ETRADE v. Grassa, M. ( 2020 )


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  • J-A04039-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    E*TRADE BANK                               :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                            :
    :
    :
    MATTHEW GRASSA, SANDRA                     :
    LANDMESSER GRASSA AND                      :
    OCCUPANTS                                  :    No. 661 EDA 2019
    :
    Appellants             :
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 24, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at
    No(s): CV-2017-006606
    BEFORE:     PANELLA, P.J., STRASSBURGER, J.*, and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                                  FILED MAY 12, 2020
    Appellants,    Matthew      Grassa   and    Sandra    Landmesser      Grassa
    (Defendants), appeal from judgment entered on January 24, 2019, against
    Defendants and in favor of E*Trade Bank (Plaintiff). We affirm.
    The facts underlying this appeal are as follows.        Defendants are the
    current occupants of the property in question. Amended Complaint at ¶ 9,
    Answer at ¶ 9.      Plaintiff filed a complaint in ejection against Defendants.
    Amended Complaint, New Matter at ¶ 16. Plaintiff attached a Sheriff’s Deed
    to its Amended Complaint that accurately described the property in question.
    Amended Complaint, Exhibit 1; Answer at ¶ 3.
    On July 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint for ejectment against
    Defendants. On December 27, 2017, Defendants filed preliminary objections
    to Plaintiff’s complaint, alleging that Plaintiff failed to conform its complaint to
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A04039-20
    established law because the verification attached to the complaint was signed
    by Plaintiff’s attorney Martha E. Von Rosentiel, Esq., and not Plaintiff. Plaintiff
    filed an amended complaint on January 16, 2018, attaching a verification
    signed by the Vice President of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (Bayview),
    Attorney-in-fact for Plaintiff, verifying that the statements in the complaint
    are true and correct to the best of her knowledge and made subject to 18
    Pa.C.S. § 4904. Plaintiff attached a limited power of attorney between Plaintiff
    and Bayview to the amended complaint. On February 16, 2018, Defendants
    filed preliminary objections to Plaintiff’s amended complaint.         Defendants
    claim that Plaintiff failed to attach a proper abstract of the title of the property
    to their complaint.     Additionally, Defendants again complained that the
    verification attached to the amended complaint was not signed by Plaintiff and
    states, “[t]he power of attorney attached to the amended complaint does not
    grant authority to Bayview or any other attorney-in-fact to bring an action in
    ejectment.”
    On February 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’
    preliminary objections.     On May 3, 2018, the trial court filed an order
    overruling Defendants’ preliminary objections. On May 23, 2018, Defendants
    filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s complaint and incorporated new matter. On June
    7, 2018, Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendants’ new matter. On June 11, 2018,
    Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied
    without prejudice for Plaintiff to refile its motion upon completion of discovery.
    On October 22, 2018, Plaintiff filed a second motion for summary judgment.
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    On January 24, 2019, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
    Plaintiff and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. On February 25, 2019,
    Defendants filed this timely notice of appeal.1
    Defendants present the following issues for review:
    1. Whether, where genuine issues of material fact exist, the
    trial court abused its discretion and/or committed errors
    of law by granting a motion for summary judgment.
    2. Whether, where a post-foreclosure complaint in
    ejectment was brought by an agent pursuant to a limited
    power of attorney which does not grant to the agent the
    authority to bring post-foreclosure actions in ejectment
    or otherwise, the trial court abused its discretion and/or
    committed errors of law by overruling the defendants’
    preliminary objections and granting plaintiff’s motion for
    summary judgment.
    3. Whether, where the plaintiff failed to attach a valid and
    complete abstract of title to its ejectment complaint, the
    trial court abused its discretion and/or committed errors
    of law by overruling the defendants’ preliminary
    objections and granting plaintiff’s motion for summary
    judgment.
    Defendants’ Brief at 8.
    Our standard of review of an appeal from an order granting summary
    judgment is well settled:
    Summary judgment may be granted only in the clearest of
    cases where the record shows that there are no genuine
    issues of material fact and also demonstrates that the
    moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    Whether there is a genuine issue of material fact is a
    question of law, and therefore our standard of review is de
    ____________________________________________
    1The trial court did not order Defendants to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
    of errors complained of on appeal.
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    novo and our scope of review is plenary. When reviewing a
    grant of summary judgment, we must examine the record
    in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
    Reason v. Kathryn's Korner Thrift Shop, 
    169 A.3d 96
    , 100 (Pa. Super.
    2017) (internal citations omitted).
    Defendants’ first and second issues can be discussed together.
    Defendants, in their brief, set out excerpts from their various pleadings under
    their first issue heading. Defendants conclude that a genuine issue of material
    fact existed as to whether Bayview had the authority to bring the current
    action. However, Defendants do not provide an argument on this point under
    this heading, but rather discuss Bayview’s authority under their second issue
    heading. Therefore, we will discuss the first two issues as one. Defendants
    argue that Bayview lacked the authority to sign the verification on behalf of
    Plaintiff, in violation of Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024, and accordingly the trial court erred
    in granting summary judgment.
    Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024 states:
    (a) Every pleading containing an averment of fact not
    appearing of record in the action or containing a denial of
    fact shall state that the averment or denial is true upon the
    signer's personal knowledge or information and belief and
    shall be verified. The signer need not aver the source of the
    information or expectation of ability to prove the averment
    or denial at the trial. A pleading may be verified upon
    personal knowledge as to a part and upon information and
    belief as to the remainder. . . .
    (c) The verification shall be made by one or more of the
    parties filing the pleading unless all the parties (1) lack
    sufficient knowledge or information, or (2) are outside the
    jurisdiction of the court and the verification of none of them
    can be obtained within the time allowed for filing the
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    pleading. In such cases, the verification may be made by
    any person having sufficient knowledge or information and
    belief and shall set forth the source of the person's
    information as to matters not stated upon his or her own
    knowledge and the reason why the verification is not made
    by a party.
    Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024. Any person, including an attorney for a party, may verify
    on behalf of another party, provided that person does so only in those cases
    in which the conditions delineated in Rule 1024 are present.        JP Morgan
    Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 
    63 A.3d 1258
    , 1270 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
    omitted).
    Verification is necessary to defend a party against spurious
    allegations; it must not be transformed into an offensive
    weapon designed to strike down an otherwise valid petition.
    While we do not, of course, condone willful noncompliance
    with our procedural rules, a hypertechnical reading of each
    clause, and a blind insistence on precise, formal adherance,
    benefits neither the judicial system nor those utilizing that
    system. [C]ourts should not be astute in enforcing
    technicalities to defeat apparently meritorious claims.
    Monroe Contract Corp. v. Harrison Square, Inc., 
    405 A.2d 954
    , 958 (Pa.
    Super. 1979) (this Court reversed dismissal of a petition where verification
    alleged party did not have knowledge but did not allege party was without
    sufficient information).
    The verification is signed by the Vice President of Bayview Loan
    Servicing, as attorney-in-fact for Plaintiff, and states that Bayview has been
    authorized to make the verification on behalf of Plaintiff.     The verification
    states that Plaintiff “lacks the sufficient knowledge or information to make this
    verification” because it delegated the servicing activities to Bayview, its
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    attorney-in-fact. The verification states, “the undersigned is fully familiar with
    the statements made in the complaint and verifies that the facts set forth in
    the amended complaint are true and correct to the best of her knowledge,
    information and belief.” This satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024.
    Defendants additionally argue that the limited power of attorney
    between Bayview and Plaintiff did not grant Bayview, as the agent and
    attorney-in-fact of Plaintiff, the authority to bring post-foreclosure actions,
    namely, an action in ejectment. In addition, Defendants argue that the power
    of attorney has expired. Defendants are challenging the validity of the power
    of attorney signed between Bayview and Plaintiff, namely, they are
    challenging the terms of the agreement. However, as Defendants are not a
    party to the power of attorney, Defendants do not have standing to challenge
    it. See Ira G. Steffy & Son, Inc. v. Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, 
    7 A.3d 278
    , 287–88 (Pa. Super. 2010) (appellant had no rights under
    agreement between appellee and another party; appellant was not a third
    party beneficiary of contract between appellee and other party). E*Trade is
    the plaintiff bringing the ejectment action, therefore, it is not necessary that
    Bayview’s power of attorney give it authority to bring the action. Bayview is
    not the plaintiff bringing the ejectment action.
    Next, Defendants dispute the sufficiency of the abstract of title
    presented by Plaintiff in its complaint. In an action in ejectment, Pa.R.Civ.P.
    1054(b) provides: “A party shall set forth in the complaint or answer an
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    abstract of the title upon which the party relies at least from the common
    source of the adverse titles of the parties.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1054(b).
    An abstract of title is simply a compilation in an abridged
    form of the record of the vendor's title; it is a summary of
    the most important parts of the deeds and other
    instruments comprising the evidences of title, arranged in
    chronological order, and intended to show the original
    source and incidents of title. [I]f the plaintiff's abstract
    reveals a defect in his chain of title, he will not have
    established a prima facie title, without which his claim must
    fail; the defendant need prove nothing.
    Busin v. Whiting, 
    535 A.2d 1078
    , 1080 (Pa. Super. 1987) (internal citations
    omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 
    570 A.2d 508
    (Pa. 1989).
    Plaintiff complied with Pa.R.Civ.P. 1054(b). In its complaint, Plaintiff
    attached the Sheriff’s Deed, dated May 26, 2017, identifying the property in
    question, and stating that the property was vested in Matthew Grassa and
    Sandra Grassa by deed from Mark Fletcher Binnion, dated July 11, 2006,
    recorded July 12, 2006 in the Delaware County Office of the Recorder of Deeds
    in Deed Book 3850, Page 1209. See Amended Complaint, Exhibit pages 6-9
    (unpaginated).    Plaintiff stated that an in rem judgment in mortgage
    foreclosure was entered against Defendants in the Court of Common Pleas of
    Delaware County in Docket No. 12-5329. See Amended complaint at ¶ 4.
    Plaintiff attached the docket to its complaint. Next, Plaintiff stated that the
    subject premises was subjected to a Sheriff’s sale on April 21, 2017, that
    Plaintiff was the successful bidder at the Sheriff’s sale and attached the
    Sheriff’s Deed Poll to the complaint.
    Id. Plaintiff stated
    that the Sheriff’s
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    Deed Poll was recorded on June 1, 2017 in the Office of the Recorder of
    Delaware County at Instrument No. 2017028402, Book No. 6006, Page 0159.
    Id. Plaintiff stated
    that the Sheriff’s Deed Poll represents the common source
    of the adverse titles to the Defendants and Plaintiff.
    Id. The complaint
    incorporates this deed by reference in accordance with Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(g).
    See
    id. (“a party
    may incorporate by reference ... any matter which is
    recorded or transcribed verbatim in the ... office of the ... recorder of deeds
    ... of such county”). Plaintiff satisfied Pa.R.Civ.P. 1054(b) by showing the
    common source of the title in question.
    The verification to the complaint was sufficient under the Rules of Civil
    Procedure and Defendants’ arguments as to the limited power of attorney and
    abstract of title are meritless.
    Judgment affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 05/12/2020
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 661 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 5/12/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/12/2020