Com. v. Lantzy, C. ( 2020 )


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  • J-A11023-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    CAMERON CHRISTOPHER LANTZY                 :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1568 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 5, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
    CP-67-CR-0006918-2018
    BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                          FILED AUGUST 26, 2020
    Cameron Christopher Lantzy appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered following his conviction for driving under the influence of a controlled
    substance (“DUI”) and driving without rear lights.1 Lantzy challenges the
    sufficiency of the evidence and contends the trial court erred in denying his
    motion to preclude certain testimony. We affirm.
    On September 13, 2018, while on patrol, Pennsylvania State Trooper
    Ryan Wildermuth pulled over Lantzy’s vehicle because it had an inoperable
    third brake light. After speaking with Lantzy and having him perform several
    field sobriety tests, Trooper Wildermuth arrested Lantzy for DUI. Trooper
    Wildermuth obtained a warrant to test Lantzy’s blood, but after four attempts
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(2) and 4303(b).
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    to draw blood failed, Trooper Wildermuth abandoned the effort. The
    Commonwealth charged Lantzy with the above offenses.
    Lantzy filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude some of Trooper
    Wildermuth’s testimony regarding his observations of Lantzy’s condition
    before the arrest. The court granted the Motion as to any testimony of eyelid
    tremors, but held the remainder of the Motion in abeyance until the court
    heard testimony regarding Trooper Wildermuth’s training. N.T., 8/29/19, at 4.
    At the hearing, Trooper Wildermuth testified that he had eight years of
    experience in DUI investigations and drug enforcement, had personally
    conducted roughly 250 DUI investigations and arrests, and had assisted in
    over 300 DUI arrests.
    Id. at 6.
    In addition to standard field sobriety training,
    Trooper Wildermuth had participated in Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving
    Enforcement (“ARIDE”) training.
    Id. At ARIDE, Trooper
    Wildermuth learned
    about various substances that cause impairment, including marijuana/THC,
    and the signs of impairment caused by each substance.
    Id. at 7.
    Trooper Wildermuth testified that he had pulled Lantzy over due to a
    broken taillight, and had not used a radar instrument to determine whether
    Lantzy was speeding before he pulled him over.
    Id. at 8, 16.
    Trooper
    Wildermuth also had not followed Lantzy’s car long enough to determine if
    Lantzy was swerving, and did not observe Lantzy driving erratically before he
    pulled him over.
    Id. at 16-17.
    However, Trooper Wildermuth testified that once he began talking to
    Lantzy, he observed that Lantzy had “glassy bloodshot eyes. They were heavy
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    like he was tired.”
    Id. at 9.
    Trooper Wildermuth detected a strong odor of
    fresh marijuana emanating from the vehicle, and, on the floor mat,
    “observe[d] what I recognized through training and experience as marijuana
    crumbs, essentially just little pieces of buds.”
    Id. Trooper Wildermuth testified
    that Lantzy’s passenger told him he was in
    possession of marijuana and paraphernalia, and Trooper Wildermuth directed
    Lantzy to get out of the vehicle.
    Id. Lantzy told Trooper
    Wildermuth that
    “about an hour prior . . . he shared a blunt with friends.”
    Id. at 10.
    Trooper
    Wildermuth could smell the odor of burnt marijuana on Lantzy’s breath.
    Id. Lantzy consented to
    take field sobriety tests (“FST’s”).
    Id. Trooper Wildermuth first
    had Lantzy perform a “nine step walk and turn” test.
    Id. During the test,
    Trooper Wildermuth observed six signs indicating that
    Lantzy’s judgment was impaired: (1) Lantzy “start[ed] too early,” (2) he “lost
    balance while holding the start position,” (3 & 4) he “stepped off the line . . .
    twice,” (5) he “turned improperly during the second nine steps,” and (6) “he
    took ten steps” instead of nine.
    Id. at 11.
    Trooper Wildermuth next
    administered the “one-leg stand” test”, and observed Lantzy “after picking his
    foot up to start[,] put his foot down right away,” before successfully
    completing the test.
    Id. at 11-13.
    Trooper Wildermuth then asked Lantzy to
    perform a “Romberg balance test,” during which Lantzy was to estimate the
    passage of 30 seconds.
    Id. at 13.
    Trooper Wildermuth observed Lantzy
    swaying “an inch or two” during this test.
    Id. at 13, 24. -3-
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    Trooper Wildermuth also asked Lantzy to stick out his tongue, and
    observed “large raised bumps and greenish discoloring” on the rear of his
    tongue.
    Id. at 14.
    He further noticed “reddening of the conjunctiva which is
    the lower eyelid,” and “a lack of smooth pursuit in both eyes.”
    Id. Trooper Wildermuth compared
    the latter condition to “a kid playing with polar opposite
    magnets. When the eyes come in, they reject.”
    Id. Trooper Wildermuth attributed
    these effects to smoking marijuana.
    Id. Trooper Wildermuth testified
    that he would not have been comfortable letting Lantzy drive home,
    and arrested him for DUI.
    Id. Once the parties
    finished examining Trooper Wildermuth, Lantzy’s
    counsel renewed his objection to the testimony “regarding the green tongue,
    the eye tremors, the conjunctivitis test.”
    Id. at 15.
    The court overruled the
    objection, stating, “I think he can testify regarding the observations. He can’t
    tell me necessarily what it all means, some of it he can. But certainly he can
    testify as to the observations.”
    Id. at 15-16.
    Lantzy’s attorney responded,
    “That is true.”
    Id. at 16.
    The court announced that Trooper Wildermuth’s hearing testimony
    would be incorporated into trial, which would proceed immediately. The
    Commonwealth introduced video footage from the dashboard camera of
    Trooper Wildermuth’s vehicle, and rested.
    Before   announcing    the   verdict,   the   court   recounted   Trooper
    Wildermuth’s testimony, and stated it “also had the opportunity to observe
    the dash cam video. Certainly the nine step walk and turn test showed a
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    number of signs of impairment.”
    Id. at 33.
    The court convicted Lantzy on both
    counts, and sentenced him to serve six months’ intermediate punishment and
    pay a fine. The court also gave Lantzy notice that the Pennsylvania
    Department of Transportation would be suspending his driving privileges.
    Lantzy appealed.
    The issues Lantzy raises are as follows:
    [1.] Did the trial court err in not granting [Lantzy’s] motion in
    limine seeking to omit from evidence the Trooper’s lay opinion
    testimony as to the degree of impaired driving in which he
    believed [Lantzy] was under, as well as, omitting from evidence
    the Trooper’s observations of the “green tongue,” [and]
    “horizontal gaze nystagmus test,” . . . as irrelevant evidence?
    [2.] Did the trial court err in finding sufficient evidence to establish
    a violation of Section 3802(d)(2) of the Vehicle Code in the
    absence of expert testimony as to causation? . . .
    Lantzy’s Br. at 26, 34 (reordered).2
    I. Motion in Limine
    Lantzy contends that the court erred in denying his Motion in Limine.
    First, Lantzy argues the court should have precluded Trooper Wildermuth’s
    testimony regarding Lantzy’s green tongue and the results of the horizontal
    gaze nystagmus (“HGN”) test. Lantzy argues the Commonwealth did not
    present this evidence as expert opinion, and these methods are not commonly
    known or understood attributes of using marijuana. Lantzy also claims there
    ____________________________________________
    2Lantzy raised additional issues in the Questions Presented section of his brief.
    We address only those issues for which Lantzy provided argument.
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    was no evidence that these conditions indicated any specific degree of
    marijuana impairment.
    Next, Lantzy argues that the court should have excluded Trooper
    Wldermuth’s lay opinion as to Lantzy’s impairment, because Trooper
    Wildermuth was not admitted as an expert, and had no scientific basis for his
    opinion. Lantzy argues that although he had admitted to smoking marijuana
    an hour before the stop, and Trooper Wildermuth smelled burnt marijuana
    emanating from Lantzy’s breath, these would not “inform the Trooper’s
    opinion regarding the specific degree of impairment.” Lantzy’s Br. at 39.
    Lantzy also claims the court should have excluded all of the above evidence
    as irrelevant.
    We review a decision regarding the admission of evidence for an abuse
    of the trial court’s discretion. Commonwealth v. Gause, 
    164 A.3d 532
    , 537
    (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc).
    Lantzy waived his challenge to the ruling on his Motion in Limine by
    agreeing with the trial court when it announced its ruling. When the court
    stated that the trooper could testify about his observations, but could not
    “necessarily” explain what “it all means, some of it he can,” Lantzy’s counsel
    replied, “That is true.” N.T. at 15-16. He cannot now complain that that ruling
    was incorrect.
    Even assuming that the court improperly denied the Motion in Limine,
    the error was at most harmless. Evidence admitted in error is harmless if (1)
    its prejudicial effect was de minimis; (2) it was cumulative of other,
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    substantially similar, and properly admitted evidence; or (3) the properly
    admitted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming in comparison to the
    prejudicial effect caused by the error that the error could not have contributed
    to the verdict. See 
    Gause, 164 A.3d at 540
    .
    Any error in admitting the trooper’s testimony about Lantzy’s gaze was
    not prejudicial above a de minimis amount. Lantzy did not argue to the trial
    court that Trooper Wildermuth’s testimony about Lantzy’s gaze was testimony
    about an inadmissible HGN test, and in fact, the trial court did not consider it
    as such. The trial court stated in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that the trooper
    had not testified about an HGN test. As Lantzy then proceeded to a bench
    trial, we cannot say that Lantzy sustained anything more than de minimis
    prejudice.
    Furthermore, allowing the testimony about Lantzy’s gaze and tongue
    was at most harmless because the evidence was offered to show that he was
    under the influence of marijuana and there was a lot of other evidence that
    he was under the influence. Lantzy admitted to having smoked marijuana an
    hour beforehand, and the trooper observed marijuana in Lantzy’s vehicle and
    smelled it on his breath.
    We also find no merit to Lantzy’s argument that the court should have
    excluded Trooper Wildermuth’s lay opinion that Lantzy was impaired. Trooper
    Wildermuth’s lay opinion was informed by a number of factors he was readily
    able to perceive and understand based on his training and experience, and
    “not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Gause,
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    J-A11023-20 164 A.3d at 538
    ; Pa.R.E. 701. His testimony aided the court in determining
    whether Lantzy had consumed marijuana, and whether Lantzy was impaired
    by its use. Pa.R.E. 701. The court properly admitted the lay opinion.
    II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Lantzy argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of DUI.
    We consider Lantzy’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to
    the following standard:
    When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
    determine whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
    verdict winner, the evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences
    therefrom are sufficient for the trier of fact to find that each
    element of the crime charged is established beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    Commonwealth v. Green, 
    204 A.3d 469
    , 484 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation
    omitted). “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
    circumstantial evidence.”
    Id. at 484-85
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown,
    
    23 A.3d 544
    , 559 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc)). As it is a matter of law, we
    review the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. Commonwealth
    v. Hall, 
    199 A.3d 954
    , 960 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, 
    206 A.3d 1028
    (Pa. 2019). We do not consider the weight or credibility of the evidence when
    reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Knox, 
    219 A.3d 186
    , 195 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, No. 495 EAL 2019, 
    2020 WL 1527230
    (Pa. Mar. 31, 2020).
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    Lantzy argues that his performance on the FST’s did not show “obvious
    signs of a lack of coordination to a degree that would make one believe he
    lacked the ability to drive safely.” Lantzy’s Br. at 30. Lantzy claims he
    performed the walk and turn test with only “subtle imperfections in an
    otherwise acceptable performance” of the test; that although he put his foot
    down at the start of the one leg stand test, he “went on to successfully
    [complete] the test without issue”; and that he estimated the time accurately
    during the Romberg test, and only swayed an inch or two while his eyes were
    shut.
    Id. at 30-31.
    Lantzy argues he did not perform any worse than “any
    other completely sober teenager . . . at night with emergency lights flashing
    in [his] face, presumably [testing] for the first time, and without the
    opportunity for a do-over.”
    Id. Next, Lantzy argues
    that there was no evidence that he had driven
    erratically, as Trooper Wildermuth did not observe anything wrong with
    Lantzy’s driving. Lantzy also points out that there was no obvious evidence
    that Lantzy had recently been smoking marijuana, such as billowing smoke or
    burnt marijuana. Finally, Lantzy argues that without expert testimony
    regarding Lantzy’s level of impairment, the results of a blood test, or evidence
    of erratic driving, the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion that
    Lantzy was impaired to a degree that had prevented him from driving safely.
    Section 3802(d)(2) prohibits an individual from driving a motor vehicle
    while “under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree which
    impairs the individual’s ability to safely drive . . . the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A §
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    3802(d)(2). This section does not require the Commonwealth to prove there
    was a specific amount of a drug in the driver’s system, or necessitate expert
    testimony in every case. Commonwealth v. Griffith, 
    32 A.3d 1231
    , 1239
    (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 
    42 A.3d 342
    , 345 (Pa.Super. 2012).
    Whether expert testimony is necessary is a case-by-case determination, and
    depends upon “the specific drug at issue” and “the nature and overall strength
    of the Commonwealth’s evidence.” 
    Griffith, 32 A.3d at 1239
    . FST’s “are
    generally accepted methods for ascertaining alcohol or drug impairment at the
    time of a traffic stop,” and “performing poorly may be sufficient for a finding
    of impairment.” Commonwealth v. Salter, 
    121 A.3d 987
    , 996-97 (Pa.Super.
    2015). There is no requirement that the Commonwealth produce evidence of
    erratic driving to establish the inability to drive safely.
    Id. at 995.
    Here, Trooper Wildermuth testified that Lantzy showed signs of
    impairment during the FSTs, and had glassy, bloodshot eyes; had the odor of
    burnt marijuana on his breath; and admitted to smoking marijuana an hour
    prior to the stop. He also said that during the FSTs, Lantzy exhibited multiple
    instances of an inability to maintain balance and other indicators of
    intoxication. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this
    evidence was sufficient to establish that Lantzy was under the influence of
    marijuana, and that his ability to drive safely was impaired. See, e.g.,
    Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 
    42 A.3d 302
    , 308-09 (Pa.Super. 2012)
    (evidence was sufficient to prove DUI under Section 3802(d)(2), without
    expert testimony, where Commonwealth presented evidence that the
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    defendant caused a motor vehicle accident, was unusually calm when
    speaking with police officers immediately afterward, and confessed that he
    had smoked marijuana earlier in the day). Lantzy’s arguments that he
    performed other aspects of the FSTs properly goes to the weight, and not the
    sufficiency of the evidence. See generally Commonwealth v. Widmer, 
    744 A.2d 745
    , 751 (Pa. 2000). As the Commonwealth presented sufficient
    evidence to sustain the conviction, we affirm Lantzy’s judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 08/26/2020
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1568 MDA 2019

Filed Date: 8/26/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/26/2020