Sierra, A. v. Daneri, J. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ANTONIO SIERRA, PH.D. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
JACK DANERI, MICHAEL CLARK, : No. 1647 WDA 2019
TAMMY WHITE, SAMUEL KLINE, JOSH :
SHAPIRO, COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA :
Appeal from the Order Entered October 15, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Civil Division at No(s): No.
12719-2019
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 20, 2020
Appellant Antonio Sierra, Ph.D. (Appellant) appeals pro se from the
Order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County on October 15,
2019, denying his serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA)1. We affirm.
In September of 1998, following a jury trial in Lebanon County,
Appellant was convicted of thirty-one (31) criminal counts, which arose from
a brutal incident that occurred in a second floor apartment on Main Street,
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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Anville, Pennsylvania, on November 4, 1997.2 Appellant was sentenced in
Lebanon County in 1998, and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence in
1999. Appellant’s appellate rights were reinstated on collateral attack in May
of 2000. See Trial Court Opinion, filed August 10, 2000, at 1-2 (Court of
Common Pleas of Lebanon County No. 1997-11239), attached as “Exhibit C”
to PCRA.
In March of 2004, Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Illegal
Sentence and/or for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and the trial court denied the
motions as untimely. Appellant fled an appeal with this Court in April of 2004,
and in October of that year, we affirmed the trial court’s Order. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s Petition for Allowance of
Appeal in April of 2005. Numerous motions followed, all of which were denied
by the trial court of Lebanon County. Appellant’s subsequent appeals to this
Court and to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were unsuccessful.
On October 3, 2019, Appellant filed the instant “Motion for Post
Conviction Collateral Relief” in Erie County. Therein, he acknowledged that
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2 Appellant’s thirty-one guilty counts were as follows: three (3) counts of
Criminal Attempt to Commit Criminal Homicide; six (6) counts of Aggravated
Assault; three (3) counts of Recklessly endangering Another Person; three (3)
counts of Unlawful Restraint; three (3) counts of Arson Endangering Persons;
three (3) counts of Theft by Unlawful taking, one (1) count of Criminal Attempt
to Commit Theft by Unlawful Taking; eight (8) counts of Robbery and one (1)
count of Criminal Conspiracy. See Trial Court Opinion, filed August 10, 2000,
at 2 n. 1 (Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County No. 1997-11239),
attached as “Exhibit C” to PCRA.
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while he filed his Petition more than a year after the “alleged date of final
judgment” he claimed his failure to timely-file the petition was the result of
governmental interference with correspondence addressed to him while he
has been incarcerated between January and April of 2019. See PCRA petition,
filed 10/3/19, at 2-3. He also makes numerous allegations pertaining to his
trial. Specifically, he contends, as he had in earlier appeals, that prosecutors
conceded attempted third degree murder is not a valid charge of which one
can be convicted.
In its Order entered on October 15, 2019, the trial court denied
Appellant’s PCRA petition as he has not been convicted of any crimes in Erie
County; thus, no basis exists for a PCRA petition there. The court noted that
Appellant was aware he had not been convicted of a crime in Erie County and
advised him “that he may face sanctions for any further abuse of the judicial
process in Erie County in which he seeks relief related to his Lebanon County
Criminal Convictions.” See Order of Court, 10/15/19, at 1.
Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal pro se on November 4, 2019.
On November 5, 2019, the trial court entered its Order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b), and Appellant filed his “Plaintiff’s Concise Statement of Matters
Complained of on Appeal” on November 22, 2019. That statement is
comprised of ten, single-spaced pages which contain forty-five separately
numbered paragraphs. In its Memorandum Opinion filed on December 4,
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2019, the trial court found that Appellant’s appeal lacked merit and should be
dismissed for the reasons set forth in the October 15, 2019, Order.
In his brief, Appellant presents the following Statement of Questions:
1) Whether portions of the trial court[’]s Order that denied
subsequent P.C.R.A. and in forma pauperis is manifestly
unreasonable when government interference with conditions of an
illegal incarceration is within 9545(b)(1)(i), to timely assert
process commencement on violation to Plaintiffs First, Fourth,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States by Defendants unlawfully seized incoming privileged
correspondence with no probable cause and where plaintiff
represents an illegal charge as detaining him without due process
of law and impeding due course of justice? -
2) Whether, portions of the trial courts assessment of 2016-2017
filings in the State Courts of Pennsylvania as alleged (now)
constitutes prejudice, where said portions of facts (presumably
judicially true), are previously unknown and Plaintiff exercise due
diligence to bring these claims before the (present) Court
satisfying 9545(b)(1)(ii) component and, ... As plaintiff disclose
an unlawful attack by Defendants on Plaintiff[‘]s civil action
through a known Order that was a 1925(a) Opinion, as brought to
the Trial Courts attention, Yet; thereafter, continued to cause
prejudice by alleging intentional misleading and confusing
technical facts critical to evaluating Plaintiffs conduct when
Defendants and this Court themselves did not address the
misrepresented nature of the Order, not effects of said
determination, -
3) Whether the trial court exercised a manifestly unreasonable
judgment when, notwithstanding any of Defendants and such
government statements to the contrary of the evidence placed to
the P.C.R.A. petition on record, plaintiff is not imprisoned for any
indictable offense in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, rather
(a) Incarcerated on Attempt 3rd Degree Murder, a non -criminal
charge and Commonwealth [hereinafter "Cmwlth"] v. Lee, 312
A.2d 391 (Pa. 1973); (b) Where the trial judge altered a jury
verdict after said verdict was entered on the record as the Original
verdict, and (inter alia), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004), and Cmwlth v Dunn 385 A.2d 1299 (Pa.1975); (c) where
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a 1925(a) opinion entered by said trial judge to unlawfully vacate
said jury verdict and on the record cause plaintiff prejudice and
(inter alia), Cmwlth v. Lobiondo 462 A.2d 662, 665. n.4 (Pa.
1983), (d) where even against the jury verdict, those in
government further altered documents, leaving a verdict without
judgment (inter alia), Smith v. MeCool, 83 U.S. 560, 561 (1873);
(e) where a plea agreement rendered void by the evidence as
submitted capable of revealing no judgment of Sentence and no
judgment of commitment to cause prejudice as to Plaintiff where
the contract being without notice or opportunity to contest for
plaintiff is dissolved as unconstitutional, illegal and said suspended
alleged conviction and sentence as void, binds no one as the law
will not avail itself to be made lawful and (inter alia) Miller v
Alderhold, 288 U.S. 206, 210 (1933), and Hill v. Ex Rel Wampler
296 U.S. 460, 465 (1936); (f) where evidence expose Attempt
3R Degree Murder without a Statute and therefore an
unconstitional law that is not a crime (inter alia) Ex Parte Siebold
100 US 371(1880), Bond v U.S. 564 U.S. 211, 227 (2011)(per
curiam); (g) where trial judge takes action beyond power
conferred by law (its jurisdiction), renders action non-waveable,
Void, a nullity and inter alia, Hall v. Ames 162 F. 1008 (CA.181.
Cir. 1910), and Cmwlth v. Hall, 140 A. 626, 631 (Pa.1928); (h)
where Defendants would be forced to agree issuing a Motion for
Modification and (inter alia), Cmwlth v. Isabell 467 A.2d 1287
(Pa. 1983), (i) where plaintiff is required to file in custodial district
as a matter of law, and Jacobs v. Giroux, 2015 U.S.Dist. LEXIS
82651 (US.DC.WD.PA), and Brown v. Pa. D.O.C, 81 A.3d 814
(Pa. 2018) -
4) Whether trial court erred in failing to issue restraining Order
against all parties, immediately after plaintiff timely P.C.R.A.
petition, where the facts as plead by plaintiff reveal a complete
miscarriage of justice warranting judicial control over all
immediate parties involved, rather than threaten sanction to
plaintiff for entrusting life to the Administration of Justice ?
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.3
Prior to addressing Appellant’s issues, we first must determine whether
we have jurisdiction over his PCRA petition. “The question of whether a
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3 The Commonwealth has not filed an appellate brief.
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[PCRA] petition is timely [filed] raises a question of law. Where the petitioner
raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of
review [is] plenary.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa.
Super. 2016). Any PCRA petition, including second and subsequent petitions,
must either (1) be filed within one year of the judgment of sentence becoming
final, or (2) plead and prove a timeliness exception. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
Furthermore, the petition “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim
could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).4
“For purposes of [the PCRA], a judgment [of sentence] becomes final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Here,
Appellant's judgment of sentence became final nearly twenty (20 Years ago;
thus, Appellant's 2019 petition was facially untimely, and he was required to
plead and prove an exception to the timeliness requirements. The exceptions
provide as follows.
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
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4 This subsection was recently amended, effective December 24, 2018, to
extend the time for filing from 60 days of the date the claim could have been
presented to one year. However, this amendment does not apply to
Appellant's PCRA petition because it was filed prior to the amendment's
effective date.
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judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws
of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time
period provided in this section and has been held by that
court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).
Herein, even had Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition in the proper
lower court, as noted supra, he attempts to plead the governmental-
interference exception in his PCRA petition based upon the alleged withholding
of correspondence from him while in prison and previously raised challenges
to aspects of his trial. However, he has not proven he is entitled to relief
under that exception to the PCRA time-bar. To the contrary, both Appellant’s
concise statement of matters complained of on appeal and appellate brief fail
to conform to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate procedure prevent and
these deficiencies have prevented meaningful appellate review. As a result,
Appellant has waived these claims.
This Court has explained:
Rule 1925 is a crucial component of the appellate process because
it allows the trial court to identify and focus on those issues the
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parties plan to raise on appeal. This Court has further explained
that a Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to
identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent to
no Concise Statement at all.
Tucker, 939 A.2d at 346 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, the ten-page, single spaced concise statement Appellant
submitted is not sufficiently concise, contains numerous confusing and vague
contentions, and fails to set forth coherently his issues to be raised on appeal.
Accordingly, we deem all of Appellant’s issues waived. See, e.g., Jiricko v.
Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 213 (Pa.Super. 2008) (holding that appellant
had waived all of his issues on appeal for his failure to comply with Rule
1925(b), and stating that “while [a]ppellant’s five-page [concise] statement
can certainly be characterized as ‘lengthy,’ the crux of the problem is that the
statement is an incoherent, confusing, redundant, defamatory rant[.]”); see
also Kovalev v. Sowell, 839 A.2d 359, 367 n.7 (Pa.Super. 2003) (stating
that “as a pro se litigant, [an appellant] is not entitled to any particular
advantage because [ ]he lacks legal training.” (citation and quotation marks
omitted)).
In addition, it is axiomatic that appellate briefs must materially conform
to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, and this
Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if an appellant fails to comply with
these requirements. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101. “[W]here an appellate brief fails to
provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to
develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim
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is waived.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009), cert.
denied, 562 U.S. 906 (2010) (citations omitted). In addition, “although this
Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se
status generally confers no special benefit upon an appellant.”
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251–52 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal
denied, 879 A.2d 782 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted). Accordingly, a pro se
litigant must comply with our procedural rules. See id.
Herein, Appellant’s brief falls well below the minimum standards
delineated in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. For one, the
argument section of Appellant’s brief is not divided into sections addressing
each of the four issues he lists in his statement of questions involved.
Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 2119(a). Also, the brief contains irrelevant citation to the
record, and fails to discuss cogently the facts of this case as they relate to
relevant legal authority. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)–(c).
Moreover, like his concise statement of matters on appeal, Appellant’s
brief is rambling and nearly unintelligible. Therein, Appellant discusses a
myriad of issues most of which do not pertain to the questions before us and
attempts to relitigate claims this Court previously determined lack merit either
on direct appeal or in prior appeals on collateral review. Thus, even if we
liberally construe the materials Appellant filed, including his concise
statement, the lack of pertinent legal argument and other substantial defects
in his appellate brief preclude us from conducting meaningful review. See
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Pa.R.A.P. 2101; see also Johnson, supra at 924. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial Court’s October 15, 2019, Order, albeit for a different reason.5
Appellant also filed with this Court a “Petition to Enforce Judgment”,
and an “Application for Reconsideration to Bail” on March 4, 2020. “An issue
before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an
order that has any legal force or effect.” Selective Way Ins. Co. v. Hosp.
Grp. Servs., Inc., 119 A.3d 1035, 1040 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
In light of our foregoing disposition, we decline to address these motions, and
they are dismissed as moot.
Order affirmed. Petition to Enforce Judgment and Application for
Reconsideration to Bail dismissed as moot. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/20/2020
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5 “It is well-settled that we may affirm the trial court's order on any valid
basis.” Seneca Res. Corp. v. S&T Bank, 122 A.3d 374, 387 (citation
omitted).
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