In the Interest of: S.S.W. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.S.W., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: D.W., FATHER :
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: No. 778 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered February 6, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000333-2019
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2020
Appellant D.W. (Father) appeals from the order involuntarily terminating
his rights to 9-year-old daughter S.S.W. (Child), pursuant to the Adoption Act.
See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b).1 After review, we affirm.
The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows: The family
came to the attention of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services
(DHS) in 2015 after the agency received a report that Child’s school-aged
siblings were truant from the Philadelphia School District. DHS monitored the
situation by conducting investigations and home visits, and ultimately
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The trial court also terminated the rights of S.S. (Mother). Mother’s appeal,
which also concerns S.S.W.’s siblings, is also listed before this panel, but is
addressed by a separate memorandum. S.W.’s siblings include a half-brother,
S.J. (age 11); and half-sisters, L.S.-J. (age 6), and K.J. (age 3). There is
another half-sister, A.J. (age 15), but her case was not a part of the
termination proceedings as her whereabouts were unknown.
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determined that the Children were safe. Although Father may have been
involved in the Child’s care in some capacity, he did not reside with the family.
DHS held a single case plan meeting to establish various goals to stabilize the
family.
In December 2016, Mother was arrested on a simple assault charge,
pleaded guilty, and received a sentence of 12 months of probation.
Thereafter, DHS was unable to verify that the Children received medical care.
Mother was using marijuana and failed to follow through with her single case
plan goals. DHS was finally able to contact Father to determine whether he
could be a placement option; however, Father abruptly left the meeting and
never made himself a resource. DHS filed dependency petitions in May 2017.
In June 2017, the juvenile court adjudicated the Children dependent;
however, they were not removed from Mother’s physical care. The court
ordered DHS to implement services to stabilize the home, including beds for
Child and her siblings. At the ensuing permanency review hearing in
September 2017, the court learned Mother was incarcerated following a
probation violation. By December 2017, the juvenile court placed the Children
in the care of the Maternal Grandfather. The Children were eventually placed
in three separate pre-adoptive foster homes. In any event, none of the
Children returned to parental care after December 2017.
By May 2018, Mother was released. DHS revised the parents’ single
case plans. Father’s goals included: 1) ensure Child attended school daily and
completed assignments; 2) sign consents to ensure Child attends medical
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appointments and follow up with treatment recommendations; 3) attend
parenting classes; 4) make himself available to DHS; 5) submit to random
urine screens. Father was not compliant with these goals. In April 2019, DHS
petitioned for the termination of Father’s rights and to change the goal of the
dependency case from reunification to adoption. The trial court conducted the
consolidated hearing over the course of two dates: November 26, 2019 and
February 6, 2020. Father chose not appear for either date, but he was
represented by counsel. The court granted the petition and terminated
Father’s rights. He timely filed this appeal.
Father presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its
discretion by terminating the parental rights of
[F]ather, D.W.[,] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§]
2511(a)(1) where [F]ather presented evidence that
he substantially met his [Family Service Plan] goals
and tried to perform his parental duties[?]
2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its
discretion by terminating the parental rights of
[F]ather, D.W.[,] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§]
2511(a)(2) where [F]ather presented evidence that
he has remedied his situation by taking parenting,
drug treatment and receiving mental health treatment
[?] Father has the present capacity to care for his
[C]hild.
3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its
discretion by terminating the parental rights of
[F]ather, D.W.[,] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§]
2511(b) where evidence was presented that
established the [C]hild had a strong parental bond
with [F]ather[?]
Father’s Brief at 8.
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We review these issues mindful of our well-settled standard of review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record. If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to
Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of
the child[.]
In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
In this case, the court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to
subsections 2511(a)(1)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Those subsections provide:
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any
of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period
of at least six months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled
purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or
has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent.
[…]
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1) ... or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice
of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b).
This Court need only agree with the court as to any one subsection of
2511(a), as well as subsection 2511(b) in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843
A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Therefore, we analyze the trial
court’s decision to terminate under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b).
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We begin with Section 2511(a)(2). Regarding this section, we have
previously stated the following:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must
be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal has caused the child to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). Moreover, “[t]he grounds for termination due to parental incapacity
that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the
contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to
perform parental duties.” In re B.J.Z., 207 A.3d 914, 922-923 (Pa. Super.
2019) (citation omitted).
Instantly, Father argues that he worked toward completing his
reunification goals, that there was no evidence he was asked to submit to
drug/alcohol screens, nor was there evidence that he was invited to attend
Child’s medical appointments. See Father’s Brief at 16. Father contends that
he was involved in Child’s life prior to her dependency adjudication and that
he was presently able to provide a safe home to Child. Id. Father concludes
the court erred because he had the present capacity to care for Child. Id.
Upon our review, we disagree with Father’s contentions. Father did not
offer himself as a placement resource when Mother was incarcerated in April
2017. The caseworker testified that she repeatedly tried to contact Father,
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but her efforts failed. Father never complied with a home assessment or proof
of housing during the life of the case. Father did not participate in Child’s
educational planning or medical treatment. Father did not consistently visit
Child. In fact, he became aggressive during the visits he did attend and
blamed Child for her being in foster care. Consequently, the trial court had to
suspend his visitation. Clearly, he did not have the present capacity to care
for Child at the time of the termination hearing, as evidenced, among other
reasons, his outstanding bench warrant. See generally N.T., 11/26/19, at
30-35. Because Father did not appear at the termination hearing, he could
not contest the caseworker’s testimony or evidence. We conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found DHS met its burden of
proof under Section 2511(a)(2). Therefore, Father’s contentions concerning
Section 2511(a) are without merit.
Next, we address whether termination best served the Children’s needs
and welfare under Section 2511(b). Regarding this portion of the analysis, we
have previously stated:
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has
explained, section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a
bonding analysis and the term “bond” is not defined in the
Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of
the emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a
factor to be considered as part of our analysis. While a
parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by
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the court when determining what is in the best interest of
the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have with
the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the
trial court should consider the importance of continuity
of relationships and whether any existing parent-child
bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the
child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Regarding his second appellate issue, Father focuses only on the bond
aspect of the Section 2511(b) analysis. He argues that because he was
present for the first seven years of her life, there is a parental bond. He
concludes the court abused its discretion by terminating his rights under
Section 2511(b). See Mother’s Brief at 16-17.
Father misconstrues the bond inquiry. The question is not whether one
exists, but whether the bond is worth preserving. When examining the effect
upon a child of severing a bond, courts must examine whether termination of
parental rights will destroy a “necessary and beneficial relationship,” thereby
causing a child to suffer “extreme emotional consequences.” In re E.M., 620
A.2d 481, 484-85 (Pa. 1992). Notwithstanding the fact that Father had been
absent from Child’s life during her dependency case, Child did not have any
issues resulting from the lack of contact. The caseworker testified that Child
does not see Father as her parent, because he was never around long enough
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to form such a relationship. Moreover, the caseworker testified that Child told
her she wished to be adopted. This comports with Child’s legal counsel, who
also expressed an understanding of the termination and adoptions
proceedings, and Child’s desire to be adopted by the foster parent. See N.T.
11/26/19, at 45-46; see also N.T., 2/6/20, at 24, 67-68. No parental bond
exists, but even if one existed, it would not be the sort worth preserving. We
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that DHS met its
burden under Section 2511(b). Father’s final appellate argument is without
merit.
In sum, we conclude the trial court did not err or commit an abuse of
discretion by finding involuntary termination of Father’s rights was warranted
under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b) of the Adoption Act.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/21/20
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