Com. v. Martin, J. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JULIETTE ANN MARTIN, :
:
Appellant : No. 996 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 22, 2019
in the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-44-SA-0000024-2018
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED: APRIL 30, 2020
Juliette Ann Martin (“Martin”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following her guilty plea, following a summary appeal, to driving while
operating privilege is suspended, her seventeenth offense.1 We affirm.
Martin pled guilty, before a magisterial district judge, to driving while
operating privilege is suspended on November 29, 2018.2 The district judge
sentenced Martin to a term of 90 days in county jail, plus a $1,000 fine. Martin
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1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a).
2 The typewritten traffic citation indicates that Martin was charged under
subsection 1543 (b) (concerning a violation where the license suspension was
the result of a DUI offense). However, the citation under subsection 1543(a)
is handwritten next to it, and signed by Granville Township Police Officer
Thomas Wilson. The traffic docket indicates that Martin pled guilty to the
lesser charge arising out of section 1543(a).
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subsequently filed a summary appeal in the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin
County.
On May 22, 2019, the matter proceeded before the trial court. At the
start of the hearing, Martin’s counsel admitted that Martin drove on the day
in question, and asked to proceed with the issue of sentencing. The trial court
found Martin guilty under section 1543(a),3 and sentenced Martin to serve 30
days in county jail, to begin on June 5, 2019, plus a fine of $1,000.4
On May 29, 2019, Martin, represented by new counsel, filed a post-
sentence Motion to withdraw her guilty plea and extend her surrender date.
Specifically, Martin argued that her plea counsel had entered a guilty plea on
her behalf, and therefore, her plea was not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. The trial court scheduled a hearing for June 6, 2019, and stayed
Martin’s surrender date pending the resolution of her Motion. The
Commonwealth filed an Answer to Martin’s post-sentence Motion.
Prior to the commencement of the scheduled hearing on the post-
sentence Motion, Martin filed a Petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
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3 In its Order and Sentence, the trial court states that Martin entered a guilty
plea.
4 During the hearing, Martin’s counsel acknowledged that this was Martin’s
seventeenth offense, and the 90-day jail term imposed by the district judge
would have been appropriate for a conviction under section 1543(b). See
N.T. (Summary Appeal), 5/22/19, at 3, 7. However, the parties indicated
their prior agreement that Martin be allowed to plead to the lesser charge
under section 1543(a). See id. at 2, 6-7.
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Act (“PCRA”), see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Therein, Martin sought to
withdraw her post-sentence Motion, and again asserted her claim that plea
counsel had entered a guilty plea on her behalf without her agreement. At
the start of the hearing, Martin’s counsel and the trial court discussed Martin’s
intention to withdraw her post-sentence Motion, and instead submit the PCRA
Petition for review. See N.T. (Post-Sentence Motion), 6/6/19, at 2; see also
id. at 3 (wherein counsel explained that the post-sentence Motion was a legal
nullity, because such motions are not permitted in summary appeals);
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D) (providing that “[t]here shall be no post-sentence motion
in summary appeals....”). Counsel then clarified that Martin wished to present
mitigation evidence, i.e., that Martin’s autistic son began having an emotional
meltdown while he was at his vocational program; his uncle did not answer
his phone call; and Martin drove to pick up her son.5 N.T. (Post-Sentence
Motion), 6/6/19, at 10. The trial court granted Martin’s oral Motion to
withdraw both her post-sentence Motion and her PCRA Petition, and denied
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5 The trial court also expressed concerns regarding the procedural propriety
of the PCRA Petition. See N.T. (Post-Sentence Motion), 6/6/19, at 3, 15. The
trial court agreed to consider the exchange as an oral Motion to Reconsider
her sentence based on the court’s inherent authority to amend sentences
within 30 days. Id. at 17; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505; Pa.R.Crim.P. 720,
cmt. (stating that “[a]lthough there are no post-sentence motions in summary
appeals …, nothing in this rule is intended to preclude the trial judge from
acting on a defendant’s petition for reconsideration.”).
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Martin’s oral Motion to Reconsider. The trial court additionally directed that
Martin’s sentence would commence on June 21, 2019.
Martin filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 19, 2019, requesting
that the trial court modify her sentence to include two separate 15-day terms.
Martin alleged that her son’s medical issues require “constant daily oversight,”
and for his need to maintain a daily routine. The trial court granted Martin’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
On June 21, 2019, Martin filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the trial
court’s May 22, 2019 judgment of sentence. 6 The trial court subsequently
ordered Martin to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters
complained of on appeal, and Martin timely complied.
Martin now raises the following issue for our review: “Did not the [trial]
court abuse its discretion when it denied [Martin’s] request for a new
sentencing hearing at which she would present relevant evidence of mitigation
that prior counsel failed to present?” Brief for Appellant at 3.
Martin contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her
request for a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 9. Specifically, Martin claims
that
[s]he requested to call witnesses who would have established her
motivation for getting behind the wheel despite having a
suspended license. As an offer of proof, [Martin] represented
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6Martin also filed a Motion for stay of sentence pending appeal, which the trial
court granted.
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through counsel that her autistic adult son was having an
emotional meltdown while at an adult education center.
Testimony in support would have included confirmation that he
was there, that he was in emotional crisis, the danger his
meltdowns pose to himself and others, and whether anyone but
[] Martin is capable of calming him in those times.
Id. Additionally, Martin asserts that the trial court improperly referenced an
unsworn representation, which was not made part of the record. Id. at 10.
According to Martin, the trial court failed to consider that she had acted under
strong provocation.7 Id.
Trial courts are generally granted broad discretion in sentencing
matters. See Commonwealth v. Hoch, 936 A.2d 515, 519 (Pa. Super.
2007). Therefore, we will review Martin’s sentence for an abuse of discretion.
See id. “An abuse of discretion … requires a result of manifest
unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of
support as to be clearly erroneous.” Id.____________________________________________
7 We observe that Martin’s argument includes a statement of the law regarding
a trial court’s discretion in imposing a sentence, and the statutory factors a
trial court must consider in sentencing a defendant. See Brief for Appellant
at 8-9. To the extent that Martin’s argument could be construed as an
allegation that the trial court failed to appropriately consider these sentencing
factors, Martin has waived a specific challenge to the discretionary aspects of
her sentence, because such claim was not adequately preserved or developed.
See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that an appellant’s argument shall include
“such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”), (f)
(stating that “[a]n appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a
sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in a separate section of the brief
a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with
respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence.”).
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Initially, as motions for reconsideration do not properly lie from
summary appeals, Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D), the trial court was not required to
consider any additional arguments related to sentencing. Our review of the
transcripts of the summary appeal hearing reveals that Martin did not
specifically request a new sentencing hearing, nor did she request to present
additional witnesses. Rather, Martin’s counsel pointed to the court’s inherent
authority to amend its sentence8 and explained that Martin wished to exercise
her right to allocution and explain her actions. N.T. (Post-Sentence Motion),
6/6/19, at 9. Martin’s counsel then stated as follows:
As an offer of proof, the shortest version is that [Martin’s]
son …, who is Autistic, was at a vocation program when he began
experiencing an emotional meltdown while there; that [Martin’s
son] called his Uncle David[,] who was his ride and when David
did not answer, he called [Martin,] and [Martin], you know, her
child is in extreme emotional distress, knowing that she is not
allowed to drive, got into the car to go get [her son] and take him
home.
You know, [Martin] didn’t try calling David herself, which is
a reason why we’re here saying … [w]e just want to present this
at sentencing. And, you know, it was basically the next shuttle
that would have been able to take [Martin’s son] home from the
facility was hours away. So it was just a matter of, you know, a
mother going to her suffering child.
Again, I’m not trying to do the sentencing right now[,]
but an offer of proof. …
Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added).
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8 Relevantly, “a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any
order within 30 days after its entry … if no appeal from such order has been
taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505.
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Further, as a repeat offender, Martin was subject to a mandatory
minimum sentence of 30 days in jail. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6503(a.1) (providing
that “[a] person convicted of a sixth or subsequent offender under section
1543(a) shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $1,000 and to
imprisonment for not less than 30 days but not more than six months.”); see
also N.T., 6/6/19, at 9 (wherein Martin’s counsel stated that Martin
understood that there is a 30-day mandatory minimum, “but also understands
that [the court] does have discretion to order that the time be served through
electronic monitoring.”).
Moreover, to the extent the trial court could exercise discretion in this
matter, our review confirms that the court considered several mitigating
factors in imposing Martin’s sentence. Prior to imposing sentence during the
summary appeal hearing, the trial court acknowledged its awareness, based
on personal knowledge that Martin’s son had medical needs. See N.T.
(Summary Appeal), 5/22/19, at 5 (wherein the trial court stated, “I’ll just take
judicial notice that I know there are some issues….”). The trial court also
noted the fact that seven years had elapsed since Martin’s last violation of
section 1543(a). See id. at 8, 9. The court ultimately decided that electronic
monitoring would be insufficient in light of the high number of offenses in
Martin’s history. See id. at 9-10. Additionally, the court reiterated its
consideration of such potentially mitigating circumstances during the hearing
on Martin’s post-sentence Motion. See N.T. (Post-Sentence Motion), 6/6/19,
at 14-15. Thus, we cannot grant Martin relief on this claim.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 04/30/2020
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