Com. v. Venson, D. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DAVID VENSON :
:
Appellant : No. 494 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 15, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0002426-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED MAY 22, 2020
David Venson appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the
Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas on January 15, 2019. After careful
review, we affirm.
On August 14, 2014, Venson, a minor (“the victim”), and an uncharged
co-defendant, J.F., had a sexual encounter in a parked car. That same day,
the victim reported to police that Venson sexually assaulted her. On
September 9, 2015, a criminal complaint was filed against Venson, charging
him with several sexual offenses. At that time, Venson’s whereabouts were
unknown and a warrant was issued for his arrest.
On September 14, 2016, Venson was apprehended in New York State.
He refused to waive extradition and was released after ninety days because
the Governor's warrant was not yet signed. On September 25, 2017, he was
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apprehended a second time in New York State. This time, he waived
extradition and was returned to Pennsylvania. He subsequently waived his
right to a preliminary hearing and all charges were bound over for court.
On September 21, 2018, a jury convicted Venson of one count each of
statutory sexual assault: 11 years or older, involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse with a person less than 16 years old, unlawful contact with a
minor, aggravated indecent assault of a complainant less than 16 years old,
corruption of minors - defendant age 18 or above, corruption of minors, and
one count of indecent assault - person less than 16 years old.
On January 15, 2019, the trial court sentenced Venson to an aggregate
term of one hundred and ninety-two to three hundred and ninety-four months’
imprisonment. Venson filed timely pro se post–sentence motions. While those
motions were under review, Venson filed a pro se notice of appeal to this
Court. About a month later, Venson filed a pro se motion to appoint counsel.
Shortly thereafter, the court allowed counsel of record to withdraw and
appointed Attorney Carl Poveromo.
Before we address Venson’s substantive claims on appeal, we must
address the irregularities of Venson’s status after sentencing. Venson was
represented by counsel up until sentencing. Seven days after sentencing,
Venson filed a pro se post-sentence motion on January 15, 2019. Venson then
filed a pro se notice of appeal on March 21, 2019. Normally, his pro se filings
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should have been forwarded to counsel of record. See Commonwealth v.
Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1044 (Pa. 2011).
However, it is clear from the record that all parties, including Venson,
understood that he was proceeding pro se after sentencing. See N.T.,
Sentencing, 1/15/19, at 33. Venson does not challenge his pro se status
during this period, or the procedure by which he became pro se. Under these
circumstances, we do not conclude that Venson was engaged in a form of
hybrid representation after sentencing. He was without counsel from the time
of sentencing to the time the court appointed appellate counsel. Accordingly,
we turn to reach the merits of Venson’s issues.
First, Venson contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his petition for dismissal of charges on Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 speedy trial grounds.
Specifically, he argues the Commonwealth did not act with due diligence in
locating and arresting him after the criminal complaint was filed, in extraditing
him from New York after learning of his whereabouts, and in bringing him to
trial once he was apprehended and returned to Pennsylvania.
Our scope and standard of review on this issue are as follows.
Our standard of review relating to the application of Rule 600 is
whether the trial court abused its discretion. Our scope of review
is limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule 600 evidentiary
hearing and the findings of the trial court. We must view the facts
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Commonwealth v. Robbins, 900 A.2d 413, 415 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation
omitted).
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Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court is
not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule [600]. Rule
[600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection
of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of
society. In determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy
trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society’s
right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain
those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it.
However, the administrative mandate of Rule [600] was not
designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith
prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1239 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc)
(citation omitted; brackets in original).
Rule 600 “provides for dismissal of charges only in cases in which
the defendant has not been brought to trial within the term of the
adjusted run date, after subtracting all excludable and excusable
time.” The adjusted run date is calculated by adding to the
mechanical run date, i.e., the date 365 days from the complaint,
both excludable time and excusable delay. “Excludable time” is
classified as periods of delay caused by the defendant. “Excusable
delay” occurs where the delay is caused by circumstances beyond
the Commonwealth's control and despite its due diligence. “Due
diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Due diligence does not require perfect
vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a showing by the
Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has been put forth.” Due
diligence includes, inter alia, listing a case for trial prior to the run
date, preparedness for trial within the run date, and keeping
adequate records to ensure compliance with Rule 600. Periods of
delay caused by the Commonwealth's failure to exercise due
diligence must be included in the computation of time within which
trial must commence.
Commonwealth v. Moore, 214 A.3d 244, 248-249 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(citations omitted).
“Once a violation of Rule 600 has been established ... the inquiry
becomes whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in bringing [a
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defendant] to trial and if the circumstances occasioning the postponement
were beyond the control of the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Kearse,
890 A.2d 388, 392 (Pa. Super. 2005). “The Commonwealth ... has the burden
of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that it exercised due
diligence.” Commonwealth v. Cole, 167 A.3d 49, 71 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
Venson contends that the Commonwealth did not make a sustained and
consistent effort to locate and arrest him during the three-hundred and
seventy-one days between when the complaint was filed and when he was
apprehended in New York. His contention is belied by the record.
Corporal Patrick McGurrin of the Pennsylvania State Police testified that
on September 9, 2015, he filed a criminal complaint against Venson charging
him with the above listed charges and a warrant was issued for his arrest. See
N.T., Rule 600 Hearing, 9/4/2018, at 13-14. On the same day, Corporal
McGurrin attempted to serve Venson with the arrest warrant but found Venson
was not residing at a Scranton address that had been provided. See id. at 17-
18.
Corporal McGurrin then tried to locate Venson in Kingston, Pennsylvania
where he was informed Venson had been spotted, but was unable to locate
him. See id., at 18. The Pennsylvania State Police then issued a Public
Information Release Report in order to assist with Venson’s apprehension. See
id. at 23-24. Over the course of the next month, Corporal McGurrin submitted
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Venson’s picture and information about the charges against him to the
Pennsylvania Crime Intelligence Center for dissemination to law enforcement
authorities and to Pennsylvania Crime Stoppers to obtain assistance in locating
Venson. See id. at 19-22.
In November of 2015, Corporal McGurrin completed a report in which
he indicated that Venson was still at large, that he had advised the
Pennsylvania State Police Fugitive Unit of the outstanding arrest warrant, he
had notified PA Crime Stoppers again, and he had performed a JNET search
through the Department of Labor. See id. at 32-33. He ascertained from JNET
that Venson was associated with a hair salon in Indiana, Pennsylvania.
Corporal McGurrin made contact with the owner of the salon, who claimed he
did not know Venson. See id. at 33.
In February of 2016, Corporal McGurrin again provided information to
the Pennsylvania State Police Fugitive Unit. See id., at 22. In May of 2016,
Corporal McGurrin interviewed Venson’s brother, but was not able to obtain
any information regarding Venson’s whereabouts. See id. at 25-26. In July of
2016, Corporal McGurrin completed a supplemental report detailing additional
efforts to locate Venson. See id. at 34. The report reflected he had contacted
the victims/witnesses in the investigation but they had no further information
to provide. See id. He also requested PA Crimestoppers re-release Venson’s
information. See id. Finally, on September 14, 2016, Corporal McGurrin was
advised by the NYPD that Venson had been apprehended. See id., at 35.
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The evidence of record regarding the efforts made by Corporal McGurrin
was sufficient to demonstrate due diligence by the Commonwealth between
the time the complaint was filed and when Venson was apprehended in New
York.
Venson further contends the Commonwealth did not act with due
diligence in extraditing him from New York. Specifically, he argues the
Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence in the ninety days between his
initial arrest in New York and subsequent release from custody, and then in
the two hundred and eighty nine days between his release from custody and
his re-arrest. Again, his contention is belied by the record.
Corporal McGurrin testified that the day after he was advised Venson
had been apprehended, New York authorities advised that Venson was
refusing extradition and Pennsylvania authorities would have to secure a
Governor’s Warrant. See id., at 36. Corporal McGurrin released that
information to the Lackawanna County District Attorney’s Office and followed
their progress in securing a Governor’s Warrant through emails with Barry
Moran. See id., at 36, 81-82, 83.
On October 24, 2016, Moran emailed Corporal McGurrin indicating that
he was working on the Governor’s Warrant Application and inquired as to
whether Corporal McGurrin would be the one picking Venson up. A few days
later, the application was forwarded from the District Attorney’s Office to the
Director of Extraditions and Capital Case Management of the Pennsylvania
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Governor’s Office of General Counsel. After some back and forth for required
changes and corrections, on December 8, 2016, the District Attorney’s Office
returned the corrected and finalized paperwork to the Director of Extraditions.
On December 12, 2016, the Pennsylvania Governor’s Office sent the
finalized extradition paperwork to the New York Governor’s Office. On the
same date, New York authorities advised that Venson was released because
the Governor’s Warrant had not been received. See id. at 37. The New York
judge directed Venson’s attorney to produce him back in court on January 5,
2017 because New York and Pennsylvania officials were working on a
Governor’s Warrant and Venson’s attorney agreed. See id. On December 27,
2016, Moran advised Corporal McGurrin about Venson’s release and the court
date. On December 29, 2016, the State of New York issued a Governor’s
Warrant for Venson’s arrest.
On January 5, 2017, Venson failed to appear before the New York judge.
See id., at 37. Moran advised Corporal McGurrin that Venson had failed to
appear for the scheduled court date, that the court issued a bench warrant,
that the New York Police Department was advised, and that the court docket
was left open and not dismissed. In February of 2017, PA Crime Stoppers
database indicated that Venson remained a fugitive.
In August of 2017, Corporal McGurrin completed a supplemental report
which indicated that Venson remained at large and had been placed on the
Pennsylvania State Police Ten Most Wanted list. See id., at 38. The case
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remained in Crime Stoppers and NCIC and the investigation was continuing.
See id. That same month Corporal McGurrin enlisted the assistance of the
United States Marshall’s Fugitive Task Force. On September 25, 2017, Venson
was apprehended in New York and waived extradition. See id., at 78.
It is clear from the record that the Commonwealth presented sufficient
evidence of due diligence in extraditing Venson from New York. We note
especially that the time from January 5, 2017 to September 25, 2017 is clearly
excluded from Rule 600 calculations as Venson chose not to report to the New
York court when directed to do so.
Venson finally claims the Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence
during the three hundred and twenty seven days between the time he was
returned to Pennsylvania and the Rule 600 Hearing.
Venson was arraigned in Lackawanna County on October 3, 2017 and a
preliminary hearing was scheduled for October 11, 2017. The Commonwealth
continued the hearing to October 25, 2017, at which time Venson waived his
right to a preliminary hearing. See id.
On December 1, 2017, a pretrial conference was held, at which time the
court issued a scheduling order for trial. The order required the
Commonwealth to provide discovery to the defense by December 15, 2017.
The Commonwealth provided the discovery seven days late. On December 29,
2017, Venson filed a motion for extension of time to file pretrial motions. On
January 3, 2018, the court granted the motion, indicating in the order that all
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additional time generated by the defense request shall run against Venson for
Rule 600 purposes.
On January 5, 2018, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel. After a hearing, the court granted the motion on January 23, 2018,
and appointed new counsel. On February 27, 2018, the court held another
pretrial conference with new counsel.
On April 4, 2018, Venson filed a counseled omnibus pretrial motion. On
April 26, 2018, he filed a brief in support of the motion. On that same date,
counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The court granted the motion
and appointed new counsel. On May 7, 2018, a pretrial conference was held
with the newly appointed counsel. On June 5, 2018, counsel filed a motion for
discovery and request for bill of particulars. Another pretrial conference was
held on June 7, 2018.
On June 26, 2018, Venson filed a counseled petition for nominal bail
under Rule 600 and a brief in support of the motion. On July 19, 2018, the
court issued an order granting the motion to set nominal bail. On July 20,
2018 and August 2, 2018, additional pretrial conferences were held. On
August 3, 2018, the court issued an order modifying bail.
On August 7, 2018, the defense filed a motion for the appointment of
an investigator. On August 22, 2018, Venson filed an amended counseled
omnibus pretrial motion. On August 24, 2018, Venson filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 600 and a brief in support of the motion. The Commonwealth
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filed an answer to the motion and accompanying brief on August 31, 2018.
The Rule 600 Hearing was held on September 4, 2018.
After considering the testimony and evidence presented, the trial court
concluded that the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of proof that it
demonstrated due diligence and that there was no Rule 600 violation. See
Trial Court Opinion, at 11. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
finding given the evidence presented at the hearing. Venson’s first issue is
therefore without merit.
Next, Venson contends the Commonwealth failed to disprove his
mistake of age defense. Section 3102 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code
provides the following regarding the mistake of age defense:
Except as otherwise provided, whenever in this chapter the
criminality of conduct depends on a child being below the age of
14 years, it is no defense that the defendant did not know the age
of the child or reasonably believed the child to be the age of 14
years or older. When criminality depends on the child’s being
below a critical age older than 14 years, it is a defense for the
defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or
she reasonably believed the child to be above the critical age.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3102. In interpreting this Section, this Court has stated the
following:
[The] [a]ppellant's argument that the Commonwealth, in the first
instance, was required to prove as an element of the crime that
[the] [a]ppellant knew or believed that [the victim] was [a certain
age] is without legal support. In matters involving sexual offenses
against children, when criminality depends on the child's being
below a specified age but older than fourteen years, it is a defense
for the defendant to prove that he or she reasonably believed the
child to be above the critical age. Because Section 3102 places the
initial burden on the accused to prove mistake of age, absent such
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a defense being proffered by the defendant, the Commonwealth
bears no burden of proof regarding the defendant's knowledge of
or belief as to the age of the child victim.
Commonwealth v. Bohonyi, 900 A.2d 877, 884 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Based on the aforementioned,
Venson was permitted to present a mistake of age defense, and once
proffered, the burden shifted to the Commonwealth to disprove the defense.
See id.Venson points solely to evidence introduced by the Commonwealth
concerning his personal belief as to the victim’s age, namely State Trooper
Sandy Vanluvender’s testimony. Vanluvender testified that during an
interview with Venson, Venson indicated that he believed the victim was over
eighteen, that he would never have intercourse with a juvenile female because
he knew it was a serious charge, and that he asked the victim and J.F. if the
victim was eighteen and they both said yes. See N.T, 9/21/2018, at 7-8.
To rebut this testimony, J.F.’s mother testified that she had informed
Venson prior to the date in question that the victim was fifteen years old. See
id. at 202-2031. Further, a photograph of the victim was admitted into
____________________________________________
1[J.F.’s mother]: I told him she was 15 years old and I pretty much flipped
out because he was hanging out with her because of her age …
[Commonwealth]: Was that conversation prior to August 14, 2014?
[J.F.’s mother]: Yes.
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evidence, which showed what the victim looked like around the time of the
incident. See id. at 78. Finally, the victim testified that on the night in question
she was wearing her middle school cheerleading sweatshirt, and the
Commonwealth admitted the same into evidence. See id. at 81-82. In its
opinion, the trial court credited the testimony of J.F.’s mother and other
evidence submitted by the Commonwealth, and concluded that Venson could
not have reasonably believed that the victim was eighteen or older.
Likewise, the jury, sitting as finder of fact, was free to credit the
Commonwealth’s evidence. As the jury was properly instructed on the mistake
of age defense, and nevertheless found Venson guilty of the crimes charged,
we are bound by the fact finder’s credibility determinations. Therefore,
Venson’s second issue is without merit.
Next, Venson claims the trial court imposed an illegal sentence because
his conviction of unlawful contact with a minor should have merged with his
convictions for statutory sexual assault and involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse. He claims merger was proper here because the offenses share
____________________________________________
…
[Commonwealth]: When you told him that -- when you told the defendant
that, did he appear to understand you? Did he understand what you were
saying?
[J.F.’s mother]: Yes.
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the same elements and that the same acts served as the basis for the
convictions.
“A claim that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence by failing to
merge sentences is a question of law.” Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983,
1020 (Pa. Super. 2014). Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo and
our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Brougher, 978 A.2d
373, 377 (Pa. Super. 2009).
The Sentencing Code provides as follows.
No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes
arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements
of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other
offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court
may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765. “Accordingly, merger is appropriate only when two
distinct criteria are satisfied” (1) the crimes arise from a single criminal act;
and (2) all of the statutory elements of one of the offenses are included within
the statutory elements of the other.” Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d
1244, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
The crime of unlawful contact with a minor is defined, in relevant part,
as follows:
(a) Offense defined.—A person commits an offense if he is
intentionally in contact with a minor for the purpose of engaging
in an activity prohibited under any of the following, and either the
person initiating the contact or the person being contacted is
within this Commonwealth:
(1) Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating
to sexual offenses).
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1). Furthermore, a minor is “[a]n individual under 18
years of age,” and “Contacts” is defined as follows:
Direct or indirect contact or communication by any means,
method or device, including contact or communication in person
or through an agent or agency, through any print medium, the
mails, a common carrier or communication common carrier, any
electronic communication system and any telecommunications,
wire, computer or radio communications device or system.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(c). As such, the elements of this crime focus on the act
of intentionally, either directly or indirectly, contacting or communicating with
a minor for the purpose of engaging in statutory sexual assault and
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. Notably, this crime does not require
the further criminal conduct to be consummated; it is the communication with
the intent to consummate the further crimes that forms the basis of criminal
liability. See Commonwealth v. Reed, 9 A.3d 1138, 1146 (Pa. 2010).
Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse is defined, in pertinent part, as
engaging in deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than 16
years of age. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(7). “The crime of involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse occurs when the actor, by physical compulsion or threats
thereof, coerces the victim to engage in acts of anal and/or oral intercourse.”
Commonwealth v. Snyder, 870 A.2d 336, 351 (Pa. Super. 2005). Statutory
sexual assault is defined in pertinent part as engaging in sexual intercourse
with a complainant under the age of 16 years and that person is four or more
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years older than the complainant and the complainant and the person are not
married to each other. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1.
Here, the contact proscribed by § 6318 took place when Venson urged
J.F. to call the minor victim to invite her to smoke marijuana and hang out.
This contact was clearly initiated for the purpose of effectuating the
subsequent offenses, which consisted of oral and sexual intercourse with the
minor victim. While the crimes were carried out contemporaneously, such a
circumstance does not require merger for sentencing purposes.
Venson’s argument is premised upon the mistaken belief that the
statutory sexual assault and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse must be
carried out in order for the actor to have committed the unlawful contact
offense. To the contrary, once an Appellant intentionally contacts or
communicates with a minor, for the purpose of engaging in the prohibited
activity, the crime of unlawful contact with a minor has been completed. The
actual intercourse is not an element of the crime contemplated in § 6318. In
other words, the actor need not be successful in completing the purpose of his
or her contact or communication with the minor. Moreover, the
contact/communication contemplated in § 6318 need not be made in person
and can be accomplished through an agent or agency. Clearly, such is not the
case with the subsequent offenses. Since each offense requires proof of an
element that the other does not, the offenses do not merge. We find this issue
is also without merit.
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Finally, Venson argues the trial court imposed a manifestly excessive
and unreasonable sentence by sentencing him at the upper end of the
standard sentencing ranges for his convictions, as well as by requiring those
sentences to be served consecutively. Venson concedes this claim challenges
the discretionary aspects of his sentence. “A challenge to the discretionary
aspects of a sentence must be considered a petition for permission to appeal,
as the right to pursue such a claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v.
McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must
invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
the Sentencing Code, 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
omitted; brackets in original).
Here, Venson filed a post-trial motion in which he asked the court to
overturn and reconsider the sentence. He included multiple reasons for
reconsideration, including that his sentence was outside the guidelines, that
his sentences should have merged, that the district attorney had made false
and prejudicial statements which led to his harsh sentence, that the minimum
sentence is beyond the recommended sentence based on his prior record
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score, and that the “unusual and extreme sentence” is due to racial bias. See
Post-Trial Omnibus Motion, 1/22/2019, at 15-17.
However, in his 1925(b) statement, Venson, for the first time claims the
sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and unreasonable because the
trial court sentenced him at the upper end of the standard sentencing range
for his convictions and imposed consecutive sentences. Then, in his Rule
2119(f) statement, he claims for the first time, that the trial court failed to
put its reasons for sentencing on the record.
Venson failed to raise any of these challenges to the trial court’s
discretion during the sentencing hearing or in his post-sentence motion. As
such, he did not give the sentencing judge an opportunity to reconsider or
modify his sentence based on those specific challenges, and, therefore, the
claims are waived. See Commonwealth v. Reeves, 778 A.2d 691, 692-693
(Pa. Super. 2001) (holding that appellant’s failure to raise a specific claim
regarding imposition of sentence in post-sentence motion deprived the trial
court of the opportunity to consider the claim and therefore the claim was
waived on appeal).
We note, even if not waived, Venson’s claim lacks merit. The court
adequately considered all sentencing factors and explained on the record the
reason for the sentence. See N.T., Sentencing, 1/15/2019, at 30-32.
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Further, the trial court reviewed a pre-sentence report. See id. at 30.
Where the trial court had the benefit of reviewing a pre-sentence report, we
must
presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant
information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed
those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A
pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for itself.
In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of
engaging in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly that
sentencers are under no compulsion to employ checklists or any
extended or systematic definitions of their punishment procedure.
Having been fully informed by the pre-sentence report, the
sentencing court’s discretion should not be disturbed. This is
particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where it can
be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of awareness of
the sentencing considerations, and there we will presume also that
the weighing process took place in a meaningful fashion. It would
be foolish, indeed, to take the position that if a court is in
possession of the facts, it will fail to apply them to the case at
hand.
Commonwealth v. Hallock, 603 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. Super. 1992).
Despite Venson’s arguments to the contrary, the trial court properly
considered all factors necessary in imposing the sentence. The trial court had
the benefit of a pre-sentence report, combined with the trial court’s
consideration of the witness testimony. Accordingly, Venson’s claim lacks
merit even if it had been properly preserved.
As we find none of Venson’s issues on appeal merit relief, we affirm the
judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 05/22/2020
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