Com. v. Morgret, A. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 2092 MDA 2018
AMY ELIZABETH MORGRET
Appeal from the Order Entered December 3, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-41-CR-0000631-2018
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2020
The Commonwealth appeals from the December 3, 2018 Order entered
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, granting Appellee Amy
Elizabeth Morgret’s Motion to Suppress. After careful review, we affirm.
We glean the following facts from the certified record. On June 30, 2016,
Appellee was released on parole. As a condition of her release, Appellee was
prohibited from directly or indirectly having contact or associating with
persons who “sell or use drugs, outside a treatment setting or possess drug
paraphernalia.” N.T. Hearing, 9/20/18, at 7. Parole Agent Josh Kriger
supervised Appellee.
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Quran Geddy,1 with whom Appellee’s daughter had an intimate
relationship, was also on parole and supervised by Agent Jason Lamay. On
October 25, 2017, Agent Lamay was waiting for a search warrant outside Mr.
Geddy’s residence when Appellee and her daughter walked up to Mr. Geddy’s
home. When Agent Lamay asked why they were there, Appellee informed
Agent Lamay that her daughter believed she had been impregnanted by Mr.
Geddy.
After Agent Lamay obtained the search warrant for Mr. Geddy’s
residence, he discovered drug paraphernalia in the home. The Commonwealth
arrested Mr. Geddy for possession of drug paraphernalia and detained him in
the Lycoming County jail.
After Mr. Geddy’s arrest, Agent Lamay discussed with and received
approval from his supervisor to search Appellee’s residence. On October 27,
2017, Agent Lamay and two other parole agents2 arrived at Appellee’s
residence and informed Appellee that they were conducting a parole search.
However, they actually searched the residence to “look[] for any kind of
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1 Quran Geddy is referred to as “Quran Getty” in Appellee’s Omnibus Pre-trial
Motion, “Caran Getty” in the Opinion related to the Motion, and “Coron Getty”
in the Pre-Trial Motion hearing transcript. The trial court noted in its 1925(a)
Opinion that it believes that the correct spelling of the individual’s name is
“Quran Geddy.”
2 Appellee’s parole agent, Agent Kriger was not involved in the search and the
record contains no indication that he was aware of Agent Lamay’s search at
any time. See N.T. Hearing, 9/20/18, at 4-9 (Agent Kriger testifying about
the conditions of Appellee’s parole, including her written consent to
warrantless searches of her residence and the prohibition of her having direct
or indirect contact with illicit drug sellers and drug paraphernalia).
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contraband in relation to Mr. Ge[dd]y, whether it be drugs, paraphernalia.”
N.T. Hearing, 9/20/18, at 16. During the search, the agents found two
unlabeled pill bottles containing unknown pills and a generic acetaminophen
bottle with an unknown powdery substance in Appellee’s bedroom nightstand
drawer. They also saw a digital scale in the living room. The agents then
stopped their search and Agent Lamay contacted the Williamsport Bureau of
Police. A parole agent transported Appellee to the parole office.
Police Officer Jason Bell arrived at Appellee’s apartment and the parole
agents showed him the items they had found. Officer Bell then drove to the
parole office to speak with Appellee and obtained her consent to conduct a
search of her residence. Officer Bell proceeded to conduct the search, during
which he discovered additional drugs in Appellee’s bedroom.3 Officer Bell also
found a black purse in Appellee’s bedroom containing multiple individual
bundles of ten-and twenty-dollar bills, which together totaled $7,120.
The Commonwealth subsequently charged Appellee with six counts of
Possession with Intent to Deliver Controlled Substances and six counts of
Possession of a Controlled Substance.
Appellee filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, which included a Motion to
Suppress. In the Motion to Suppress, Appellee contended that the parole
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3The drugs and pills found by the parole agents and Officer Bell were later
determined to be Tramadol, Alprazolam, Methylfentanyl, Buprenorphine and
Oxycodone.
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agents’ October 27, 2017 entry into her home was a ruse and illegal, and thus,
the warrantless search was improper.
The court held a pre-trial motion hearing on September 20, 2018, in
which Agents Kriger and Lamay and Officer Bell, among others, testified.
On December 3, 2018, the trial court entered an Opinion and Order,
granting Appellee’s Suppression Motion. The court concluded that the
Commonwealth’s proffered reasons for the search were not supported by
reasonable suspicion because “the only evidence was that Appellee’s daughter
was associating with Ge[dd]y,” and “[c]onducting a warrantless search of
[Appellee’s] home to determine if Ge[dd]y left controlled substances or
paraphernalia was not a sufficient reason established by reasonable
suspicion.” Op. and Order, dated 12/3/18, at 9-10.
The Commonwealth filed a timely interlocutory appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).4 Both the Commonwealth and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
The Commonwealth presents two issues for our review:
I. Did the court err in finding that the search of [Appellee’s]
residence by Parole Agents was illegal, as said search as
conducted without reasonable suspicion, when that issue was not
raised in [Appellee’s] Motion to Suppress nor raised in either an
oral or written amendment?
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4 Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) provides that “the Commonwealth may take an appeal as
of right from an order that does not end the entire case where the
Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate
or substantially handicap the prosecution.”
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II. Did the court err in granting [Appellee’s] Motion to Suppress
by finding that the search conducted by Parole Agents was without
reasonable suspicion?
Appellant’s Br. at 4.
In its first issue, the Commonwealth asserts that Appellee did not
properly raise the issue of “reasonable suspicion” in her Motion to Suppress
and, therefore, waived the issue. Id. at 10. We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 8 of our state Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches
and seizures. In re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001). A parolee,
however, has fewer constitutional search and seizure protections than a
regular citizen. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 130 A.3d 38, 42 (Pa. Super.
2015); Commonwealth v. Moore, 805 A.2d 616, 620 (Pa. Super. 2002). “In
exchange for early release from prison, [a] parolee cedes away certain
constitutional protections[.]” Commonwealth v. Sperber, 177 A.3d 212,
215 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, a parolee still has
“limited constitutional protections” related to warrantless searches. Coleman,
130 A.3d at 42. Parole officers may perform a warrantless search of a
parolee’s residence only if there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that
evidence of contraband or a violation of parole will be discovered. Id.; 61
Pa.C.S. § 6153(d)(1).
To effectuate these constitutional protections, the exclusionary rule bars
the use of illegally obtained evidence in state prosecutions in order to deter
illegal searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Arter, 151 A.3d 149, 153-
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54 (Pa. 2016). Prior to trial, a defendant may file a motion “to suppress any
evidence alleged to have been obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(A); see Commonwealth v. Long, 753 A.2d 272, 279 (Pa.
Super. 2000). “The motion shall state specifically and with particularity the
evidence sought to be suppressed, the grounds for suppression, and the facts
and events in support thereof.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(D).
Here, although Appellee did not specifically use the term “reasonable
suspicion” in her Motion to Suppress, we nevertheless conclude that the
Motion “specifically and with particularity [stated] the evidence sought to be
suppressed, the grounds for suppression, and the facts and events in support
thereof.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(D). In the Motion, Appellee asserted that “[t]he
physical evidence, [the] money and alleged drugs . . . obtained from
[Appellee] and her residence[,]was the product [of] and tainted by [the parole
agents’] illegal entry into [her] home.” Motion to Suppress, 7/28/28, ¶ 20.
She described the parole agents’ search of her residence as “a ruse and illegal
and improper[,]” noting that the Commonwealth did not obtain a search
warrant or valid consent. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 22. Thus, contrary to the
Commonwealth’s contention, Appellee did assert in her Suppression Motion
that the search violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
and thus, did not waive the challenge to the search. Id. at ¶ 23. Accordingly,
this issue has no merit.
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In its second issue, the Commonwealth asserts that Agent Lamay had
reasonable suspicion to conduct the search of Appellee’s residence. Appellant’s
Br. at 14. Therefore, the court should have denied Appellee’s Motion to
Suppress. See id.
“When reviewing the grant of a suppression motion, we must determine
whether the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and whether the
legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v.
McCleary, 193 A.3d 387, 390 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “We may
only consider evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Id. (citation
omitted). “[B]ecause the defendant prevailed on this issue before the
suppression court, we consider only the defendant’s evidence and so much of
the Commonwealth’s evidence as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the suppression record as a whole. Id. (citation omitted).
We are highly deferential to the suppression court’s factual findings and
credibility determination. Commonwealth v. Batista, 219 A.3d 1199, 1206
(Pa. Super. 2019). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as
factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to
their testimony. The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of
the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v.
Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted). If the
record supports the suppression court’s findings, we may not substitute our
own findings. Bastista, supra at 1206. However, we give no deference to the
suppression court’s legal conclusions and review them de novo. Id.
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As discussed above, pursuant to U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions,
“[p]arole officers may perform a [warrantless] search of a parolee’s residence
only where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates
reasonable suspicion that evidence of contraband or a violation of parole will
be discovered.” Coleman, supra at 42 (citing 61 Pa.C.S. § 6153). The
following factors may be taken into account when determining the existence
of reasonable suspicion: (i) the observations of agents; (ii) information
provided by others; (iii) the activities of the offender; (iv) information
provided by the offender; (v) the experience of agents with the offender; (vi)
the experience of agents in similar circumstances; (vii) the prior criminal and
supervisory history of the offender; and (viii) the need to verify compliance
with the conditions of supervision. 61 Pa.C.S. § 6153(d)(6).
The Commonwealth asserts that Agent Lamay possessed reasonable
suspicion that Appellee had violated the condition of her parole—the
prohibition against having contact or associating with persons who sell or use
drugs—because (1) he had been informed that Mr. Geddy was known to leave
drugs in his girlfriends’ homes; (2) on October 25, 2017, he had seen Appellee
and her daughter arriving at Mr. Geddy’s home to speak with him about her
daughter’s pregnancy; and (3) on that same date, Mr. Geddy was arrested for
drug related matters. Appellant’s Br. at 15.
The suppression court concluded that the Commonwealth failed to
demonstrate that the parole agents had a reasonable suspicion that the
warrantless search would lead to evidence of Mr. Geddy’s controlled
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substances or drug paraphernalia or a violation Appellee’s parole. Trial Ct.
1925(a) Op., dated 6/12/19, at 2; Op. and Order at 9-11. The court
determined that the parole agents did not, in fact, believe that Appellee
violated her parole because Agent Lamay explicitly stated that he went to
Appellee’s residence to “specifically look[ ] for any kind of contraband in
relation to Mr. [Geddy], whether it be drugs [or] paraphernalia[,]” not for
evidence in relation to any parole violation committed by Appellee. Trial Ct.
1925(a) Op. at 3 (quoting N.T. Hearing at 16). The court found that the search
was based on a “bald assertion” that Mr. Geddy was known to leave controlled
substances or paraphernalia in the homes of his girlfriends—noting that the
Commonwealth did not present any evidence to support this assertion, i.e.,
how the agent knew that Mr. Geddy left drugs in his girlfriends’ homes, the
reliability of the information, and the staleness of this information. Op. and
Order at 10.
Review of the record supports the suppression court’s conclusion that
the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that parole agents did not have
a reasonable suspicion that evidence of contraband or a violation of
parole would be discovered at Appellee’s residence. Coleman, 130 A.3d at
42. The sole purpose of the search was to look for contraband related to Mr.
Geddy. Additionally, the record shows that the Commonwealth failed to
establish a connection between Mr. Geddy’s alleged drug activity and
Appellee.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the suppression court’s factual findings
are supported by the record and discern no error in its grant of Appellee’s
Motion to Suppress.5
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/13/2020
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5 We note that while Officer Bell obtained verbal consent from Appellee to
conduct a search of her residence, this consent was the product of the parole
agents’ unconstitutional initial search of her residence. Therefore, the consent
was invalid and the trial court properly suppressed the evidence from the
search conducted by the parole agents and the search conducted by Officer
Bell. See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903, 909 (Pa. 2000)
(concluding that the defendant’s consent was invalid and the fruits of the
search must be suppressed because the initial detention which led to the
consent was illegal).
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