In the Int. of: D.A.C.N., Appeal of: D.N. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S06002-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: D.A.C.N., A            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: D.N., MOTHER                    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 1953 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
    No(s): CP-51-AP-0000387-2019
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                                 Filed: March 23, 2020
    D.N. (Mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to
    her two-year-old daughter, D.A.C.N.-A. (Child), pursuant to sections
    2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) of the Adoption Act.1 After our review, we
    affirm.
    Child, born in February 2017, first came to the attention of the
    Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) when Mother tested
    positive for phencyclidine (PCP) at the time of Child’s birth.     At that time,
    Father was incarcerated.         DHS obtained a protective custody order and
    removed Child from Mother’s care. At the February 23, 2017 shelter care
    hearing, the court determined that Mother was receiving inpatient drug and
    ____________________________________________
    1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of H.B.C. (Father) on June
    13, 2019. Father’s appeal is listed before a separate panel of this Court.
    J-S06002-20
    alcohol treatment at a mother/baby program, and the court ordered Child be
    reunified with Mother at the facility.
    The case became active again in December 2017, following reports that
    the parents were under the influence of illicit drugs and that Father was
    verbally abusive.     This incident triggered police intervention, after Father
    threatened to kill everyone at the scene. Police contacted DHS and Emergency
    Medical Services (EMS) to transport Child to St. Christopher’s Hospital for
    Children for evaluation. Both Mother and Father attempted to remove Child
    from EMS, pulling on her arms and legs. DHS obtained a protective custody
    order. Child was evaluated and discharged from the hospital to a foster home.
    Following a December 21, 2017 shelter care hearing, the court lifted the
    protective custody order. The court referred Mother to the Clinical Evaluation
    Unit (CEU) for a drug screen and granted Mother supervised visits at DHS with
    Child.
    At a January 25, 2018 meeting, the Community Umbrella Agency (CUA)-
    NorthEast Treatment Center (NET) held an initial planning meeting, setting
    the goal of reunification with a concurrent goal of adoption.             Mother’s
    objectives     were   to   comply   with   her   CEU   referral   and   subsequent
    recommendation, attend and complete domestic violence classes, obtain
    stable and appropriate housing, comply with court-ordered visitation, and
    complete parenting classes.
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    On February 1, 2018, the court adjudicated Child dependent.2         The
    court found aggravated circumstances in that Mother’s parental rights to
    another child had been involuntarily terminated on July 11, 2014.       See 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(5). The court referred Mother to CEU for drug and alcohol
    screens and dual diagnosis assessment (drug and alcohol/mental health), and
    to the Achieving Reunification Center (ARC) for appropriate services; the court
    also suspended Mother’s visits with Child, issued an aggravated circumstances
    order, and ordered that DHS discontinue efforts toward reunification. See 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(5) (aggravated circumstances exist where “parental rights
    of the parent have been involuntarily terminated with respect to a child of the
    parent); see also Interest of S.U., 
    204 A.3d 949
    , 965 (Pa. Super. 2019)
    (where finding of aggravated circumstances exists, it is within juvenile court’s
    discretion to determine whether reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate
    need for removing child from home or to preserve and reunify family shall be
    made or continue to be made).
    Throughout 2018 and early 2019, the court held several permanency
    review hearings. At the March 6, 2019 hearing, the court determined Mother
    was non-compliant with the permanency plan.            In particular, she was
    inconsistent in her attendance at supervised visits and never progressed to
    ____________________________________________
    2 Throughout the dependency case, Father failed to comply with the court-
    ordered permanency plan. In January 2019, Father was arrested on a bench
    warrant for a probation violation; he had been on probation following a 2015
    guilty plea to burglary and conspiracy. Father was sentenced to eleven and
    one-half months’ to twenty-three months’ incarceration for the probation
    violation.
    -3-
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    unsupervised contact with Child, she tested positive for drugs after completing
    a treatment program, and she relocated to New York City after Child entered
    foster care.   Although Mother did not provide DHS with an address, she
    testified at the hearing that she was living in a two-bedroom apartment with
    her aunt and her cousin in New York, stated the address and indicated that
    her aunt had given her permission to live there.         See N.T. Termination
    Hearing 6/13/19, at 45-46.
    On May 28, 2019, DHS filed goal-change and termination petitions. On
    June 13, 2019, the court held a termination hearing. At that time, Child was
    two years old and had been in placement for eighteen months.
    At the hearing, JoAnn Braverman, Esquire, represented Child as her
    Guardian ad litem (GAL), and Sharon Wallis, Esquire, represented Child as her
    Child Advocate Attorney. Mother was present at the hearing, represented by
    counsel, and she testified on her own behalf. Lashay Hickenbottom, CUA Case
    Manager, testified on behalf of DHS. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
    court terminated Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1),
    (2), (5), (8) and (b). Mother filed this timely appeal. She raises the following
    issues for our review:
    1. Did the trial court err in terminating [Mother’s] parental
    rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A §§ 2511(a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8)?
    2. Did the trial court err in finding that termination of Mother’s
    parental rights best served [C]hild’s developmental,
    physical and emotional needs under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
    2511(b)?
    Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
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    In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights,
    [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
    when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
    termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
    standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
    findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
    they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 
    9 A.3d 1179
    ,
    1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate
    courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
    or abused its discretion. Id.; In re R.I.S., 
    36 A.3d 567
    , 572 (Pa.
    2011) (plurality). As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion
    does not result merely because the reviewing court might have
    reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel–Bassett
    v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 
    34 A.3d 1
    , 51 (Pa. 2011);
    Christianson v. Ely, 
    838 A.2d 630
    , 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a
    decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
    demonstration     of     manifest   unreasonableness,     partiality,
    prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 
    Id.
    As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an
    abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
    observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
    equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
    record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
    relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
    hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.
    Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result,
    as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an
    appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court
    and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment;
    instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual
    findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal
    conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
    discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 
    650 A.2d 1064
    , 1066
    (Pa. 1994).
    In re I.E.P., 
    87 A.3d 340
    , 343–44 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting In re Adoption
    of S.P., 
    47 A.3d 817
    , 826–27 (Pa. 2012)).
    -5-
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    A party seeking termination of a parent’s rights bears the burden of
    proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing evidence,” a standard
    that requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to
    enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the
    truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re T.F., 
    847 A.2d 738
    , 742 (Pa. Super.
    2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Further,
    a parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
    parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in
    resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent
    child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for
    a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental
    responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her
    physical and emotional needs.
    In the Interest of K.Z.S., 
    946 A.2d 753
    , 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
    omitted).
    Mother argues DHS did not meet its burden of establishing grounds for
    termination by clear and convincing evidence under sections 2511(a)(2), (5)
    or (8), or establish that termination best served Child’s needs and welfare
    pursuant to section 2511(b). We disagree.
    The trial court’s opinion thoroughly addresses subsections 2511(a)(1),
    (2), (5), and (8). In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this
    Court need only agree with any one subsection of section 2511(a). See In
    re B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).            In order to
    terminate parental rights under section 2511(a)(8), DHS must establish the
    following: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for [twelve]
    -6-
    J-S06002-20
    months or more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the
    removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) termination of
    parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.          23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8); In re Adoption of M.E.P., 
    825 A.2d 1266
    , 1275-76
    (Pa. Super. 2003). Under section 2511(b), the court must consider whether
    termination will meet Child’s needs and welfare. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b); In
    re C.P., 
    901 A.2d 516
    , 520 (Pa. Super. 2006).
    Our review of the hearing testimony and the record before us reveals
    that the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights under 23
    Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(8) and (b) is supported by clear and convincing
    evidence. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/19, at 12-18 (at time of termination
    hearing, Child had been in DHS custody for eighteen months, Mother was
    minimally compliant with objectives, including visitation, tested positive for
    drugs after completing treatment program, and did not comply with court-
    ordered parenting capacity evaluation; with respect to section 2511(b), case
    manager testified that despite being “appropriate,” Mother and Child were not
    bonded, Child is thriving in foster care and is “very attached” to foster parent,
    who had also adopted Child’s biological sibling, termination “would not sever
    an existing and beneficial relationship with Mother[,]” and Child would not
    suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated). See also
    N.T. Termination Hearing, supra at 15-25.
    We agree with the trial court that Child deserves permanency and
    stability, and we find no abuse of discretion or error of law. R.J.T., supra.
    -7-
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    We affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights, and we rely upon
    the opinion of the Honorable Joseph Fernandes. The parties are directed to
    attach a copy of Judge Fernandes’ opinion in the event of further proceedings.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/23/20
    -8-
    Circulated 03/03/2020 11 :26 �M
    . t � .- .            . .
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    ••It'•
    II.,            I
    FOR THE COUNTY OF PIDLADELPHIA                                                                 2Ul9 SEP 23 Al-': !O: C3
    FAMILY COURT DMSION
    In the Interest of D.A.C.-N., a Minor                            CP-.51-AP�0000387-2019
    FID:     51-FN-004746-201 l
    APPEAL OF: D.N., Mother                                          1953 EDA 2019
    OPINION1
    Fernandes, J.:
    Appellant D.N. ("Mother") appeals from the order entered on June 13, 2019, granting the petition
    filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS"), to involuntarily terminate
    Mother's parental rights to D.A.C.-N. ("Child') pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    §2Sl l(a)(2), (S)� (8) and (b), Carla Beggin, Esquire, counsel for Mother, (..Mother's Counsel")
    filed a timely Notice of Appeal with a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to
    Rule l 92S(b) ('�Statement of Errors") on July 12, 2019.
    Factual and Procedural Background:
    DHS originally became involved with this family on February 17, 2017. when DHS received a
    General Protective Services ("'GPS") report that alleged Child and Mother tested positive for
    phencyclidine ("PCP'') at the time of Child's birth on February 16, 2017; Child was born at 38.3
    weeks gestation and weighed six pounds and seven ounces; Child                      \V8S   in the well-baby nursery
    and was not exhibiting any signs of drug withdrawal; Mother denied PCP use and stated that
    someone must have given her the drug without her knowledge; Child's sibling ("Sibling") was
    adopted in 2016; Mother received Department of Public Welfare benefits; Mother requested
    paperwork to apply for Women, Infants, and Children benefits; Mother resided with Maternal
    Aunt; Mother had previously been incarcerated in 2016 but had no pending legal matters; Mother
    was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder e'PTSD"), bipolar disorder, depression. and
    anxiety; Mother reported that she received mental health treatment through Community Behavioral
    I Th.etrial court requested the Notes of Testimony for June 13, 2019, on July 10, 20 I 9. The trial court made subsequent
    requests on August l 3, 2019, end August 27, 2019. The trial court received lhe Notes of Testimony on August 28,
    2019.
    Page 1 of 18
    Health ("CBH"); Mother was previously prescribed medication but had not filled the prescription;
    Mother stated that she was prepared to care for Child; and Father was incarcerated2• This report
    was determined to be valid. On that same date, DHS visited Mother and Child at Pennsylvania
    Hospital to investigate the allegations of the GPS report. Mother denied that she used drugs and
    stated that she attended a party on February 14, 2017. where she smoked a cigarette that had been
    given to her, which she believed had been laced with drugs. Mother also explained that similar
    circumstances explained her two prior positive drug screens. Mother indicated that she resided
    with Maternal Aunt and a friend (""Friend") and that she was prepared to care for Child. DHS
    learned that Child was not experiencing any symptoms of withdrawal. Subsequently, DHS visited
    Mother's home and met with Maternal Aunt. DHS determined that the home was appropriate and
    that Mother, Maternal Aunt, and Friend each rented a room in the home of Friend's father, who
    was also a household member. Maternal Aunt and Friend denied any drug use; however, DHS
    learned that Maternal Aunt had previously lost custody of her children due to a history of drug use
    and lack of supervision. On February 21, 2017. DHS learned that Child was ready for discharge.
    DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody ("OPC") fur Child. Child was subsequently placed
    with Maternal Great-Grandmother ('�MGGM''). On that same date, DHS learned that Mother
    entered an inpatient drug treatment program at Interim House West. OHS subsequently visited
    Interim House West and met with Mother as well as the program director. The program director
    confirmed that Mother had been admitted to an inpatient mother/baby drug and alcohol program,
    A shelter care hearing was held for Child on February 23, 2017. Mother was present for this
    hearing. The,trial court' lifted the OPC and discharged the temporary commitment to OHS and
    Child's dependency matter. The trial court determined that Mother was receiving inpatient drug
    and alcohol treatment at a mother/baby program, and ordered that Child be reunified with Mother
    at the facility. On that same date. Child was returned to Mother's care at Interim House West.
    On December 7, 2017, DHS received a GPS report that alleged Mother and Father took Child to
    1 father's parental rights were also involuntarily terminated by the trial court on June 13, 2019, Father filed a Notice
    ofAppeal on July 10, 2019.(19$0 EDA 2019). The trial court responded to father's appeal byfUing a separate opinion
    on September 1 I, 2019.
    3 For the hearing held on February 23, 2017, the trial judge assigned to this matter was the Honorable Vincent Fwiong,.
    while the matter was heard by Master Alexis Ciccone, For the hearing held on December 21, 2017, the trial judge
    assigned to this matter was the Honorable Jonathan Irvine. Betwee-n January 4.2018, and June 19, 2018, the trial judge
    assigned to this matter was the Honorable Lyris Younge. From Septembers. 2018 to the present, this matter is assigned
    to the Honorable Joseph Fernandes.
    Page 2 of 18
    Maria De Los Santos Health Center for a well-child visit; Mother appeared to be under the
    influence of drugs although Father did not appear to be impaired; Mother appeared drowsy and
    sleepy; Mother denied being under the influence of alcohol or drugs; Child had previously been
    examined on October 25, 2017 and that Mother appeared to be under the influence of drugs at that
    examination as Mother's speech was slurred and she asked repetitive questions; Motber bad a
    history of PCP and marijuana use; there was a history of domestic violence between Mother and
    Father; and Mother may suffer from depression. This report was determined to be valid On
    December 19, 2017, DHS received a supplemental GPS report that alleged Mother and Father were
    involved in a verbal altercation; Mother and Father were under the influence of drugs; Father
    admitted that he and Mother had been smoking PCP and marijuana; the Philadelphia Police
    Department ("PPD") was called to the home; the family was informed that DHS had been
    contacted; Emergency Medical Services ("EMS") were contacted to transport Child to St.
    Christopher's Hospital for Children for an evaluation; Mother and Father attempted to physical
    remove Child from the EMS workers by pulling on her arms and legs; Mother and Father engaged
    the PPD in a physical altercation after Child was removed from the scene; medical personnel
    determined Child was healthy and well-fed. DHS subsequently learned that Children's Hospital
    was ready to discharge Child and DHS subsequently obtained an OPC for Child, who remained
    hospitalized on a social hold while DHS located an appropriate foster care placement. On
    December 19., 2017, Child was placed in a foster home through Bethany Christian Services.
    A shelter care hearing was held for Child on December 21, 2017. Mother was present for this
    hearing. The trial court lifted the OPC and ordered the temporary commitment to DHS to stand.
    Mother was referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit ("CElf') for a forthwith drug screen. Mother
    was granted supervised visits at the agency with Child.
    On January 25, 2018, the Community Umbrella Agency ("CUA'') NorthEast Treatment Centers
    ("NET') held the initial Single Case Plan ("SCP'') meeting. Mother did not participate in this
    meeting. Child's primary goal was reunification with a concurrent goal of adoption. Mother's
    objectives were to comply with her CEU referral and subsequent recommendations; attend and
    complete domestic violence classes; obtain stable and appropriate housing; comply with court-
    ordered visitation; and complete parenting classes.
    Page 3 of 18
    On February 1, 20184, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent. discharged the temporary
    commitment, and fully committed Child to DHS. The trial court found that aggravated
    circumstances existed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §6302(5) in that Mother's parental rights of Sibling
    were involuntarily terminated by the Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine on July 11, 2014. The trial
    court ordered Mother be referred to the CEU for a forthwith drug and alcohol screen, dual
    diagnosis assessment, and three random drug screens. The trial court also referred Mother to the
    Achieving Reunification Center (°ARC") for appropriate services. The trial court ordered that a
    SCP meeting be held within the next 20 days, Mother's visits with Child were to be suspended
    until further order of the court. Additionally, the trial court issued an Aggravated Circumstances
    Order on the same date, ordering no efforts to be made to reunify Child with Mother.
    A permanency review hearing was held for Child on April 19, 2018. Mother was present for this
    hearing. It was determined that Mother was non-compliant with the permanency plan and that
    Mother reported that she was engaged in ARC services, but CUA-NET did not have a record of
    Mother's engagement. The trial court ordered Child remain as committed to DHS and Mother be
    referred to the CEU for a forthwith drug and alcohol screen, dual diagnosis assessment, and three
    random drug screens. The trial court ordered that Mother's visitation with Child remain suspended,
    but once Mo1her engaged in dual diagnosis treatment and submitted at least two consecutive
    negative drug screens with progress notes and treatment plans, Mother was to have supervised
    visits at the agency.
    A pennanency review hearing was held for Child on June 19, 2018. Mother was present for this
    hearing. The trial court learned that the CEU did not recommend substance abuse treatment for
    Mother, but did refer Mother to the Behavioral Health System (..BHS'1 due to her reported mental
    heal1h history. The trial court ordered Child remain as committed; Mother sign all releases;
    Mother's therapist was to provide a treatment plan and progress notes forthwith; Mother was again
    ordered to be referred to the CEU for a forthwith drug and alcohol screen; and Mother's visitation
    with Child remain suspended, but if Mother's therapist recommended visitation, visits were to
    begin immediately at DHS.
    4 The
    adjudicatOl)' hearing was ori;inally iK:heduled for January 41 2018, and again on January 18, 2018. On both
    dates, the adjudicatory h�ng was continued due to the unavailability of the trial court judge and issues with the trial
    court internet sysmrn.
    Page 4 of 18
    On July 24, 2018, the SCP was revised. Mother participated in this meeting by telephone. Child's
    primary goel was reunification with the concurrent goal of adoption. Mother's objectives remained
    the same with the addition of continuing to attend her substance abuse and mental heal th treatment,
    as recommended.
    A permanency review hearing was held for Child on September S, 20185• Mother was present for
    this hearing. The trial court determined that Mother was substantially compliant with the
    pennanency plan; Mother completed domestic violence and parenting programs; and Mother was
    engaged in mental health and substance abuse treatment. The trial court ordered Child to remain
    committed as placed; Mother be referred to the CEU for a forthwith drug and alcohol screen with
    three random drug screens; Mother to complete a parenting capacity evaluation ('4PCE"); and
    Judge Fernandes reinstated Mother's visits bi-weekly, three .. house supervised at the agency with
    Child.
    On October 17. 2018, the SCP was revised. Mother did not participate in this meeting. Child's
    primary goal was reunification with the concurrent goal of adoption. Mother's objectives remained
    the same.
    A permanency review hearing was held for Child on December S, 2018. Mother was present for
    this hearing. It was determined that Mother was minimally compliant with the permanency plan,
    Mother was receiving mental health treatment, and that Mother appeared to be under the influence
    of drugs or alcohol during a supervised visit with Child on October 15, 2018, which Mother
    attributed to her medication. The trial court ordered that Child remain as committed; Mother be
    referred to the CEU for a forthwith drug and alcohol screen and three random drug screens; Mother
    provide a treatment plan and progress report; and Mother is to comply with her PCE referral.
    A permanency review hearing was held for Child on March 6, 2019. Mother was present for this
    hearing. The trial court determined that Mother was non-compliant with the permanency plan;
    Mother was not participating in visitation with Child; Mother was scheduled for a PCE on February
    20, 2019, but Mother failed to attend the appointment; Mother completed domestic violence, anger
    s A status review hearing was scheduled for June 26. 2018. The case was continued due to DHS's request for the
    matter to be heard by the trial court judge.
    Page S of 18
    management, and an inpatient substance abuse treatment through Cornerstone Treatment
    Facilities. Mother tested positive for marijuana after completing the inpatient program. The trial
    court ordered Child remain as committed; Mother be referred to the CEU for a forthwith drug and
    alcohol screen, dual diagnosis assessment again, and three random drug screens; Mother provide
    a treatment plan and progress report; Mother reschedule her PCE; Mother comply with all services
    and recommendations; Mother sign all releases and consents; OHS to file an involuntary
    termination of parental rights (''TPR") petition to be filed as to Mother; and that CUA-NET explore
    voluntary relinquishment of parental rights with Mother.
    On April 11, 2019, the SCP was revised. Mother did not participate in this meeting. Child's
    primary goal was identified as adoption with the concurrent goal of permanent legal custody
    ("PLC"). Mother's objectives were to provide documentation of her completion of substance abuse
    treatment; complete random drug screens; obtain stable and appropriate housing; comply with
    court-ordered visitation; and to complete her PCE.
    Child has been in DHS care since December 19, 2017. Mother has failed to successfully comply
    with all of her objectives and comply with all court orders throughout the life of the case. DHS
    filed TPR and goal change petitions as to Mother on May 28, 2019.
    On June 13, 2019, the trial court held the termination trial" for Child. Mother was present for this
    trial. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to involuntarily terminate Mother's
    parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §25ll(aX2), (.5), (8) and (b). On July 12, 2019, Mother's
    Counsel filed this appeal on behalf of Mother.
    Diseassion:
    On appeal, Appellant-Mother represents that the trial court erred when it found that:
    1. OHS by clear and convincing evidence had met its burden to terminate Appellant' s parental
    rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(l), (2), (.5), and (8).7
    6   The ttial was fur both termination of parental right$ and goal change of Child. Moeher did not appeal the goal change
    of reunification to adoption,
    7 Mother's Sratement of Errors indicates that the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23
    Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a){l) on June 13, 2019. The trial court only terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant co 23
    Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a)(2), (S), (S), and (b }. Sinc:e Mother's. parental rights were not terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    §25 l l(aXl), this Opinion will not address this issue.
    Page 6of 18
    2. The termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests and OHS had met
    its burden pursuant to 23 Pa.C. S.A. §2S 11 (b).
    Mother's Counsel only filed a Notice of Appeal for the June 13. 2019 trial court order that
    tenninated Mother's parental rights. Mother's Counsel did not file a Notice of Appeal of the June
    13, 2019 trial court order changing Child's permanency goal from reunification to adoption. A
    party waives their right to appeal an order if notice of the appeal is not filed within 30 days after
    the entry of the relevant order. Kok.en l?t .C()loniq/ Assur. Co._, 
    885 A.2d 1078
    , 110 I (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2005). Since Mother has failed to file a Notice of Appeal for the June 13, 2019 trial court order
    changing Child's permanency goal, Mother has waived her right to appeal the goal change. For
    the purpose of this opinion, Mother's issues 1 through 5 will be consolidated to read: Did the trial
    court err or abuse i1S discretion when it terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23
    Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b)? Mother has appealed the involuntary termination of her
    parental rights.
    The grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights are enumerated in the Adoption Act at
    23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a). In proceedings to involuntarily terminate parental rights the burden of
    proof is on the party seeking termination, which must establish the existence of grounds for
    termination by clear and convincing evidence. In      re Adoption ofAtenciD, 
    650 A.2d 1064
     (Pa
    1994). The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(2). This
    section of the Adoption Act includes, as a ground for invohmtary tennination of parental rights,
    the repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent that causes the child
    to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
    well-being; and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
    not be remedied by the parent. This ground is not limited to affirmative misconduct. It may include
    acts of refusal to perform parental duties, but focuses more specifically on the needs of the child.
    Adoption ofC.A. W.. 
    683 A.2d 911
    , 914 (Pa. Super. 1996).
    Throughout the time that Child has been in the custody of DHS, Mother's SCP objectives were
    dual diagnosis, random drug screens, housing, complete a PCE, and visitation. (N.T. 06/13/19,
    pgs. 7·8� 10, 12). Mother has attended almost all permanency review hearings for the Iife of the
    case and she is aware ofher objectives. (N.T. 06/13/19, pg. 7; OHS Exhibit 7wl5). On February l ,
    2018, the trial court found aggravated circumstances existed and no efforts were to be made to
    Page 7 of 18
    reunify Child with Mother. (N.T. 06/13/19, pg. 70). Prior to the permanency review hearing on
    March 6, 2019, Mother completed domestic violence, employment, and parenting. (N.T. 06/13/19,
    pgs. 46-47� Mother Exhibit 2-4). Mother completed an inpatient drug and alcohol program at
    Cornerstone Treatment Center in New York on February 2019. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs, 30, 38-39, 51-
    S 8; Mother Exhibit l). Mother did not fulfill the menta.J health component of her dual diagnosis
    objective at this provider. (N.T. 06/13/19, pg. 48). Mother attempted to enroll in a mental health
    program in New York City and eventually obtained an appointment on May 2019. Mother was
    diagnosed with bipolar disorder, PTSD, depression, and anxiety. Mother is scheduled to attend
    therapy once a week and consult with a psychiatrist for medication within two weeks of June 13.
    2019, after the termination trial. Mother has been off her medication for this entire time period.
    (N. T. 06/13/19, pgs. 7 6·80). Al though Mother completed the inpatient drug and alcohol program,
    Mother tested positive for marijuana at a forthwith drug screen at the CEU on March 6, 2019.
    (N.T. 06/13/191 pgs. 13-14, 30). On that same date, Mother refused to schedule an assessment, as
    ordered, because Mother indicated to the CEU that since she lives in New York City, the trial court
    should have considered that fact prior to making the order. Mother also refused to schedule the
    assessment for a future date that coincides with a date that Mother travels to Philadelphia to visit
    Child. Mother indicated that she does not recall refusing to schedule the assessment with the CEU.
    (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 13-14, 61, 64 .. 65). Following Mother's discharge from Cornerstone Treatment
    Center in February 2019, Mother did not participate in any other drug and alcohol treatment. (N.T.
    06113/19, pgs, 1 1 � 12, 57-61 ). Mother still has not complied with the court order to be re-assessed
    at the CEU. (N.T. 06/13/19, pg. 65). After the permanency review hearing on March 6, 2019, CUA
    contacted Mother to attend her random drug screens on April l 7, 20 t 9, May l 6, 2019, and May
    29, 2019. Mother cbose to avail herself to the CEU for drug screens on May 13, 2019i and June 3,
    2019. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs, 14� 15). Mother claimed that CUA never contacted her to attend random
    drug screens, but later stated that she couldn 't attend the random drug screen within 24 hours of
    notification due to her work schedule and lack of money to get to Philadelphia. (N.T. 06/13/19�
    pgs. 66--68). On the day of her visit with Child on April 29, 2019, Mother did come to the
    courthouse to provide a drug screen, but she left without giving the screen, nor did she provide any
    documentation that she is maintaining her sobriety. (N.T. 06/13/ t 9, pgs. 73· 7 S). For the life of the
    case, Mother has been in and out of shelters and treatment programs. Mother currently resides in
    New York City with a maternal aunt and a maternal cousin. CUA indicated that Mother does not
    Page 8 of 18
    have appropriate housing for Child to be reunified with Mother. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 9-10, JO ..J t.
    45-46). Mother had a scheduled PCE on February 20, 2019. Although Mother was aware of the
    scheduled PCE, Mother arrived late to the appointment and the PCB was unable to he completed
    as scheduled. Mother has not completed the PCE. (N.T. 06113/19, pg. 10). Between Child's
    adjudication on February 1, 2018 and September 5, 2018, Mother's visits with Child were
    suspended, (DHS Exhibits 7-13). After the trial court reinstated visitation on September 5, 2018,.
    supervised visits were scheduled with Mother and Child bi-weekly on Mondays. CUA indicated
    that between the permanency review hearing on March 6, 2019, and the termination and goal
    change trial on June 13, 2019, Mother only attended two visits. Mother informed CUA that she
    missed scheduled visits with Child due to her work schedule. (N.T. 06/13/19. pgs. 8-9). Mother
    claims that she has attended four visits since the permanency review hearing on Mardi 6, 2019,
    and missed only one date due to the agency's closure on Memorial Day. (N.T. 06113/19, pgs. 55-
    56). Mother's visitation with Child has never graduated beyond supervised visitation. (N.T.
    06/13/19, pgs, 15-16). Although CUA indicated that the visits between Mother and Child are
    appropriate, CUA stated that Child is unfamiliar with Mother. Child is quiet and timid while
    Mother has high levels of energy during the visits. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs, 9, 16, 40-41). Mother has
    been minimally compliant with her objectives. (NT. 06/ 13/19. pg. 15). Child needs permanency,
    which Mother cannot provide. Mother has demonstrated that she is unwilling to provide Child with
    essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for her physical and mental well-being.
    The conditions and causes of mother's incapacity cannot or will not be remedied by Mother.
    Mother had ample opportunity to put herself in a position to parent. DHS was not required to
    provide reasonable efforts to Mother for reunification due to the previous involuntary tennination
    of Mother's parental rights with respect to another child. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 94�95; DHS Exhibit
    7). The testimony of the DHS witness was credible. Mother's repeated and continued incapacity
    has not been mitigated. Termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a){2) was proper.
    Mother also appeals the trial court's tenninationof parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §25 l l(a)(5)1
    which permits tennination when a child was removed, by court or vohmtary agreement, and placed
    with an agency if, for at least six months, the conditions which led to the placement of the child
    continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period
    of time, the services reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions
    Page 9 of 18
    .
    leading to placement, and termination best serves the child's needs and welfare. DHS, as a child
    and youth agency� cannot be required to extend services beyond the period of time deemed as
    reasonable by the legislature or be subjected to herculean efforts. A child's life cannot be put on
    hold in hope that the parent will summon the ability   to handle   the responsibilities of'parenting, lrl
    re J.T., 
    817 A.2d 509
     (Pa. Super. 2001). As a consequence, Pennsylvania's Superior Court has
    recognized that a child' s needs and welfare require agencies to work toward termination of parental
    rights when a child has been placed in foster care beyond reasonable temporal limits and after
    reasonable efforts for reunification have been made by the agency, which have been ineffective.
    This process should be completed within eighteen months. In re N. W.. 
    851 A.2d 508
     (Pa. Super.
    2004).
    Child has been in OHS custody since December 21, 2017, eighteen months at time of the
    termination trial on June 13, 2019. Mother's SCP objectives were dual diagnosis, random drug
    screens, housing, complete a PCE, and visitation. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 7-8, 10. 12). Mother Im
    attended almost all permanency review hearings for the Hfe of the case and she is aware of her
    objectives. (N.T. 06/13/19, pg. 7; DHS Exhibit 7-15). Prior to the permanency review hearing on
    March 6, 2019, Mother completed domestic violence, employment, and parenting. (N.T. 06/13/19,
    pgs. 46-47; Mother Exhibit 2-4). Mother completed an inpatient drug and alcohol program at
    Cornerstone Treatment Center in New York on February 2019. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs, 30, 38-39;
    Mother Exhibit 1 ). Mother did not fulfill the mental hea1th component of her dual diagnosis
    objective at this provider. (N. T. 06/ 13/19, pg. 48). Mother attempted to enroll in a mental health
    program in New York City and eventually obtained an appointment on May 2019. Mother was
    diasnosed with bipolar disorder, PTSD, depression, and anxiety. Mother is scheduled to attend
    therapy once a week and consult with a psychiatrist for medication within two weeks of June 13,
    2019� after the termination trial. Mother has been off her medication for this entire time period.
    (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs, 76-80). Although Mother completed the inpatient drug and alcohol program,
    Mother tested positive for marijuana at a forthwith drug screen at the CEU on March 6� 2019.
    (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 13-14, 30). On that same date, Mother refused to schedule an assessment, as
    ordered, because Mother indicated to the CEU that since she lives in New York City, the trial court
    should have considered that fact prior to making the order. Mother also refused to schedule the
    assessment for a future date that coincides with a date that Mother travels to Philadelphia to visit
    Page 10 of 18
    Child. Mother indicated that she does not recall refusing to schedule the assessment with the CEU.
    (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 13· l 4, 61, 6+65). Following Mother's discharge from Cornerstone Treatment
    Center in February 2019, Mother did not participate in any other drug and alcohol treatment. (N.T.
    06/13/19, pgs, 11-12, 57-61). Mother still has not completed the court-ordered re ..assessment at
    the CEU. (N.T. 06/13/19, pg. 65). After the permanency review hearing on March 6, 2019, CUA
    contacted Mother to attend her random drug screens on April 17, 2019, May 16� 2019, and May
    29, 2019. Mother chose to avail herself to the CEU for drug screens on May 13, 2019, and June 3,
    2019. (N. T. 06/13/19, pgs. 14· l 5). Mother claimed that CUA never contacted her to attend random
    drug screens, but later stated that she couldn't attend the random drug screen within 24 hours of
    notification due to her work schedule and lack of money to get to Philadelphia. (N.T. 06/13/19,
    pgs. 66-68). When Mother came to Philadelphia for a visit with Child on April 29, 2019, Mother
    came to the courthouse for a drug screen but left without giving the screen or providing any
    documentation that shows that she is maintaining her sobriety. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 73-75). For
    the life of the case, Mother has been in and out of shelters and treatment programs. Mother
    currently resides in New York City with a maternal aunt and a maternal cousin. CUA indicated
    that Mother does not have appropriate housing for Child to be reunified with Mother. (N.T.
    06/13/19, pgs, 9�10, 30-31, 45·46). Mother had a scheduled PCE on February 20, 2019. Although
    Mother was aware of the scheduled PCE, Mother arrived late to the appointment and the PCE was
    unable to be completed as scheduled. Mother has not completed the PCE. (N.T. 06/13/19, pg. 10).
    Between Child's adjudication on February 1, 2018 and September 5, 2018, Mother's visits with
    Child were suspended. (OHS Exhibits 7-13). After the trial court reinstated visitation on September
    5, 2018, supervised visits were schedu1ed with Mother and Child bi-weekly on Mondays. CUA
    indicated that between the permanency review hearing on March 6, 2019, and the termination and
    goal change trial on June 13, 2019, Mother only attended two visits. Mother informed CUA that
    she missed scheduled visits with Child due to her work schedule. (N. T. 06/13/19, pgs. 8-9). Mother
    claims that she has attended fom visits since the pennanency review hearing on March 6, 2019,
    and missed only one date due to the agency's closure on Memorial Day. (N. T. 06/13/19, pgs. 55·
    56). Mother's visitation with Child has never graduated beyond supervised visitation. (N.T.
    06/13/19, pgs. IS-16). Although CUA indicated that the visits between Mother and Child are
    appropriate, CUA stated that Child does not recognize Mother. Child is quiet and timid while
    Mother has high levels of energy during the visits. (N. T. 06/13/19, pgs. 9, 16, 4041 ). Mother has
    Page 11 of 18
    been minimally compliant with her objectives. (NT. 06/13/ J 9, pg. 15). Child is currently placed in
    a pre-adoptive foster home. Child recognizes her foster parent as her caregiver. (N.T. 06/13119,
    pg. 17). Child is placed in the same home as a biological sibling that was previously adopted by
    Child's current foster parent with whom she shares a strong bond. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 18, 24, 34).
    Child is currently receiving early speech intervention due to development delays and currently
    attends daycare. (N. T. 06/13/19, pgs. 25, 89). The foster parent takes Child to all of her medical
    appointments. Mother has not participated in any Child's medical appointments. (N.T. 06/13!19,
    pgs. l 7• 18). Child is strongly bonded with the foster parent and shows affection toward the foster
    parent. (N. T. 06/13/19, pgs. 1 7, 89). Child needs permanency, which Mother is unable to provide.
    As a result, the trial court found that tenninationofMother's parental rights was in the best interest
    of Child for her physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being. DHS was not required to
    provide reasonable efforts to Mother for reunification due to the previous involuntary termination
    of Mother's parental rights with respect to another child. (N. T. 06113/ l 9, pgs. 94-95; DHS Exhibit
    1). The testimony of the DHS witness was credible. Termination best serves Child's needs and
    welfare. Because the trial court made these detenninations on the basis of clear and convincing
    evidence, termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(S) was also proper.
    The trial court also terminated Mother's parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(S), which
    permits termination when:
    The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary
    agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
    placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to
    exist and tennination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
    This section does not require the court to evaluate a parent's willingness or ability to remedy the
    conditions which initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy ofDHS services offered
    to the parent, only the present state of the conditions. In re: Adovtion ofKJ.• 93.S A.2d 1128, 1133
    (Pa. Super. 2009). The party seeking termination must also prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that the termination is in the best interest of the child. The best interest of the child is determined
    after consideration of the needs and welfare of the child such as love, comfort, security, and
    stability. In re J3owman, A,2d 217 (Pa. Super. 1994). See also In re Adoption o(T.T.B.. 
    835 A.2d 387
    , 397 {Pa. Super. 2003).
    Page 12 of 18
    ..
    Child has been in DHS custody since December 2 l, 2017, eighteen months at time of the
    termination trial on June 13, 2019. Mother's SCP objectives were dual diagnosis, random drug
    screens, housing, complete a PCE, and visitation. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 7-8, 10, 12). Mother has
    attended almost all permanency review hearings for the life of the case and she is aware of her
    objectives. (N.T. 06/13/19, pg. 7; DHS Exhibit 7-15). Prior to the permanency review hearing on
    March 6, 2019, Mother completed domestic violence, employment, and parenting. (N.T. 06/13/ l 9,
    pgs. 46-47; Mother Exhibit 2-4). Mother completed an inpatient drug and alcohol program at
    Cornerstone Treatment Center in New York on February 2019. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 30, 38-39;
    Mother Exhibit l ). Mother did not fulfill the memal health component of her dual diagnosis
    objective at this provider. (N. T. 06/13/ l 9, pg. 48). Mother attempted to enroll in a mental health
    program in New York City and eventually obtained an appointment on May 2019. Mother was
    diagnosed with bipolar disorder, PTSD, depression. and anxiety. Mother is scheduled to attend
    therapy once a week and consult with a psychiatrist for medication within two weeks of June 13,
    2019, after the termination trial. Mother has been off her medication for this entire time period.
    {N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 76-80). Although Mother completed the inpatient drug and alcohol program,
    Mother tested positive for marijuana at a forthwith drug screen at the CEU on March 6, 2019.
    (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 13-14, 30). On that same date, Mother refused to schedule an assessment, as
    ordered, because Mother indicated to the CEU that since she lives in New York City, the trial court
    should have considered that fa.ct prior to making the order. Mother also refused to schedule the
    assessment for a future date that coincides with a date that Mother travels to Philadelphia to visit
    Child. Mother indicated that she does not recall refusing to schedule the assessment with the CEU.
    (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 13-14, 61, 64-65). Following Mother's discharge from Cornerstone Treatment
    Center in February 2019, Mother did not participate in any other drug and alcohol treatment. (N.T.
    06/13/19, pgs, 11-12, 57-61). Mother still has not completed the court-ordered re-assessment at
    the CEU. (N.T. 06/13/19, pg. 65). After the permanency review hearing on March 6, 2019, CUA
    contacted Mother to attend her random drug screens on April 1 7, 20 19, May 16, 2019, and May
    29, 2019. Mother chose to avail herself to the CEU for drug screens on May 13, 2019, and June 3,
    2019. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs, 14-15). Mother claimed that CUA never contacted her to attend random
    drug screens, but later stated that she couldn't attend the random drug screen within 24 hours of
    notification due to her work schedule and lack of money to get to Philadelphia. (N.T. 06/13/19,
    pgs. 66-68). On April 29, 2019, Mother came to the courthouse for an unscheduled drug screen,
    Page 13 of18
    •
    but left without giving the screen and failed to provide any documentation that shows that she is
    maintaining her sobriety. (N. T. 06113/ l 98, pgs. 73- 75). For the life of the case, Mother has been
    in and out of shelters and treatment programs, Mother currently resides in New York City with a
    maternal aunt and a maternal cousin. CUA indicated that Mother does not have appropriate
    housing for Child to be reunified with Mother. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 9-10, 30-31, 45-46). Mother
    had a scheduled PCE on February 20, 2019. Although Mother was aware of the scheduled PCE,
    Mother arrived late to the appointment and the PCE was unable to be completed as scheduled.
    Mother has not completed the PCE. (N.T. 06/13/19, pg. 10). Between Child's adjudication on
    February 1, 2018 and September 5. 2018, Mother's visits with Child were suspended, (DHS
    Exhibits 7-13). After the trial court reinstated visitation on September 5, 2018, supervised visits
    were scheduled with Mother and Child bi-weekly on Mondays. CUA indicated that between the
    permanency review hearing on March 6, 2019, and the termination and goal change trial on June
    13. 2019, Mother only attended two visits. Mother informed CUA that she missed scheduled visits
    with Child due to her work schedule. (N. T. 06113/19, pgs. 8-9). Mother claims that she has attended
    four visits since the permanency review hearing on March 6, 2019 and missed only one date due
    to the agency's closure on Memorial Day. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 55-56). Motber's visitation with
    Child has never graduated beyond supervised visitation. (N.T. 06/13/19� pgs, 15-16). Although
    CUA indicated Chat the visits between Mother and Child are appropriate, CUA stated that Child is
    unfamiliar with Mother. Child is quiet and timid while Mother has high levels of energy during
    the visits. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs, 9, 16, 40-41). Mother has been minimally compliant with her
    objectives. (NT. 06/13/19, pg. 15). Child is currently placed in a pre-adoptive foster home. Child
    recognizes her foster parent as her caregiver. (N.T. 06/13/19, pg. 17). Child is placed in the same
    home as a biological sibling that was previously adopted by Child's current foster parent with
    whom she shares a strong bond. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 18, 24, 34). Child is currently receiving early
    speech intervention due to development delays and currently attends daycare. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs.
    25, 89). The foster parent takes Child to all of her medical appointments. Mother has not
    participated in any Child's medical appointments. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 17·18). Child is strongly
    bonded with the foster parent and shows affection toward the foster parent. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs.
    17, 89). As a result, the trial court found that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the
    best interest of Child for her physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being. Mother has
    been unable to place herself in a position to parent for the life of the case. The conditions which
    Page 14 orts
    led to the removal of Child continue to exist after eighteen months and termination of Mother's
    parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Child. The testimony of DHS witness
    was credible. OHS was not required to provide reasonable efforts to Mother for reunification due
    to the previous involuntary termination of Mother' s parental rights with respect to another child.
    (N.T. 06/13/19. pgs. 94-95; DHS Exhibit 7). Because the record contains clear and convincing
    evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and tennination under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    §2511 (a)(8) was also proper.
    After a finding of any grounds for termination under Section (a), the court must. under 23
    Pn.C.S.A. §251 l(b), also consider what - if any - bond exists between parent and child. In re
    Jm,qluntary Termination of C.W.S.M. and KA.LM. 
    839 A.2d 410
    , 415 (Pa. Super. 2003). The
    trial court must examine the status of the bond to determine whether its termination "would destroy
    an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship", In re Adaption afT.B.B, 
    835 A.2d 387
    , 397
    (Pa. Super. 2003). In assessing the parental bond, the trial court is permitted to rely upon the
    observations and evaluations of social workers. In re KZ.S.. 
    946 A.2d 753
    , 762·763 (Pa. Super.
    2008). In cases where there is no evidence of       any bond between the parent and child, it is
    reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis depends on the
    circumstances of the particular case. 
    Id.
     However under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(b), the rights of a
    parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
    housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care, if found to be beyond the control of the
    parent Beyond the presence of a bond between a parent and child, the trial court can equally
    emphasize the safety and needs of the child, and should consider the intangible. such as the love,
    comfort, security, and stability that the child might have with their foster parent. In re Adoption of
    CD.R., 
    11 A.3d 1212
    , 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015).
    Between Child's adjudication on February 1, 2018 and September 5, 2018, Mother's visits with
    Child were suspended. (DHS Exhibits 7-13). After the trial court reinstated visitation on September
    5, 2018, supervised visits were scheduled with Mother and Child bi-weekly on Mondays. CUA
    indicated that between the permanency review hearing on March 6, 2019, and the termination and
    goal change trial on June 13, 2019, Mother only attended two visits. Mother informed CUA that
    she missed scheduled visits with Child due 1o her work schedule. (N. T. 06/13/19, pgs, 8�9). Mother
    claims that she has attended four visits since the permanency review hearing on March 61 2019,
    Page 15 of 18
    • ..1   I   l
    and missed only one date due to the agency's closure on Memorial Day. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 55-
    56). Mother averages two visits per court cycle review since her visits were reinstated on
    September 5, 2018. (N.T. 06/13/19, pg. 31). Mother's visitation with Child has never graduated
    beyond supervised visitation. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs, 15·16). Although CUA indicated that the visits
    between Mother and Child are appropriate, CUA stated that Child is unfamiliar with Mother. Child
    is quiet and timid while Mother has high levels of energy during the visits. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs, 9,
    16, 40-41 ). Mother and Child are not well-bonded. Child can recognize Mother, but Mother and
    Child do not have a strong relationship. (N.T. 06/)3/19, pgs, 15, 16). Mother and Child do not
    have a parent-child relationship. (N .T. 06!13/19, pgs, 16-17). Child is currently placed in a pre-
    adoptive foster home. Child recognizes her foster parent as her caregiver. (N.T. 06/13/19, pg. 17).
    Child is placed in the same home as a biological sibling that was previously adopted by Child's
    current foster parent with whom she shares a strong bond. (N. T. 06/ l 3/ 19, pgs. 18, 24� 34). Child
    is currently receiving early speech intervention due to development delays and currently attends
    daycue. (N.T. 06/13/19. pgs. 25, 89). The foster parent takes Child to all of her medical
    appointments. Mother has not participated in any Child's medical eppointments. {N.T. 06/13/19,
    pgs, 17-18). Child is strongly bonded with the foster parent and shows affection toward the foster
    parent (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs, 17, 89). It is in Child's best interest for Mother's parental rights to be
    involuntarily tenninated and Child would not suffer any irreparable harm from the termination.
    (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs, 18-19). Child was appointed legal counsel ("'Legal Counsel") and Legal
    Counsel met with Child and had the chance to observe Child. Although Child is three-years-old,
    Child is non-verbal due to developmental delays and foster parent indicated that Child can be shy
    when meeting new people. Legal Counsel observed that Child appeared shy and held onto the
    foster parent during the meeting. Although Legal Counsel was unable to discuss Child's wishes
    directly with Child, Legal Counsel noted that Child appeared happy. Legal Counsel briefly met
    Child's biological sibling and observed that the sibling appeared to be happy in the environment.
    Legal Counsel indicated that the foster home appeared to be a positive environment and noticed a
    strong relationship between the foster parent and Child. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs. 89-90). The record
    establishes by clear and convincing evidence that termination would not sever an existing and
    beneficial relationship with Mother. OHS was not required to provide reasonable efforts to Mother
    for reunification due to the previous involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights with
    respect to another child. (N.T. 06/13/19, pgs, 94-95; OHS Exhibit 7). The OHS witness was
    Page 16 of 18
    �   •   I   I
    credible. The trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights to Child under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    §251 l(b) was proper and there was no error oflaw or an abuse of discretion.
    Conclusion:
    For the aforementioned reasons. the trial court found that DHS met its statutory burden by clear
    and convincing evidence regarding tennination of Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23
    Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b), since it would best serve Child's emotional needs and
    welfare. The trial court's involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights was proper and
    should be affirmed.
    By the court.
    Page 17 of 18
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    FOR THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA
    FAMILY COURT DIVISION
    In the Interest ofD.A.C.-N., a Minor                      CP-51-AP-0000387-2019
    FID:     5 I ·FN-004746-2011
    APPEAL OF: D.N., Mother                                   1953 EDA2019
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that this court is serving a copy of this duly executed Opinion upon all parties or
    their counsel on ,Septemi,er 2,3,, io 1, 9. The names and addresses of al I persons served are as foUows:
    Roberto Valdes, Esq.
    City of Philadelphia Law Department                      Carla Beggin, Esq.
    1515 Arch Street, 161h Floor                             1800 John F. Kennedy Blvd, Suite 300
    Philadelphia. Pennsylvania 19102                         Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
    Attorney for D.H.S.                                      Attorney for Mother
    Sharon K. Wallis, F.sq.                                  Jo Ann Braverman, Esq.
    640 Rodman Street                                        1500 Walnut Street, 2151 Floor
    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19147                         Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102
    Child Advocate                                           Guardian Ad Litem
    Neal Masciantonio, Esq.
    1806 Callowhill Street
    Phi lade I phi a, Pennsy I vania 19130
    Attorney for Father
    BY:�
    -....::::::::
    Ariel J. Bruce
    Law Clerk to the Hon. Joseph L. Fernandes
    First Judicial District of Pennsylvania
    Family Division
    1501 Areh sc, Room 1431
    Philadelphia, Pa. 19102
    T: (215) 686-2660 I F: (215) 686-4224
    Ariel.bruce@courts.phila.gov
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