Com. v. Taft, S. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S35026-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    STEVEN TAFT
    Appellant                No. 1637 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 8, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0000818-2017
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                              Filed: October 1, 2020
    Appellant, Steven Taft, appeals from his judgment of sentence of two to
    four years’ imprisonment for sexual assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1. Appellant
    challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. We affirm.
    The trial court accurately recounted the factual and procedural history
    as follows:
    The charge in question arises from an incident in the early
    morning hours of September 4, 2016.      On the evening of
    September 3, 2016, the victim, S.K., attended a party at an
    apartment on Temple University’s campus, which Appellant
    shared with several roommates.     S.K. went to the party
    accompanied by her friend, Tess Mariani (Tess), and another
    friend.
    S.K. met Appellant for the first time at the party and had no
    physical contact with him during the evening, nor did they discuss
    sex or sexual relationships. After being at the apartment for
    approximately five hours, S.K. and Tess decided around 3:00 a.m.
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S35026-20
    to sleep there and Appellant offered for them to stay in his
    bedroom and provided them with over-size T-shirts in which to
    sleep. Appellant was not in the room when S.K. fell asleep and
    was not supposed to stay in the room.
    After falling asleep, S.K. awoke to find Appellant penetrating her
    with his finger. S.K. testified that she “laid still,” “didn’t move a
    muscle,” and [did not] make any noise. Appellant then moved her
    onto her side, removed her underwear, and penetrated her vagina
    with his penis. While Appellant was having intercourse with her,
    S.K. remained motionless, did not communicate with Appellant
    and wanted to, “act as if asleep.” At no time did S.K. verbally
    express her consent to the intercourse.
    S.K. further stated that throughout the incident, she did not alert
    Tess because she did not know what she (S.K.) would say to
    [Tess]. As the incident occurred, S.K. thought to herself that she
    wanted to leave.
    S.K. testified that she did not want any of the sexual contact and
    that she and Appellant had never discussed having sexual contact.
    When Appellant eventually ejaculated on her back, S.K. went into
    the bathroom. Tess also awoke at that time and followed her into
    the bathroom where she found S.K. crying. S.K. informed her that
    she had been raped.
    S.K. and Tess then decided to call an Uber and go home.
    [Appellant] left the room for them to get changed and then offered
    to walk them to Morgan Hall on Temple’s campus. S.K. did not
    want to disturb her parents in the early hours of the morning so
    the women took an Uber to a friend’s house in Oreland, PA., which
    S.K. considered a “safe zone.” S.K. eventually went to S.K.’s
    father’s house and informed him what had occurred. S.K.’s father
    then called her mother. Her parents called the police and the
    three of them went to Abington Hospital where swabs of S.K.’s
    mons pubis and perianal area were administered by a sexual
    assault nurse examiner.
    A subsequent DNA analysis of a sperm fraction detected in the
    rectal swab taken from S.K. revealed a DNA mixture 302.3
    quintillion times more likely to have originated from S.K. and
    Appellant than S.K and a random unrelated Caucasian person,
    while the major DNA component of the sperm fraction found in
    the vaginal vault swab matched [Appellant]’s DNA profile.
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    Appellant was arrested on January 10, 2017 and charged with the
    above offenses. On November 7, 2018, the case proceeded to a
    jury trial before the Honorable Diana L. Anhalt. At trial the
    Commonwealth’s evidence recounted the above events.
    Appellant, in turn, testified on his own behalf and admitted to
    engaging in sexual intercourse with S.K. and likewise admitted
    that S.K. had never given verbal consent for sex. Appellant,
    however, contended that while touching S.K.’s vagina and while
    engaging in sexual intercourse he believed she had, “moved
    toward him,” “pushing back up against him.” The jury rejected
    Appellant’s claim of consent and on November 9, 2017, the jury
    returned a verdict of guilty of sexual assault.1
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/20/19, at 1-4 (record citations omitted).
    On May 8, 2019, the trial court imposed sentence. Appellant filed timely
    post-sentence motions challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence,
    which the court denied, and a timely appeal to this Court. Both Appellant and
    the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises two issues in this appeal, which we re-order for
    purposes of convenience:
    1. Did the trial court abuse err when it denied Appellant’s post-
    sentence motion that the evidence presented at trial was
    insufficient as a matter of law to find Appellant guilty of sexual
    assault?
    2. Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant’s post-sentence
    motion that the jury’s guilty verdict to the charge of sexual assault
    was against the weight of the evidence?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    ____________________________________________
    1 The jury acquitted Appellant of indecent assault and aggravated indecent
    assault.
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    When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
    determine “whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all reasonable
    inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
    verdict winner, are sufficient to support all the elements of the offense.”
    Commonwealth v. Cline, 
    177 A.3d 922
    , 925 (Pa. Super. 2017).              “This
    standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial
    rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused
    to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Stokes, 
    78 A.3d 644
    , 649 (Pa. Super. 2013).
    The Crimes Code defines the crime of sexual assault as follows: “Except
    as provided in [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 3121 (relating to rape) or [18 Pa.C.S.A. §]
    3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse), a person commits a
    felony of the second degree when that person engages in sexual intercourse
    . . . with a complainant without the complainant’s consent.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
    3124.1.
    Since Section 3124.1 does not prescribe the culpability sufficient to
    establish each material element of the offense, the defendant’s culpability is
    established if he acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect to
    each such element. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(c); Commonwealth v. Carter, 
    418 A.2d 537
    , 542-43 (Pa. Super. 1980).         Of these three levels of intent,
    recklessness requires the least level of proof.    Carter, 
    418 A.2d at 543
    .
    Section 302 defines recklessness as follows:
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    (3) A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of
    an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
    unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
    from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
    that, considering the nature and intent of the actor's conduct and
    the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
    deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
    would observe in the actor's situation.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(3). In accordance with these precepts, the trial court
    instructed the jury that to prove sexual assault, the Commonwealth had to
    establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant “acted knowingly or at
    least reckless[ly] regarding S.K.’s non-consent.” N.T. 11/8/18, at 78.
    To prove sexual assault, it is not necessary for the Commonwealth to
    establish that the victim resisted the assault.         Commonwealth v.
    Andrulewicz, 
    911 A.2d 162
    , 165 (Pa. Super. 2006). The uncorroborated
    testimony of the complaining witness is sufficient to convict a defendant of
    sexual offenses. Commonwealth v. Cramer, 
    195 A.3d 594
    , 602 (Pa. Super.
    2018).
    Here, the trial court reasoned:
    [T]he victim testified—and Appellant admitted—that Appellant
    engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim. The victim testified
    that she did not consent to the intercourse, did not have physical
    contact with Appellant throughout the evening, never talked to
    Appellant about engaging in sexual activity, and did not want any
    of the sexual contact that occurred. She never verbally consented
    to sex and remained motionless throughout the incident without
    moving a muscle. Finally, the victim immediately reported the
    crime after the incident and immediately left Appellant’s residence
    in the wee hours of the morning. In addition, Tess corroborated
    the victim’s testimony that she did not have physical contact with
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    J-S35026-20
    Appellant throughout the evening. Tess further indicated that the
    victim was crying immediately after the incident and immediately
    reported that she had been raped.
    When viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, such
    evidence was clearly sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction.
    Audrulewicz, supra (testimony of victim that defendant pushed
    her onto bed, removed her clothes and had sexual intercourse
    with her sufficient to establish sexual assault); Commonwealth
    v. Prince, 
    719 A.2d 1086
    , 1089 (Pa. Super. 1998) (evidence
    victim did not consent to sexual intercourse and stayed near
    defendant all night out of fear for safety sufficient to sustain
    conviction for sexual assault).
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/20/19, at 6-7. We agree with this analysis.
    Appellant argues that the evidence did not establish that he acted
    recklessly with regard to S.K.’s absence of consent. We disagree. Multiple
    facts demonstrate Appellant’s reckless disregard for S.K.’s lack of consent.
    S.K. and Appellant had never met before the evening of this incident. During
    the hours before intercourse, they did not have any romantic or sexual
    interactions.      They did not kiss, hold hands, discuss sex or sexual
    relationships, or even have a conversation alone together.       S.K. spent the
    entire night with her best friend, Tess, because she did not know the people
    at the party. When S.K. and Tess agreed to stay over, Appellant left the room
    while S.K. changed her clothes before going to bed so he did not see her
    undressed.      S.K. and Tess opted to sleep in a bed alone together, while
    Appellant was expected to sleep elsewhere.         S.K. wore clothing while she
    slept.    Nonetheless, she woke up to find Appellant’s fingers in her vagina
    before he penetrated her with his penis. Appellant admitted that he did not
    -6-
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    ask S.K. whether she was okay or wanted to have sex at any point in time.
    Instead, he made a deliberate decision to disregard the risk that she did not
    want to have intercourse and penetrated her anyway. Appellant admitted that
    the only thing S.K. did that he interpreted as indicating her consent was
    touching his hand during the party. The mere touching of Appellant’s hand
    hours earlier was nowhere close to consent to full-fledged sexual intercourse
    with someone S.K. barely knew.
    For these reasons, Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
    evidence fails.
    Next, Appellant argues that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the
    evidence. We disagree.
    The law pertaining to weight of the evidence claims is well-settled.
    The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder
    of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
    and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is
    not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and
    must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the
    credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to
    determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so
    clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal
    weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
    On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to
    whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury
    verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a
    weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of
    discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the
    verdict is against the weight of the evidence. An appellate court
    may not reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence
    as to shock one’s sense of justice.
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    Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 
    109 A.3d 711
    , 723 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    In our view, the trial court acted within its discretion by concluding that
    the verdict did not shock its conscience. S.K. testified, and Appellant admitted,
    that Appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with her. S.K. testified that she
    did not consent to the intercourse, did not have physical contact with Appellant
    throughout the evening, never talked to Appellant about engaging in sexual
    activity, and did not want any of the sexual contact that occurred. She never
    verbally consented to sex and remained motionless throughout the incident
    without moving a muscle. She did not kiss Appellant, touch him or otherwise
    indicate that she wanted to engage in intercourse. Nor did Appellant ask for
    her consent or even speak to her during the incident. While Appellant claimed
    that S.K. moved closer to him during intercourse, S.K. contradicted Appellant
    by stating that he moved her body. Although S.K. did not resist, the crime of
    sexual assault does not require proof that she resisted. Following the incident,
    S.K. immediately left Appellant’s residence and reported the crime.           In
    addition, Tess corroborated S.K.’s testimony that she did not have physical
    contact with Appellant throughout the evening. Tess indicated that S.K. was
    crying immediately after the incident and immediately reported that she had
    been raped.    In light of this testimony, the jury's decision to credit S.K.’s
    testimony and find that she did not consent to intercourse in no way shocks
    the conscience.
    -8-
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    For these reasons, Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence
    fails.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judge Bowes joins the memorandum.
    Judge Colins concurs in the result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/1/20
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1637 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 10/1/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/1/2020