Com. v. Ford, C. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
CHRISTIAN LEE FORD, : No. 293 MDA 2020
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 9, 2020,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No. CP-36-CR-0001496-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
CHRISTIAN LEE FORD, : No. 294 MDA 2020
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 9, 2020,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No. CP-36-CR-0001443-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
CHRISTIAN LEE FORD, : No. 295 MDA 2020
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 9, 2020,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No. CP-36-CR-0002530-2016
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BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2020
In these consolidated appeals, Christian Lee Ford appeals from the
judgments of sentence entered on January 9, 2020,1 following his negotiated
guilty plea to three counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and one count
of driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked at No. CP-36-CR-
0001496-2016 (“No. 1496-2016”);2 one count each of possession with intent
to deliver (“PWID”), possession of drug paraphernalia, and resisting arrest at
No. CP-36-CR-0001443-2016 (“No. 1443-2016”);3 and one count each of
possession of a controlled substance (heroin) and possession of drug
paraphernalia at No. CP-36-CR-0002530-2016 (“No. 2530-2016”).4
Contemporaneously with this appeal, counsel has requested leave to withdraw
in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981), and their
1The trial court amended the judgments of sentence on February 4, 2020 to
correctly reflect Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive (“RRRI”) sentences at
Nos. 1443-2016 and 1496-2016.
2 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(ii), (iii), (d)(2), and 1543(b)(1), respectively.
3 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (a)(32), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104, respectively.
4 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16) and (a)(32), respectively.
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progeny. After careful review, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and
affirm the judgments of sentence.5
The trial court summarized the protracted factual and procedural history
of this case as follows:
On July 14, 2015, [appellant] was involved in a
one-car accident in East Lampeter Township.
[Appellant] was transported by ambulance to the
hospital for evaluation and treatment of injuries. At
the hospital, [appellant] was advised he was under
arrest for [DUI] and further advised of implied
consent. [Appellant] submitted to a blood test[,]
which confirmed the presence of cocaine,
amphetamines, and heroin in his system. As a result,
[appellant] was charged at No. 1496-2016 with three
counts of [DUI], and one count of driving with a
suspended license. When [appellant] failed to appear
for his preliminary hearing on these charges on
September 2, 2015, a bench warrant was issued for
his arrest.
[Appellant] was eventually apprehended by the police
on the outstanding bench warrant on March 18, 2016.
After being told he was under arrest, [appellant] fled
on foot. When the officer eventually caught
[appellant], he continued to resist, and substantial
force was required to effectuate the arrest. A search
incident to arrest revealed 159 bags of heroin, and a
digital scale and syringes in his possession. As a
result, [appellant] was charged at No. 1443-2016 with
[PWID] heroin, resisting arrest and possession of drug
paraphernalia. Bail was posted on March 28, 2016,
and [appellant] was released from custody.
On April 21, 2016, the bail bondsman, who was
attempting to revoke [appellant’s] bail and return him
to Lancaster County Prison, called for police
assistance when he discovered that [appellant] was in
5The Commonwealth has indicated that it will not be filing a brief in this
matter.
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possession of a needle and heroin packets. The police
arrested [appellant] and charged him at No. 2530-
2016 with possession of a controlled substance and
drug paraphernalia.
On June 23, 2016, [appellant] tendered three
separate negotiated plea agreements on each of the
above-referenced informations. [The trial court]
accepted the pleas and immediately sentenced
[appellant] in accordance with the negotiated
agreements. At No. 1443-2016, [appellant] received
a sentence of two to four years’ incarceration on the
PWID charge and probationary terms of two years and
one year for the resisting arrest and possession of
drug paraphernalia charges. [Appellant] was eligible
for a RRRI sentence of 18 months. The negotiated
plea included a $100 fine, a $250 fee and forfeiture of
$325.25.
At No. 1496-2016, [appellant] received a sentence of
one to four years’ incarceration on Count 1, DUI:
controlled substance (cocaine and amphetamines),
and a concurrent sentence of 90 days’ incarceration
for the offense of driving while suspended. The other
two DUI counts merged with Count 1 for sentencing
purposes. [Appellant] was eligible for [an] RRRI
sentence of nine months. [Appellant] also received
fines of $1,500 for his second DUI offense and $1,000
for the driving [while operating privilege is suspended
or revoked] charge, and was ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of $107.
At No. 2530-2016, [appellant] received probationary
terms of three years for drug possession and one year
for drug paraphernalia possession. [Appellant] also
agreed to a $100 fine. The negotiated agreement
provided that [appellant] would serve all periods of
incarceration and probation concurrently and would
be responsible for the costs of prosecution.
[Appellant] filed neither post[-]sentence motions nor
a direct appeal from the above judgments of
sentence, and they became final on July 23, 2016.
[Appellant] was represented at the guilty plea and
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sentencing hearing on June 23, 2016, by the
Lancaster County Public Defender’s Office.
On September 20, 2016, [appellant], acting pro se,
filed a timely “petition for review” which [the trial
court] treated as a petition for post[-]conviction
collateral relief, [pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
9546,] challenging the legality of his sentence.
Pursuant to Rule 904(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure, counsel was appointed to
represent [appellant], who filed an amended petition
on December 27, 2016. In this amended petition,
[appellant] claimed he received an unlawful sentence
based upon the imposition of a fine without a hearing
on his ability to pay. Alternatively, [appellant] argued
that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue
a sentence modification or direct appeal from the
unlawful sentence. On January 26, 2017, this court
issued a notice pursuant to [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 907(1)
stating its intention to dismiss [appellant’s] petition
without a hearing. By opinion and order dated
March 10, 2017, [appellant’s] amended PCRA petition
was denied.
[Appellant] filed a direct appeal to the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania. On November 30, 2017, in an
unpublished memorandum opinion, a three-judge
panel of the Superior Court vacated this court’s order
dismissing [appellant’s] PCRA petition, vacated the
non-mandatory DUI fines imposed at Nos. 2530-2016
and 1443-2016, and remanded for resentencing. The
Superior Court further vacated the fine for the DUI
driving with a suspended license charge at No. 1496-
2016 and remanded for resentencing consistent with
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1). See Commonwealth v.
Ford, 181 A.3d 458 [] (Pa.Super. 2017)
[(unpublished memorandum)]. Specifically, the
Superior Court found that under 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9726(c) the trial court was required to convene a
hearing to determine [appellant’s] ability to pay a
non-mandatory fine, regardless of his agreement to
the fine as part of his guilty plea agreement. The
Superior Court determined that the obligation of the
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trial court to conduct this analysis was non-waivable
by [appellant].
The Commonwealth’s petition for reargument was
denied by the Superior Court on February 9, 2018.
The Commonwealth then filed a petition for allowance
of appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
which was granted on August 22, 2018, to consider
whether the Sentencing Code requires a separate
inquiry into a defendant’s ability to pay a fine that he
or she agreed to pay as part of a negotiated guilty
plea. See Commonwealth v. Ford, 191 A.3d 1290[(Pa. 2018)]. In a published opinion on
September 26, 2019, the Supreme Court held that the
Sentencing Code’s requirement that the trial court not
sentence a defendant to pay a non-mandatory fine
unless there is record evidence that the defendant has
the ability to pay the fine was not satisfied in this case
when [appellant] agreed to pay a given fine as part of
a negotiated guilty plea agreement. Commonwealth
v. Ford, [] 217 A.3d 824, 830 ([Pa.] 2019). Thus,
the Supreme Court determined that [appellant]
received an illegal sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9726(c). The Order of March 10, 2017, denying
[appellant’s] amended PCRA petition was affirmed in
part and vacated in part by the Supreme Court, and
the case was remanded to the trial court in September
2019.
[Appellant’s instant] counsel, Daniel C. Bardo, Esquire
[(“Attorney Bardo”)], was court appointed on
October 4, 2019, to represent [appellant] in pre-trial,
trial and post-trial proceedings. Th[e trial] court
received correspondence from [appellant] dated
November 14, 2019, in which he claimed his counsel
had abandoned him. Attorney Bardo further informed
the court that [appellant] had stated repeatedly that
he did not want counsel to represent him and that he
would proceed pro se. Accordingly, Attorney Bardo
filed a petition to withdraw, and a [hearing pursuant
to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa.
1998),] was scheduled for January 9, 2020.
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At the Grazier hearing, Ford indicated to the [trial]
court that this entire appeal had been the result of his
inability to purchase shampoo and other necessary
items because of the Act 84 deduction of monies the
Department of Corrections makes from [appellant’s]
prison inmate account to pay his fines, costs and
restitution. [See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(b)(5)(i).]
[Appellant] informed the [trial] court that he did not
wish to proceed pro se and that he did not wish to
exercise his right to go to trial on the charges.
Accordingly, [Attorney Bardo’s] petition to withdraw
was denied.
At the conclusion of the Grazier hearing on
January 9, 2020, [appellant] tendered a negotiated
guilty plea to the charges at all three dockets.
Pursuant to the agreement, [appellant] received an
aggregate sentence of three years’ probation at []
No. 2530-2016. At [] No. 1496-2016, an aggregate
sentence of one to four years’ incarceration was
imposed, plus a mandatory $1,500 fine, and
restitution in the amount of $107. For the possession
with intent to deliver heroin charge at [] No. 1443-
2016, th[e trial c]ourt imposed a term of two to four
years’ incarceration. Concurrent sentences of one and
two years’ probation were imposed on the drug
paraphernalia and resisting arrest charges,
respectively. The negotiated agreement provided that
[appellant] would serve all periods of incarceration
and probation concurrently and would be responsible
for the costs of prosecution.
On January 22, 2020, [appellant] filed a post sentence
motion nunc pro tunc or motion to correct illegal
sentence at each of the three dockets, noting that the
parties’ understanding and agreement when
[appellant] entered his negotiated guilty plea on
January 9, 2020, was that he would receive the same
sentence as he had previously agreed to, with a
reduction in the fines. The original sentences,
imposed June 23, 2016, included RRRI minimum
sentences; the sentences imposed on January 9,
2020, did not. With the agreement of the
Commonwealth, [appellant’s] motion was granted on
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February 4, 2020, and the Clerk of Court was directed
to amend the sentencing orders and DC-300B court
commitment forms to reflect [an] RRRI sentence of
18 months at [] No. 1443-2016, and [an] RRRI
sentence of 9 months at [] No. 1496-2016.
Trial court opinion, 2/7/20 at 1-8 (case citation formatting amended;
emphasis added; footnotes, internal quotation marks, some citations, and
extraneous capitalization omitted).
On February 5, 2020, Attorney Bardo filed separate, timely notices of
appeal on appellant’s behalf at each docket number. That same day,
Attorney Bardo filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal,
in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), quoting verbatim the issues appellant
wanted him to raise on appeal:
[I] wish to file a direct appeal and a [PCRA]
imidiately [sic] within the 10 days. [N]o way was [I]
sitting in this county waiting trial. [T]heres [sic] still
illegal sentencing that went on. [O]nce again they
charged [$]1500[,] not [$]1000 as stated on the
supreme court briefing and decision. [I] was under
duress to finalize my sentence. [M]y money issues
were not corrected. [I]m [sic] not going to stand
there and argue with the judge. [I]ve [sic] had 3 and
a [sic] years to think about my case.
....
[I] wish to appeal and a [PCRA. [T]hey illegally are
using funds that were illegally gained. [I] want the
[trial] court to deny it. [I] was denied reasonable bail
when I requested it. [I] also didn’t get [RRRI] on my
resentence. [T]he da [sic] agreed to same terms....
Rule 1925(b) statement, 2/5/20 at ¶¶ 2-3, quoting “Bail Administration
Request Forms,” 1/10/20 and 1/11/20 (typos in original; footnote omitted).
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Therein, Attorney Bardo also indicated his intention to file an
Anders/McClendon brief. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on
February 7, 2020. Appellant’s application to consolidate these appeals was
granted by this court on February 25, 2020.
On March 2, 2020, we issued an order directing appellant to show cause
why his appeals should not be quashed pursuant to our supreme court’s
holding in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). Appellant
filed a timely response, and this court discharged the rule to show cause,
referring the issue to the merits panel. Thereafter, on April 24, 2020,
Attorney Bardo filed a petition and brief to withdraw from representation.
Appellant did not respond to Attorney Bardo’s petition to withdraw.
Prior to any consideration of Attorney Bardo’s Anders brief and his
petition to withdraw, we must first address whether the notices of appeal
Attorney Bardo filed on appellant’s behalf were in compliance with the
requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure and
Walker. In Walker, our supreme court provided a bright-line mandate
requiring that “where a single order resolves issues arising on more than one
docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed for each case,” or the appeal
will be quashed. Id. at 971, 976-977. The Walker court applied its holding
prospectively to any notices of appeal filed after June 1, 2018. In the instant
case, the notices of appeal were filed on February 5, 2020, and therefore, the
Walker mandate applies. The appeal was of a single order resolving issues
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arising on all three docket numbers. A review of the record demonstrates that
appellant filed separate notices of appeal at each docket number; however,
all three notices of appeal reference multiple docket numbers in their
respective captions. A recent en banc panel of this court held that such a
practice does not invalidate appellant’s separate notices of appeal.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, A.3d , 2020 WL 3869723 at *12
(Pa.Super. July 9, 2020) (en banc) (overruling the pronouncement in
Commonwealth v. Creese, 216 A.3d 1142, 1144 (Pa.Super. 2019), that “a
notice of appeal may contain only one docket number.”). Accordingly, we
shall consider the merits of appellant’s appeal.
“When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the
merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to
withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa.Super.
2010) (citation omitted). In order to withdraw pursuant to Anders, “counsel
must file a brief that meets the requirements established by our Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).”
Commonwealth v. Harden, 103 A.3d 107, 110 (Pa.Super. 2014) (parallel
citation omitted). Specifically, counsel’s Anders brief must comply with the
following requisites:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history
and facts, with citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel
believes arguably supports the appeal;
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(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
frivolous; and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the
appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate
the relevant facts of record, controlling case
law, and/or statutes on point that have led to
the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Id. (citation omitted).
Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748 (Pa.Super.
2005), and its progeny, “[c]ounsel also must provide a copy of the Anders
brief to his client.” Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 880
(Pa.Super. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The brief
must be accompanied by a letter that advises the client of the option to
“(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal;
or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of the court[’]s
attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.” Id.“Once counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this [c]ourt’s
duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and render an
independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.”
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 291 (Pa.Super. 2007)
(en banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, we conclude that Attorney Bardo has satisfied the technical
requirements of Anders and Santiago. Attorney Bardo has identified the
pertinent factual and procedural history and made citation to the record.
Attorney Bardo has also raised multiple claims on appellant’s behalf that could
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arguably support an appeal, but ultimately concludes the appeal is wholly
frivolous. (See Anders brief at 9-12.) Attorney Bardo has also attached to
his petition a letter to appellant, which meets the notice requirements of
Millisock. Accordingly, we proceed to conduct an independent review of the
record to determine whether this appeal is wholly frivolous.
Appellant first argues that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary
because he “was under duress to finalize [his] sentence.” (Anders brief at
9-11; see also Rule 1925(b) statement, 2/5/20 at ¶ 2.)
“The law does not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome
of his decision to enter a plea of guilty[; a]ll that is required is that
[appellant’s] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently made.” Commonwealth v. Diaz, 913 A.2d 871, 873 (Pa.Super.
2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 931
A.2d 656 (Pa. 2007). In order to ensure a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
plea, trial courts are required make the following inquires in the guilty plea
colloquy:
(1) the nature of the charges to which he is pleading
guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) he is
giving up his right to trial by jury; (4) and the
presumption of innocence; (5) he is aware of the
permissible ranges of sentences and fines possible;
and (6) the court is not bound by the terms of the
agreement unless the court accepts the plea.
Commonwealth v. Kpou, 153 A.3d 1020, 1023 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation
omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590. “Pennsylvania law presumes a
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defendant who entered a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing, and the
defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Kpou, 153 A.3d at 1024
(citation omitted). Moreover, when a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea after
sentencing, as is the case here, he must demonstrate “prejudice on the order
of manifest injustice before withdrawal is justified.” Commonwealth v.
Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1046 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation omitted).
Here, appellant’s contention that his negotiated guilty plea was the
result of duress is belied by the record. On January 9, 2020, appellant
executed a written guilty plea colloquy wherein he acknowledged, inter alia,
that no promises or threats were made to him with regard to his guilty plea
or sentence and that he was pleading guilty of his own free will. (Written
guilty plea colloquy, 1/9/20 at ¶¶ 49-54.) That same day, the trial court
conducted an on-the-record colloquy, as mandated by Rule 590. The
transcript of the guilty plea colloquy demonstrates that the trial court inquired
at great length with regard to appellant’s decision to plead guilty. Appellant
indicated during this hearing that he understood his right to a jury trial and
that he was considered innocent until proven guilty. (Notes of testimony,
1/9/20 at 31-32.) Appellant further acknowledged that he understood the
elements of the charges he was pleading guilty to at each docket number, and
the permissible ranges of sentences and fines possible for each count. (Id.
at 33-46.) Appellant was also given a factual basis for the plea. (Id. at
47-50.) Furthermore, appellant indicated that he reviewed the written guilty
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plea colloquy with Attorney Bardo prior to signing it, and again acknowledged
that he was “mak[ing this decision [to plead guilty] for himself.” (Id. at
45-46, 51.) The trial court also gave appellant an explanation of his appellate
rights, and appellant indicated that he understood them. (Id. at 53-54.)
This court has long recognized that “[a] person who elects to plead guilty
is bound by the statements he makes in open court while under oath and he
may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the
statements he made at his plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Turetsky,
925 A.2d 876, 881 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 940
A.2d 365 (Pa. 2007). Based on the foregoing, we find that appellant is bound
by the statements he made during his guilty plea colloquies, and his claim that
the negotiated guilty plea was a product of duress is meritless.
Appellant next contends that the sentence imposed at No. 1496-2016
was illegal because the trial court imposed a $1500 fine and “not [$]1000 as
stated on the supreme court briefing and decision.” (Anders brief at 11-12;
see also Rule 1925(b) statement, 2/5/20 at ¶ 2.)
“A challenge to the legality of [a] sentence may be raised as a matter
of right, is non-waivable, and may be entertained so long as the reviewing
court has jurisdiction.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 19-20
(Pa.Super. 2007). “The determination as to whether the trial court imposed
an illegal sentence is a question of law; our standard of review in cases dealing
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with questions of law is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Stradley, 50 A.3d 769,
772 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
Instantly, the record reflects that appellant pled guilty at No. 1496-2016
to, inter alia, DUI — controlled substance in violation of Section 3802(d), his
second offense of this nature, and the trial court sentenced him to 90 days’
imprisonment and a $1500 fine in accordance with the mandatory sentencing
provisions set forth in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3804(c)(2)(ii). Our supreme court
confirmed in appellant’s prior appeal that the mandatory $1500 fine imposed
by the trial court at No. 1496-2016 was legal. See Ford, 217 A.3d at 827.
Accordingly, appellant’s challenge to the legality of sentence is meritless.
Appellant also argues that “the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) is
. . . using funds that were illegally gained.” (Anders brief at 12; see also
Rule 1925(b) statement, 2/5/20 at ¶ 3.) This court has long recognized that
the proper forum for contesting the DOC’s collection of fines and costs
pursuant to Act 846 is in the Commonwealth Court. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.
6Pursuant to Section 9728(b) of the Sentencing Code, commonly referred to
as Act 84:
The [DOC] shall make monetary deductions of at least
25% of deposits made to inmate wages and personal
accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution,
costs imposed under section 9721(c.1), filing fees to
be collected under section 6602(c) (relating to
prisoner filing fees) and any other court-ordered
obligation.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(b)(5)(i).
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§ 761, “[t]he Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions or proceedings . . . [a]gainst the Commonwealth government,
including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity[.]” Id. at
§ 761(a)(1). This includes statewide agencies like the DOC. See
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 858 A.2d 627, 629-630 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(affirming the trial court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over
defendant’s Act 84 motion without prejudice to seek relief in the
Commonwealth Court); see also Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833 A.2d 151,
153-154 (Pa.Super. 2003) (holding that a motion seeking to enjoin Act 84
deductions is a civil action against the DOC for which the Commonwealth Court
had exclusive jurisdiction). Accordingly, appellant’s claim is outside this
court’s jurisdiction and must fail.
In his final claim, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to
include RRRI minimum sentences in his January 9, 2020 sentencing orders,
per the terms of his negotiated guilty plea. (See Rule 1925(b) statement,
2/5/20 at ¶ 3.) This claim is belied by the record. As noted, on February 4,
2020, the trial court granted appellant’s “Post Sentence Motion
Nunc Pro Tunc or Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence,” and directed the Clerk
of Court to amend the January 9, 2020 sentencing orders to reflect an RRRI
sentence of 18 months at No. 1443-2016 and an RRRI sentence of 9 months
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at No. 1496-2016. (Trial court order, 2/4/20 at ¶¶ 3-4.) Accordingly,
appellant’s final claim warrants no relief.7
Based on the foregoing, we agree with Attorney Bardo’s assessment that
this appeal is wholly frivolous and that appellant is not entitled to relief on his
claims. After our own independent review of the record, we discern no
additional issues of arguable merit. Accordingly, we grant Attorney Bardo’s
petition to withdraw and affirm the amended judgments of sentence.
Judgments of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 09/29/2020
7 Although not briefed by Attorney Bardo in his Anders brief, to the extent
appellant argues that he “was denied reasonable bail when [he] requested it,”
see Rule 1925(b) statement, 2/5/20 at ¶ 3, this claim is not cognizable on
appeal. As recognized by the trial court, “in pleading guilty, [appellant]
effectively waived all claims except for the validity of the plea, the jurisdiction
of the court accepting his plea, and the legality of sentence.” (Trial court
opinion, 2/7/20 at 11.) See Commonwealth v. Williams, 204 A.3d 489,
495 (Pa.Super. 2019) (stating, “when a defendant pleads guilty, he waives
the right to challenge anything but the legality of his sentence and the validity
of his plea.” (citation omitted)).
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