U.S. Home Corp. v. Sinclair, S. ( 2021 )

J-A27040-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
U.S. HOME CORPORATION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
SALLY ANN MOYER SINCLAIR AND : No. 1040 EDA 2020
PETER SINCLAIR :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 13, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s):
No. 2005-C-2185
BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 19, 2021
Appellant, U.S. Home Corporation (“U.S. Home”), appeals from the
judgment entered in the trial court following the trial court’s grant of the
motion of Appellees, Sally Ann Moyer Sinclair and Peter Sinclair, to enforce a
2005 settlement agreement that created an easement in favor of the Sinclairs
on two parcels owned by U.S. Home. We affirm.
The facts in this appeal are not in dispute. The Sinclairs own a
residential property at 5877 Applebutter Hill Road in Upper Saucon Township
(“Sinclair Property”). In 1977, Sally Ann Moyer and her then-husband were
granted an easement by the owners of an adjacent property for the right of
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A27040-20
ingress, egress, and regress from the Sinclair Property to Blue Church Road.1
Sally Ann Moyer and Peter Sinclair later married and took joint ownership of
the Sinclair Property.
In 2004, U.S. Home purchased land fronting Blue Church Road, and
received approval from Upper Saucon Township (“Township”) to build an 85-
lot subdivision to be known as Blue Ridge West Estates. This land included
the neighboring property of the Sinclair Property on which their easement was
situated.
In 2005, U.S. Home brought suit in the trial court to extinguish the
Sinclairs’ easement and establish a new easement that better conformed to
the planned development of Blue Ridge West Estates. The Sinclairs and U.S.
Home entered into a settlement agreement on May 31, 2006. In the
agreement, the Sinclairs agreed to extinguish the existing easement in
exchange for U.S. Home granting the Sinclairs a new easement as follows:
U.S. Home hereby grants and conveys to Sinclairs, their heirs,
personal representatives and assigns, the non-exclusive right of
ingress, egress and regress over and along a fifty (50) foot wide
easement between Lots 11 and 12 of Blue Ridge West Estates to
a certain roadway proposed to be named Saucon Ridge Road
(which name may later be changed) as shown on the final plan for
Blue Ridge West Estates . . . as recorded in the Office of the
Recorder of Deeds of Lehigh County, Pennsylvania . . .
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1Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “ingress-and-egress easement” as one that
provides “[t]he right to use land to enter and leave another’s property.”
Easement, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
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Settlement Agreement, 5/31/06, ¶3. U.S. Home also agreed to pay the
Sinclairs $100,000 as consideration and to construct a 12-foot wide paved
driveway through the easement. Id. ¶¶4, 5. The agreement provided that
the easement would be construed as a covenant running with the land and
that the party that prevails in future litigation arising out of the settlement
agreement would be entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and litigation costs
from the other party. Id. ¶¶8, 11.
Shortly after the settlement agreement was approved, U.S. Home built
a driveway from the Sinclair Property to Saucon Ridge Road along the property
line of Lots 11 and 12. N.T., 9/17/19, at 12-13, 71-72. Although there is
some dispute about whether the driveway was built to its required 12-foot
width, the Sinclairs used the driveway until the date of the present litigation
without complaint. Id. at 13, 61-66.
In 2018, U.S. Home submitted construction plans to the Township for a
house on Lot 11, and the Township issued a notice to proceed with the
construction and an amended notice to proceed on January 5, 2018 and July
31, 2018, respectively. Id. at 96; Exhibits P-1, P-2. Construction began in
2018, and included the placement of an approximately one- to two-foot high
earthen mound, or berm, along the Lot 11 side of the driveway and excavation
and regrading of the Lot 11 easement area to capture the storm-water run-
off from Lot 11. N.T., 9/17/19, at 22-34, 46, 75-78, 82, 95, 106-08; Answer
to Motion, 8/27/19, ¶7. U.S. Home has not developed Lot 12, and the portion
of the easement area within Lot 12 remains flat in comparison to the revised
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grading on the portion of the easement area in Lot 11. Id. at 28, 32-35, 87-
88. Construction concluded in 2019, and the Township issued a certificate of
occupancy for the house built on Lot 11 on July 16, 2019. Id. at 78, 96-97;
Exhibit P-3. The finished house on Lot 11 was approximately four feet from
the edge of the easement area. N.T., 9/17/19, at 86. U.S. Home did not
consult with the Sinclairs during the approval process for Lot 11 or while
construction was taking place. Id. at 23, 83-84, 100.
The Sinclairs filed the instant motion to enforce the settlement
agreement on July 31, 2019, alleging that the regrading and the construction
of the berm within the Lot 11 portion of the easement area violated the
Sinclairs’ right of ingress, egress, and regress. Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement, 7/31/19, ¶¶8-12. In the motion, the Sinclairs sought an
injunction to enforce U.S. Home’s compliance with the easement as set forth
in the settlement agreement and an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. Id.
¶¶13-15. On August 27, 2019, U.S. Home filed an answer and counter-motion
for attorneys’ fees.
On September 17, 2019, a hearing was held before the trial court. At
the hearing, Mr. Sinclair testified that the construction of the berm and
regrading performed on Lot 11 affected his use of the easement by removing
the shoulder on the Lot 11 side of the driveway. N.T., 9/17/19, at 31-32, 34,
40, 53-54. In particular, Mr. Sinclair stated that large vehicles could not drive
over the berm inhibiting access by construction and emergency vehicles and
also that there would be no space to allow vehicles to pass or for a snow plow
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to push snow off the driveway. Id. Mr. Sinclair opined that the berm would
also inhibit water drainage, leading to more water flow on the driveway. Id.
at 41.
Richard Roseberry, a civil engineer at Maser Consulting, the firm that
U.S. Home contracted for the permitting and land development process on Lot
11, also testified at the hearing. Mr. Roseberry stated that, as the grading of
Lot 11 currently exists, the storm water from Lot 11 is not directed onto the
driveway. Id. at 95. He opined that the improvements to Lot 11 did not
negatively impact vehicular access to the Sinclair Property nor did they impede
a snow plow from pushing snow on either side of the driveway. Id. at 98.
Mr. Roseberry stated that the driveway was originally designed to have no
peak and storm water “sheet flows down the driveway” towards Saucon Ridge
Road where it is directed via the gutter of that road towards the storm-water
collection system; the water flow on the driveway was not affected by the
construction on Lot 11. Id. at 98-99, 103.
Mr. Roseberry testified that his firm was required to obtain a National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit for Lot 11, which required the
management of the two-year storm volume by way of infiltration on each lot.
Id. at 106-07. The grading on Lot 11 needed to “capture the front yard, the
side yard, the rear yard, the roof[, and] the driveway” and “achieve 90 percent
of the lot disturbance being directed to an infiltration basin.” Id. at 106-07.
The purpose of the berm, according to Mr. Roseberry, was to ensure that the
all of the storm water that hits the disturbed area of the development would
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be directed towards the infiltration basin rather than towards other properties.
Id. at 107-08. Mr. Roseberry stated that the storm-water requirements were
dictated by Township ordinance and the Lehigh County Conservation District.
Id. at 97, 107. In the event any further earth needed to be moved on the
property, Mr. Roseberry stated that Township approval would be required. Id.
at 106.
Mr. Roseberry testified that the bowl-like graded slope downwards away
from the driveway was necessary in order to capture the storm water on the
entire lot. Id. at 108. Prior to any work being performed on Lot 11, the
lowest point was on the far end of the lot from the driveway and therefore it
was necessary to lower the ground on the driveway side to make it in line with
the elevation on the far side. Id. Mr. Roseberry estimated that the slope of
the regraded portion of Lot 11 coming down from the berm towards the newly
built house was approximately 3:1 or 33%. Id. at 113. He stated that the
berm could be moved approximately three feet towards the Lot 11 house and
still maintain the 3:1 slope. Id. at 110. Mr. Roseberry testified that if the
berm were moved closer to the house, a “very minimal amount” of water
would be added to the driveway. Id. at 112.
On November 15, 2019, the trial court entered an order providing as
follows:
1. [The Sinclairs’] Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement filed
July 31, 2019 is GRANTED;
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2. [U.S. Home] is enjoined from violating [the Sinclairs’] ingress,
egress and regress rights over and along the fifty (50) foot wide
easement;
3. [U.S. Home] shall take the necessary steps to remove any
encroachments, [undo] any regrading and otherwise restore [the
Sinclairs’] easement fully;
4. [U.S. Home] shall pay [the Sinclairs’] litigation costs and
attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,493.00; and
5. [U.S. Home’s] Counter-Motion to [the Sinclairs’] Motion to
Enforce Settlement Agreement filed August 27, 2019 is DENIED.
Order, 11/15/19.
In its accompanying opinion, the trial court explained its ruling as
follows:
The grading activities of [U.S. Home], including the creation of
berms which encroach upon the Easement, substantially interfere
with [the Sinclairs’] use of the Easement. [The Sinclairs] have the
right to keep the entirety of the Easement open for the express
purpose of the Easement, i.e., ingress, egress and regress.
Although the purpose of the Easement can be accomplished in less
than the whole area dedicated to the [E]asement, the owner of
the servient estate does not have the right to deny access to the
unnecessary portion of the property to the owner of the dominant
estate. The owner of the dominant estate is entitled to
enforcement, as written, without risking limitation as a result of a
court’s determination that the rights can be otherwise served.
[The Sinclairs] have the right to open and improve the remainder
of the Easement for the stated purpose at any time; however, the
berms created by the grading activities of [U.S. Home]
substantially interfere with such purpose and potential. While the
berms are present within the Easement, [the Sinclairs] are
essentially denied access to that portion of the Easement because
they are unable to ingress, egress and regress due to the berm’s
height and steep slope. Further, the presence of the berms would
make it more difficult for [the Sinclairs] to improve said portion of
the Easement if they wish to do so.
Opinion, 11/15/19, at 4.
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U.S. Home filed a motion for post-trial relief, which the trial court denied
on March 24, 2020 by order and accompanying opinion. U.S. Home then filed
a notice appeal from the order denying its post-trial motion.2, 3
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2 On May 13, 2020, the trial court filed a notice pursuant to Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(a) stating that it was relying on the reasons set forth in its
March 24, 2020 opinion accompanying the order denying U.S. Home’s motion
for post-trial relief.
3 On May 12, 2020, this Court entered an order directing U.S. Home to
praecipe the trial court prothonotary to enter judgment and then file a certified
copy of the docket in this Court showing that judgment was entered. See
Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Construction Corp., 657 A.2d 511,
514 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc) (appeal cannot be taken from an order
denying a motion for post-trial relief and instead lies from the entry of
judgment). U.S. Home complied with our order, filing a praecipe to enter
judgment in the trial court, which was entered on May 13, 2020. U.S. Home
subsequently filed a copy of the updated docket with this Court. We have
amended the caption to reflect that the appeal was taken from the entry of
judgment rather than the order denying U.S. Home’s post-trial motion.
In this case, it appears that U.S. Home was not required to file a motion for
post-trial relief pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1, and instead it should
have appealed directly from the November 15, 2019 order resolving the cross-
motions to enforce the settlement agreement. See Bennett v. Juzelenos,
791 A.2d 403, 405-06 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that failure to file a post-
trial motion from the grant of a motion to enforce a settlement did not cause
appellant to waive appellate claims because a post-trial motion is not
permitted under Rule 227.1 in such cases). Generally, where a party files an
unauthorized post-trial motion from a final order, the post-trial motion does
not toll the appeal period. Vietri ex rel. Vietri v. Delaware Valley High
School, 63 A.3d 1281, 1288 (Pa. Super. 2013). However, as the propriety of
U.S. Home’s post-trial motion was not raised by the parties or lower court,
Rule 227.1 is silent as to whether a post-trial motion is required in this case,
and our precedent does not directly address the effect on the timeliness of an
appeal where a party files a post-trial motion from a ruling on a motion to
enforce a settlement agreement, we decline to quash U.S. Home’s appeal as
untimely. Cf. Newman Development Group of Pottstown, LLC v.
Genuardi’s Family Markets, Inc., 52 A.3d 1233, 1247-48 (Pa. 2012)
(holding that appellate court should not impose “the heavy consequence of
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U.S. Home raises the following issues on appeal:
A. Did the lower court err in concluding that the grading on Lot 11
which was done in the area of the easement substantially
interferes with [the] Sinclairs’ use of the easement for ingress and
egress?
B. Did the lower court err in directing U.S. Home to take the
necessary steps to remove any encroachment, und[o] any
regrading and otherwise restore [the] Sinclairs’ easement area in
the absence of municipal approval and the issuance of approval
by the appropriate governmental agency modifying the terms of
the prior [National Pollution Discharge Elimination System] permit
issued in regard to the grading which was done within the
easement area?
C. Did the lower court err at paragraph 2 of its order enjoining
U.S. Home “from violating [the] Sinclairs’ ingress, egress and
regress rights along the fifty (50) foot wide easement” as that
provision is unduly vague and therefore unenforceable?
D. Did the lower court err in granting the relief requested by the
Sinclairs because the Sinclairs did not present evidence at the time
of trial that U.S. Home and/or Lennar [Corporation] owned and
controlled the entirety of the area within the easement which the
Sinclairs sought to have regraded?
U.S. Home Brief at 4-5 (suggested answers, trial court disposition, and
unnecessary capitalization omitted).
“When reviewing a trial court’s decision to enforce a settlement
agreement, our scope of review is plenary as to questions of law, and we are
free to draw our own inferences and reach our own conclusions from the facts
as found by the court.” Salsman v. Brown, 51 A.3d 892, 893-94 (Pa. Super.
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waiver” on a party due to non-compliance with Rule 227.1 unless the
applicability of Rule 227.1 to the particular circumstance is “apparent upon its
face or, failing that, in clear decisional law construing the Rule”).
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2012) (citation omitted). We are bound by the trial court’s findings of fact to
the extent supported by competent evidence, and the prevailing party is
entitled to have the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to its position.
Id. at 894. “Thus, we will only overturn the trial court’s decision when the
factual findings of the court are against the weight of the evidence or its legal
conclusions are erroneous.” Id. (citation omitted).
Like the interpretation of a contract, the interpretation of the terms of
an express easement is a question of law as to which our scope of review is
plenary. Zettlemoyer v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 657 A.2d
920, 924 (Pa. 1995); PARC Holdings, Inc. v. Killian, 785 A.2d 106, 112
(Pa. Super. 2001). In interpreting an express easement, “if the location, size
or purpose of an easement is specified in the grant, then the use of an
easement is limited to the specifications.” PARC Holdings, 785 A.2d at 111;
see also Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 924. Only when the language of the
instrument conveying the easement is ambiguous will a court look to the intent
of the parties and the attending circumstances at the time the grant was made
to determine the extent of the easement. PARC Holdings, 785 A.2d at 111.
In its first appellate issue, U.S. Home argues that the trial court erred
in concluding that it substantially interfered with the Sinclairs’ easement for
ingress, egress, and regress to their Property. Because the easement was
non-exclusive, U.S. Home asserts that it was able to make use of the portion
of Lot 11 that fell within the easement to the extent it did not impinge on the
Sinclairs’ ability to come and go from their property. According to U.S. Home,
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the improvements on Lot 11 did not interfere with the Sinclairs’ access as the
12-foot wide driveway was untouched and there remained a flat shoulder on
the Lot 12 side. U.S. Home further asserts that Mr. Sinclairs’ claimed impacts
from the construction were belied by the evidence put forth at the hearing
showing that there was ample room for emergency vehicles and snow plows
and the improvements were for the purpose that all storm water would be
collected on Lot 11. U.S. Home contends that the Sinclairs’ claim is merely
that it will be harmed in the future if it at some point intends to make use of
a different portion of the 50-foot easement for its ingress, egress, and regress,
but this claim cannot serve as the basis for a current finding of substantial
interference.
Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in construing
the Sinclairs’ rights under the easement and that its finding that U.S. Home
substantially interfered with the easement was supported by the evidence. As
U.S. Home points out, the grantor of a non-exclusive access easement is not
entirely foreclosed from using the property and “may make use of his land in
any way that does not interfere substantially with the previously created
easement.” Associates of Philipsburg v. Hurwitz, 437 A.2d 447, 451 (Pa.
Super. 1981); see also Hann v. Saylor, 562 A.2d 891, 894 (Pa. Super.
1989). Furthermore, “[t]he owner of a dominant estate may not exercise the
rights granted to him or her without regard to the rights of the servient
owner.” Purdy v. Zaver, 580 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. Super. 1990). In
addition, no relief is due to the owner of the dominant estate merely based on
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an “alleged possible future burdensome use of” the easement by the owner of
the servient estate. Associates of Philipsburg, 437 A.2d at 451-52.
However, even where the owner of the dominant estate has never used
the easement, that party is entitled to “open and improve” the easement “at
anytime.” Kinzey v. Marolt, 432 A.2d 234, 235-36 (Pa. Super. 1981); see
also Croyle v. Dellape, 832 A.2d 466, 471-72, 476 (Pa. Super. 2003). This
retained right to open the easement applies to the entire area of the easement
even where the easement holder is currently using less than the full amount
or a smaller portion would suffice for their needs. Scoppa v. Myers, 491
A.2d 148, 150 (Pa. Super. 1985); Kinzey, 432 A.2d at 235-36; see also In
re Jerrehian, 155 A.3d 674, 683 & n.12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). As our Supreme
Court has explained, “the scope of an easement is not diminished because the
owner of the benefited land failed to immediately use the easement to the
fullest extent allowable.” Zettlemoyer, 657 A.2d at 926 (quoting Lease v.
Doll, 403 A.2d 558, 563 n.9 (Pa. 1979)). Thus, an easement holder’s
“subsequent agreement, use, and acquiescence” does not limit that party from
later seeking the benefit of the full rights granted under the easement. Id. at
925-27; see also Piro v. Shipley, 60 A. 325, 329 (Pa. 1905) (holding that
each party to an easement “has a right to insist that the terms of the
agreement be complied with, and that, so long as the easement is enjoyed, it
shall remain substantially as it was at the time the right accrued, regardless
of whether benefit or damage will result from a proposed change” (citation
omitted)).
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In this case, the easement as set forth in the settlement agreement
provides that the Sinclairs will have access for ingress, egress, and regress
from the Sinclair Property to Saucon Ridge Road across Lots 11 and 12.
Settlement Agreement, 5/31/06, ¶3. While the settlement agreement
required U.S. Home to pave a driveway through the easement, the terms of
the easement unambiguously provided that the easement area was 50 feet
wide, rather than the 12-foot width of the driveway. Id. ¶¶3, 5. The Sinclairs
were not confined to only use the 12-foot wide driveway, but instead they
have the unilateral option to select any portion of the 50-foot wide easement
area for access in the future. As the trial court explained, the Sinclairs have
“have the right to open and improve the remainder of the [e]asement for the
stated purpose at any time.” Opinion, 11/15/19.
Furthermore, competent evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion
that the construction on Lot 11 substantially interfered with the Sinclairs’ use
of the easement. Notwithstanding U.S. Home’s arguments to the contrary,
the substantial interference analysis here does not focus on whether the
Sinclairs are currently blocked from traveling from Saucon Ridge Road to the
Sinclair Property through the easement area. Rather, the issue is whether
U.S. Home’s actions substantially interfered with the Sinclairs’ ability to open
up any portion of the easement’s 50-foot width for ingress and egress to their
property. The evidence presented below clearly showed that the infiltration
basin built on Lot 11 with a 33% slope away from the driveway was not
amenable to use for vehicular access to the Sinclair Property. Similarly, while
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there was testimony that an emergency vehicle could drive over the berm if
necessary and a snow plow could push snow onto the Lot 11 side of the
driveway, there is no doubt that the presence of the berm would hinder the
Sinclairs from making use of the Lot 11 portion of the easement area as a
right of way.
Our precedent supports the trial court’s finding that U.S. Home
substantially interfered with the Sinclairs’ rights under the easement. In
Kinzey, the trial court found that the appellant had an easement by
implication over Third Street, a 50-foot wide, unimproved right-of-way that
the appellee had obstructed; the trial court, however, only required the
appellee to remove part of the obstruction to allow access over the southern
half of the street. 432 A.2d at 235. This Court found that the trial court had
erred in allowing the appellee to maintain the obstruction over part of the
street, holding that the appellant “could open and improve [the entire width
of the street] at anytime, even though the portion of Third Street, here in
question, has never been opened or dedicated to a public use.” Id. at 235-
36.
In Scoppa, the plaintiffs sued to regain access to a 20-foot wide alley
running behind their houses that the defendants, the owners of the alley, had
obstructed by building a wall across the right of way. 491 A.2d at 149. The
trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had an easement by implication over
the alley, but that they could still gain access to their houses if the alley was
reduced to 15 feet wide and 5 feet of the wall was permitted to remain
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standing. Id. This Court overruled the trial court, holding that it was error
for the lower court to craft “a compromise solution” that was “achieved at the
expense of plaintiffs’ legal right to an alley twenty feet in width.” Id. at 150.
As in Kinzey and Scoppa, U.S. Home here seeks “a compromise
solution” whereby it would be allowed to keep its obstruction in place over the
servient estate and the Sinclairs’ easement would be reduced accordingly. Id.
The trial court correctly rejected this claim and held that U.S. Home could not
place an obstruction along the entire 50-foot width of the easement that would
prevent the Sinclairs from using the easement for its express purpose, namely
the Sinclairs’ ingress, egress, and regress from their property to Saucon Ridge
Road.
U.S. Home also argues that the trial court erred in relying on the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals decision Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v.
Kmart Corporation, 13 F.3d 762 (3rd Cir. 1994), as there are material
factual differences between the two cases. While not binding on us, we find
the Third Circuit’s analysis of Pennsylvania law to be persuasive and
supportive of the trial court’s resolution of instant case. In Epstein, a
partnership that owned a commercial property with no street frontage in
Lehigh County held a non-exclusive 100-foot wide easement over a
neighboring parcel for ingress and egress to the closest road. 13 F.3d at 764-
65. In 1992, Kmart, which had acquired the servient estate, proposed
substantial modifications to their property, including the erection of concrete
barriers. Id. at 765. Relying on Kinzey and Scoppa, the Third Circuit
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determined that under Pennsylvania law the partnership as owner of the
dominant estate could insist that the easement be maintained according to its
original terms “even though the purpose of the easement could be fulfilled on
the remaining part” after Kmart’s planned improvements. Id. at 766-67. The
appellate court concluded that, while Kmart’s argument that the owner of the
land-locked parcel only needed a 14-foot wide right-of-way had “common-
sense appeal,” this fact was irrelevant as Kmart’s proposal to build barriers on
the easement area would eliminate portions of it from its dedicated purpose.
Id. at 768. The Third Circuit thus affirmed the district court decision that
Kmart’s proposed alterations would substantially interfere with the
partnership’s rights under the easement. Id. at 769.
U.S. Home attempts to distinguish Epstein on the basis that the
easement served a commercial property, the entire easement area was paved
before Kmart proposed to alter it, and the easement declaration specifically
provided that “[n]o barriers, fences, curbs or other obstruction” could be
placed in the easement area. Id. at 765. None of these distinctions, however,
undermines the trial court’s decision here or its reliance on Epstein. There is
no support in our caselaw for U.S. Home’s contention that easements
benefitting commercial, rather than residential, properties are entitled to
greater protection. Cf. Scoppa, 491 A.2d at 149-50 (holding that plaintiffs
could enforce their rights in easement over entire 20-foot alley that serviced
their lots created in a subdivision plan). Furthermore, while in Epstein the
entire easement area was paved at the outset, the crucial factor was not the
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partnership’s prior use of the easement area but rather the express grant of
a 100-foot wide easement area for the partnership’s use and the Pennsylvania
rule that “a court may not reduce the size of an express easement merely
because its purpose can be otherwise fulfilled.” 13 F.3d at 768. Finally, the
federal appellate court did not base its decision in Epstein on the fact that
the easement declaration specifically prohibited the erection of barriers in the
easement area, but instead on the fact that Kmart’s proposed improvements
“eliminate[d a portion] of the easement from its dedicated purpose.” Id.Like in Epstein, U.S. Home’s obligation under the easement is not
merely to ensure that the Sinclairs only have an adequate area for ingress,
egress, and regress from their property but that the entire 50-foot width is
available for that purpose. Thus, although U.S. Home has not undertaken
action that wholly foreclosed the Sinclairs’ travel to and from Saucon Ridge
Road, the evidence below showed that it prevented the Sinclairs’ use of a
significant portion of the easement area in Lot 11 through the regrading and
construction of the berm. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion
that U.S. Home substantially interfered with the easement.
U.S. Home next argues that the portion of the trial court order directing
it to “take the necessary steps to remove any encroachments, [undo] any
regrading and otherwise restore [the Sinclairs’] easement fully” was in error
because it did not include a proviso that any such work must be done in
accordance with applicable local regulations. Order, 11/15/19, ¶3. U.S. Home
contends that as its original work on Lot 11 was conducted in compliance with
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an approved Township storm-water plan, it cannot now “be directed to
essentially perform an illegal act, i.e., regrade the area of the berm without
the issuance of appropriate municipal approvals.” U.S. Home Brief at 32.
While we recognize that the trial court’s order will likely require new
approvals and potentially significant expense by U.S. Home to return the
easement area to a state amenable to vehicular access, we do not see this as
grounds for vacating the trial court’s order. Put quite simply, U.S. Home
brought its current predicament entirely on itself. As it conceded at the
hearing below, U.S. Home did not advise the Township of its obligations under
the easement during the plan approval process or consult with the Sinclairs
prior to beginning work on Lot 11. Nor did U.S. Home go to court before
beginning construction to seek a modification of the easement or to obtain a
declaration that its plans were in compliance with the easement.
Furthermore, while U.S. Home claims that the trial court’s order would
violate local storm-water regulations, these regulations were not made a part
of the record before the trial court. In addition, although the construction on
Lot 11 was approved by local authorities, the record is bereft of evidence that
U.S. Home could not have gained approval for an alternate storm-water plan
on Lot 11 that respected the Sinclairs’ easement rights or that it will be
impossible to gain approval for work that will satisfy the trial court’s order.
Cf. Epstein, 13 F.3d at 769 (rejecting claim by Kmart that its proposed
improvements to the easement area were required by the Department of
Transportation because Kmart had “not presented evidence showing that
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PennDOT will approve no plan for access to its property except one that would
interfere with” the partnership’s easement rights). Therefore, we cannot
evaluate U.S. Home’s claim that the trial court’s order is illegal and conclude
that U.S. Home’s second appellate issue merits no relief.4
In its third appellate issue, U.S. Home challenges the portion of the trial
court’s November 15, 2019 order providing that it “is enjoined from violating
[the Sinclairs’] ingress, egress and regress rights over and along the fifty (50)
foot wide easement.” Order, 11/15/19, ¶2. U.S. Home argues that this
injunction is “unduly vague and therefore, unenforceable” because it does not
provide fair notice of the conduct that is being enjoined. U.S. Home Brief at
33.
U.S. Home relies solely on Epstein for this claim, wherein the Third
Circuit determined that portions of the district court injunction constraining
Kmart were not sufficiently tailored to remedy the specific harms that Kmart
had planned for the easement area. 13 F.3d at 770-72. However, in that
case, the federal appellate court focused on specific prohibitions on the trial
court’s injunction prohibiting signage and striping of lanes – safety measures
that were not inconsistent with the use of the easement area for ingress and
egress – and a vague “catch-all” command that Kmart not “otherwise” violate
____________________________________________
4 Notwithstanding our ruling here, we take no position on whether local
authorities can incorporate the easement area into future storm-water
management plans while at the same time protecting the Sinclairs’ easement
rights.
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the easement. Id. Here, by contrast, we read the trial court’s injunction of
U.S. Home to not “violat[e] [the Sinclairs’] ingress, egress and regress rights
over and along the fifty (50) foot wide easement” as simply providing that the
Sinclairs’ rights under the easement encompass the entire 50-foot wide length
of the easement and that U.S. Home may not place obstructions in the
easement area. Order, 11/15/19, ¶2. We do not interpret the challenged
language as prohibiting U.S. Home from undertaking any reasonable non-
exclusive use of the easement area, such as locating driveways for access to
either Lot 11 or 12 within the easement area, so long as those efforts do not
impair the Sinclairs’ rights. Therefore, we conclude that U.S. Home has fair
notice of the enjoined conduct and it is not entitled to relief on its third issue.
In its final issue, U.S. Home argues that the trial court’s mandate that
it return the easement area to its prior condition was in error based on a lack
of evidence that the company still retained ownership of Lot 11. U.S. Home
notes that construction on the single-family residence on Lot 11 was
completed in 2019, and it states that it does not have authority to perform
work on any land it does not own. U.S. Home does not expressly aver in its
brief that it has transferred ownership of Lot 11, only that the Sinclairs failed
to submit evidence to the trial court regarding the ownership of the lot.
In its answer to the Sinclairs’ motion to enforce the settlement
agreement, U.S. Home denied that it still owned all of the Blue Ridge West
Estates lots adjacent to the Sinclair Property and “affirmatively averred that
the property surrounding [the] Sinclairs’ Property is currently owned by
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Lennar Corporation and other individual property owners.” Answer, 8/27/19,
¶2. U.S. Home did not identify which lots of Blue Ridge West Estates were
owned by Lennar Corporation and which were owned by “individual property
owners.” Id. Lennar Corporation and U.S. Home are related entities, and for
the purposes of this litigation have been treated interchangeably. See N.T.,
9/17/19, at 69; Settlement Agreement, 5/31/06, ¶10.
At the trial court hearing, counsel for the Sinclairs attempted to probe
the issue of who owned Lot 11 by asking Mr. Sinclair whether U.S. Home or
Lennar had provided notice that they had sold Lot 11, a requirement of the
settlement agreement. N.T., 9/17/19, at 15; Settlement Agreement,
5/31/06, ¶6. Counsel for U.S. Home objected, and the trial court sustained
this objection, ruling that that issue of improper notice of any sale of Lot 11
was not raised in the motion to enforce the settlement agreement and is “not
for this hearing[, but] might be for some later hearing.” N.T., 9/17/19, at 15-
18.
In this case, neither party brought forth evidence at the hearing
regarding the issue of the ownership of Lot 11, and indeed, to the extent the
Sinclairs did try to raise the issue, U.S. Home challenged the expansion of the
hearing into this area. Furthermore, there is no dispute that U.S. Home or a
related entity performed the regrading on Lot 11 that substantially interfered
with the Sinclairs’ easement while the company still owned the property.
Therefore, based on the record developed below, we are not persuaded that
the trial court committed error by ordering U.S. Home to remove the
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obstructions it had created to the Sinclairs’ ingress and egress along the
easement area. To the extent U.S. Home can claim that it will be impossible
for it to comply with the trial court’s order that it remove any obstructions
from Lot 11 due to a change of ownership, that issue must be addressed in
further proceedings before the trial court.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/19/21
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