Com. v. King, D. ( 2020 )


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  • J-A16039-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    DERRICK LAMAR KING                         :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 2035 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 5, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0005008-2018
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                    FILED: OCTOBER 30, 2020
    Derrick Lamar King (“King”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed following his convictions of one count of aggravated assault and two
    counts of simple assault.1 We affirm.
    On July 3, 2018, at approximately 9:55 a.m., Christopher Williams
    (“Williams”) was in the process of being discharged from the Berks County
    Prison. Correctional Officer Matthew Lutz (“C.O. Lutz”) ordered Williams to go
    down to the first floor of the cell block, but Williams failed to do so. After
    some time, Williams descended to the first floor, where he encountered King,
    also an inmate, and the men engaged in an argument. C.O. Lutz ordered
    Williams to proceed to the desk for final discharge, but Williams ignored C.O.
    Lutz’s directive. As the argument between Williams and King escalated, C.O.
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(3), 2701(a)(1).
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    Lutz called for the Special Operations Group (“S.O.G.”) to respond to the
    situation. C.O. Lutz repeatedly ordered King and Williams to stop arguing and
    attempted to physically separate the men. As C.O. Lutz stepped between King
    and Williams, King struck C.O. Lutz in the face, knocking him out.
    At roughly the same time, Correctional Officer James Barron (“C.O.
    Barron”), a member of S.O.G., responded to the scene. C.O. Barron watched
    King’s single punch make contact with both C.O. Lutz and Williams.         C.O.
    Barron approached King, who took up a fighting stance. C.O. Barron wrapped
    his arms around King, forced him to the ground, and handcuffed King. C.O.
    Lutz was transported to Reading Hospital, where he was diagnosed with a
    concussion.
    At the close of the bench trial, on August 30, 2019, the trial court
    deferred issuing a verdict in order to continue reviewing the video surveillance
    from the cell block.2 Additionally, the trial court requested that the parties
    find case law regarding the doctrine of transferred intent. On September 5,
    2019, the trial court convicted King of the above-mentioned offenses.
    A pre-sentence investigation report had been prepared in advance of
    the verdict and King immediately proceeded to sentencing. The trial court
    ____________________________________________
    2 The video surveillance was not included in the certified record on appeal.
    See Commonwealth v. Bongiorno, 
    905 A.2d 998
    , 1000 (Pa. Super. 2006)
    (stating that it is the appellant’s duty to ensure that the record certified on
    appeal is complete).
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    sentenced King to a term of 21 to 42 months in prison for the charge of
    aggravated assault, and a concurrent term of 12 to 24 months in prison for
    one charge of simple assault.3 The trial court directed King’s sentence to run
    consecutively to the unrelated sentence he was then serving at docket number
    CP-06-CR-4202-2017 (“No. 4202-2017”).
    On September 11, 2019, King filed a timely post-sentence Motion,
    challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.           Additionally, King
    requested that the trial court modify his sentence so that it could be served
    concurrently with his sentence at No. 4202-2017. After a hearing, the trial
    court denied King’s post-sentence Motion. King filed a timely Notice of Appeal
    and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of errors
    complained of on appeal.
    King now raises the following claims for our review:
    A. Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a
    matter of law[,] where[] the Commonwealth’s evidence presented
    at trial failed to establish that [King] did not act in self-defense?
    B. Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a
    matter of law[,] where[] the Commonwealth’s evidence presented
    at trial failed to establish that [King] did intent [sic] to cause or
    did cause bodily injury to the alleged victim?
    C. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence[,]
    where[] the verdict is so contrary to [the] evidence and shocks
    one’s sense of justice[,] where the Commonwealth’s evidence
    presented at trial failed to establish that [King] did not act in self-
    defense?
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    3   The remaining simple assault conviction merged for sentencing purposes.
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    D. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence[,]
    where[] the verdict is so contrary to [the] evidence and shocks
    one’s sense of justice[,] where the Commonwealth’s evidence
    presented at trial failed to establish that [King] did intent [sic] to
    cause or did cause bodily injury to the alleged victim?
    Brief for Appellant at 4-5 (some capitalization omitted).
    We will address King’s first two claims together, as both challenge the
    sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial. In his first claim,
    King argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to support a
    conviction of simple assault against Williams, where King was acting in self-
    defense. Id. at 10. King contends that Williams had balled his fists and that
    King responded to the provocation by throwing a punch. Id. at 10-11. King
    claims that he was unable to retreat, because Williams, who was yelling at
    King, descended from the second floor to the first floor, advanced towards
    King and continued yelling at King.      Id. at 13.   Further, King states that
    Williams “squared up in a fighting position against [King]” and was being
    disorderly. Id.
    King further claims that the trial court misapplied the doctrine of
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    transferred intent,4 because his punch towards Williams was justified under
    the self-defense doctrine. Id. at 11-13. In support of this claim, King relies
    on our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Fowlin, 
    710 A.2d 1130
     (Pa. 1998).5 Brief for Appellant at 11-13. King claims that he intended
    to punch Williams, not C.O. Lutz. Id. at 13-14. King asserts that he was
    justified when he threw a single punch at Williams and, under Fowlin, he
    could not have been convicted of simple assault or aggravated assault for the
    accidental strike to C.O. Lutz. Id. at 12-13.
    ____________________________________________
    4   The doctrine of transferred intent provides, in relevant part, the following:
    § 303. Causal relationship between conduct and result
    ***
    (b)     Divergence      between       result     designed        or
    contemplated and actual result.--When intentionally or
    knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an
    offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not
    within the intent or the contemplation of the actor unless:
    (1) the actual result differs from that designed or
    contemplated as the case may be, only in the respect that
    a different person or different property is injured or affected
    or that the injury or harm designed or contemplated would
    have been more serious or more extensive than that cause[]
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 303(b)(1).
    5 In Fowlin, our Supreme Court held that when a person, acting in justifiable
    self-defense, injures a third-party bystander, he may not be found criminally
    liable for his injury to the bystander. Fowlin, 710 A.2d at 1131.
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    In his second claim, King argues that the Commonwealth failed to
    establish that he intended to cause, or did cause, bodily harm to Williams. Id.
    at 14. King emphasizes that the Commonwealth did not call Williams to testify
    and, thus, the trial court erred in finding that “there was sufficient evidence
    to show a simple assault [against Williams].”6 Id.
    When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
    adhere to the following standard of review:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
    is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
    most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
    to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
    a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not
    weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-
    finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
    established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
    may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
    and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
    be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
    may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
    evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
    must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
    ____________________________________________
    6 We could deem King’s second claim waived for failure to adequately develop
    the claim for our review. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that an appellant’s
    argument shall include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are
    deemed pertinent.”); see also Commonwealth v. Hardy, 
    918 A.2d 766
    ,
    771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that “it is appellant’s duty to present
    arguments that are developed for our review” and “[t]his Court will not act as
    counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.”); In re
    R.D., 
    44 A.3d 657
     (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating that where an appellant’s brief
    lacks analysis, meaningful appellate review is precluded). However, we
    decline to do so because it is closely related to his first claim.
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    considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact[,] while passing upon the
    credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
    is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    97 A.3d 782
    , 790 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    omitted).
    The Crimes Code defines the offense of aggravated assault as follows:
    § 2702. Aggravated assault
    (a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of aggravated
    assault if he:
    ***
    (3) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes
    bodily injury to any of the officers, agents, employees or
    other persons enumerated in subsection (c), in the
    performance of duty[]
    ***
    (c) Officers, employees, etc., enumerated.--The officers,
    agents, employees and other persons referred to in subsection
    (a) shall be as follows:
    ***
    (9) Officer or employee of a correctional institution, county
    jail or prison, juvenile detention center or any other facility
    to which the person has been ordered by the court pursuant
    to a petition alleging delinquency under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] Ch.
    63 (relating to juvenile matters).
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3), (c)(9).
    Additionally, the Crimes Code provides that “[a] person is guilty of
    assault if he: (1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
    causes bodily injury to another.” Id. § 2701(a)(1).
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    As stated above, King claims that his use of force was justified under
    the doctrine of self-defense. The use of force against a person is justified
    “when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the
    purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force” by another
    person. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a). There is no burden on the defendant to prove
    a claim of self-defense, but there must be some evidence, from any source,
    to justify a finding of self-defense. See Commonwealth v. Black, 
    376 A.2d 627
    , 630 (Pa. 1977). If there is any evidence that will support the claim, then
    the issue is properly before the fact finder.       See Commonwealth v.
    Mayfield, 
    585 A.2d 1069
    , 1071 (Pa. Super. 1991). “If a defendant introduces
    evidence of self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the burden of disproving
    the self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt.”        Commonwealth v.
    Houser, 
    18 A.3d 1128
    , 1135 (Pa. 2011).
    The Commonwealth can disprove a claim of self-defense by establishing
    that “[1] the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in danger of
    death or serious bodily injury; or [2] the accused provoked or continued the
    use of force; or [3] the accused had a duty to retreat and the retreat was
    possible with complete safety.” Smith, 97 A.3d at 787. The Commonwealth
    must establish only one of these three elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Commonwealth v. Burns, 
    765 A.2d 1144
    , 1149 (Pa. Super. 2000).
    In its Opinion, the trial court addressed King’s self-defense claim as
    follows:
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    The [trial] court, sitting as the finder of fact in a bench trial,
    did not find that [King] was acting in self[-]defense[,] but was the
    aggressor in the situation. [King] also had the ability to retreat.
    The [trial] court reviewed the video multiple times. [C.O.
    Lutz] testified that [Williams] was ordered down to the first level.
    [King] approached and asserted himself into the situation. The
    situation escalated and [King] was the initial aggressor. While
    [Williams] did not back down in response to [King]’s aggression,
    [that] does not negate [King]’s culpability. It seems incongruous
    that [Williams], at the moment of his release, would deliberately
    choose to instigate a fight that would almost certainly result in his
    continued incarceration.      The theory of self-defense [] was
    rejected by the [trial] court. [King] threw a punch intending to
    hit [Williams,] but [C.O. Lutz] had already moved in [] between
    the men and was struck with enough force to render him
    unconscious. The fact that [C.O. Lutz] was not the intended target
    does not negate the fact that this was an intentional choice to
    strike by [King] with the intent to cause injury to another person.
    When viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
    evidence of each material element of the crimes charged was
    established beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/7/20, at 5.
    We agree with and adopt the trial court’s reasoning in rejecting King’s
    first two claims.     See id.; see also Smith, supra; Burns, 
    supra.
    Additionally, we observe that the trial court also had the benefit of the video
    surveillance from the cell block, which the trial court reviewed extensively.
    See N.T. (Bench Trial), 8/30/19, at 32, 48 (wherein the trial court took a
    recess to watch the video multiple times and ultimately deferred the verdict
    to continue reviewing the video); see also Trial Court Opinion, 2/7/20, at 5.
    Moreover, to the extent that King relies on Fowlin, his argument is without
    merit because King was not acting in justifiable self-defense when he threw a
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    punch at Williams. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/7/20, at 5; see also Smith,
    supra; Burns, 
    supra.
    Regarding King’s second claim, the record reflects that he was
    attempting to strike, and did strike, Williams.       See N.T. (Bench Trial),
    8/30/19, at 25-27 (wherein C.O. Barron testified that King threw a punch at
    Williams, striking both C.O. Lutz and Williams). Additionally, in his brief, King
    acknowledged that he was attempting to strike Williams.           See Brief for
    Appellant at 13. Thus, the Commonwealth’s evidence established an attempt
    to cause injury, where King threw a punch, intended for Williams, powerful
    enough to give C.O. Lutz a concussion. See N.T. (Bench Trial), 8/30/19, at
    12-13; see also Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 
    54 A.3d 940
    , 948-49 (Pa.
    Super. 2012) (stating that “it is sufficient to support a conviction [of simple
    assault] if the Commonwealth establishes an attempt to inflict bodily injury[,]”
    and that such attempt may be shown by circumstances reasonably suggesting
    that a defendant intended to cause injury). Accordingly, we cannot grant King
    relief on his first two claims.
    In his remaining two claims, King asserts that the verdict was against
    the weight of the evidence. Brief for Appellant at 15-16. In both claims, he
    asserts that “the trial court committed error in not finding that the verdict was
    against the weight of the evidence and that[,] in fact[,] the verdict shock’s
    one’s sense of justice.” 
    Id.
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    Our standard of review related to a challenge to the verdict as against
    the weight of the evidence is well settled.
    The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact[,]
    who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to
    determine the credibility of witnesses. An appellate court cannot
    substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we
    may only reverse the … verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence
    as to shock one’s sense of justice.
    Commonwealth v. Small, 
    741 A.2d 666
    , 672-73 (Pa. 1999). Additionally,
    where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim, an appellate court’s role
    is not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the
    weight of the evidence; rather, our appellate review is limited to whether the
    trial   court   abused   its   discretion   in   ruling   on   the   weight   claim.
    Commonwealth v. Champney, 
    832 A.2d 403
    , 408 (Pa. 2003).
    King has failed to adequately develop his third and fourth claims for our
    review.    King’s arguments regarding both of these claims contain a single
    boilerplate citation of this Court’s standard of review, with no further
    discussion of relevant case law, statutes, or the facts of his case. Accordingly,
    King’s remaining claims are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see also Hardy,
    
    supra;
     In re R.D., supra.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/30/2020
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