Com. v. Harris, W. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIE MAURICE HARRIS :
:
Appellant : No. 20 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered November 20, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0003121-1997
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 22, 2021
Appellant, Willie Maurice Harris, appeals from the trial judge’s order that
corrected an error in a prior sentencing order. We affirm.
Appellant was charged with one general count of Criminal Homicide, 18
Pa.C.S. § 2501(a), in the shooting death of Roderick McMahon. 1 Following a
jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder on August 7, 1997,
and was sentenced on September 4, 1997, to “undergo imprisonment in the
State Correctional System for the period of his natural life, without parole….”
The Sentencing Order stated in full:
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1 The charge in full read: “The actor intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or
negligently caused the death of Roderick McMahon another human being, in
violation of Section 2501(a) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, Act of
December 6, 1972, 18 Pa.C.S. §2501(a).” Criminal Information, 4/18/97, at
1.
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AND NOW, to-wit, this 4th day of September, 1997,
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9715, [Appellant] is sentenced to
undergo imprisonment in the State Correctional System for the
period of his natural life, without parole; and he is remanded to
the Diagnostic Clinic of the State Correctional Institution at
Pittsburgh to be assigned to such institution as may be deemed
appropriate by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
Sentencing Order, 9/4/97, at 1. After Appellant’s judgment of sentence was
affirmed by this Court on August 6, 2004, the Supreme Court granted
allowance of appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal. Commonwealth v.
Harris, 860 A.2d 1129, 682 WDA 2002 (Pa. Super. filed August 6, 2004)
(unpublished memorandum), appeal granted, 868 A.2d 1198, 455 WAL 2004
(Pa. filed February 11, 2005), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 915
A.2d 626, 3 WAP 2005 (Pa. filed February 20, 2007).2
On November 20, 2019, the trial court, sua sponte, filed a correction of
the original sentencing order. The amended sentencing order stated:
AND NOW, to-wit, this 20th day of November, 2019, it is
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Order
entered in the above-captioned case dated September 4, 1997,
referring to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9715, be and hereby shall be corrected
to reflect the proper Statute, that being, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9711.
Amended Sentencing Order, 11/20/19, at 1. Appellant filed a notice of appeal
on December 17, 2019. Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained: “[T]he Order
entered on November 20, 2019, correct[ed] a clerical error with regard to the
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2 There is further significant procedural history that is not relevant to the
issues on appeal.
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sentencing statute from 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9715 to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711.” Trial
Court Opinion, 1/7/20, at 1.
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues, which we restate
verbatim:
I. WHERE THE SENTENCING STATUTE AT 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711,
ONLY PROVIDES FOR SENTENCING RENDERED BY JURY
VERDICTS AS TO CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND THEN SENTENCING,
DID THE STATE UNLAWFULLY TRY DEFENDANT FOR AN OFFENSE
WHERE NO PENALTY ATTACHED AT FIRST DEGREE MURDER,
WHEN THE DEATH PENALTY IS NOT BEING SOUGHT?
II. IS 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711, APPLICABLE TO OFFENDER WHERE THE
DEATH PENALTH IS NOT BEING SOUGHT AND CAN A DEFENDANT
BE CONVICTED OF 1 DEGREE MURDER, WHERE ORIGINAL
OFFENSE NOTICED UPON WAS CRIMINAL HOMICIDE AT 18
Pa.C.S. § 2501, AND WHERE NO PENALTY ATTACHES THERETO
AND DOES SUBSUMING THE CONVICTION UNDER FIRST DEGREE
STATUTE AT 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711, RENDER THE ENTIRE
CONVICTION NUGATORY?
III. DID THE SENTENCING COURT ERR IN IT’S APPLICATION OF
THE DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING STATUTE WHERE THE DEATH
PENALTY WAS NOT BEING SOUGHT?
IV. DID THIS COURTS INVOCATION OF 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711,
IMPLICATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE, WHERE THE JURY WAS
RELEASED WITHOUT HAVING RENDERED IT’S SENTENCING
VERDICT IN ACCORD WITH THE PROVISIONS STRICTLY
SETFORTH BY THE STATE LEGISLATURE AT Pa.C.S. § 9711
SEQ.?…
Appellant’s Brief at viii.
Section 9715 of the Sentencing Code provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
§ 9715. Life imprisonment for homicide
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(a) Mandatory life imprisonment.--Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 9712 (relating to sentences for offenses
committed with firearms), 9713 (relating to sentences for offenses
committed on public transportation) or 9714 (relating to
sentences for second and subsequent offenses), any person
convicted of murder of the third degree in this Commonwealth
who has previously been convicted at any time of murder or
voluntary manslaughter in this Commonwealth or of the same or
substantially equivalent crime in any other jurisdiction shall be
sentenced to life imprisonment, notwithstanding any other
provision of this title or other statute to the contrary.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9715(a).
Section 9711 of the Sentencing Code provides, in relevant part:
§ 9711. Sentencing procedure for murder of the first
degree
(a) Procedure in jury trials.—
(1) After a verdict of murder of the first degree is
recorded and before the jury is discharged, the court
shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing in which
the jury shall determine whether the defendant shall
be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.
(2) In the sentencing hearing, evidence concerning
the victim and the impact that the death of the victim
has had on the family of the victim is admissible.
Additionally, evidence may be presented as to any
other matter that the court deems relevant and
admissible on the question of the sentence to be
imposed. Evidence shall include matters relating to
any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
specified in subsections (d) and (e), and information
concerning the victim and the impact that the death
of the victim has had on the family of the victim.
Evidence of aggravating circumstances shall be
limited to those circumstances specified in subsection
(d).
(3) After the presentation of evidence, the court shall
permit counsel to present argument for or against the
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sentence of death. The court shall then instruct the
jury in accordance with subsection (c).
(4) Failure of the jury to unanimously agree upon a
sentence shall not impeach or in any way affect the
guilty verdict previously recorded.
* * *
(f) Sentencing verdict by the jury.—
(1) After hearing all the evidence and receiving the
instructions from the court, the jury shall deliberate
and render a sentencing verdict. In rendering the
verdict, if the sentence is death, the jury shall set
forth in such form as designated by the court the
findings upon which the sentence is based.
(2) Based upon these findings, the jury shall set forth
in writing whether the sentence is death or life
imprisonment.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a), (f).
Here, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and was sentenced
to life in prison without parole. This sentence was not unlawful, as alleged by
Appellant. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. In fact, both Sections 9715 and 9711 address
sentences for life imprisonment for homicide. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9711, 9715.
Section 9715, however, pertains to life imprisonment following a conviction of
third-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter with a previous statutorily
identified conviction.
In the case sub judice, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder.
Thus, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715 is not relevant to Appellant’s sentence. Section 9711
addresses sentences of either life imprisonment or the death penalty for
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individuals convicted of first degree murder. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. Accordingly,
42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 is the proper statutory provision that should have been
referenced in Appellant’s sentencing order. Thus, the inclusion of Section
9715 in Appellant’s original sentencing order appears to have been clerical
error only. The amended sentence did not impose upon Appellant an illegal
sentence. Appellant’s sentence of life imprisonment under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711
was lawfully imposed following his conviction of first-degree murder.
Furthermore, we note the inherent power of a trial court to correct a
clerical error in one of its orders. “It is well-settled in Pennsylvania that a trial
court has the inherent, common-law authority to correct ‘clear clerical errors’
in its orders. A trial court maintains this authority even after the expiration
of the 30 day time limitation set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505[3] for the
modification of orders.” Commonwealth v. Borrin, 12 A.3d 466, 471 (Pa.
Super. 2011) (internal citation omitted). “As a matter of general guidance,
our Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of the inherent authority in cases
that involve clear errors in the imposition of sentences that were incompatible
with the record or black letter law.” Id. at 473.
The trial court had the authority to amend the original sentencing order.
By changing the statutory citation referenced in the order, the trial court did
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3 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 provides: “Except as otherwise provided or prescribed
by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order
within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any
term of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed.” Id.
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not resentence Appellant, but rather, identified the correct provision by which
Appellant had been sentenced. Thus, we cannot agree with Appellant that the
trial court’s amended sentencing order imposed upon him an illegal sentence.
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in correcting the clerical
error in the original sentencing order by issuing the amended sentencing
order. Appellant is entitled to no relief on this claim.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/22/2021
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