Com. v. Smith, R. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S46020-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    RAFIQ SMITH                                :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 2717 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 28, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0003850-2013
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                                 Filed: April 8, 2021
    Appellant, Rafiq Smith, appeals pro se from the order denying his
    petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.
    §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    On April 10, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of rape, involuntary
    deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), robbery, sexual assault, and kidnapping.1
    The convictions stem from an attack committed against a woman after she
    had an evening out with her coworkers and approached her public transit train.
    On May 15, 2015, the trial court found Appellant to be a sexually violent
    predator and sentenced him to serve an aggregate term of incarceration of
    twenty to forty years. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence
    ____________________________________________
    1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3123(a)(1), 3701(a)(1), 3124.1, and 2901(a)(2),
    respectively.
    J-S46020-20
    on July 11, 2016, and our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of
    appeal on December 13, 2016. Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    154 A.3d 849
    ,
    1777 EDA 2015 (Pa. Super. filed July 11, 2016) (unpublished memorandum),
    appeal denied, 
    164 A.3d 456
     (Pa. 2016).
    On December 1, 2017, Appellant timely filed, pro se, the instant PCRA
    petition. Court appointed counsel entered his appearance on December 18,
    2017. On July 23, 2018, counsel filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter.2 On
    July 31, 2018, the PCRA court entered a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to
    dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a response, in
    which he requested an extension of time to file objections and leave to amend
    his PCRA petition on August 24, 2018. On August 28, 2018, the PCRA court
    entered an order dismissing the PCRA petition and granting counsel’s motion
    to withdraw.     This timely appeal followed.    Appellant and the PCRA court
    complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
    1. Should the Court review the PCRA proceedings sua sponte,
    because the [c]ourt below erred in accepting and ruling on
    Appellant’s pro-se motions, including a pro-se Response to the
    [PCRA c]ourt’s Rule 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss when the pro-
    se pleadings constituted hybrid representation and therefore a
    nullity because PCRA counsel, though he abandoned Appellant,
    was still counsel of record having not been permitted to withdraw
    from representation?
    ____________________________________________
    2  Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth
    v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc)
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    J-S46020-20
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    In his sole claim for relief, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred
    in accepting his pro se response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice of intent
    to dismiss.   Appellant’s Brief at 10-15.     Appellant contends that although
    counsel had requested to withdraw, the motion had not been granted and
    Appellant’s pro se filing was the equivalent of hybrid representation. Id. at
    11. Appellant asserts that his pro se filing was a legal nullity. Id. at 13.
    Before we address the merits of Appellant’s issue, we must determine
    whether   the   claim     presented   has   been   properly   preserved   for   our
    consideration. Our Courts have consistently ruled that where a lower court
    directs a defendant to file a concise statement pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule
    of Appellate Procedure 1925, any issues not raised in that statement shall be
    waived. Commonwealth v. Bullock, 
    948 A.2d 818
    , 823 (Pa. Super. 2008)
    (citing Commonwealth v. Lord, 
    719 A.2d 306
    , 308 (Pa. 1998)).                     In
    Commonwealth v. Butler, 
    812 A.2d 631
    , 633 (Pa. 2002), our Supreme
    Court reaffirmed its holding in Lord and stated: “In Lord, however, this Court
    eliminated any aspect of discretion and established a bright-line rule for waiver
    under Rule 1925 …. Thus, waiver under Rule 1925 is automatic.” See also
    Commonwealth v. Oliver, 
    946 A.2d 1111
    , 1115 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting
    that Lord “requires a finding of waiver whenever an appellant fails to raise an
    issue in a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement”).
    -3-
    J-S46020-20
    We are mindful that Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial judges in
    identifying and focusing upon those issues that the parties plan to raise on
    appeal.   The absence of a trial court opinion addressing a particular claim
    poses a substantial impediment to meaningful and effective appellate review.
    Commonwealth v. Lemon, 
    804 A.2d 34
    , 36 (Pa. Super. 2002). Rule 1925
    is thus a crucial component of the appellate process. Lemon, 
    804 A.2d at 37
    .
    “When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not
    enough for meaningful review.” Commonwealth v. Dowling, 
    778 A.2d 683
    ,
    686 (Pa. Super. 2001). In addition, claims that are not raised before the trial
    court are waived. See Commonwealth v. Lopata, 
    754 A.2d 685
    , 689 (Pa.
    Super. 2000) (stating that “[a] claim which has not been raised before the
    trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); Commonwealth
    v. Ryan, 
    909 A.2d 839
    , 845 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citing Commonwealth v.
    Gordon, 
    528 A.2d 631
    , 638 (Pa. Super. 1987) (reiterating that “[a] theory of
    error different from that presented to the trial jurist is waived on appeal, even
    if both theories support the same basic allegation of error which gives rise to
    the claim for relief.”)).
    Our review of the certified record reflects that on September 17, 2018,
    the PCRA court issued an order directing Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    statement within twenty-one days. The record further reflects that after the
    granting of multiple extensions of time, Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b)
    statement on February 15, 2019.          Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement
    -4-
    J-S46020-20
    contained ten issues. However, the Rule 1925(b) statement did not include
    the issue Appellant currently presents to this Court.   Accordingly, we are
    constrained to conclude that this issue is waived. Bullock, 
    948 A.2d at 823
    .
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/8/21
    -5-