K.H. v. E.H. ( 2020 )

J-A04030-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
K.H., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
E.H., :
:
Appellee : No. 1998 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered June 12, 2019
in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): 2013-15447
2016-DR-01277
Pacses No. 748111495
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STRASSBURGER, J.* and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MAY 18, 2020
K.H. (Mother) appeals from the June 12, 2019 order, which denied
Mother’s exceptions, preliminary objections, and motion for judgment on the
pleadings, and affirmed the Master’s order awarding E.H. (Father) credit for
overpayment of child support. Upon review, we affirm.
The trial court provided the following extensive background. Mother
and Father are the parents of A.H., born in 2009.
In 2010, a divorce decree was issued in Delaware County,
P[ennsylvania], incorporating a Marriage Settlement Agreement
between the parties dated August 28, 2010. Pursuant to the
Agreement and Order, Father was obligated to pay child support
to Mother in the amount of $460 per month commencing as of
May 1, 2010.
On August 4, 2012, Mother filed a petition in Delaware
County to increase Father’s child support obligation; however,
the petition was denied.
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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In January 2014, Mother filed a second petition in
Delaware County to increase Father’s child support obligation.
While this petition was pending, the parties entered into an
agreement dated September 14, 2015, incorporated into an
order dated September 15, 2015,2 issued in Montgomery
County, wherein the parties agreed to the settlement of the
pending support action brought by Mother. They agreed that
Father’s child support obligation would be waived and any
arrearages marked as “zero” upon Father complying with the
execution of all documents required by the agreement. (Note:
In an order dated August 30, 2017,[1] th[e trial] court found that
the agreement was enforceable and binding and that Father had
complied with the execution of all required documents.)
______
2 The agreement dated September 14, 2015 is a
comprehensive document containing 96 paragraphs. The
intent of the parties was to memorialize their global
agreements, and more specifically, in relation to Mother’s
support exceptions, Mother’s agreement to terminate the
support order. See paragraphs 47 through 52. The
document was prepared by Mother’s attorney and she
acknowledged that she understood the provisions of the
agreement and acknowledged that it was fair and
equitable. See paragraph 96.
Notwithstanding the parties’ September 2015
agreement/order waiving child support and arrearages, Mother’s
January 2014 petition for modification of child support was heard
by a Delaware County Support Master in January 2016, who
issued a recommendation and interim order dated January 16,
2016, finding that Father should pay $2,000 per month in child
support.5 On January 27, 2016, Father filed support exceptions
and a de novo appeal from this interim order.
____________________________________________
1 This order was dated August 30, 2017, and filed August 31, 2017. The trial
court and a prior panel of this Court referred to this order by its written date,
as opposed to its filing date. For consistency, this Court will also refer to
this order by its written date of August 30, 2017, within this memorandum.
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_____
5 It appears that the Master issued this interim order based
upon his interpretation of the parties’ September 2015
agreement. Pursuant to his interpretation, Father was
obligated to pay $2,000 per month in child support as a
“penalty” under the agreement and not based upon the
parties’ actual income. Interpretation of the terms of an
agreement is beyond a Master’s legal authority. In th[e
trial] court’s order dated August 30, 2017, it was held that
Father is not subject to any “penalty” under the terms of
the parties’ agreement and did not owe child support in the
amount of $2,000 per month. Mother’s appeal of this
order was quashed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court []
on February 7, 2018 (No. 3941 EDA 2017). Therefore, the
order dated August 30, 2017 is final and binding.
The matter was assigned before The Honorable William
Mackrides. On May 16, 2016, Judge Mackrides took the case
under advisement and stayed enforcement of any support
orders[,] placing the matter in non-financial obligation status
until the issuance of a decision.
On June 14, 2016, Judge Mackrides transferred jurisdiction
and venue of the support matter to Montgomery County[]. A
transfer order was also issued in Delaware County on the same
date signed by the motion judge, The Honorable Margaret J.
Amoroso. The transfer order referenced the Delaware County
support order dated April 16, 2010 and directed that Father pay
$460 per month in child support and arrearages of $3,353.88 as
of June 14, 2016.7
______
7 The transfer order conflicts with Judge Mackrides’ order
dated May 16, 2016 and does not supersede his stay and
placement of this case in non-financial obligation status.
On June 24, 2016, an acceptance of transfer order was
issued by The Honorable Rhonda Lee Daniele transferring the
matter to Montgomery County. Pursuant to the terms of the
acceptance of transfer order, the Delaware County order dated
April 16, 2010, was accepted and Father’s child support
obligation was determined to be $0 per month with no
arrearages due.
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On July 7, 2016, Mother filed a petition to modify the June
24, 2016 Montgomery County order, but her petition was
dismissed. Mother did not appeal this decision and the June 24,
2016 [order] became final and binding.
On August 31, 2016, Mother filed another petition to
modify child support in Montgomery County. An order was
issued in this proceeding on August 30, 2017, wherein th[e trial]
court made the following findings, as are relevant herein:
1) The parties’ agreement dated September 14, 2015 is
a valid and binding contract.
2) Father was not required to pay $2,000 per month in
child support as a “penalty” under the terms of the
agreement.
3) Father and Mother agreed to the waiver of child
support and the payment of any arrears by Father
effective September 15, 2015, under the terms of
the agreement/order.
4) Notwithstanding the parties’ agreement to waive
support, pursuant to the child support proceeding
commenced by Mother, the facts supported an award
of child support under the Commonwealth’s parens
patriae responsibility to the minor child. Father was
directed to pay child support in the amount of
$739.03 per month retroactive to the date of
Mother’s application for modification of child support
on August 31, 2016.
5) The Montgomery County order dated June 24, 2016,
issued by Judge Daniel[]e is final and binding on this
court and directs as of the date of the order, Father
had no child support obligations and owed no
arrears. Th[e trial] court has no authority to
overrule this final order.
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Mother filed a motion for reconsideration and an appeal. Both
were denied with the appeal having been quashed.[2]
Accordingly, the order[s] dated June 24, 2016 [and August 30,
2017 are] final and binding on the parties.
A notice of proposed reduction was sent to the parties by
Montgomery County Domestic Relations Office (“DRO”) on
September 25, 2017, and a conference was subsequently held
on November 30, 2017 before a Support Master. No agreement
was reached and a support hearing was scheduled for January
10, 2018, which was thereafter cancelled in accordance with the
following DRO administrative actions:
1) A letter dated January 23, 2018 was sent to both
parties from Gary W. Kline, Director of Montgomery
County DRO. The letter indicated that after
clarifying the matter with th[e trial] court, the
effective date of Father’s child support obligation in
the amount of $739.03 (pursuant to the August 30,
2017 order indicated above) is August 31, 2016.
Director Kline further stated that: “There is no
support order from September 15, 2015 to August
31, 2016. No adjustments will be made on this
account until further order of the court or agreement
of the parties.”
2) A notice of proposed reduction of the charging order
was issued on February 14, 2018, indicating that
Father had overpaid child support in the amount of
$11,320.40. Mother objected to the charging order
and a hearing was held on June 5, 2018 before
Master Mindy Harris, Esq. On June 13, 2018, Master
____________________________________________
2 Mother filed a notice of appeal on December 6, 2017, from the November
7, 2017 order denying her motion for reconsideration of the August 30, 2017
order. Because an appeal must be filed timely from the underlying order,
not an order disposing of a motion for reconsideration, this Court sua sponte
quashed Mother’s December 6, 2017 notice of appeal as untimely filed from
the August 30, 2017 order. In so doing, this Court noted that the lower
court failed to dispose of Mother’s motion for reconsideration in a timely
manner, and was therefore without jurisdiction to enter the November 7,
2017 order. Per Curiam Order, 2/7/2018, at 1-2 (unnumbered).
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Harris issued a recommendation and order attaching
an audit dated June 6, 2018, by Montgomery County
DRO “reflecting an accurate history of the entire
case.” The audit showed an overpayment of
$7,747.94. To resolve the overpayment, Master
Harris directed that Father pay 80% of his monthly
child support obligations until the credit is
exhausted. Mother filed exceptions that went before
The Honorable Emanuel A. Bertin.
In a memorandum and order issued by Judge Bertin dated
October 10, 2018, both parties were granted leave to file a
petition to set the arrearages or credits, with the matter to be
heard before th[e trial] court. On October 30, 2018, Mother filed
a petition to set arrearages. On February 21, 2019, she also
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in accordance with
Pa.R.C.P. 1034. Father filed an answer and new matter and
counterclaim on February 27, 2019. Mother filed preliminary
objections to the same on March 18, 2019. Argument by
counsel was heard in this matter on April 23, 2019.
Order, 6/12/2019, at 1-4 (unnecessary capitalization and some footnotes
omitted).
By order of June 12, 2019, the trial court denied Mother’s exceptions,
preliminary objections, and motion for judgment on the pleadings, and
affirmed the Master’s June 13, 2018 order regarding Father’s receiving credit
for overpayment of child support. Id. at 8. Mother timely filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the trial court denied. This timely-filed appeal
followed.3
____________________________________________
3 Both Mother and the trial court have complied with the mandates of
Pa.R.A.P. 1925. We note that Father chose not to file a brief because he
was in agreement with the trial court’s order and opinion. Letter from
Father, 11/21/2019.
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On appeal, Mother raises three questions for our consideration.
[1] When child support is to be placed into non-financial support
obligation status must all of the notice and hearing requirements
of [Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(f)] be complied with before a stay can
issue[,] which terminated child support for almost one year?
[2] Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed
errors by violating the coordinate jurisdiction rule when it
determined that only some of the court orders issued in a
coordinate and transferring jurisdiction needed to be followed
and when the court misinterpreted another order by essentially
reading into that order language not contained in the order[,
t]he result of which was the improper termination of child
support for almost one year[.]
[3] Whether the trial court erred in interpreting the agreement
among the parties in a manner, which was and continues to
be[,] prejudicial to [M]other[.]
Mother’s Brief at 5 (trial court answers and unnecessary capitalization
omitted).
We begin with our well-settled standard of review in child support
cases.
Appellate review of support matters is governed by an abuse of
discretion standard. When evaluating a support order, this Court
may only reverse the trial court’s determination where the order
cannot be sustained on any valid ground. An abuse of discretion
is [n]ot merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a
conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment
exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of record.
The principal goal in child support matters is to serve the best
interests of the children through the provision of reasonable
expenses.
J.P.D. v. W.E.D., 114 A.3d 887, 889 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
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Initially, we observe that Mother’s claims do not challenge the
substance of the order appealed from, which dealt solely with awarding
credit to Father for overpayment of child support. Rather, it is evident that
this appeal is nothing more than Mother attempting to take another bite of
the apple, in that all of her claims challenge the August 30, 2017 order and
the trial court’s interpretation of the 2016 transfer orders therein.
Specifically, in her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court
misinterpreted the May 2016 order as placing the matter in non-financial
obligation status because Judge Mackrides did not comply with the
requirements of Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(f) prior to imposing the May 2016 order,
and therefore, Mother contends, Father should owe child support from
September 15, 2015, forward. Mother’s Brief at 14-21. In the August 30,
2017 order, the trial court determined that the May 2016 order placed the
matter in non-financial obligation status pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(f),
and concluded that Father owed child support from the time of Mother’s
August 31, 2016 petition to modify. Order in Support Exceptions,
8/30/2017, at 2, 7; Order, 8/30/2017. Thus, Mother had the opportunity to
challenge the trial court’s interpretation of the May 2016 order, along with
the determined start date for support payments, in her motion for
reconsideration of the August 30, 2017 order. In her motion for
reconsideration, contrary to her position in this appeal, Mother
acknowledged that the May 2016 order had placed the matter in a non-
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financial obligation status and requested that the award of child support be
retroactive to May 16, 2016, not the September 2015 date she uses now.
Mother’s Petition for Reconsideration, 10/2/2017, at ¶ 4.
In her second claim on appeal, Mother argues that the trial court erred
in ignoring Judge Amoroso’s 2016 transfer order while upholding Judge
Daniele’s 2016 transfer order. Mother’s Brief at 22. Again, this relates back
to the trial court’s interpretation of the 2016 transfer orders in the August
30, 2017 order, which Mother already challenged in her motion for
reconsideration of the August 30, 2017 order. See Mother’s Petition for
Reconsideration, 10/2/2017, at ¶ 8.
In her third claim, Mother argues that the trial court erred in
interpreting the parties’ September 14, 2015 agreement in a manner
prejudicial to Mother. Mother’s Brief at 24. On appeal, Mother argues that
the trial court erred in characterizing the agreement as being written by
Mother’s counsel, and by finding that Mother had unclean hands. Id. at 24-
25. Again, this relates back to the trial court’s findings in the August 30,
2017 order, which Mother specifically challenged in the prior, quashed
appeal. Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 12/6/2017, at ¶¶ 1,
6 (arguing that the trial court erred in determining agreement was drafted
by Mother’s counsel and that Mother had unclean hands).
As detailed supra, Mother already attempted to appeal from the
August 30, 2017 order. This Court quashed that appeal as untimely filed.
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As such, this Court will not revisit those issues that were previously argued.
See Green v. Green, 783 A.2d 788, 794 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2001) (rejecting
appellant’s request to re-litigate an issue on appeal from a Montgomery
County court order when the same issue had been brought before the
Delaware County courts, denied, appealed to this Court, and quashed by this
Court as untimely filed). Moreover, Mother has forfeited her right to raise
any claims challenging the 2016 transfer orders or the August 30, 2017
order as the appeal period for challenging those orders has long since
passed. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (“[T]he notice of appeal ... shall be filed
within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.”).
Mother includes in her third claim an argument that the trial court
demonstrated prejudice towards Mother in its June 12, 2019 order by
mentioning its prior finding of Mother acting in bad faith and having unclean
hands. Mother’s Brief at 24. Contrary to Mother’s claim, when taken in
context, it is evident that the complained-of passage was an attempt to
forestall any potential claim of prejudice. While providing this Court with the
procedural history of the matter, the trial court noted that although it had
found Mother to have acted in bad faith and with unclean hands in the
August 30, 2017 order, “Mother’s prior conduct, however, has no relevance
to the issues of child support that are presently before [the trial court].”
Order, 6/12/2019, at 4-5.
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Based on the foregoing, Mother has failed to convince us that the trial
court abused its discretion in entering the June 12, 2019 order. Accordingly,
we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/18/20
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