MJ Test Prep v. Lynch, D. ( 2021 )

J-A19042-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MJ TEST PREP, LLC AND MATTHEW : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
W. JOSEPH, PH.D., : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
DAVID LYNCH AND VELTIO, LLC :
: No. 3531 EDA 2019
Appellants :
Appeal from the Order Entered November 27, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at
No(s): No. CV-2019-004426
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: Filed: January 21, 2021
I agree with the Majority that we should affirm the trial court’s order
granting the preliminary injunction. I write separately to clarify my position.
I would affirm because of the “highly deferential standard” of review we
apply to orders granting preliminary injunctions. Summit Towne Centre,
Inc. v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc., 828 A.2d 995, 1000 (Pa. 2003).
Our review of a preliminary injunction “is limited to a determination of whether
an examination of the record reveals that ‘any apparently reasonable grounds’
support the court’s disposition.” Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
explained that we reverse only if there are no “apparently reasonable grounds”
for the preliminary injunction, or “the rule of law relied upon was palpably
erroneous or misapplied”:
[W]e recognize that on an appeal from the grant or denial
of a preliminary injunction, we do not inquire into the merits
J-A19042-20
of the controversy, but only examine the record to
determine if there were any apparently reasonable grounds
for the action of the court below. Only if it is plain that no
grounds exist to support the decree or that the rule of law
relied upon was palpably erroneous or misapplied will we
interfere with the decision of the [trial court].
Id. (quoting Roberts v. Board of Dirs. of Sch. Dist., 462 Pa. 464, 341 A.2d
475, 478 (1975)).
Here, Joseph in effect asked the trial court to pierce the corporate veil
between himself and MJ Test Prep, and the trial court essentially did as he
asked, albeit not explicitly. Applying the “highly deferential standard” of
review, I do not believe the court’s doing so for purposes of a preliminary
injunction was reversible error. If a business owner seeks a preliminary
injunction that in effect requires a court to pierce the veil, it is difficult to say
that the court was wrong to do so. After all, the owner is presumably aware
of the nature of the owner’s relationship with the business and willing to take
on the ramifications of piercing the veil.
Perhaps more to the point, a court grants a preliminary injunction
merely to preserve the status quo ante and to protect the court’s ability to
grant the ultimate relief sought. It is not a final determination of the case on
the merits. Because I believe there were “apparently reasonable grounds” for
the preliminary injunction, and “the rule of law relied upon” was not “palpably
erroneous or misapplied,” I respectfully concur.
President Judge Panella joins the concurring memorandum.
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