southwest Airlines, Co.,
163 A.3d 1014, 1016-17 (Pa.Super. 2017).
Unlike a judgment entered by confession or by default,
which remains within the control of the court indefinitely and
may be opened or vacated at any time upon proper cause
shown, a judgment entered in an adverse proceeding
ordinarily cannot be disturbed after [it has become final]. A
judgment entered in an adverse proceeding becomes
final if no appeal therefrom is filed within thirty days.
Thereafter, the judgment cannot normally be modified,
rescinded or vacated.
Shelly Enterprises, supra at 493-94 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added).
“This doctrine, respecting judgments entered [in adverse proceedings],
has a very definite function, namely, to establish a point at which litigants,
counsel and courts ordinarily may regard contested lawsuits as being at an
end.” Simpson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 504 A.2d 335, 337 (Pa.Super. 1986).
Although the inability of a court to grant relief from a
judgment entered in a contested action after the appeal
-4-
J-A15015-20
period has expired is not absolute, the discretionary power
of the court over such judgments is very limited. Generally,
judgments regularly entered on adverse proceedings cannot
be opened or vacated after they have become final, unless
there has been fraud or some other circumstance so grave
or compelling as to constitute extraordinary cause justifying
intervention by the court.
Shelly Enterprises, supra at 494 (quoting Orie v. Stone, 601 A.2d 1268,
1270 (Pa.Super. 1992), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 533 Pa.
315, 622 A.2d 286 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
omitted).
“An oversight by counsel in failing to appeal does not constitute
‘extraordinary cause’ which permits a trial court to grant relief from a final
judgment entered in a contested action.” Simpson, supra at 337-38.
Rather, “extraordinary cause … is generally an oversight or action on the part
of the court or the judicial process which operates to deny the losing party
knowledge of the entry of final judgment so that the commencement of the
running of the appeal time is not known to the losing party.” Shelly
Enterprises, supra at 494 n.3 (quoting Orie, supra at 1272) (emphasis
omitted).
Instantly, Appellant filed various petitions in the trial court as if a default
judgment had been entered in favor of Appellee. The certified record,
however, reflects that the court entered judgment on the pleadings against
Appellant after an adverse proceeding. Appellant conceded “she learned of
the fact that the judgment had been entered when she attended the case
-5-
J-A15015-20
management conference in September 2018.” (Petition to Strike or Open
Judgment, filed 4/3/19, at 13).3 Thereafter, Mr. Moody was dismissed from
the case, and the February 13, 2019 docket entry was added to confirm the
judgment against Appellant. Significantly, Appellant did not file a notice of
appeal within thirty days of either the entry of the order following the case
management conference or the February 13, 2019 docket entry. Appellant
has also failed to allege any extraordinary cause as a ground for opening the
judgment on the pleadings. See Shelly Enterprises, supra; Simpson,
supra.
Instead of filing a notice of appeal, Appellant filed a petition to vacate
and a petition to strike or open the judgment. Absent a default judgment or
a showing of extraordinary circumstances, the appeal period expired and the
trial court lacked authority to entertain Appellant’s petitions. See id.
Consequently, the trial court’s decision to address Appellant’s petitions on the
merits was without legal effect. See Shelly Enterprises at 496 (reiterating
appellant’s petition to open judgment on pleadings amounted to untimely
collateral attack on final judgment). Being a legal nullity, the May 3, 2019
order denying Appellant’s petition to strike or open the judgment was not an
____________________________________________
3 Moreover, the Prothonotary provided Appellant with notice of the entry of
judgment by sending her a copy of the order that same day. See Pa.R.C.P.
236 (explaining prothonotary shall immediately give written notice of entry of
judgment to each party, if unrepresented, and shall note giving of notice in
docket).
-6-
J-A15015-20
interlocutory order appealable as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1).
Therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction in this matter, and we quash the
appeal.
Appeal quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Lazarus joins this memorandum.
Judge Strassburger files a concurring memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/14/20
-7-