Com. v. Cammann, S. ( 2020 )

J-S35029-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEPHEN CAMMANN
Appellant No. 2220 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 2, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0007271-2018
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: Filed: November 19, 2020
Appellant, Stephen Cammann, appeals from the July 2, 2019 judgment
of sentence imposing 11½ to 23 months of house arrest for recklessly
endangering another person1 (“REAP”). We affirm.
The trial court, sitting as factfinder, recited the pertinent facts in its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:
At trial, the Commonwealth first presented the testimony of
complainant, Kenyatta Brown. Mr. Brown testified that, on June
21, 2018 between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., he was at his
grandmother’s house at 21st and Carpenter Streets in
Philadelphia, engaged in an argument with his girlfriend, Tanaiyah
Dennis. Mr. Brown and Ms. Dennis were having an argument over
the fact that he had left her inside his grandmother’s house, while
Mr. Brown was out and about with his friends. As Mr. Brown
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
J-S35029-20
described it: ‘When I came back to the house, she tried to leave.
And I didn’t want her to leave. So we got in an argument.’ Ms.
Dennis left the house, and Mr. Brown followed her outside, where
they argued for 10 minutes. Ms. Dennis then started walking
southbound on 21st Street toward Kimball, and Mr. Brown pursued
her; the couple continued to argue, stopping in front of 2101
Kimball Street, where they encountered Appellant and his
girlfriend, Dr. Laura Nalbandian, who were installing a wooden
gate on the side of Dr. Nalbadian’s residence.
Dr. Nalbandian asked Ms. Dennis if ‘everything [was]
allright?’ Mr. Brown responded, ‘This is my girlfriend. Mind your
business.’ Mr. Brown testified that Appellant, who was holding a
hammer, then asked Ms. Dennis if she was okay and grabbed her
wrist. Mr. Brown grabbed hold of Ms. Dennis’ other wrist and
started walking back toward his grandmother’s house, at which
time he was struck in the side of the head and fell to the ground.
Mr. Brown testified that the next thing he knew, he woke up in
Thomas Jefferson University Hospital (“TJUH”) with a skull
fracture. He spent several days recovering in the hospital, and at
the time of trial, still had a scar on his head.
The Commonwealth also introduced stipulated evidence
that, if called to the stand, the records custodian or TJUH would
testify that Mr. Brown was treated at TJUH for a left parietal
depressed skull fracture as a result of being hit in the head with a
hammer. He was admitted to the hospital on June 21 and
discharged on June 24, 2018.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/17/19, at 2-3.
Appellant and Dr. Nalbandian offered a different account of the
altercation, wherein Mr. Brown pushed Appellant into a wall and reached for a
shiny object in his pocket. Id. at 3. Appellant therefore claimed he acted in
self-defense. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court found Appellant not
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guilty of aggravated assault2 and possessing an instrument of crime,3 but
guilty of REAP. The court imposed sentence as set forth above, and this timely
appeal followed.
Appellant raises a single assertion of error:
Where the lower court acquitted Appellant of aggravated
assault, simple assault, and possessing an instrument of crime,
specifically finding that the Commonwealth failed to disprove his
justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt, was the evidence
insufficient to support the guilty verdict for recklessly endangering
another person?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
“The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of
protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on
the present occasion.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a). A person may not use deadly
force unless he believes it is necessary to protect himself against “death,
serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or
threat[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(b)(2).
Where an accused raises the defense of self-defense under
Section 505 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, the burden is on
the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant’s act was not justifiable self-defense. The
Commonwealth sustains this burden if it establishes at least one
of the following: 1) the accused did not reasonably believe that
he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the
accused provoked or continued the use of force; or 3) the accused
had a duty to retreat and the retreat was possible with complete
____________________________________________
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702.
3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907.
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safety. It remains the province of the jury to determine whether
the accused's belief was reasonable, whether he was free of
provocation, and whether he had no duty to retreat.
Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1229–30 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Section 505(b)(2)(ii)
imposes a duty to retreat rather than resorting to deadly force, so long as the
actor knows he can do so with complete safety, though the actor is not
required to retreat from his dwelling.
Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Fowlin, 710 A.2d 1130 (Pa.
1998), in which this Court wrote that “the defender may not be simultaneously
found to have justifiably acted in self-defense and be criminally liable for
crimes involving recklessness or malice.” Id. at 1132. Similarly, in
Commonwealth v. Hilbert, 382 A.2d 724 (Pa. 1978), our Supreme Court
wrote that a claim of self-defense, if believed, negates “any element of […]
recklessness of consequences.” Id. at 731. Based on Fowlin and Hilbert,
Appellant claims that the trial court could not convict him of REAP after
accepting his justification defense as to the other crimes.
We disagree, because Appellant’s argument rests on a
mischaracterization of the record. Nowhere did the trial court specifically find
that the Commonwealth failed to disprove Appellant’s justification defense.
On the contrary, the trial transcript reflects the following:
Clearly, this was a very difficult, very difficult, situation and
difficult decision. I found it certainly disingenuous when it
seems so impossible for you or your girlfriend to admit you
hit him in the head with a hammer and somehow you try
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and make it like you punched him. That was, honestly, so
disingenuous. And for what type of smart reason you thought
that was the appropriate response, you could not be more
mistaken.
This is a court of law. This is not a place where you come
and manipulate words to your advantage. This is where you come
and you tell the truth. [The victim’s mother] is entirely right. This
was a situation that, once it escalated, you needed to walk
away, get on your cell phone, call 911. To hit a man in the
head with a hammer is to use deadly force.
The burden on the Commonwealth is very high here to prove
or disprove that you were justified in doing so. There were
inconsistencies in the testimony. Do not think for one moment
that your response to the situation was appropriate. It was not.
It may have reached a legal standard that is very difficult to
overcome. That is very different than what you do in a real-life
situation when someone is smaller than you, clearly, and you have
a hammer in your hand. I am speaking now. It is time you listen
up. There were other actions you could have taken, clearly,
to diffuse the situation.
N.T. Trial, 7/2/19, at 87-88 (emphases added).
Appellant quotes the italicized portion of the quoted language.
Appellant’s Brief at 12. From the italicized language, Appellant draws the
conclusion that the trial court found that the Commonwealth failed to disprove
his justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant’s conclusion is
incorrect. The remainder of the quoted language, particularly the bolded
sentences, makes clear that the trial court did not credit some of the testimony
of Appellant and his girlfriend. Furthermore, the trial court found that
Appellant used deadly force, had an opportunity to retreat, and failed to do
so. Appellant’s brief does not address any of these findings.
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Based on the foregoing, we find nothing in the record to support
Appellant’s claim that the trial court acquitted him of aggravated assault and
possessing an instrument of crime based on his justification defense.
Accordingly, Fowlin and Hilbert pose no bar to his conviction for REAP.
Subject to these observations, we affirm Appellant’s conviction based on the
trial court opinion, which accurately addresses the sufficiency of the evidence4
in support of Appellant’s REAP5 conviction. We direct that a copy of the trial
court’s December 17, 2019 opinion be filed along with this memorandum.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/19/20
____________________________________________
4 “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard of
review requires us to examine all of the evidence admitted at the hearing,
together with any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the party whose position is bolstered by the trial court's findings.”
Commonwealth. v. Henkel, 938 A.2d 433, 438 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 955 A.2d 356 (Pa. 2008).
5 “A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly
engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of
death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
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Circulated 10/30/2020 01:24 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL TIUAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-51-CR-0007271-2018
vs.
STEPHEN CAMMANN 2220 EDA 2019
OPINION
SCHULMAN, S.J., J.
Stephen Cammann ("Appellane') has appealed the Court's judgment of conviction and
sentence. The Court submits the following Opinion in accordance with the requirements of
Pa.R.A.P. 1925, and for the reasons set forth herein, recommends that its judgment be affirmed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 2, 2019, following a bench trial before this Court, Appellant was convicted of
recklessly endangering another person ("REAP").1 On the same date, upon considering all the
relevant facts and circumstances of this case, the Court sentenced Appellant to 11 � to 23
months' incarceration.
On July 3 I, 2019, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in the Superior Court. On
September 18, 2019, the Court ordered Appellant to file a Concise Statement of Matters
Complained of on Appeal in accord with Pa.RAP. 1925(b), and on October 8, 2019, counsel for
Appellant timely complied.
1
Appellant was acquitted of aggravated assault, possessing an instrument of crime ("PIC") and
simple assault.
II. FACTUAL HISTORY
At trial, the Commonwealth first presented the testimony of the complainant, Kenyatta
Brown. Mr. Brown testified that, on June 21, 2018 between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., he was at his
grandmother's house at 21st and Carpenter Streets in Philadelphia, engaged in an argument with
his girlfriend, Tanaiyah Dennis. Mr. Brown and Ms. Dennis were having an argument over the
fact that he had left her inside his grandmother's house, while Mr. Brown was out and about with
his friends. As Mr. Brown described it: "When I came back in the house, she tried to leave.
And I didn't want her to leave. So we got in an argument." Ms. Dennis left the house, and Mr.
Brown followed her outside, where they argued for IO minutes. Ms. Dennis then starting
walking southbound on 21st Street toward Kimball, and Mr. Brown pursued her; the couple
continued to argue, stopping in front of 2101 Kimball Street, where they encountered Appellant
and his girlfriend, Dr. Laura Nalbandian, who were installing a wooden gate on the side of Dr.
Nalbandian's residence. (See N.T. 07/02/19 at 13-18).
Dr. Nalbandian asked Ms. Dennis if "everything [was] all right"? Mr. Brown responded,
"This is my girlfriend. Mind your business." Mr. Brown testified that Appellant, who was
holding a hammer, then asked Ms. Dennis if she was okay and grabbed her wrist. Mr. Brown
grabbed hold of Ms. Dennis' other wrist and started walking back toward his grandmother's
house, at which time he was struck in the side of the head and fell to the ground. Mr. Brown
testified that the next thing he knew, he woke up in Thomas Jefferson University Hospital
(''TJUH") with a skull fracture. He spent several days recovering in the hospital, and at the time
of trial, still had a scar 011 his head. (See N.T. 07/02/19 at 16-23, 29).
The Commonwealth also introduced stipulated evidence that, if called to the stand, the
records custodian for TJUH would testify that Mr. Brown was treated at TJUH for a left parietal
2
depressed skull fracture as a result of being hit in the head with a hammer. He was admitted to
the hospital on June 21 and discharged on June 24, 2018. (See N.T. 07/02/19 at 32).2
For his case-in-chief, Appellant first presented the testimony of his girlfriend, Dr.
Nalbandian. Dr. Nalbandian testified that, on June 21, 2018 at approximately 8:30 p.m., she was
outside her residence at 2101 Kimball Street with Appellant, who was building and installing a
gate on the side of the property. At that time and location, she observed Mr. Brown "dragging
and shoving" Ms. Dennis, and holding her in a "bear hug", Dr. Nalbandian testified that Ms.
Dennis exclaimed, "Let me go" as they turned the corner onto Kimball Street. Dr. Nalbandian
rounded the corner of Kimball Street and observed Mr. Brown pinning Ms. Dennis against the
wall and "knocking her around." (See N.T. 07/02/19 at 33-40).
At this point, Dr. Nalbandian and Appellant attempted to intervene. Words were
exchanged between them and Mr. Brown. According to Dr. Nalbandian, Mr. Brown initiated
threatening behavior toward her, and then toward Appellant. She described Mr. Brown as
pushing Appellant into a wall and reaching his hand in and out of his pocket, where she saw a
"shiny object" that looked to her like the handle of a pocketknife .
. ... "And he was -- I was looking at his [Mr. Brown's] back.
He was facing north on [the] 2pt Street sidewalk. And as he
turned to do this with his shoulders, Mr. Brown's shoulder was still
in Steve's chest and holding him against the things. That is when
Steve hit him with his right hand on the back of his head or neck.
Q. What was in his right hand?
A. A hammer was in his right hand. You can see it in
the tool belt on that picture. And he had a drill in his other hand.
He was using it to hang screws, and I was handing him screws.
3
Q: So in other words, he didn't draw this hammer from
the tool belt?
A: No.
Q: It was in his hand when Br. Brown approached
him?
A: Correct.
Q: Okay. What happened? Did you see Mr. Brown
fall?
THE COURT: I am sorry. Are you saying he hit him with his hand
or he hit him with the hammer?
A. He hit him with his fist and I am told the hammer is
what connected with Mr. Brown's head.
THE COURT: You are told? You didn't see?
A. I saw him drop. I saw Mr. Brown drop.
THE COURT: That is not the question.
BY MR. PERRI:
Q: He had a hammer in his hand?
A: Yes.
Q: And he swung the hand with the hammer-
A: He was holding the handle.
* * *
(N.T. 07/02/19 at 40-44).
4
On cross-examination, Dr. Nalbandian tried to further clarify whether she actually
saw the Appellant hit Mr. Brown in the head with a hammer.
BY MS.LYNN
Q: Dr. Nalbandian, you said that you didn't actually see Stephen hit Mr.
Brown in the head; is that correct?
A: No. I saw him hit him. I saw his arm swing and his arm hit him.
Q: Okay. In the side of the head?
A: No. Back of the head.
Q: And you are saying today that you didn't see a hammer in his hand?
A: I saw a hammer in his hand.
Q: But he didn't hit him with a hammer? He punched him was your
testimony.
A: He used his fist and was holding the hammer in it. So if this is the handle
ofahammer-
Q: So you are saying Mr. Cammann punched Mr. Brown in the head with a
hammer essentially.
A: Sure, essentially.
* * *
THE COURT: I would like to know very clearly, ma'am, one way or the other, did you
see what contacted the defendant's ---what contacted the complaining witness' head? What
contacted? Was it a fist or a hammer? Or did you not see?
Q: It was the hammer.
(N. T. 7 /2/ 19 pgs.46-4 9)
5
Dr. Nalbandian testified that, after Mr. Brown went down, Appellant called 9-1-1 and
rendered aid to Mr. Brown while emergency responders were en route. A crowd of people began
to assemble, at which time Dr. Nalbandian saw a teenager remove an "object" from Mr. Brown's
right pocket. (See N.T. 07/02/19 at 44-45).
Finally, Appellant testified in his own defense. He testified that, on June 21, 2018, he
was working on a gate outside Dr. Nalbandian's residence, when he heard two people arguing.
When he looked up, he saw Mr. Brown and Ms. Dennis crossing 2 I st Street. "She was yelling at
him. She kept saying, 'Stop. Let me go.' She had said 'Ouch,' a bunch of times." Appellant
testified that he saw Mr. Brown repeatedly punching Ms. Brown in the ribs and saw her fall to
the ground more than once -- but Mr. Brown continued to pick her up and drag her around in a
bear hug. A neighbor across the street attempted to intervene, but "Mr. Brown ran him off. He
got right in his face and [the neighbor] turned around and went back in the house." Thereafter,
Ms. Dennis crossed the street and kept yelling, "Stop. Let me go", at which time Dr. Nalbandian
stated, "Hey, buddy, if she wants you to let her go, you have to let her go." (See N.T. 07/02/19
at 51-54).
Appellant testified that after Dr. Nalbandian told Mr. Brown to "let her go", Mr. Brown
became "enraged"; he ran Dr. Nalbandian up against the wall and shouted in her face. Dr.
Nalbandian was "frozen" and did not say anything. At that point, Appellant stated, "Hey, chill
the F' out." Mr. Brown then turned on Appellant and pushed him against the wall with his
shoulder, stating, "What the F' you going to do? I will F' you up. I will F' ing kill you."
Appellant replied, "Dude, calm down. Just calm down. There are cops on the street. Just calm
down." Appellant testified that as he was saying this, Mr. Brown was reaching for the handle of
"something" in his right pocket. When Mr. Brown reached for this object a second time,
6
Appellant struck him in the head with a hammer, immediately felling him to the ground,
Appellant testified that after he struck Mr. Brown with the hammer, he dialed 9-1-1 and
attempted to render aid until Mr. Brown's family members arrived and stopped him. (See N.T.
07/02/19 at 54-58).
In rebuttal, the Commonwealth called Ms. Dennis to the stand. Ms. Dennis testified that,
on the evening of June 21, 2018, she got into an argument with her boyfriend, Mr. Brown, in the
area of Zl " and Kimball Streets. Ms. Dennis testified that, at the time, Mr. Brown was grabbing
her wrists, pulling her toward his grandmother's house, and stating that he was "sorry." Dr.
Nalbandian approached her and asked if she was okay. Ms. Dennis stated, "Yes. This is my
boyfriend", and Mr. Brown told her to "mind her business". They continued to argue in front of
Dr. Nalbandian, who "kept saying something", and Mr. Brown kept saying "mind your
business." Ms. Dennis testified that while Mr. Brown was pulling her by the left aim, Appellant
grabbed her right wrist, at which point Mr. Brown was struck and collapsed to the ground. (See
N.T. 07/02/19 at 63-70).
On cross-examination, Ms. Dennis admitted that, shortly after the incident, she provided
a statement to detectives indicating that Mr. Brown was not just holding her wrists but was
holding her in a bear hug when they were arguing. Additionally, she admitted that after Dr.
Nalbandian said to Mr. Brown, "You gotta let her go", Mr. Brown started waving his hands and
yelling in her face. (See N.T. 07/02/19 at 71-75).
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Based on the foregoing evidence, the Court found Appellant guilty of REAP, and not
guilty of the remaining offenses. On the same date, the Court imposed sentence as previously set
forth. 3 This appeal followed.
III. ISSUE ON APPEAL
Appellant sets forth the following issue in his Rule 1925(b) Statement:
1. The evidence at trial was insufficient to support Appellant's
conviction for recklessly endangering another person. The
Commonwealth failed to disprove Appellant's justification
defense beyond a reasonable doubt, which resulted in an
acquittal on every other charge.
(Appellant's Rule 1925(b) Statement, p. 1 ).
IV. DISCUSSION
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Appellant's Convictions
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for REAP.
This claim fails.
A. Sufficiency Standard
In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner. It accepts as
true all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom
upon which the finder of fact could properly have based its verdict, in determining whether the
3The Court originally ordered Appellant to serve his sentence on house arrest. (See N.T.
07 /02/19 at 89-91 ). However, when Appellant subsequently appeared for house arrest
processing at the Criminal Justice Center, he was found to be in possession of an eight-inch
dagger. Appellant thereafter was brought before the Court, which revoked Appellant's house
arrest and ordered him to serve his sentence in an institutional setting with work-release
eligibility. (See N.T. 08/09/19 at 4-22). Appellant's sentence is not subject of this appeal.
8
evidence and inferences are sufficient to support the challenged conviction. Commonwealth v.
Carroll, 507 A.2d 819, 820 (Pa. 1986); Conunonwealth v. Griscavage, 517 A.2d 1256, 1259 (Pa.
1986); Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 74 7 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. Super. 2000).
"[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude
every possibility of innocence." Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120 (Pa. Super. 2005);
see Commonwealth v. Rippy, 732 A.2d 1216, 1218-1219 (Pa. Super. 1999) (while conviction
must be based on more than mere speculation, "the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a
mathematical certainty"). "Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the
fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances." Commonwealth v.
Hutchinson, 947 A.2d 800, 806 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis in original); see also
Commonwealth v. Sneddon, 738 A.2d 1026, 1027 (Pa. Super. 1999).
"The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence." Commonwealth v.
Jones, 874 A.2d at 120. Thus, the decision of the trier of fact will not be disturbed where there is
support for the verdict in the record. Commonwealth v. Bachert, 453 A.2d 931, 935 (Pa. 1982).
When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court "may not weigh the evidence
and substitute [its] judgment for that of the fact-finder." Commonwealth v. Vetrini, 734 A.2d
404, 407 (Pa. Super. 1999)
"Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered." Hutchinson, 947 A2d at 806. "Finally, the trier
of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence." Id.9
B. REAP
In order to sustain a conviction for REAP, the Commonwealth must prove that Appellant
"'recklessly engagejd] in conduct which place[d] or may [have] placed another person in danger
of death or serious bodily injury."' Commonwealth v. Schmohl, 975 A.2d 1144, 1148 (Pa.
Super. 2009) (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705). "A person acts recklessly if he or she 'consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk' of injury to others." Schmohl at 1148 ( quoting 18
Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3)).
C. Application
Applying the foregoing principles and considering the totality of the circumstances, the
evidence established that Appellant acted recklessly in response to a verbal altercation that he
initiated with Mr. Brown. There was no credible evidence that Mr. Brown was armed or
presented a danger that would justify Appellant's violent attack. As noted by the Court, both Dr.
Nalbandiau's and Appellant's testimony lacked credibility. At sentencing, the Court explained
that it found the defense witnesses to be "certainly disingenuous when it seems so impossible for
you or your girlfriend to admit that you hit him in the head with a hammer and somehow try and
make it like you punched him." (N.T. 7/2/19 pg.87). Furthermore, Dr. Nalbandian testified that
Appellant hit Mr. Brown in the back of the head, while the patties stipulated that Mr. Brown
suffered a left skull fracture. Nor was there any evidence that Mr. Brown was armed with a
weapon, rather, there was only speculation by Appellant and his girlfriend that they saw an
"object" in his pocket. The Appellant's claim of justification, therefore, was based neither upon
credible testimony nor direct evidence. Thus, the Court found that Appellant's reaction in
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violently swinging a hammer at a person's head was not appropriate under the circumstances;
rather, "[tjhis was a situation that, once it escalated, [Appellant] needed to walk away, get on
[his] cell phone, call 911. To hit a man in the head with a hammer is to use deadly force." (See
N.T. 07/02/19 at 88). Finding no justification for the attack, Appellant nonetheless applied
deadly force not just against Mr. Brown, but also while holding Ms. Dennis by the wrist, placing
her in danger of serious bodily injury as well. As such, the evidence was more than sufficient to
establish the crime of REAP. Accordingly, Appellant's sufficiency claim fails.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons set forth in the foregoing Opinion, this Court's judgment of
sentence should be affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
«:»:
SUSAN I. SCHULMAN, J.
11