Com. v. Gordon, B. ( 2020 )


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  • J-A17019-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    BRIAN GORDON                               :
    :
    Appellant         :   No. 3038 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 22, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-09-CR-0002526-2018
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                           FILED AUGUST 17, 2020
    Brian Gordon (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury
    conviction of burglary/adapted for overnight accommodations1 and related
    offenses. On appeal, Appellant argues: (1) the trial court erred in granting
    the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the original criminal information charge
    of burglary/not adapted for overnight accommodations;2 and (2) the verdict
    was against the weight of the evidence supporting his identity as the
    perpetrator. For the reasons below, we affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1)(ii).
    2   18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(3).
    J-A17019-20
    The trial court summarized the evidence presented at Appellant’s jury
    trial. The victim in this matter, Stephen Howard, testified to the following:
    [D]uring the early morning hours of April 3, 2018, Mr. and Mrs.
    [Tiffani] Howard, their three children and Mrs. Howard’s mother
    were inside their home located at 310 Crimson Court, Warrington
    Township, Bucks County.       At approximately 3:00 a.m., Mr.
    Howard entered the garage through the door connecting the
    kitchen to the garage. At the time, he observed [Appellant] in
    Mrs. Howard’s car. Upon being confronted by Mr. Howard,
    [Appellant] fled the garage, pursued by Mr. Howard. After a brief
    foot chase, during which Mr. Howard never lost sight of
    [Appellant], Mr. Howard tackled [Appellant] and a struggle
    ensued. When police arrived on scene, Mr. Howard was on top of
    [Appellant]. In the immediate vicinity, police found approximately
    $30 in loose change[ ] scattered on the street, a plastic bag, and
    dark-colored work gloves. After the police arrived, Mr. Howard
    returned to his home to find the center console of his wife’s car
    open and approximately $4.00 in change missing from the door
    pocket of the vehicle.
    Trial Ct. Op., 1/10/20, at 4 (citations to trial transcript omitted). Pertinently,
    Mr. Howard testified he did not see the perpetrator’s face while they were in
    the garage.          However, Appellant’s vehicle was found nearby.   N.T. Trial,
    1/7/19, at 13, 25.
    Appellant was arrested at the scene. For this incident, Appellant was
    initially charged with burglary/not adapted for overnight accommodations,
    criminal trespass,3 receiving stolen property (RSP), theft from a motor vehicle,
    disorderly conduct, and loitering and prowling at nighttime.4
    ____________________________________________
    3   18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(a)(1)(i).
    4   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3925(a), 3934(a), 5503(a)(4), 5506.
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    The Howards’ neighbor, Ernest Rehr, testified that on April 3, 2018,
    while the chase and altercation between Appellant and Mr. Howard ensued,
    he awoke to his dog barking at the sound of two men shouting near his home.
    N.T., 1/4/19, at 175-76. Mr. Rehr looked out his window to investigate, saw
    his vehicle’s interior dome light was on, and “realized that somebody had been
    in [his] car, [so he] called the police.”
    Id. at 176-77.
    Police arrived and
    arrested Appellant. Police also learned that approximately $5 worth of coins
    had been taken from Mr. Rehr’s vehicle.
    Id. at 181-82.
    For this incident,
    Appellant was also charged with theft from a motor vehicle, RSP, and loitering
    and prowling at night time.
    Finally, we note Mr. Howard and Mr. Rehr’s neighborhood was described
    as a quiet residential area with “good sized yards,” most of which are not
    fenced. N.T., 1/4/19, at 148, N.T, 1/7/19, at 7. Mr. Howard’s residence is on
    a cul-de-sac, while Mr. Rehr’s home is located between two cul-de-sacs, one
    being Crimson Court.
    On August 31, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a motion to amend the
    criminal information, seeking leave to change the burglary charge from
    burglary/not adapted for overnight accommodations to burglary/adapted for
    overnight accommodations.       On January 4, 2019, the trial court heard
    argument, granted the Commonwealth’s motion to amend, and immediately
    proceeded to trial.
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    At trial, Mr. Howard testified Appellant was wearing a white t-shirt,
    hoodie, or something similar, but Mr. Howard could not remember because
    the incident happened nine months prior.         N.T., 1/4/19, at 142, 146.
    However, Officer Jamie Valerieno, a responding officer, testified that Appellant
    wore a blue and gray sweatshirt and sweatpants.
    Id. at 190.
         The
    Commonwealth presented a photograph, marked C-3, taken when officers
    arrived on scene and depicting Appellant on the ground in a sweatshirt and
    sweatpants, with black work gloves under his left arm.
    Id. at 191.
    Meanwhile,
    another responding officer, Officer Alexander Moldavisky, testified Appellant
    was wearing a long sleeve black shirt, matching the description in the affidavit
    of probable cause.
    Id. at 202-03, 215.
    Plastic bags and $30 in loose change
    were also scattered on the ground near Appellant.
    Id. at 195-96, 210.
    Finally,
    also presented at trial were Mr. Howard’s crimen falsi convictions from Ohio,
    dated 2003 and 2010.
    Id. at 126-28.
    Appellant testified in his defense to the following. On his way home
    from work in Bensalem, Appellant was paid to drop off co-workers at their
    homes in Warrington and Warminster. N.T., 1/7/19, at 29, 34. Along the
    way, Appellant stopped at the home of a former co-worker in Warrington.
    Id. at 30, 34.
    Appellant later stopped at a Wawa store, which did not have a
    bathroom, for coffee and “took the back . . . side road” out of the
    neighborhood.
    Id. at 31.
    With a sudden urge to urinate, Appellant stopped
    his car in the neighborhood.
    Id. at 31, 35.
    He took off his driving gloves to
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    relieve himself in someone’s yard.
    Id. at 31, 36.
    When Appellant attempted
    to go back to his vehicle, he heard someone yelling in his direction, and was
    then tackled to the ground.
    Id. Appellant further testified
    that he had nothing
    to do with the $30 in change that was found on the ground close to him.
    Id. On January 7,
    2019, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the charges of
    burglary/adapted for overnight accommodations, loitering and prowling at
    night time, criminal trespass, theft from a motor vehicle, and RSP — all
    relative to Mr. Howard.    The jury found Appellant not guilty of disorderly
    conduct with respect to Mr. Howard, as well as all charges related to Mr. Rehr’s
    motor vehicle.
    On April 22, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four to ten
    years’ imprisonment on burglary/adapted for overnight accommodations, and
    one year of probation for loitering and prowling at night time, to be served
    consecutively. No penalty was imposed for the remaining convictions.
    On May 2, 2019, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion
    challenging the weight of the evidence, which the trial court denied on
    September 24, 2019. A timely notice of appeal was filed on October 24, 2019.
    Thereafter, Appellant complied with the trial court’s November 13, 2019 order
    directing him to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
    Appellant raises two issues for our review:
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    [1] Did the Court err in granting the Commonwealth’s motion to
    amend count one of the information to 18 Pa.C.S. §
    3502(a)(1)(ii).
    [2] Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence in that the
    complainant’s testimony contained major discrepancies, and
    Appellant testified credibly that he did not commit the crimes.
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.5
    First,     Appellant         argues    the   trial   court   erred   in   granting   the
    Commonwealth’s motion to amend the criminal information because the new
    charge, burglary/adapted for overnight accommodation, involved different
    elements than the original charge — burglary/not adapted for overnight
    accommodation. He emphasizes the court permitted the Commonwealth to
    amend the information on the day of trial. Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant
    concedes “many of the facts as alleged were unchanged,” but nevertheless
    avers the “untimely amendment was prejudicial as it changed the elements of
    the crime charged.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. We disagree.
    “The decision of whether to allow the Commonwealth to amend the
    [i]nformation[ ] is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and only an
    abuse of discretion will constitute reversible error.”                   Commonwealth v.
    Small, 
    741 A.2d 666
    , 681 (Pa. 1999).                         Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 564 provides:
    The court may allow an information to be amended, provided that
    the information as amended does not charge offenses arising from
    a different set of events and that the amended charges are not so
    materially different from the original charge that the defendant
    ____________________________________________
    5   For ease of review, we have reordered the issues.
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    would be unfairly prejudiced. Upon amendment, the court may
    grant such postponement of trial or other relief as is necessary in
    the interests of justice.
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 564.
    [T]he purpose of Rule 564 is to ensure that a defendant is fully
    apprised of the charges, and to avoid prejudice by prohibiting the
    last minute addition of alleged criminal acts of which the
    defendant is uninformed. The test to be applied is:
    [W]hether the crimes specified in the original
    indictment or information involve the same basic
    elements and evolved out of the same factual
    situation as the crimes specified in the amended
    indictment or information. If so, then the defendant
    is deemed to have been placed on notice regarding his
    alleged criminal conduct. If, however, the amended
    provision alleges a different set of events, or the
    elements or defenses to the amended crime are
    materially different from the elements or defenses to
    the crime originally charged, such that the defendant
    would be prejudiced by the change, then the
    amendment is not permitted.
    *    *    *
    In reviewing a grant to amend an information, the Court will
    look to whether the appellant was fully apprised of the factual
    scenario which supports the charges against him. Where the
    crimes specified in the original information involved the same
    basic elements and arose out of the same factual situation as the
    crime added by the amendment, the appellant is deemed to have
    been placed on notice regarding his alleged criminal conduct and
    no prejudice to defendant results.
    *    *    *
    Since the purpose of the information is to apprise the
    defendant of the charges against him so that he may have a fair
    opportunity to prepare a defense, our Supreme Court has stated
    that following an amendment, relief is warranted only when the
    variance between the original and the new charges prejudices an
    appellant[.]   Factors that we must consider in determining
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    whether a defendant was prejudiced by an amendment include:
    (1) whether the amendment changes the factual scenario
    supporting the charges; (2) whether the amendment adds new
    facts previously unknown to the defendant; (3) whether the entire
    factual scenario was developed during a preliminary hearing; (4)
    whether the description of the charges changed with the
    amendment; (5) whether a change in defense strategy was
    necessitated by the amendment; and (6) whether the timing of
    the Commonwealth’s request for amendment allowed for ample
    notice and preparation.
    *    *    *
    If there is no showing of prejudice, amendment of an
    information to add an additional charge is proper even on the day
    of trial. . . .
    Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 
    897 A.2d 1218
    , 1221, 1221-24 (Pa. Super.
    2006) (citations omitted).
    The Pennsylvania burglary statute states:
    (a) Offense defined.—A person commits the offense of
    burglary if, with the intent to commit a crime therein, the person:
    (1) . . .
    (ii) enters a building or occupied structure, or
    separately secured or occupied portion thereof, that is
    adapted for overnight accommodations in which at the
    time of the offense any person is present; [or]
    *    *    *
    (3) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately
    secured or occupied portion thereof that is not adapted for
    overnight accommodations in which at the time of the offense
    any person is present[.]
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1)(ii), (3).
    Here, the trial court opined:
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    The amendment of the criminal information did not alter the facts
    upon which the prosecution was based. The probable cause
    affidavit in support of the criminal complaint clearly alleges that
    [Appellant] entered the attached garage of a private, occupied
    residence. Those facts were presented at the preliminary hearing.
    [Appellant] was therefore on notice that the structure was
    adapted for overnight accommodation.
    Moreover, the Commonwealth filed its Motion to Amend
    Criminal Information on August 31, 2018 — four months before
    trial.   [Appellant], therefore, received ample notice of the
    Commonwealth’s intent to seek to amend the criminal information
    to reflect the subsection of the burglary statute applicable to the
    factual allegations.
    Finally, the amendment did not require any change in
    defense strategy. [Appellant]’s defense at trial was that, while he
    was in the neighborhood at the time the crime was committed, he
    was not the person who committed the crime. The amendment
    of the criminal information to reflect that the building burglarized
    was adapted for overnight accommodations therefore had no
    impact on defense strategy.
    Trial Ct. Op. at 6-7 (citations to trial transcript omitted). We agree.
    Appellant does not address, nor refute, the trial court’s analysis that:
    (1) while the amendment was granted on the day of trial, the Commonwealth
    filed its motion four months earlier and thus he had notice; and (2) his defense
    strategy of mistaken identity was not affected.     Both the Commonwealth’s
    initial and amended information alleged Appellant entered the attached garage
    of the Howard residence. The new burglary charge that the Commonwealth
    wished to charge contained only one new element — that the structure was
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    adapted for overnight accommodation.6                   Appellant understood he was in a
    residential area because he admitted at trial that he intended to urinate in
    someone’s yard. See N.T., 1/4/19, at 31. Finally, Appellant fails to establish
    he was prejudiced, especially as he concedes “many of the facts as alleged
    were unchanged.” See 
    Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1223
    ; Appellant’s Brief at 16.
    Appellant’s sole claim of prejudice is that the “untimely amendment was
    prejudicial as it changed the elements of the crime charged.” Appellant’s Brief
    at 16. This argument is conclusory as well as circular; it merely cites the fact
    of the amendment without explaining particularly how he was prejudiced. For
    the foregoing reasons, we do not disturb the order of the trial court permitting
    the Commonwealth to amend the information.
    In his second issue, Appellant argues the verdict was against the weight
    of the evidence. As stated above, his defense at trial was that another person
    committed the crimes. Appellant maintains Mr. Howard’s testimony regarding
    the perpetrator’s clothing was inconsistent with other testimony and evidence
    presented at trial. Further, Appellant avers Mr. Howard’s crimen falsi record
    casted doubt on Appellant’s identity as the actor because Mr. Howard was the
    only person to identify Appellant, and Mr. Howard testified he did not see the
    actor’s face while inside his garage.               Meanwhile, Appellant maintains he
    ____________________________________________
    6 We note Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement raised an additional issue: a
    challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for burglary, on the ground that Mr.
    Howard’s garage was not a separately secured or occupied building or
    structure. He has abandoned this claim on appeal.
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    testified credibly that he “was never in the Howard[s’] garage” and did not
    commit the crimes.7 Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant also contends another
    person committed the crimes and ran away, citing his acquittal of the charges
    relating to Mr. Rehr’s vehicle. Finally, Appellant avers pursuant to Mr. Rehr’s
    testimony, “it would have been impossible for Appellant to have committed
    the theft at Mr. Rehr’s house and then committed the theft at Mr. Howard’s
    house.” Appellant’s Brief at 13.
    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated:
    A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
    against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion
    of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a
    mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
    facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, “the
    role of the trial judge is to determine that ‘notwithstanding all the
    facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore
    them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny
    justice.’” It has often been stated that “a new trial should be
    awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as
    to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is
    imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to
    prevail.”
    An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with
    a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of
    review applied by the trial court:
    Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
    exercise of discretion, not of the underlying
    question of whether the verdict is against the
    weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has
    had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence
    ____________________________________________
    7 Neither Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement nor brief specify which of his
    convictions were allegedly against the weight of the evidence. Nevertheless,
    we note Appellant’s contention of mistaken identity and insistence that he did
    not commit any of the crimes.
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    presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
    consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by
    the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s
    determination that the verdict is against the weight of
    the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for
    granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
    conviction that the verdict was or was not against the
    weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be
    granted in the interest of justice.
    Commonwealth v. Clay, 
    64 A.3d 1049
    , 1054-55 (Pa. 2013) (citations
    omitted).
    A motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary
    to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient
    evidence to sustain the verdict but claims that “notwithstanding
    all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to
    ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to
    deny justice.”
    Commonwealth v. Lyons, 
    833 A.2d 245
    , 258 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
    omitted); see also Trial Ct. Op. at 3 (quoting same).
    Our Supreme Court has explained:
    The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who
    is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence to determine
    the credibility of the witnesses.      An appellate court cannot
    substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we
    may only reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so contrary to
    the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.
    Commonwealth v. Champney, 
    832 A.2d 403
    , 408 (Pa. 2003) (citations
    omitted).
    In denying relief of Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim, the trial
    court reasoned:
    In support of his weight of the evidence claim, [Appellant]
    argues that the Commonwealth’s witnesses, the homeowner,
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    lacked credibility based on an inconsistency in the description of
    the clothing worn by the individual observed in the garage and
    [Appellant’s] clothing.      However, “the determination of the
    credibility of a witness is within the exclusive province of the jury.”
    The inconsistency identified by [Appellant] is not of such a nature
    or extent as to make the jury’s verdict so contrary to the evidence
    as to shock one’s sense of justice. Moreover, the identification of
    [Appellant] as the perpetrator was established not only by the
    victim’s identification of [Appellant] but by the fact that
    [Appellant] was immediately pursued and apprehended at the
    scene. [Appellant’s] claim therefore lacks merit.
    Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5.
    Although this Court’s review “is a review of the [trial court’s] exercise of
    discretion, not of the underlying” weight of the evidence claim, Appellant’s
    argument makes no reference to the trial court’s discussion of having already
    denied relief on this issue. See 
    Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055
    . We agree with the
    court’s reasoning that the jury was free to believe all, part, or none of the
    evidence, and to determine the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony. See
    
    Champney, 832 A.2d at 408
    ; 
    Rakowski, 987 A.2d at 1219
    .
    Although there was conflicting testimony as to Appellant’s clothing, and
    Mr. Howard admitted he did not see the actor’s face while in the garage, Mr.
    Howard testified he never lost sight of Appellant while in pursuit. N.T., 1/4/19,
    at 133, 135, 147. Appellant also ignores that Mr. Howard tackled Appellant
    and remained “on top of” him until police arrived. See Trial Ct. Op. at 4. With
    respect to Mr. Howard’s past crimen falsi convictions, the court charged the
    jury that it was to decide how the convictions affected his credibility. N.T.,
    1/4/19, at 126-28.      The jury was free to believe his testimony identifying
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    Appellant as the person in his wife’s vehicle.       Moreover, Mr. Howard’s
    immediate pursuit and apprehension of Appellant supported Mr. Howard’s
    identification of Appellant as the perpetrator. Thus, the verdict does not shock
    one’s sense of justice. Appellant’s claim lacks merit.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/17/20
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Document Info

Docket Number: 3038 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 8/17/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/17/2020