Medved, G. v. Smith, V. ( 2021 )


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  • J-A06024-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    GERALD M. MEDVED AND SHIRLEY            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MEDVED, HIS WIFE                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    VERNON SMITH AND SHEILA SMITH,          :
    HIS WIFE                                :   No. 724 WDA 2020
    :
    Appellants           :
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 6, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Civil Division at No(s):
    1898 of 2012 G.D.
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                          FILED: APRIL 16, 2021
    Vernon Smith and Sheila Smith (the Smiths), h/w, appeal from the final
    judgment entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County in favor of
    Appellees, Gerald M. Medved and his wife, Shirley Medved (the Medveds).
    After careful review, we affirm.
    The instant quiet title action involves a wedge-shaped 8.0691 acre tract
    of land (Property) located in Springhill Township, Fayette County.        The
    Property is situated directly to the south of the Smiths’ property and to the
    east and west of other land owned by the Medveds. The Property was initially
    part of a farm (Robinson Farm), which was acquired in 1952 from the Smiths’
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    predecessor, Jules J. Quertinmont, Jr.           In the mid-to-late 1940s,1 Gerald’s
    parents, George and Charlotte Medved (George and Charlotte), purchased
    land (Medved Farm) from John Brajokovich. George and Charlotte utilized the
    Property as if it were part of the Medved Farm. Gerald Medved testified that
    a barbed-wire fence encloses the entire Medved Farm, including the northern
    portion of the Property. The Medveds obtained title to the Medved Farm in
    November 2001, when Charlotte Medved passed away. The Property was not
    described in the deed conveying the land from Charlotte to the Medveds; it
    was, however, described in the Smiths’ deed.
    The northern edge of the Property is separated from the Smiths’ land by
    a four-strand barbed wire fence attached to posts. The fence was erected in
    the early 1940s and maintained by George and Charlotte, their agents, and
    other Medved family members. The fence has never been removed and there
    is no gate on the fence line between the Property and the Smiths’ land.
    Additionally, no fence borders the east or west sides of the Property.2
    Gas transmission lines were installed south of the northern edge of the
    Property in 1962; George and Charlotte received compensation from gas
    ____________________________________________
    1  George and Charlotte acquired the Medved Farm in two separate
    transactions. N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 11/19/19, at 31-32. In 1945, they
    purchased twenty-four acres and, in 1949, they purchased the remaining
    twelve acres. Id. at 32. The land purchased in 1949, which included the
    Property, was never surveyed. Id. George and Charlotte and their family
    moved onto the Medved Farm in 1945. Id. at 30.
    2 A now-unoccupied house, that was once occupied by Gerald, his parents,
    siblings and Brajokovich, and later by Charlotte until her death, is located
    within the perimeter of the Medved Farm, but not on the Property.
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    companies for rights-of-way across the Property in order to install the lines.
    George mined coal on the Property from the 1940s through 1962. In the mid-
    1950’s, a lumber company timbered the entire Medved Farm, including the
    Property.     Some backfilling and excavation work was conducted on the
    Property in the 1970s and 1990s, respectively. A farm road, running east-
    west, bisects the southern portion of the Property.        The land below the
    Property’s southern boundary line is wooded land. A surveyor, hired by the
    Medveds for trial, testified that although there are some trees on the Property,
    it is properly classified as pastureland, not woodland.3
    On August 17, 2012, the Medveds filed an action to quiet title to the
    Property against the Smiths, asserting4 their right based on two legal theories:
    adverse possession and boundary by recognition and acquiescence (or,
    consentable boundary). During a three-day non-jury trial held in November
    2018, the Medveds presented over 25 witnesses and 40 exhibits, including tax
    ____________________________________________
    3   “Woodland” is often just another name for a forest.                      See
    https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/woodland          (last   visited
    4/6/21). Most of the time, though, geographers use the term to describe a
    forest with an open canopy. Id. The canopy is the highest layer of foliage in
    a forest[; i]t is made up of the crowns, or tops, of trees. Id. Pastureland, on
    the other hand, is a “diverse type of land where the primary vegetation
    produced        is    herbaceous       plants    and      shrubs.”           See
    https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/landuse/rangepa
    sture/?cid=nrcsdev11_001074 (last visited 4/6/21). These lands provide
    forage for beef cattle, dairy cattle, sheep, goats, horses[,] and other types of
    domestic livestock. Id.
    4 The complaint was amended, in response to preliminary objections filed by
    the Smiths, to plead more specifically.
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    claim and property maps, photos of the subject property over the years, land
    surveys, coal and gas company receipts, plats, and a gas company right-of-
    way agreement. Following trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the
    Medveds, concluding that they established title to the Property on the basis of
    a consentable line by recognition and acquiescence. The Smiths filed post-
    trial motions that were denied. They then filed a timely notice of appeal and
    court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on
    appeal. On appeal, the Smiths raise the following issues for our consideration:
    (1)   Did the trial [court] fail to apply the strict standards set forth
    by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which requires Plaintiffs
    to prove a fence as a boundary line by recognition and
    acquiescence in order to prevail?
    (2)   Did the trial [court] err in finding that undeveloped acreage
    had been occupied continuously for 21 years when there is
    no evidence that any structure or fencing was ever erected
    upon the land in question and there was no evidence of
    ongoing cultivation of the land in question in contravention
    of well-settled adverse possession principles that have also
    been incorporated into the doctrine of consentable boundary
    line by recognition and acquiescence.
    Appellants’ Brief, at 4.
    Our standard of review of verdicts in bench trials is as follows:
    Our review in a non-jury case is limited to whether the findings of
    the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether
    the trial court committed error in the application of law. We must
    grant the court’s findings of fact the same weight and effect as
    the verdict of a jury and, accordingly, may disturb the non-jury
    verdict only if the court’s findings are unsupported by competent
    evidence or the court committed legal error that affected the
    outcome of the trial. It is not the role of an appellate court to pass
    on the credibility of witnesses; hence we will not substitute our
    judgment for that of the factfinder. Thus, the test we apply is not
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    whether we would have reached the same result on the evidence
    presented, but rather, after due consideration of the evidence
    which the trial court found credible, whether the trial court could
    have reasonably reached its conclusion.
    Lynn v. Pleasant Valley Country Club, 
    54 A.3d 915
    , 919 (Pa. Super. 2012)
    (internal citations omitted).
    The Smiths allege that the trial court erred by not applying “the strict
    requirements . . . regarding the establishment of a binding consentable line
    by recognition and acquiescence” and in finding that the Medveds “had
    occupied the undeveloped acreage continuously for 21 years when there was
    no evidence that any structure or fencing was ever erected” upon the Property
    or any evidence of “on[-]going cultivation” of the Property. Appellants’ Brief,
    at 13. The Smiths also argue that there was insufficient evidence showing
    that they had disclaimed ownership of the Property. Appellants’ Brief, at 16.
    Such lack of evidence, they claim, fails to establish the “occupancy”
    requirement necessary to prove the doctrine of consentable boundary line by
    recognition and acquiescence. Id. at 20.
    Instantly, the trial court found that:    the Property was in continuous
    control of the Medveds and their predecessors in title;5 the Property was solely
    used by the Medveds, their family members, and friends; the use of the land
    varied at times from cultivation, strip mining, and grazing land for horses and
    ____________________________________________
    5 “[T]acking [of privity of possession] is permitted [under a theory of
    acquiescence in a boundary] upon sufficient and credible proof of delivery of
    conveyance, which was previously claimed and occupied by the grantor and is
    taken by the grantee as successor in such interest.” Zeglin v. Gahagen, 
    812 A.2d 558
    , 566 (Pa. 2002).
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    cows; and that the Medveds have established that they were in possession of
    the Property as they maintained dominion over the parcel.            Trial Court
    Opinion, 9/21/20, at 6. Specifically, the court noted that the Property “was
    entirely contained within the fenced area of the Medved farm [and that the
    Medveds’] control was open, notorious and hostile.” 
    Id.
    “One who claims title by adverse possession must prove actual,
    continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct[,] and hostile possession of
    the land for twenty-one years. Each of these elements must exist; otherwise,
    the possession will not confer title.” Recreation Land Corp. v. Hartzfeld,
    
    947 A.2d 771
    , 774 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). “Generally, ‘actual
    possession of land means dominion over the property.’” Bride v. Robwood
    Lodge, 
    713 A.2d 109
    , 112 (Pa. Super. 1998). However, “[w]hat constitutes
    adverse possession depends, to a large extent, on the character of the
    premises.” 
    Id.
    The doctrine of consentable line, which is a separate and distinct theory
    from adverse possession, is a rule of repose for the purpose of quieting title
    and discouraging confusing and vexatious litigation. Plott v. Cole, 
    547 A.2d 1216
    , 1220 (Pa. Super. 1988). In order to establish a binding consentable
    line by recognition and acquiescence, a party must prove that: (1) each party
    has claimed the land on his side of the line as his own; and (2) that this
    occupation has occurred for the statutory period of twenty-one years. Id. at
    1221.     “[A]cquiescence,” in the context of a dispute over real property,
    “denotes passive conduct on the part of the lawful owner consisting of failure
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    on his part to assert his paramount rights or interests against the hostile
    claims of the adverse user.” Zeglin, supra at 562 n.2 (quotation omitted).
    “[W]hen a consentable line is established, the land behind such a line becomes
    the property of each neighbor regardless of what the deed specifies.” Moore
    v. Moore, 
    921 A.2d 1
    , 5 (Pa. Super. 2007). See Soderberg v. Weisel, 
    687 A.2d 839
    , 843 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citation omitted) (“In essence, each
    neighbor gains marketable title to that land behind the line, some of which
    may not have been theirs under their deeds.”).
    Instantly, the trial court found that the properties owned by the Medveds
    and the Smiths have been separated by a fence that has been maintained by
    the Medved family over the years. The court found that the fence “completely
    separates the entirety of the [Property] from the Smiths’ [p]roperty.” Trial
    Court Opinion, 9/21/20, at 2. Moreover, when George and Charlotte moved
    onto the Medved Farm in 1945, it was already surrounded by a fence that “has
    remained in the same location and has been repaired over the years by both
    [George and Charlotte] and the [Medveds].” Id. at 3. See N.T. Non-Jury
    Trial (George Medved’s testimony), 11/19/18, at 30, 40, 52-53, 68, 77 (fence
    existed on Medved Farm since he was little child in 1945, no one ever disputed
    Medveds’ ownership of Property, and he maintained fence since George and
    Charlotte acquired farm in early 1940s); id. at 35 (“Well, everybody had their
    farms fenced in. And that whole farm had four strands of barbed wire on the
    whole thing that I can remember. When we bought it, you know, a fence—
    that I can remember. . . . I am sure the whole farm had four strands [of
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    barbed wire] on it [when we bought it].”); id. at 38 (recalling fence was
    continuous and enclosed Property in 1950); see also id. at 7 (land surveyor’s
    testimony) (in July 2012 he noticed “[a]long the northern edge of the
    delineated area[,] there’s a substantial [barbed] wire fence that runs the
    whole length”); id. (beneath fence line multiple gas line rights-of-way
    located); id. at 10 (“It’s an old fence, a substantial fence and it looks like it
    has been . . . maintained.”); id. (did not remember any gates or openings of
    fence line between Property and Smiths’ property); id. (fence on Medved’s
    property enclosed or closed off Property from Smiths’ property).
    Based on the testimony at trial, the court found: that the subject fence,
    which admittedly needed repairs over the years, does not include any gate or
    opening on to the Smiths’ property; the remainder of the Property is contained
    completely within the fenced area of the Medved Farm; and the Property has
    no features that distinguish it from the remining land of the Medved Farm.
    Id. See also Dimura v. Williams, 
    286 A.2d 370
     (Pa. 1972) (unlike adverse
    possession, not essential that fence line as boundary for consentable line be
    substantial).
    With regard to activity that took place on the Property, the court found
    that Gerald Medved’s family conducted strip-mining activity on the Property,
    altered the terrain in the 1990s by backfilling, and permitted a gas company
    to place lines on the Medved Farm intersecting the Property. See id. at 40
    (George Medved testifying his father mined coal from 1949 to 1969 on
    Property); id. at 46 (Columbia Gas installed subterraneous gas lines on
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    Property in 1962); id. at 50 (Medveds had to backfill Property because there
    was a “big cut” like a canyon down through land and all around it in 1970s
    and 1980s); id. at 52 (George Medved maintained road on eastern boundary
    of Property that he consistently used to haul coal). Further, the entire Medved
    family raised crops, grew hay, hunted, and grazed animals on the Property;
    they also used the Property as a play area for children. Id. (when George and
    Charlotte purchased Medved Farm, it was pastureland used to cultivate
    soybeans, corn, potatoes and also used to pasture cows and horses).
    The court concluded that each party had acted as though the land on
    their side of the fence was their own property, that the Medveds had occupied
    the Property continuously since George and Charlotte purchased the property
    in 1945, and that George and Charlotte controlled the Medved Farm (which
    included the Property) continuously and uninterrupted until it was transferred
    to the Medveds. Finally, the court found the Medveds established that the
    fence line separated the Smith’s property from the Property for “a period in
    excess of 21 years.” Id. at 5. See Schimp v. Allman, 
    659 A.3d 1032
    ,1034
    (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation omitted) (question where boundary line is actually
    located is for trier of fact; where trial judge sits as fact-finder, appellate court
    will not reverse court’s decision on appeal unless trial court’s findings are not
    supported by credible evidence).
    Here, the trial court found that the Medveds established their “hostile”
    occupation of the Property through testimony presented by various witnesses
    at trial.   Specifically, that testimony showed that the Smiths asked the
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    Medveds for permission to enter onto the Property to hunt and that the Smiths
    never made a demand for the removal of a portion of the fence that separated
    the parties’ properties.      See N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 11/19/18, at 7-8 (along
    bottom part of land survey is farm road that traverses subject property;
    Medveds used road without any objections by Smiths to go across subject
    Property to other side of Medved Farm). Moreover, the court noted that the
    Smiths did not present any evidence that they or their predecessors-in-title
    ever had dominion over the Property.
    We conclude that the trial court reasonably reached its verdict based
    upon credible evidence presented at trial.         Lynn, 
    supra.
       Specifically, the
    court’s following findings are supported by the record: the Medveds and their
    prior owners possessed the Property to the exclusion of the Smiths or their
    predecessors for over 21 years, Moore, 
    supra;
     the entire Property was
    contained within the fenced area for over 21 years; and, the Medveds and
    their family openly and hostilely controlled the Property for the requisite length
    of time. Zeglin, supra.6
    Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination that the Medveds
    established the right to the Property based on a consentable boundary line.
    Schimp, supra (evidence that claimant grew crops, pastured cattle, and
    ____________________________________________
    6  While these terms are most often associated with traditional adverse
    possession, in the case of consentable line by acquiescence “the use or
    occupancy of the premises is [also] hostile to and against the interests of the
    title owner.” Id. at 562 n.5. Id. at 562 (“doctrinal roots of acquiescence are
    grounded in adverse possession theory”).
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    constructed track road over disputed land for period exceeding 21 years,
    established dominion over land and boundary by consentable line); Dimura,
    supra at 371 (appellant’s long-standing fence line, when joined with other
    fences, established appellant’s ownership of strip of land where it was
    recognized as boundary line between her property and neighbors’ parcels).
    Judgment affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/16/2021
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