Com. v. Bond, B. ( 2020 )


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  • J-A06042-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    BERNARD K. BOND                            :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1701 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 9, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): C.P.-51-CR-0000733-2017
    BEFORE:      STABILE, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                         March 25, 2020
    Appellant, Bernard K. Bond, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County following his
    conviction by a jury on the sole charge of criminal conspiracy (to commit
    robbery).1 After a careful review, we affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Following his
    arrest in connection with a robbery, Appellant, who was represented by
    counsel, proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, Sergeant Marcus O’Shaughnessy
    testified that, on October 4, 2016, he was on duty when at approximately
    10:30 a.m. he received a call for a “robbery in progress, point of gun” at the
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.
    J-A06042-20
    Carolina Market, which is a grocery market located at 2952 Ridge Avenue.
    N.T., 11/28/17, at 25-27, 33.
    The officer received “flash information”2 over the Computer Aided
    Dispatch indicating two black males were involved: one of the black males
    was five-foot seven, wearing a blue jacket and blue jeans, while the other
    black male was six-foot wearing a blue hoodie and blue pants.
    Id. at 33.
    He
    further received information over the radio that the “the first black male was
    armed with a black handgun and the second black male was armed with a
    .357 Magnum….[The first male] was 25 to 30 years old, medium build, short
    hair. The other one in his 40’s, light complexion.”
    Id. at 34.
    Sergeant O’Shaughnessy arrived at the Carolina Market within “a few
    minutes” of receiving the radio call, and he found the victim, Jay Truesdale,
    standing on the corner outside of the market.
    Id. at 31.
    Mr. Truesdale, who
    appeared to be very upset, explained that “the males pulled a gun on him,
    took money from his out of his car, took his keys to the car, and [took] his
    cell phone.”
    Id. at 35.
    He reported the men then fled westbound on Fontain
    Street from 30th.
    Id. Sergeant O’Shaughnessy
    indicated that, based on the information
    provided to him, he completed an incident report describing the suspects as
    ____________________________________________
    2  “[F]lash information is based on a report from the initial officers to
    investigate the scene of a crime and is broadcast to other police units in the
    district.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    519 A.2d 427
    , 431 (Pa.Super. 1986).
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    “[f]irst black male medium complexion, six-foot one, medium build, blue
    jacket, blue pa[nt]s, armed with a handgun. Number 2 black male, medium
    complexion, five-foot seven, blue hoodie, blue jeans.”
    Id. at 37.
    Detective Earl Martin testified he was assigned as the lead investigator,
    and he interviewed Mr. Truesdale, who was still quite upset, at the police
    station shortly after the robbery occurred. N.T., 11/29/17, at 14-15. During
    the interview, Mr. Truesdale identified Appellant, who was his cousin, and a
    male named “Duly” as suspects.
    Id. at 18-19.
    Mr. Truesdale described “Duly”
    as a “[b]lack male, tall, athletic build, 20’s, late 20’s, earlier 30’s with a tattoo
    on his neck.”
    Id. at 22.
    Although the detective put the name “Duly” into the
    police database, no photograph or information “popped up.”
    Id. The general
    description provided by Mr. Truesdale as to “Duly” generated “hundreds of
    thousands of photos” such that the police were unable to identify “Duly’s” true
    identity.
    Id. Mr. Truesdale
    also gave the detective a description of Appellant,
    including what he was wearing at the time of the robbery, his name, his date
    of birth, and his home address of 1828 South Taylor Street.
    Id. at 23-24.
    The detective entered the information into the police database and, when
    Appellant’s photograph appeared on the screen, Mr. Truesdale immediately
    pointed to the photograph and said, “That’s my cousin. That’s my cousin.”
    Id. Mr. Truesdale
    then signed and dated the photograph.
    Id. -3- J-A06042-20
    Detective Martin testified Mr. Truesdale had no hesitation identifying
    Appellant as being involved in the robbery.
    Id. at 25-26.
    He also testified
    Mr. Truesdale confirmed his cellular phone, $150.00 in cash, and his car keys
    were taken during the robbery.
    Id. at 26.
    Moreover, Mr. Truesdale reported
    Appellant was armed with a .357 revolver during the robbery.
    Id. at 27-28.
    Detective Martin testified that, after he interviewed Mr. Truesdale, he
    went to the Carolina Market on the day of the incident and seized footage from
    surveillance cameras, which were located inside and outside of the market.
    Id. at 48.
    The video footage was entered into evidence.3
    Id. at 46-48.
    Detective Martin testified that, on October 4, 2016, at 9:30 p.m., the
    police executed a search warrant at Appellant’s residence.
    Id. at 32.
    No one
    was home at the time of the search.
    Id. During the
    search of a bedroom,
    the police found mail addressed to Appellant.
    Id. However, the
    police did not
    discover a firearm or any of the victim’s missing items.
    Id. at 32-33.
    Detective Martin then obtained an arrest warrant, which he attempted to serve
    on Appellant at his residence on October 6, 2017, to no avail.
    Id. at 37-38.
    Ultimately, Appellant was arrested on October 26, 2017, at 800 West Rockland
    Street.
    Id. at 40.
    Mr. Truesdale, who indicated in court that he recognized Appellant,
    testified Appellant is his “family.”
    Id. at 61-63.
    Specifically, Mr. Truesdale
    ____________________________________________
    3 We note the disc containing the video surveillance footage was included in
    the certified record to this Court.
    -4-
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    explained his stepfather, who raised him since he was an infant, was
    Appellant’s uncle.
    Id. at 61.
    Mr. Truesdale indicated Appellant was his step-
    cousin and, prior to the instant incident, they were “pretty close.”
    Id. at 63.
    Mr. Truesdale testified that, at one point, he gave Appellant money and took
    care of him because he was his family.
    Id. at 64.
    Regarding October 4, 2016, the day of the robbery, Mr. Truesdale
    testified that, as he was driving home from work after the overnight shift, he
    stopped at the Carolina Market in the morning to get a cup of coffee.
    Id. at 66.
      Mr. Truesdale explained he stopped his vehicle near the front of the
    market, went inside, and saw Appellant standing by another younger man who
    he knew as “Duly.”
    Id. at 71-72.
    Mr. Truesdale testified he did not stop to
    talk to Appellant or “Duly” but proceeded to get a coffee.
    Id. at 75.
    Mr. Truesdale testified he felt nervous seeing the two men together
    because he and Appellant were not “seeing eye to eye” on various things at
    that point in time.
    Id. Also, he
    explained he had lent $100.00 to “Duly,” and
    about a week before the robbery, he saw “Duly” and asked him when he was
    going to pay back the money.
    Id. at 74.
      In response, “Duly” pulled a 9
    millimeter handgun on him and said, “I ain’t got it. What you’re [sic] going
    to do?”
    Id. Mr. Truesdale
    testified he did not speak to “Duly” while he was in the
    Carolina Market on October 4, 2016; however, as Mr. Truesdale was waiting
    for his coffee to be prepared by the man behind the counter, Appellant
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    approached him and asked him for “a couple [of] dollars.”
    Id. at 77.
    Mr.
    Truesdale testified he went out to his car, retrieved $5.00, came back into the
    market, and gave Appellant $5.00.
    Id. at 81-82.
    He noticed Appellant and
    “Duly” were “huddled” together conversing when he came back inside of the
    market to give Appellant the $5.00.
    Id. at 82.
    After Mr. Truesdale paid for his coffee, he left the store, spoke briefly to
    a friend across the street, and began walking to his vehicle when he noticed
    Appellant and “Duly” exiting the market together while still conversing with
    each other.
    Id. at 84.
    As Mr. Truesdale approached the driver’s side door,
    he saw Appellant and “Duly” approach and stand by the front passenger side
    door of the vehicle.
    Id. at 85.
    Mr. Truesdale testified the following occurred:
    Q. At some point do they start having words with you?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And do you recall what that was about?
    A. My cousin actually told me, you know, You got a problem
    with my young bol? Y’all need to handle it. Actually, I said to my
    cousin, What do you mean I need to handle a problem with your
    young bol? We’re supposed to be family and he looked at me like
    I was crazy.
    Q. Okay. And at some point do you eventually get into your
    vehicle?
    A. Yes.
    Q. When you get into your vehicle, did something happen
    to you while you’re inside of your car?
    A. Yes. The young guy, he came. He opened my car door.
    He got in my car with the gun and he took my money out of my
    glove compartment where I had my money at and he took my car
    keys.
    Q. All right. Did you have anything else inside of your
    glove—are you talking about the center console of the car?
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    A. The armrest. I had my money in the armrest.
    Q. That would be between the driver and passenger seat?
    A. Yes.
    Q. In the front?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Did you have anything else other than your money?
    A. He took my car keys.
    Q. Did you have a cell phone on you that day?
    A. Yes, he took my cell phone, too.
    Q. Where was that at?
    A. That was in the console.
    Q. It was in there, too?
    A. Yes.
    Q. How much money was inside?
    A. I had just got paid. It was about $150. It was a small
    paycheck because I only worked about two or three days that day
    [sic], but I just had it in my console.
    Q. All right. Do you –is that where you always keep money?
    A. Yes. Correct.
    Q. Does anyone else know where you keep your money?
    A. Correct.
    Q. Who?
    A. [Appellant].
    ***
    Q. When this individual Duly pulls out the gun, do you
    remember where he pulled the gun from?
    A. Out of his jacket pocket.
    Q. Jacket pocket?
    A. Uh, huh.
    Q. What kind of gun was it?
    A. 9 millimeter.
    ***
    -7-
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    Q. Now, where is [Appellant] at when this is happening?
    A. Actually, he was like standing outside. Like it looked like
    he was coaching everything.
    Q. Why do you say it looked like that?
    A. Because literally like he—I literally looked at him and
    asked him, like you would actually let this man rob me like this?
    He looked at me like I was crazy. Like, my own flesh. I’m not
    going to call him my flesh and blood. I’m just going to call him
    [Appellant]. If you see on the video, I said, You’re really going to
    let this happen to me after all I done for you? And he looked at
    me like I was crazy.
    Q. Okay. What did you do when you first saw the gun?
    A. Man, I was paranoid. I was paranoid. I did not know if
    he was going to shoot me or if he wasn’t going to shoot me.
    Q. So you were afraid?
    A. Yes, I was afraid.
    Q. Did Duly say anything to you?
    A. He said, If you make a move, I’m going to kill you.
    Q. All right. So do you get out of the car? Do you stay in
    the car?
    A. Like when he was in the car with the gun, I actually got
    out of the car. And that’s when I looked at [Appellant]. I said,
    You’re going to literally let this happen? And that’s when he got
    the money out of the armrest. He got my car keys. He got out
    of the car. And after I said what I said to [Appellant] [“Duly”]
    said, Come on. We out. We out. We out. We out. Get let’s [sic]
    of here.
    Id. at 85-90.
    Mr. Truesdale testified Appellant and “Duly” walked back into the market
    together while Mr. Truesdale attempted to stop someone on the street so that
    he could call 911.
    Id. at 91.
    A brief time later, Appellant and “Duly” exited
    the market together, and Mr. Truesdale asked Appellant how he could “let
    something like that happen[,]” to which Appellant responded, “That’s your
    -8-
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    beef. That’s y’all problem. That’s y’all issue. I ain’t got nothing to do with
    that.”
    Id. Mr. Truesdale
    then watched while Appellant and “Duly” walked
    area from the area together.
    Id. at 91-92.
    Finally, a passerby permitted Mr.
    Truesdale to use his cellphone so that he could call 911 to report the robbery.
    Id. at 95.
    Mr. Truesdale testified that after the police arrived on the scene he gave
    them a description of the perpetrators, and he confirmed he gave a statement
    to the detectives at police headquarters.
    Id. at 98.
    He also confirmed he
    provided Appellant’s identity as one of the perpetrators, and he affirmatively
    identified Appellant from a police photograph.
    Id. at 98-99.
    Mr. Truesdale
    admitted he specifically informed Detective Martin that “Appellant was
    involved in th[e] robbery[.]”
    Id. at 100.
    Mr. Truesdale confirmed that, during Appellant’s preliminary hearing on
    January 24, 2017, he testified Appellant had nothing to do with the robbery.
    Id. at 102.
    However, Mr. Truesdale explained he gave such testimony at the
    preliminary hearing because he was “afraid for [his] life because two guys had
    confronted [him] before [he] went to court and told [him] that [he] better go
    to court and [he] better say [Appellant] didn’t have nothing [sic] to do with
    it.”
    Id. Mr. Truesdale
    testified that, after he testified at Appellant’s
    preliminary hearing, he left Pennsylvania and stayed in a homeless shelter in
    a different state because he was afraid for his life.
    Id. at 107-08.
    -9-
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    Upon reviewing the October 4, 2016, video surveillance footage from
    inside and outside of the Carolina Market in the courtroom, Mr. Truesdale
    confirmed the video depicted him going into the market, and “Duly” and
    Appellant were also inside of the market.
    Id. at 115-16.
    The video depicted
    Mr. Truesdale retrieving the money from his vehicle and handing the money
    to Appellant inside the market.
    Id. at 117.
    Mr. Truesdale confirmed the video depicted that, after he gave the
    money to Appellant, and he got his coffee, he left the market and crossed the
    street to talk to a friend.
    Id. at 120.
    The video depicts Appellant following
    Mr. Truesdale out of the market, glancing at Mr. Truesdale as he crossed the
    street, leaning into Mr. Truesdale’s vehicle via the opened front passenger
    window, and rifling around inside the vehicle.
    Id. at 120.
       Mr. Truesdale
    testified he went back to his vehicle and asked Appellant what he was looking
    for in the vehicle.
    Id. at 121.
    Mr. Truesdale testified he did not give Appellant
    permission to look or search for anything inside of his vehicle.
    Id. Mr. Truesdale
    confirmed the video then depicts that Mr. Truesdale went
    back across the street while Appellant went inside of the Carolina Market.
    Id. at 122.
    Shortly thereafter, the video shows Appellant and “Duly” exiting the
    market together and approaching Mr. Truesdale’s vehicle on the passenger
    side while Mr. Truesdale re-approached the vehicle on the driver’s side.
    Id. at 123.
    Pointing to the video, Mr. Truesdale testified he quickly entered his
    vehicle with the intent of driving away; however, before he could do so, “Duly”
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    entered the passenger side with his gun drawn.
    Id. at 123-24.
    The video
    depicts Appellant walking around to the driver’s side, and Mr. Truesdale
    quickly jumping out of his vehicle.
    Id. Mr. Truesdale
    testified he asked Appellant why he was letting “this go
    down[,]” and Appellant said “F” you to Mr. Truesdale.
    Id. at 124.
    The video
    shows “Duly” removing items from the center console while Appellant
    remained by Mr. Truesdale’s side.
    Id. at 124.
    The video shows “Duly” exiting
    the vehicle and walking into the market while Appellant continued exchanging
    words with Mr. Truesdale.
    Id. at 125-26.
    Within fifteen seconds, Appellant
    went back into the market with “Duly.”
    Id. at 126-27.
             Mr. Truesdale
    confirmed the video reveals that, after Appellant rejoined “Duly” in the
    market, Appellant shook “Duly’s” hand.
    Id. at 137.
    Police Officer Peter Plousis testified that on October 26, 2016, he went
    to the 800 block of West Rockland Street to “backup the execution of an arrest
    warrant” on Appellant.
    Id. at 150.
    Officer Plousis indicated that by the time
    he arrived on the scene Appellant was already in custody, and he transported
    Appellant to the police station.
    Id. at 152-53.
       Officer Plousis indicated
    Appellant provided biographical information for a police form, and Appellant
    listed his address as “1828 South Taylor.”
    Id. at 153-54.
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    At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, Appellant made a motion
    for a judgment of acquittal, and the trial court denied the motion.4
    Id. at 158.
    The jury convicted Appellant solely on one count of conspiracy (to commit
    robbery) and acquitted him on the charges of robbery, theft by unlawful
    taking, firearms not to be carried without a license, and carrying firearms in
    public in Philadelphia. N.T., 11/30/17, at 36-37.
    The Commonwealth filed a notice of intent to seek the imposition of a
    mandatory sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714. On February 9, 2018,
    following a hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to ten years to twenty
    years in prison. On February 20, 2018, Appellant filed a timely, counseled
    post-sentence motion,5 and on June 12, 2018, he filed a notice of appeal. On
    June 21, 2018, the Clerk of Courts entered an order denying Appellant’s post-
    ____________________________________________
    4 The defense offered no witnesses, and Appellant voluntarily waived his right
    to testify.
    Id. at 159-60.
    5  Generally, a defendant has ten days to file post-sentence motions.
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 720. Here, the time period expired on Monday, February 19,
    2018, which was a legal holiday. Accordingly, Appellant had until Tuesday,
    February 20, 2018, to file a timely post-sentence motion. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. §
    1908 (“Whenever the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday or
    Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday by the laws of this Commonwealth
    or of the United States, such day shall be omitted from the computation [of
    time].”).
    - 12 -
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    sentence motion by operation of law.6 All Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements have
    been met.
    On appeal, Appellant’s sole issue is whether the evidence was sufficient
    to sustain his conviction for criminal conspiracy (to commit robbery). In this
    regard, Appellant contends there is no evidence of a conspiratorial agreement
    between him and any other person and, in fact, he was merely present when
    the robbery occurred.
    A successful sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim requires discharge.
    Commonwealth v. Toritto, 
    67 A.3d 29
    (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc).
    Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the charge presents a question
    of law.
    Id. Our standard
    of review is de novo, and our scope of review is
    plenary. Commonwealth v. Walls, 
    144 A.3d 926
    (Pa.Super. 2016).               In
    conducting our inquiry, we examine:
    whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences
    derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
    ____________________________________________
    6  Appellant filed post-sentence motions on February 20, 2018, and a
    premature notice of appeal on June 12, 2018, before the court ruled on the
    post-sentence motions. The post-sentence motions were denied by operation
    of law on June 21, 2018. Thus, Appellant’s appeal relates forward to June 21,
    2018, and there are no jurisdictional impediments to our review. See
    Commonwealth v. Borrero, 
    692 A.2d 158
    (Pa.Super. 1997) (explaining
    general rule that if defendant files timely post-sentence motion, judgment of
    sentence does not become final for purposes of appeal until trial court disposes
    of motion or motion is denied by operation of law). See also Commonwealth
    v. Ratushny, 
    17 A.3d 1269
    , 1271 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2011) (explaining if court
    denies an appellant’s post-sentence motion following filing of premature notice
    of appeal, this Court will treat the appellant’s premature notice of appeal as
    having been filed after entry of order disposing of post-sentence motion).
    - 13 -
    J-A06042-20
    Commonwealth as verdict-winner, [is] sufficient to establish all
    elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We may not
    weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
    finder. Additionally, the evidence at trial need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve any
    doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt unless the evidence is so
    weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
    fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. When
    evaluating the credibility and weight of the evidence, the fact-
    finder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. For
    purposes of our review under these principles, we must review the
    entire record and consider all of the evidence introduced.
    Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 
    96 A.3d 1031
    , 1038 (Pa.Super. 2014)
    (quotation omitted). Further, a conviction may be sustained wholly on
    circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Melvin, 
    103 A.3d 1
    , 39-40
    (Pa.Super. 2014).
    The Crimes Code relevantly defines the crime of “conspiracy” as follows:
    (a) Definition of conspiracy.--A person is guilty of conspiracy
    with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent
    of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
    (1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or
    more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime
    or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or
    (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or
    commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to
    commit such crime.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903 (bold in original).
    In examining this statutory provision, this Court has held the following:
    The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the common
    understanding that a particular criminal objective is to be
    accomplished. Mere association with the perpetrators, mere
    presence at the scene, or mere knowledge of the crime is
    insufficient. Rather, the Commonwealth must prove that the
    defendant shared the criminal intent, i.e., that the Appellant was
    “an active participant in the criminal enterprise and that he had
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    J-A06042-20
    knowledge of the conspiratorial agreement.” The defendant does
    not need to commit the overt act; a co-conspirator may commit
    the overt act. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    719 A.2d 778
    , 784
    (Pa.Super. 1998) (en banc)[.]
    A conspiracy is almost always proved through circumstantial
    evidence. Commonwealth v. Swerdlow, 
    636 A.2d 1173
    , 1176
    ([Pa.Super.] 1994). “The conduct of the parties and the
    circumstances surrounding their conduct may create ‘a web of
    evidence’ linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” 
    Johnson, 719 A.2d at 785
    . The evidence
    must, however, “rise above mere suspicion or possibility of guilty
    collusion.” 
    Swerdlow, 636 A.2d at 1177
    (citation omitted).
    This Court has identified factors to be considered:
    Among the circumstances which are relevant, but not
    sufficient by themselves, to prove a corrupt
    confederation are: (1) an association between alleged
    conspirators; (2) knowledge of the commission of the
    crime; (3) presence at the scene of the crime; and (4)
    in some situations, participation in the object of the
    conspiracy. The presence of such circumstances may
    furnish a web of evidence linking an accused to an
    alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt when
    viewed in conjunction with each other and in the
    context in which they occurred.
    Commonwealth v. Olds, 
    469 A.2d 1072
    , 1075 ([Pa.Super.]
    1983).
    Once there is evidence of the presence of a conspiracy,
    conspirators are liable for acts of co-conspirators committed in
    furtherance of the conspiracy. Even if the conspirator did not act
    as a principal in committing the underlying crime, he is still
    criminally liable for the actions of his co-conspirators taken in
    furtherance of the conspiracy.
    The general rule of law pertaining to the culpability of
    conspirators is that each individual member of the
    conspiracy is criminally responsible for the acts of his
    co-conspirators committed in furtherance of the
    conspiracy. The co-conspirator rule assigns legal
    culpability equally to all members of the conspiracy.
    All co-conspirators are responsible for actions
    undertaken in furtherance of the conspiracy
    regardless of their individual knowledge of such
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    actions and regardless of which member of the
    conspiracy undertook the action.
    Commonwealth v. Galindes, 
    786 A.2d 1004
    , 1011 (Pa.Super.
    2001).
    The premise of the rule is that the conspirators have formed
    together for an unlawful purpose, and thus, they share the intent
    to commit any acts undertaken in order to achieve that purpose,
    regardless of whether they actually intended any distinct act
    undertaken in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy. It is the
    existence of shared criminal intent that “is the sine qua non of a
    conspiracy.”
    Commonwealth v. Lambert, 
    795 A.2d 1010
    , 1016-17 (Pa.Super. 2002) (en
    banc) (some citations and quotations omitted).         Ultimately, “where the
    conduct of the parties indicate that they were acting in concert with a corrupt
    purpose in view, the existence of a criminal conspiracy may properly be
    inferred.” Commonwealth v. Kinard, 
    95 A.3d 279
    , 293 (Pa.Super. 2014)
    (en banc).
    Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
    as verdict winner, we conclude the record reflects there was ample evidence
    for the jury to conclude Appellant and “Duly” were acting in concert with a
    corrupt purpose because all of the relevant circumstances discussed in
    Lambert are present.
    Initially, the record reflects Appellant and “Duly” had an association, and
    it is undisputed Appellant was present at the scene of the robbery. The video
    footage from the surveillance camera inside the Carolina Market shows
    Appellant and “Duly” conversing at length prior to Mr. Truesdale’s arrival.
    Further, Mr. Truesdale testified Appellant referred to “Duly” as “my young bol.”
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    J-A06042-20
    N.T, 11/29/17, at 85.     Moreover, Mr. Truesdale testified that, after the
    robbery, “Duly” said to Appellant, “Come on. We out. We out. We out.”
    Id. at 90.
      The two men walked back into the Carolina Market within fifteen
    seconds of each other after the robbery, shook hands, and then walked away
    from the market together.
    Moreover, there is ample evidence Appellant had “knowledge” that
    “Duly” would rob Mr. Truesdale, and he “participated” in the conspiracy.
    
    Lambert, 795 A.2d at 1016-17
    . Appellant, as opposed to “Duly,” first
    approached Mr. Truesdale and asked him for money. Apparently unsatisfied
    with the $5.00 Mr. Truesdale gave to him, Appellant, as confirmed by the
    surveillance video footage, followed Mr. Truesdale out of the market, glanced
    at Mr. Truesdale as he crossed the street, and rifled through Mr. Truesdale’s
    vehicle until Mr. Truesdale returned to stop him. Mr. Truesdale testified he
    did not give Appellant permission to search or look for anything inside of his
    vehicle. N.T., 11/29/17, at 120.
    Appellant then rejoined “Duly” inside of the Carolina Market while Mr.
    Truesdale continued his conversation with a friend across the street.
    Id. at 122.
    When Mr. Truesdale returned to his vehicle, Appellant and “Duly” exited
    the market and approached the vehicle together.
    Id. at 123.
    Mr. Truesdale
    intended to drive away; however, as confirmed by the surveillance video
    footage and Mr. Truesdale’s testimony, Appellant walked around to the
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    J-A06042-20
    driver’s side while “Duly” entered the front passenger side seat and pointed a
    gun at Mr. Truesdale.
    Id. at 123-24.
    There is no evidence “Duly” asked Mr. Truesdale where he kept his
    money; but rather, “Duly” simply opened the center console and removed the
    cash.
    Id. Mr. Truesdale
    testified Appellant, who was his step-cousin, knew
    he kept cash in the center console.
    Id. at 87.
    Additionally, Mr. Truesdale
    testified when he asked Appellant, with whom he had a recent disagreement,
    why he was allowing “Duly” to take the money, Appellant said, “‘F’ you” to Mr.
    Truesdale.
    Id. at 124.
    Based on this evidence, the jury could infer Appellant knew “Duly” was
    going to rob Mr. Truesdale. See 
    Lambert, 795 A.2d at 1016-17
    . Further, the
    jury could infer Appellant participated in the robbery by advising “Duly” of
    where Mr. Truesdale kept his money, as well as approaching the vehicle on
    the driver’s side while “Duly” committed the robbery. See
    id. As the
    trial
    court specifically noted, “even if there w[as] a flicker of doubt [about the
    existence of the conspiracy,] it would have been entirely snuffed out by the
    two men shaking hands—celebrating their enterprise—immediately after the
    robbery.” Trial Court Opinion, filed 3/7/19, at 13.
    Appellant contends he was “merely present” at the scene when the
    robbery occurred. However, as 
    indicated supra
    , from the evidence presented,
    the jury could conclude Appellant and “Duly” were engaged in concerted
    activity with Appellant as an active participant, as opposed to a mere
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    J-A06042-20
    bystander. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for
    criminal conspiracy.
    For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/25/20
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