In Re: J.N., Appeal of: J.N. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: J.N. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.N. : No. 28 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered December 4, 2019
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 583-2019
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 15, 2020
J.N. appeals from the Order stating that the Mental Health Review
Officer’s (“MHRO”) Order certifying J.N.’s extended involuntary commitment,
pursuant to section 7303 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (the “Act”),1
remained the controlling legal directive over J.N. In issuing its Order, the trial
court effectively denied J.N.’s Petition to review the MHRO’s certification. We
reverse.
On November 7, 2019, University of Pittsburgh Police Officer Michael
Talvola (“Officer Talvola”) responded to a 911 call at a dormitory complex.
Upon arriving, he encountered J.N., sitting in a hallway, with multiple open
wounds on his neck, arms, and thighs. J.N. told Officer Talvola that he wanted
to kill himself; he had cut himself with a razor blade; and several days earlier,
he had taken all of his prescription medications with the intention of killing
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1 50 P.S. §§ 7101-7503.
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himself. J.N. was transported to UPMC – Presbyterian Hospital (“UPMC –
Presbyterian”), where he received treatment for his injuries, which included
more than 120 sutures to close his wounds. Officer Talvola prepared
paperwork for a temporary involuntary commitment pursuant to section 7302
of the Act (“section 302”).2 Garrett Sparks, M.D., who treated J.N. at UPMC
– Presbyterian, certified the section 302 commitment paperwork.
In the early morning hours of November 7, 2019, J.N. finished receiving
treatment at UPMC – Presbyterian for his physical injuries, and was
transported to UPMC – Western Psychiatric Hospital (“WPIC”) for further
treatment. Later that morning, J.N. was evaluated by Patrick Buckley, M.D.
(“Dr. Buckley”). After his evaluation of J.N., Dr. Buckley filed an Application
for extended involuntary treatment pursuant to section 7303 of the Act
(“section 303”).
On November 8, 2019, J.N. appeared before a MHRO for a hearing on
the section 303 commitment certification (the “MHRO Hearing”). Officer
Talvola, Dr. Buckley, and J.N. testified at the hearing, after which the MHRO
signed the section 303 commitment certification, finding that there was clear
and convincing evidence that J.N. met the statutory requirements for
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2 Section 302 permits confinement of a patient for involuntary emergency
examination and treatment for up to 120 hours, upon the certification of a
physician stating the need for such examination. See 50 P.S. § 7302(a), (d).
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involuntary commitment. J.N. was discharged from WPIC on November 12,
2019.
On November 13, 2019, J.N. filed a Petition for review of the section
303 commitment certification. The trial court conducted a hearing on the
Petition for review on November 15, 2019 (the “November Conference”). Prior
to commencing the hearing, the trial court met with both parties’ counsel. At
that time, the trial court stated that it had listened to the tape recording of
the MHRO Hearing, and suggested that counsel for both parties listen to the
tape themselves, in order to fully understand the candor and nature of the
parties’ testimony at the MHRO Hearing. After some discussion, J.N. moved
for a continuance in order to better prepare for the hearing, which the trial
court granted. No testimony or other documentary evidence was entered into
the record at the November Conference.
On December 2, 2019, the trial court held the continued proceedings on
J.N.’s Petition (the “December Hearing”). At the December Hearing, J.N. and
counsel for the Allegheny County Office of Behavioral Health expressed to the
trial court that both parties wished to strike the section 303 commitment,
based on the fact that J.N. had been discharged, and that he was at WPIC “for
a short period of time such that he could have received the same amount of
treatment under a 302 certification.” N.T., 12/2/19, at 2. In response, the
trial court stated that there was no matter before it that it could rule on,
incorporated its discussion with counsel from the November Conference, and
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stated, “I am not ruling. It is your decision, so do what you believe is prudent.
That would be my thought.” Id. at 4.
On December 4, 2019, the trial court issued an Order where, in part, it
stated the following:
At the December [Hearing], both counsel’s positions were united.
They agreed that the [P]etition for review was withdrawn. As
such, there was nothing before th[e trial c]ourt to rule upon. The
[c]ourt’s de novo review is triggered only upon the [P]etition being
before the [C]ourt. Upon withdraw[al] of the [P]etition, the
hearing officer’s [section 303] commitment [O]rder remains the
controlling legal directive regarding [J.N.] The [c]ourt ends with
[the] observation that neither party – knowing their goal was to
somehow get the [section] 303 determination vacated –
presented any evidence whatsoever at the December [Hearing].
Given the [c]ourt’s de novo standard of review, the [c]ourt could
have entertained additional evidence.
Trial Court Order, 12/4/19.
On December 12, 2019, J.N. filed a Motion for reconsideration, wherein
he requested again that the section 303 certification be stricken and vacated
or, in the alternative, that the trial court conduct a new hearing to allow for
the presentation of evidence. On December 19, 2019, the trial court issued
an Order granting a new hearing on the Petition, which was scheduled for
January 24, 2020.
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However, J.N. filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court on January 3, 2020,
and the trial court cancelled the scheduled hearing.3 The trial court did not
order a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement, and instead relied on the
rationale stated in its December 4, 2019, Order.
J.N. raises the following issue for our review:
I. Did the [trial] court err in failing to strike the [s]ection 303
Commitment Order[,] as requested by the attorney for Allegheny
County at the review hearing, for two reasons: (1) the proper
procedures were not followed under the Act, and (2) no evidence
that J.N. was severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate
treatment was presented at the hearing?
Brief for Appellant at 6.4
J.N. argues that the trial court’s denial of his section 303 Petition for
review was improper because there was insufficient evidence produced at the
review hearing to support the commitment. Id. at 25. J.N. alleges that the
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3 The trial court’s December 19, 2019, Order only “grant[ed J.N.’s] request to
the extent that a hearing was the relief being sought.” Trial Court Order,
12/19/19. We note that J.N.’s appeal properly lies from the trial court’s
December 4, 2019, Order, wherein it stated that the section 303 commitment
Order would “remain the controlling legal directive” regarding J.N. Trial Court
Order, 12/4/19. J.N. filed his Notice of Appeal on January 3, 2020, within 30
days of the trial court’s Order.
4 We note that the record confirms that J.N.’s involuntary commitment has
ended. Even though J.N. is no longer involuntary committed, “his appeal is
not moot because the issues are ‘capable of repetition and may evade
review.’” In re Ryan, 784 A.2d 803, 805 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2001). “We may
review the issues, vacate the involuntary commitment order, and expunge the
records.” Id. (citing In re R.D., 739 A.2d 548 (Pa. Super. 1999)); In re J.K.,
595 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Pa. Super. 1991) (stating that an expired commitment
order is appealable because of the important liberty issues involved).
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trial court failed to properly develop a record at either the November
Conference or the December Hearing. Id. at 27-29. J.N. argues that the
evidence was insufficient to support a section 303 commitment order, and as
a result, the commitment order was unlawful. Id. at 32. Accordingly, J.N.
asserts that the section 303 commitment certification should be vacated, and
his record expunged. Id. at 34.
In reviewing a trial court’s order for an involuntary commitment, we
must “determine whether there is evidence in the record to justify the court’s
findings.” In re T.T., 875 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Although we
must accept the trial court’s findings of fact that have support in the record,
we are not bound by its legal conclusions from those facts.” Id.This issue implicates J.N.’s due process rights under the Act. “It is well
settled that involuntary civil commitment of mentally ill persons constitutes
deprivation of liberty and may be accomplished only in accordance with due
process protections.” In re Hutchinson, 454 A.2d 1008, 1010 (Pa. 1982);
In re Hancock, 719 A.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Pa. Super. 1998). “Recognizing
the substantial curtailment of liberty inherent to an involuntary confinement,
our Supreme Court has cautioned that the courts must strictly interpret and
adhere to the statutory requirements for commitment.” In re T.T., 875 A.2d
at 1124. “When balancing the needs of the state in protecting mentally ill
persons and others in society against the liberty interests of the individual
sought to be committed, we find that due process protections demand the
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application of the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof in cases
pursuant to [section 303].” In re Hancock, 719 A.2d at 1058.
When an appellant’s due process rights under the Act are violated, “we
may vacate the certification for involuntary treatment pursuant to section
[]303, and direct that all records pertaining to this matter be expunged.” In
re Ryan, 784 A.2d at 808. While a trial court’s review of a 303 commitment
does not require a full, de novo hearing, it does require some hearing. In re
T.J., 739 A.2d 478 (Pa. 1999). Because the MHRO cannot enter a final order,
the review hearing before the trial court is akin to a de novo hearing. Id. at
480.
The Act provides for involuntary emergency examination and treatment
of persons who are “severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate
treatment.” 50 P.S. § 7301(a). As the Act explains, in relevant part,
[a] person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of
mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and
discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to
care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a
clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself, as
defined in subsection (b) ….
Id.
Regarding the requirement that the individual pose a “clear and present
danger of harm,” the Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(b) Determination of Clear and Present Danger.--
(1) Clear and present danger to others shall be shown by
establishing that within the past 30 days the person has
inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another
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and that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will
be repeated. … For the purpose of this section, a clear and
present danger of harm to others may be demonstrated by
proof that the person has made threats of harm and has
committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm.
(2) Clear and present danger to himself shall be shown by
establishing that within the past 30 days:
(i) the person has acted in such manner as to evidence that
he would be unable, without care, supervision and the
continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need for
nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-
protection and safety, and that there is a reasonable
probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious
physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days unless
adequate treatment were afforded under this [A]ct[.]
Id. § 7301(b).
Our review discloses that J.N. was initially admitted to UPMC –
Presbyterian under section 302 of the Act. 5 Then, upon Application of WPIC,
J.N.’s involuntary commitment was extended for a period of up to 20 days
pursuant to section 303 of the Act, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 7303. Extended involuntary emergency treatment
certified by a judge or mental health review officer—not to
exceed twenty days
(a) Persons Subject to Extended Involuntary Emergency
Treatment.—Application for extended involuntary emergency
treatment may be made for any person who is being treated
pursuant to section 302 whenever the facility determines that the
need for emergency treatment is likely to extend beyond 120
hours. The application shall be filed forthwith in the court of
common pleas, and shall state the grounds on which extended
emergency treatment is believed to be necessary. The application
shall state the name of any examining physician and the
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5 J.M. does not challenge his section 302 commitment on appeal.
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substance of his opinion regarding the mental condition of the
person.
***
(c) Informal Conference on Extended Emergency
Treatment Application.—
(1) At the commencement of the informal conference,
the judge or the mental health review officer shall
inform the person of the nature of the proceedings.
Information relevant to whether the person is severely
mentally disabled and in need of treatment shall be
reviewed, including the reasons that continued
involuntary treatment is considered necessary. Such
explanation shall be made by a physician who
examined the person and shall be in terms
understandable to a layman. The judge or mental
health review officer may review any relevant
information even if it would be normally excluded
under rules of evidence if he believes that such
information is reliable. The person or his
representative shall have the right to ask questions of
the physician and of any other witnesses and to
present any relevant information. At the conclusion
of the review, if the judge or the review officer finds
that the person is severely mentally disabled and in
need of continued involuntary treatment, either as an
inpatient or through less restrictive assisted
outpatient treatment, he shall so certify. Otherwise,
he shall direct that the facility director or his designee
discharge the person.
***
(g) Petition to Common Pleas Court.—In all cases in which the
hearing was conducted by a mental health review officer, a person
made subject to treatment pursuant to this section shall have the
right to petition the court of common pleas for review of the
certification. A hearing shall be held within 72 hours after the
petition is filed unless a continuance is requested by the person's
counsel. The hearing shall include a review of the certification and
such evidence as the court may receive or require. If the court
determines that further involuntary treatment is necessary and
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that the procedures prescribed by this act have been followed, it
shall deny the petition. Otherwise, the person shall be discharged.
50 P.S. § 7303(a), (c)(1), (g).
Here, we cannot conclude that an adequate “hearing” on J.N.’s Petition
for review occurred, nor can we conclude that the trial court or the parties
followed the strict protocol detailed in section 303(g). Initially, the trial court
did not accept evidence into the record, in the form of the section 303
commitment certification, as is required in section 303(g). 50 P.S. § 7303(g)
(stating that “[t]he hearing shall include a review of the certification and such
evidence as the court may receive or require.”) (emphasis added). The trial
court did not hear testimony from witnesses, doctors, or from J.N., and did
not incorporate the audiotape or transcript from the MHRO Hearing into the
trial court record at either the November Conference or the December
Hearing. At the December Hearing, the trial court incorporated the discussion
he had with both counsel at the November Conference. N.T. (Hearing),
12/2/19, at 4. However, the November Conference only included a discussion
between the trial court and counsel regarding the audiotaped recording of the
MHRO Hearing, the trial court’s belief that the parties should listen to the tape
themselves before moving forward, and a Motion for a continuance by J.N. in
order to listen to the tape and prepare for a full hearing on the matter. See
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N.T., 11/19/19, at 3-31.6 Further, at the December Hearing, the parties
stated that they had agreed that the section 303 commitment should be
stricken, and neither party presented any evidence or testimony to the trial
court. As a result, the trial court did not have any evidence admitted into the
record, much less the commitment certification as required by section 303(g),
when it issued its December 4, 2019 Order, effectively denying J.N.’s Petition.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the County failed to prove to
the trial court that J.N.’s section 303 commitment certification was supported
by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the trial court’s December 4,
2019, Order which, in effect, denied J.N.’s Petition for review, must be
reversed. We further direct that the trial court vacate the November 8, 2019,
Order of the MHRO certifying J.N.’s section 303 commitment, and expunge
the record of such commitment. See In re Estate of S.G.L., 885 A.2d 73,
76 (Pa. Super. 2005) (reversing and directing the trial court to vacate a
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6 Our review of the transcript of both the November Conference and the
December Hearing demonstrates that the trial court extensively studied the
audiotape of the MHRO Hearing, which it described as “chilling,” and that the
contents of the tape are in “a different stratosphere” from other MHRO hearing
tapes presented in past cases. N.T., 11/19/19, at 14, 23. However, in this
unusual procedural circumstance, we are constrained to determine that the
trial court could not find that the section 303 commitment was supported by
clear and convincing evidence when, plainly, the November Conference and
the December Hearing did not include any evidence at all.
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commitment order when the procedural dictates of section 303 were not
satisfied); see also In re Ryan, 784 A.2d at 808.7
Order reversed. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/15/2020
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7 Based on this disposition, we need not address J.N.’s issue of whether
sufficient evidence existed for the MHRO to certify J.N.’s section 303
commitment.
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