Com. v. Dotson, D ( 2020 )


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  • J-S18021-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                 :
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    DELEON DOTSON                               :
    :
    Appellant                :       No. 998 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 6, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004860-2018
    BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                        FILED: MAY 18, 2020
    Appellant, Deleon Dotson, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, following his open
    guilty plea to terroristic threats.1 We affirm and grant counsel’s petition to
    withdraw.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
    Appellant threatened to kill his girlfriend during a domestic dispute. On May
    6, 2019, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to one count of terroristic
    threats. The court accepted Appellant’s plea and sentenced him to sixteen
    (16) to forty-eight (48) months’ imprisonment.            The court also revoked
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706.
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    intermediate punishment for a prior, unrelated terroristic threats conviction
    and resentenced Appellant to a concurrent term of thirty (30) to sixty (60)
    months’ imprisonment. Immediately following the sentencing announcement,
    Appellant told counsel that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. Counsel
    informed the court of Appellant’s request, but the court concluded there were
    no grounds to support a withdrawal.
    On May 15, 2019, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion
    challenging the validity of his plea.          The court denied Appellant’s post-
    sentence motion on June 14, 2019. On June 20, 2019, Appellant timely filed
    a notice of appeal. The court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on June 25, 2019. On
    July 16, 2019, counsel timely filed a Rule 1925(c)(4) statement of intent to
    file an Anders2 brief. Counsel subsequently filed an application to withdraw
    and an Anders brief with this Court.
    As a preliminary matter, counsel seeks to withdraw representation
    pursuant to Anders and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    602 Pa. 159
    , 
    978 A.2d 349
    (2009). Anders and Santiago require counsel to: (1) petition the
    Court for leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough review of the
    record, counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are wholly frivolous; (2)
    file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the
    ____________________________________________
    2   Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    , 
    18 L. Ed. 2d 493
    (1967).
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    appeal; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the appellant and advise him of
    his right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se brief to raise any additional
    points the appellant deems worthy of review. 
    Santiago, supra
    at 
    173-79, 978 A.2d at 358-61
    .      Substantial compliance with these requirements is
    sufficient.   Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 
    934 A.2d 1287
    , 1290 (Pa.Super.
    2007). After establishing that counsel has met the antecedent requirements
    to withdraw, this Court makes an independent review of the record to confirm
    that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Commonwealth v. Palm, 
    903 A.2d 1244
    ,
    1246 (Pa.Super. 2006). See also Commonwealth v. Dempster, 
    187 A.3d 266
    (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc).
    In 
    Santiago, supra
    , our Supreme Court addressed the briefing
    requirements where court-appointed appellate counsel seeks to withdraw
    representation:
    Neither Anders nor [Commonwealth v. McClendon, 
    495 Pa. 467
    , 
    434 A.2d 1185
    (1981)] requires that counsel’s brief
    provide an argument of any sort, let alone the type of
    argument that counsel develops in a merits brief. To repeat,
    what the brief must provide under Anders are references
    to anything in the record that might arguably support the
    appeal.
    *    *    *
    Under Anders, the right to counsel is vindicated by
    counsel’s examination and assessment of the record and
    counsel’s references to anything in the record that arguably
    supports the appeal.
    
    Santiago, supra
    at 176, 
    177, 978 A.2d at 359
    , 360. Thus, the Court held:
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    [I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed
    counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a
    summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations
    to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
    counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
    counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4)
    state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
    frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
    record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
    have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Id. at 178-79,
    978 A.2d at 361.
    Instantly, Appellant’s counsel has filed a petition to withdraw.      The
    petition states counsel reviewed the record and determined the appeal is
    wholly frivolous. Counsel also supplied Appellant with a copy of the brief and
    a letter explaining Appellant’s right to retain new counsel or to proceed pro se
    to raise any additional issues Appellant deems worthy of this Court’s attention.
    In the Anders brief, counsel provided a summary of the facts and
    procedural history of the case. Counsel’s argument refers to relevant law that
    might arguably support Appellant’s issue. Counsel further states the reasons
    for his conclusion that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Therefore, counsel has
    substantially complied with the technical requirements of Anders and
    Santiago.
    Appellant has not responded to the Anders brief pro se or with newly
    retained private counsel. Counsel raises the following issue on Appellant’s
    behalf:
    SHOULD APPELLATE COUNSEL BE PERMITTED TO
    WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL BECAUSE ANY APPELLATE ISSUES
    IN THE INSTANT CASE ARE FRIVOLOUS?
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    (Anders Brief at 5).
    On appeal, Appellant contends he is actually innocent, and the court
    should have granted his post-sentence motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
    Appellant concludes he is entitled to some form of relief. We disagree.
    As a general rule, the entry of a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all
    defects and defenses except lack of jurisdiction, invalidity of the plea, and
    legality of the sentence. Commonwealth v. Main, 
    6 A.3d 1026
    (Pa.Super.
    2010).    “[A] defendant who attempts to withdraw a guilty plea after
    sentencing must demonstrate prejudice on the order of manifest injustice
    before withdrawal is justified.”   Commonwealth v. Pantalion, 
    957 A.2d 1267
    , 1271 (Pa.Super. 2008). “A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice
    when it was entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.”
    Id. (quoting Commonwealth
    v. Muhammad, 
    794 A.2d 378
    , 383 (Pa.Super.
    2002)).
    Our Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that pleas are taken in open
    court and the court must conduct an on-the-record colloquy to ascertain
    whether a defendant is aware of his rights and the consequences of his plea.
    Commonwealth v. Hodges, 
    789 A.2d 764
    (Pa.Super. 2002). Specifically,
    the court must affirmatively demonstrate a defendant understands: (1) the
    nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for
    the plea; (3) his right to trial by jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5)
    the permissible ranges of sentences and fines possible; and (6) that the judge
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    is not bound by the terms of the agreement unless he accepts the agreement.
    Commonwealth v. Watson, 
    835 A.2d 786
    (Pa.Super. 2003).
    This Court will evaluate the adequacy of the plea colloquy and the
    voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining the totality of the
    circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea. 
    Muhammad, supra
    . A
    guilty plea will be deemed valid if an examination of the totality of the
    circumstances surrounding the plea shows that the defendant had a full
    understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea such that he
    knowingly   and    intelligently   entered   the   plea   of   his   own   accord.
    Commonwealth v. Rush, 
    909 A.2d 805
    (Pa.Super. 2006).
    Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was
    aware of what he was doing and bears the burden of proving otherwise.
    Commonwealth v. Pollard, 
    832 A.2d 517
    (Pa.Super. 2003). A defendant
    who decides to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes while under
    oath, “and he may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which
    contradict the statements he made at his plea colloquy.”
    Id. at 523.
    “Our
    law does not require that a defendant be totally pleased with the outcome of
    his decision to plead guilty, only that his decision be voluntary, knowing and
    intelligent.”
    Id. at 524.
    Instantly, Appellant executed a written guilty plea colloquy on May 6,
    2019. The written colloquy fully communicated Appellant’s decision to plead
    guilty. In the written colloquy, Appellant acknowledged the voluntariness of
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    his plea and his responsibility for the charged crime. Appellant also recognized
    the rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty, including his right to a trial
    by judge or jury, his right to ensure the Commonwealth met its burden of
    proof, and his limited appeal rights.
    That same day, Appellant attended the guilty plea hearing. During the
    hearing, the Commonwealth recited the factual basis for the plea. Appellant
    confirmed that he wished to plead guilty based upon the facts as stated by
    the Commonwealth.      Appellant also confirmed that he had completed and
    signed the written colloquy, and he understood the consequences of entering
    his plea.
    Under the totality of these circumstances, Appellant entered a knowing,
    voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea following adequate colloquies.        See
    
    Rush, supra
    ; 
    Muhammad, supra
    .             Therefore, the court properly denied
    Appellant’s post-sentence motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Following our
    independent review of the record, we conclude the appeal is wholly frivolous.
    See 
    Dempster, supra
    ; 
    Palm, supra
    . Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
    of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.          Counsel’s petition to withdraw is
    granted.
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    J-S18021-20
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 05/18/20
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