In Re: Estate of Lloyd, R. Appeal of: Wentworth ( 2016 )

J-A10036-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ESTATE OF REGINA R. LLOYD : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: J.G. WENTWORTH :
ORIGINATIONS, L.L.C. : No. 898 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order May 13, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 02-11-1612
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PANELLA, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 09, 2016
Appellant, J.G. Wentworth Originations, L.L.C., appeals from the order
entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ court
Division, in favor of Arthur Constable, III, executor of the estate of Regina
Lloyd (“Regina Lloyd”) and Todd T. Jordan, Esquire, guardian of the estate
for Anthony Lloyd, a minor (“Anthony Lloyd”), which denied Appellant’s
exceptions and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company’s (“MetLife”) cross-
exceptions and relieving MetLife of liability for any periodic payments made
to the estate of Michael Lloyd (“Michael Lloyd”) and to Appellant.1 We
affirm.
The Orphans’ court opinion sets forth the relevant facts and procedural
history of this case as follows.
1
Michael Lloyd, MetLife, and Metropolitan Insurance and Annuity Company
(“MIAC”) did not participate in this appeal.
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Regina Lloyd and her son, Anthony Lloyd, were involved in
an automobile accident in Florida on November 11, 2002.
At the time of the accident Regina Lloyd, who suffered a
severe and permanent injury, was married to Michael
Lloyd, who was not involved in the accident. Regina Lloyd,
and Michael Lloyd, individually and as parents and natural
guardians of their minor child Anthony Lloyd, filed a
complaint on June 3, 2003, against the municipality, the
city of Fernandina Beach. This lawsuit was settled by the
city of Fernandina Beach and its insurers, Ranger
Insurance Company and Preferred Governmental Issuance
Trust. A Settlement Agreement was executed in
November of 2003 and stated [that] specific amounts of
money…would be paid in consideration of the settlement
including payments to Regina Lloyd of $6,469.00 monthly
for thirty years. The obligation to make the monthly
payment was assigned to [MetLife] and its subsidiary
[MIAC]. MetLife began to make the required monthly
payments of $6,469.00 to Regina Lloyd on December 1,
2003.
In September of 2004, Regina, Michael, and Anthony
moved to Pennsylvania. Thereafter, Regina Lloyd filed for
a divorce and a divorce decree was granted for Regina
Lloyd and Michael Lloyd on September 12, 2007, in
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Regina Lloyd and Michael
Lloyd did not enter into a property settlement agreement
in connection with the divorce.
Regina Lloyd died in Pennsylvania on March 11, 2011. Her
will was probated in Pennsylvania. On March 15, 2011, a
letter was sent to MetLife stating that Arthur Constable III
is the executor of the estate, and informing MetLife of the
death of Regina Lloyd, and the 2007 divorce. MetLife
requested a copy of the divorce decree with property
settlement, especially [requesting] any reference to the
Annuity. In response to this request, MetLife was sent a
copy of the divorce decree and the Will of Regina Lloyd.
MetLife responded with a letter requesting the entire
divorce decree with the property settlement, showing the
reference to the annuity and how it is to be disbursed, and
stating that it must have the signature of the judge and
the date. The letter warned that if this document was not
provided, MetLife would proceed with the beneficiary
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designation on file. MetLife sent four requests for this
information and the last request was marked “Final
Request.” The last letter stated that it would make the
funds payable to the beneficiary on file unless MetLife
heard back from the addressee within [thirty] days. The
final letter was dated July 26, 2011. The letters from
MetLife were addressed to Arthur R. Constable, Jr., at an
address that was not the correct address for Arthur R.
Constable, Jr., but was the address given for
correspondence in the initial letter sent to MetLife after
Regina Lloyd’s death. MetLife’s letters of April 22, 2011,
June 10, 2011, and July 26, 2011, received no response.
This [c]ourt is troubled by the failure of the Executor to
respond to the letters from MetLife. Since MetLife is
excused from liability under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.2, [its]
payments to a former husband-beneficiary make the
Executor’s failure to respond irrelevant.
MetLife contacted Michael Lloyd on November 1, 2011. On
September 28, 2012, in response to prior correspondence
with MetLife, Michael Lloyd sent MetLife a notarized
handwritten letter providing personal identity information
and stating that he was the rightful beneficiary of Regina
Lloyd’s Annuity and that there was never any kind of
property settlement in their divorce. Thereafter, MetLife
remitted to Michael Lloyd past payments from the date of
Regina Lloyd’s death and began paying Michael Lloyd the
amount of $6,469.00 monthly.
On May 7, 2013, Michael Lloyd agreed to sell/transfer part
of the future payments to [Appellant]. Michael Lloyd
transferred $2,200.00 of the monthly annuity payments for
[twenty] years to [Appellant] for $200,000.00. This
[sale]/transfer was approved by [a] Florida state court on
June 25, 2013. The Petition For Court Approval of a
Transfer of Structure Settlement Payment Rights filed with
the Florida [c]ourt in May of 2013, …makes no mention
that Michael Lloyd was not the injured party. It further
makes no mention of his divorce from and subsequent
death of Regina Lloyd. The Florida [c]ourt [o]rder dated
June 25, 2013, …set forth in finding number [one], that
the transfer sought does not contravene “Any Federal or
State Statute.” Had the Florida [c]ourt been made aware
of Regina’s Pennsylvania divorce from Michael Lloyd as
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well as her death in 2011, that court may not have
approved the transfer. Notice of the Florida court
proceeding had not been given to the estate of Regina
Lloyd, or to the guardians of Anthony Lloyd prior to this
transfer.
On October 31, 2013, Michael Lloyd attempted to
sell/transfer another portion of the annuity to [Appellant].
This time [Appellant] notified Arthur and Angela Constable
(the guardians of the person of Anthony Lloyd) of the
impending [sale]/transfer and it was objected to by the
attorney for [Anthony Lloyd], as well as the attorney for
[Regina Lloyd]. Based on the objections, this second
[sale]/transfer was withdrawn by [Appellant]. Michael
Lloyd died in Florida on December 13, 2013.
The instant matter was commenced in this [c]ourt on
November 26, 2013, when the Estate of Regina Lloyd filed
a Petition for Citation to Show Cause Why Annuity
Payments Should Not Be Paid to Estate. MetLife and
Michael Lloyd were the named Respondents. On February
24, 2014, [Appellant] filed an Emergency Petition to
Intervene, which was granted on March 21, 2014. On
June 10, 2014, MetLife filed a Petition for Rule to
Interplead by Notice to Plaintiff Estate of Regina R. Lloyd
and [Appellant] and by Citation to Claimant Estate of
Michael R. Lloyd, which interpleader, on July 23, 2014, this
[c]ourt granted. On July 17, 2014, Anthony Lloyd filed a
Petition to Intervene, which this [c]ourt granted. On
August 21, 2014, this [c]ourt [o]rdered that Petitioner,
Estate of Regina Lloyd, [Appellant], Intervenor Guardian of
Estate of Anthony Lloyd and Claimant, Estate of Michael
Lloyd [were] enjoined from commencing or further
prosecution of any action in any court against MetLife for
periodic payments under the subject Annuity, except as a
party to the above entitled action. Currently all monthly
annuity funds have been interpleaded into this [c]ourt and
fall under the jurisdiction of this [c]ourt.
(Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed January 16, 2015, at 1-4). After conducting a
bench trial, the Orphans’ court entered an opinion and order on January 16,
2015, finding 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.2 applied under these circumstances and
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all subsequent periodic payments made pursuant to the annuity contract
were to be paid to the estate of Regina Lloyd as the contingent beneficiary,
and ordering MetLife to distribute all accumulated and future annuity
payments to Regina Lloyd’s estate as well as ordering Appellant to return to
Regina Lloyd’s estate any funds received. MetLife and MIAC filed a motion
for post-trial relief on January 23, 2015, seeking modifications to the
Orphans’ court order regarding their liability to the parties in the action. On
January 29, 2015, Appellant filed exceptions to the Orphans’ court order.
MetLife and MIAC filed cross exceptions to Appellant’s exceptions on
February 5, 2015. Appellant filed amended exceptions on February 11,
2015. On April 21, 2015, counsel for Anthony Lloyd and Regina Lloyd filed
motions to strike MetLife and MIAC’s motion for post-trial relief and
Appellant’s exceptions. The Orphans’ court entered an order on May 15,
2015, (a) denying Appellant’s exceptions and MetLife and MIAC’s cross-
exceptions, (b) relieving MetLife and MIAC of liability for any periodic
payments made to Michael Lloyd and to Appellant, and (c) stating its
January 16, 2015 decision/opinion remains in effect. Appellant timely filed a
notice of appeal on June 9, 2015. Appellant filed a motion for stay of orders
pending appeal on June 10, 2015, which the Orphans’ court granted on June
17, 2015. The Orphans’ court did not order Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),
and Appellant did not file one.
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Appellant raises one issue for our review:
WHETHER THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY
COUNTY, ORPHANS’ COURT DIVISION, ERRED AS A
MATTER OF LAW IN RULING THAT 20 [PA.C.S.A] § 6111.2
APPLIED IN THIS CASE TO RENDER INEFFECTIVE THE
DESIGNATION OF MICHAEL LLOYD AS THE BENEFICIARY
OF THE ANNUITY CONTRACT AT ISSUE.
(Appellant’s Brief at 2).
Appellant argues Section 6111.2 does not apply under these
circumstances because MIAC owned the annuity contract pursuant to a
structured tort settlement agreement, and Regina Lloyd was unable to
revoke the beneficiary designation of the annuity contract without MIAC’s
approval because she did not personally own the annuity contract. Appellant
claims the only instance in which Section 6111.2 applies is when an
individual owns an insurance policy, annuity contract, or other contract and
that individual has the unilateral legal right and power to revoke the
designation of the individual’s ex-spouse as a beneficiary at the time of the
individual’s death. Appellant insists the language of the tort settlement
agreement controls to whom the periodic payments must be made. Under
that agreement, Appellant emphasizes the “claimants,” which included both
Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd, possessed the joint power to revoke or
make any beneficiary designations, so the designation of Michael Lloyd as a
beneficiary was not unilaterally revocable by Regina Lloyd upon her death.
Appellant further contends the tort settlement agreement remains in effect
because it contains the continuing obligation to make periodic payments to
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Michael Lloyd, and the assignment agreement simply carries forward those
obligations found in the tort settlement agreement, with MIAC as the
assignee and Ranger Insurance Company as the assignor. Appellant argues
Michael Lloyd released his loss of consortium claim when he signed the tort
settlement agreement in 2003 and the Orphans’ court incorrectly relied on
its equitable powers in interpreting the contracts and the statute at issue,
upon deciding that it would be unjust to allow Michael Lloyd to block Regina
Lloyd’s beneficiary designations beyond their marriage because the
application and interpretation of Section 6111.2 is purely a question of law.
Appellant alternatively argues that if Section 6111.2 applies and renders
Michael Lloyd’s initial designation as beneficiary of the annuity contract
ineffective, his estate would still be entitled to the periodic payments
because the right to the payments arose out of the tort settlement
agreement and he was named the default beneficiary under that agreement.
Appellant concludes the Orphans’ court decision should be reversed. We
disagree.
Regarding estate matters, our standard of review of an order of the
Orphans’ court is deferential:
[W]e will not reverse unless there is a clear error of law or
an abuse of discretion. Our scope of review is also limited:
we determine only whether the court’s findings are based
on competent and credible evidence of record.
In re Estate of Karschner, 919 A.2d 252, 255-56 (Pa.Super. 2007)
(quoting In re Estate of Westin, 874 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa.Super. 2005)).
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“An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a
conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment
exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the
product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion has been abused.”
Silver v. Pinskey, 981 A.2d 284, 291 (Pa.Super. 2009) (en banc) (quoting
Mencer v. Ruch, 928 A.2d 294, 297 (Pa.Super. 2007)).
As a general rule, the law of the chosen forum governs all procedural
matters. Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 552 Pa. 570, 716 A.2d 1221
(1998). A dispute concerning the applicable substantive law, however,
compels a choice of law analysis. Wilson v. Transport Ins. Co., 889 A.2d
563, 571 (Pa.Super. 2005). “Substantive law is the portion of the law which
creates the rights and duties of the parties to a judicial proceeding, whereas
procedural law is the set of rules which prescribe the steps by which the
parties may have their respective rights and duties judicially enforced.” Id.
A court conducts the choice of law analysis under the choice of law rules of
the forum state. See Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 21, 203
A.2d 796, 805 (1964).
In Pennsylvania, a choice of law analysis includes a preliminary test:
“the first step in a choice of law analysis under Pennsylvania law is to
determine whether a conflict exists between the laws of the competing
states.” Budtel Associates, LP v. Continental Cas. Co., 915 A.2d 640,
643 (Pa.Super. 2006).
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§ 5327. Determination of foreign law
(a) Notice.−A party who intends to raise an issue
concerning the law of any jurisdiction or governmental unit
thereof outside this Commonwealth shall give notice in his
pleadings or other reasonable written notice.
(b) Materials to be considered.−In determining the law
of any jurisdiction or governmental unit thereof outside
this Commonwealth, the tribunal may consider any
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether
or not submitted by a party or admissible under the rules
of evidence.
(c) Court decision and review.−The court, not jury,
shall determine the law of any governmental unit outside
this Commonwealth. The determination of the tribunal is
subject to review on appeal as a ruling on a question of
law.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327. To ascertain the law of a sister state, a tribunal may
judicially notice the foreign law, and may inform itself of such law by
considering any relevant material or source, regardless of whether it was
submitted under the rules of evidence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327(b). The
operation of foreign law presents a question of law, rather than fact. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5327(c).
“[W]here the laws of the two jurisdictions would produce the same
result on the particular issue presented, there is a ‘false conflict,’ and the
[c]ourt should avoid the choice-of-law question.” Titeflex Corp. v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 88 A.3d 970, 979
(Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 629 Pa. 638, 105 A.3d 737 (2014)
(quoting Williams v. Stone, 109 F.3d 890, 893 (3rd Cir. 1997), cert
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denied, 522 U.S. 956, 118 S. Ct. 383, 139 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1997)). If the court
finds a true conflict exists, the court must then decide which state has the
greater interest in the application of its law, including which state had the
most significant contacts or relationship to the action. Budtel Associates,
LP, supra.
The Decedents, Estates and Fiduciaries Code governing the effect of a
divorce on a beneficiary designation2 provides in pertinent part:
§ 6111.2. Effect of divorce or pending divorce on
designation of beneficiaries
(a) Applicability.—This section is applicable if an
individual:
(1) is domiciled in this Commonwealth;
(2) designates the individual’s spouse as beneficiary
of the individual’s life insurance policy, annuity contract,
pension or profit-sharing plan or other contractual
arrangement providing for payments to the spouse; and
* * *
(i) at the time of the individual’s death is divorced
from the spouse[.]
* * *
(b) General rule.—Any designation described in
subsection (a)(2) in favor of the individual’s spouse or
former spouse that was revocable by the individual at the
individual’s death shall become ineffective for all purposes
2
With respect to the designation of beneficiaries in an insurance policy, this
section has been held as preempted by the federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (“ERISA”) at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. See In re
Estate of Sauers, 613 Pa. 186, 32 A.3d 1241 (2011). The present case
does not involve ERISA. Therefore, the state statute remains applicable.
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and shall be construed as if the spouse or former spouse
had predeceased the individual….
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.2.
Under Pennsylvania law, a loss of consortium claim arising from a
marital union has been described as:
[A] right growing out of the marriage relationship which
the [spouses] have respectively to the society,
companionship and affection of each other in their life
together. As thus defined and limited, any interference
with this right of consortium by the negligent injury to one
spouse, should afford the other spouse a legal cause of
action to recover damages for that interference.
Burns v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 510 A.2d 810, 812 (Pa.Super.
1986) (citation omitted)). This Court has previously limited the application
of marital consortium damages to the time between a spouse’s injury and
her death. See, e.g., Amato v. Bell & Gossett, 116 A.3d 607, 626
(Pa.Super. 2015) (reiterating general rule that loss of consortium damages
“are limited to the time between the spouse’s injury and his death”);
Linebaugh v. Lehr, 505 A.2d 303 (Pa.Super. 1986) (holding decedent’s
widow had no separate claim for loss of consortium in addition to her right to
recover for wrongful death). We observe our sister jurisdictions agree that
the right of consortium tracks the existence of the marital relationship and
terminates at its dissolution by death or divorce. See, e.g., Sawyer v.
Bailey, 413 A.2d 165, 167 (Me. 1980); Archie v. Hampton, 112 N.H. 13,
287 A.2d 622 (1972); Walden v. Coleman, 105 Ga.App. 242, 124 S.E.2d
313 (1962); Burk v. Anderson, 232 Ind. 77, 109 N.E.2d 407 (1952).
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After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Frank J.
Lucchino, we conclude Appellant’s issue merits no relief. The Orphans’ court
opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the question
presented. (See Orphans’ Court Opinion at 5-14) (finding: Pennsylvania has
most significant contacts or relationship to this matter and has greater
interest in protecting property rights of its citizens, as opposed to Florida’s
interest in this matter which is more tenuous; therefore, Pennsylvania law
should govern; language of tort settlement agreement does not require that
Michael Lloyd remain beneficiary of annuity contract; language of tort
settlement agreement explains that any payments made after Regina Lloyd’s
death “shall be made to such person or entity as shall be designated in
writing by Claimants to insurer or…Insurer’s assignee”, and that “[i]f no
person or entity is so designated by Claimants…such payments shall be
made to Michael R. Lloyd”; tort settlement agreement provided payments to
Regina Lloyd only; tort settlement agreement does not prohibit change in
beneficiary or require Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd to jointly designate
beneficiary after initial beneficiary designation; once claimants under tort
settlement agreement chose Michael Lloyd as beneficiary, that provision of
tort settlement agreement was fulfilled and it no longer controlled Regina
Lloyd’s ability to change beneficiary designations; assignment agreement
between MIAC and Ranger Insurance Company, which followed tort
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settlement agreement, names only Regina Lloyd and her son as claimants;
thus, there is conflicting language on who is “claimant” between tort
settlement agreement (which includes Michael Lloyd as claimant) and MIAC
and Ranger Insurance Company’s assignment agreement; language of tort
settlement agreement was not incorporated by reference into any
subsequent agreements; court must consider all relevant agreements to
reach fair and just decision; only document from which any party derives
present claim to payments is annuity contract; moreover, all of Michael
Lloyd’s rights to be compensated for loss of consortium ended upon divorce;
it would be unjust to give Michael Lloyd any right to block Regina Lloyd’s
beneficiary designations beyond time of their marriage; further, if court were
to agree with Appellant that tort settlement agreement continued to control
rights and obligations of Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd after 2003, then
court would also consider paragraph of tort settlement agreement which
prohibits claimants (Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd) from having power to
sell, mortgage, encumber, or anticipate periodic payments, by assignment or
otherwise; Florida court made no finding regarding enforceability of this non-
assignment provision; thus, court gives little weight to Appellant’s argument
that tort settlement agreement continued to control rights and obligations
concerning annuity payments; more importantly, per 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.2
of Decedents, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, entire annuity payments were
due to Regina Lloyd’s estate upon her death because her designation of
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Michael Lloyd as beneficiary became ineffective upon her death; application
of statute does not require Regina Lloyd to own annuity contract; statute
applies when individual’s spouse is designated as beneficiary in individual’s
annuity contract; annuity contract belonged to Regina Lloyd because she
was receiving annuity payments as payee and was “measuring life
(annuitant)”; fact that changes in beneficiary designation required approval
from MetLife does not mean designation of Michael Lloyd as beneficiary was
irrevocable upon Regina Lloyd’s death; there was no evidence presented at
trial that MetLife would have denied request to change beneficiary following
Regina Lloyd’s divorce; because beneficiary designation was revocable upon
Regina Lloyd’s death, per Section 6111.2, designation of Michael Lloyd as
beneficiary became ineffective for all purposes after Regina Lloyd’s death
and should have been construed as though Michael Lloyd predeceased
Regina Lloyd; notably, Michael Lloyd was not injured in car accident that left
Regina Lloyd paralyzed, and they were married for less than five years after
accident; Michael Lloyd’s loss of consortium claim terminated upon divorce;
when Michael Lloyd purportedly assigned his “interest” in annuity contract to
Appellant, Michael Lloyd had no interest in annuity contract to assign; had
Appellant read closely Michael Lloyd’s structured settlement application,
Appellant would have noticed that Michael Lloyd listed date of Regina Lloyd’s
death and their divorce incorrectly, where Michael Lloyd listed date of
divorce as more than three years after Regina Lloyd’s death; Appellant was
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not bona fide purchaser and should have known with reasonable diligence
that Michael Lloyd was no longer beneficiary of Regina Lloyd’s annuity
contract after their divorce and Michael Lloyd had no interest to sell, based
on Pennsylvania law, where Section 6111.2 dictates that, upon Regina
Lloyd’s death, designation of Michael Lloyd as beneficiary became ineffective
and was to be construed as if Michael Lloyd had predeceased Regina Lloyd;
all subsequent annuity payments were due to be paid to Regina Lloyd’s
estate as contingent beneficiary). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the
Orphans’ court opinion.
With respect to Appellant’s claim that the tort settlement agreement
remains in effect, we observe Michael Lloyd’s right to loss of consortium
extinguished upon his divorce from Regina Lloyd because his right tracked
the existence of their marriage. Therefore, Michael Lloyd’s only claim giving
rise to any rights under the tort settlement agreement likewise ceased upon
the divorce. See Linebaugh, supra. The Orphans’ court properly found
that Michael Lloyd had no rights at all under the tort settlement agreement
to transfer. As the sophisticated party in this matter and possessing the
ability to conduct a thorough due diligence for the transaction, Appellant
must bear the brunt of the empty contract it purchased, and its claim merits
no relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/9/2016
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Circulated 07/15/2016 01:36 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
RE: ESTATE OF NO: 1612 of 2011
REGINA R. LLOYD,
DECEASED
OPINION
FILED BY:
JUDGE FRANK J. LUCCHINO
DATE FILED: JUNE 17, 2015
COPIES SENT BY EMAIL TO:
Thomas J. Dempsey, Jr., Esquire
428 Forbes Avenue
Suite 1400
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
tdempseyjr@sikovandlove.com
Jack B. Cobetto, Esquire
Reed Smith, LLP
225 Fifth Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
jcobetto@reedsmith.com
Peter D. Post, Esquire
Ogletree, Deakins
One PPG Place, Suite 1900
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
peter.post@ogletreedeakins.com
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
RE: ESTATE OF NO: 1612 of 2011
REGINA R. LLOYD,
DECEASED
OPINION
The instant matter was commenced in this Court on November 26, 2013, when
the Estate of Regina Lloyd filed a Petition for Citation to Show Cause Why Annuity
Payments Should Not Be Paid to Estate. MetLife and Michael Lloyd were the named
Respondents. On February 24, 2014, Wentworth filed an Emergency Petition to
Intervene, which was granted on March 21, 2014. On June 10, 2014, MetLife filed a
Petition for Rule to lnterplead by Notice to Plaintiff Estate of Regina R. Lloyd and
Intervenor Wentwoth and by Citation to Claimant Estate of Michael R. Lloyd, which
interpleader, on July 23, 2014, this Court granted. On July 17, 2014, Anthony Lloyd
filed a Petition to Intervene, which this Court granted. Subsequently, answers, new
matter, and replies to new matter were filed by the parties.
A trial was held before this Court on December 9, 2014, and post-trial
memorandums were submitted by the parties. On January 15, 2015, this Court issued
an opinion and order disposing of the matter. On January 29, 2015, Wentworth filed
timely exceptions to this Court's order, and a motion for post-trial relief. The exceptions
filed by Wentworth were denied on May 13, 2015, upon review of the exceptions and
cross-exceptions, and after argument in open court thereon. Wentworth filed a timely
appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court on June 9, 2015.
In accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the judge who entered the
order appealed from must specify in writing the place in the record where the
reasons for the order appear. The reasons for this Court's Order dated May
13, 2015, denying the Appellant's Exceptions appear in this Court's Opinion
and Order of Court dated January 15, 2015, a copy of which is attached
hereto.
By The Court:
I S.J.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
RE: ESTATE OF NO: 1612 of 2011
REGINA R. LLOYD,
DECEASED
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
FILED BY:
JUDGE FRANK J. LUCCHINO
JANUARY 15, 2015
COPIES SENT BY EMAIL TO:
Thomas J. Dempsey, Jr., Esquire
428 Forbes Avenue
Suite 1400
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
tdempseyjr@sikovandlove.com
Jack B. Cobetto, Esquire
Reed Smith, LLP
225 Fifth Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
jcobetto@reedsmith.com
Peter D. Post, Esquire
Ogletree, Deakins
One PPG Place, Suite 1900
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
peter.post@ogletreedeakins.com
Todd T. Jordan, Esquire
Tener, Van Kirk
301 Grant Street, Suite 21 00
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
ttjordan@tenervankirk.com
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
RE: ESTATE OF NO: 1612 of 2011
REGINA R. LLOYD,
DECEASED
OPINION
The facts of this matter are largely undisputed. Regina Lloyd and her son,
Anthony Lloyd, were involved in an automobile accident in Florida on November 11,
2002. At the time of the accident Regina Lloyd, who suffered a severe and permanent
injury, was married to Michael Lloyd, who was not involved in the accident. Regina
Lloyd, and Michael Lloyd, individually and as parents and natural guardians of their
minor child Anthony Lloyd, filed a complaint on June 3, 2003, against the municipality,
the city of Fernandina Beach. This law suit was settled by the City of Fernandina Beach
and its insurers, Ranger Insurance Company and Preferred Governmental Issuance
Trust. A Settlement Agreement was executed in November of 2003, and stated specific
amounts of money that would be paid in consideration of the settlement, including
payments-to Regina Lloyd of $6,469.00 monthly for thirty years. The obligation to make
the monthly payment was assigned to Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and its
subsidiary Metropolitan Insurance and Annuity Company (hereinafter, collectively
"MetLife"). MetLife began to make the required monthly payments of $6,469.00 to
Regina Lloyd on December 1, 2003.
1
In September of 2004, Regina. Michael, and Anthony moved to Pennsylvania.
Thereafter, Regina Lloyd filed for a divorce and a divorce decree was granted for
Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd on September 12, 2007, in Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania. Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd did not enter into a property settlement
agreement in connection with the divorce.
Regina Lloyd died in Pennsylvania on March 11, 2011. Her will was probated in
Pennsylvania. On March 15, 2011, a letter was sent to M~tlife stating that Arthur
Constable Ill is the executor of the estate, and informing MetLife of the death of Regina
Lloyd, and the 2007 divorce. MetLife requested a copy of the divorce decree with
property settlement, especially any reference to the Annuity. In response to this
request, MetLife was sent a copy of the divorce decree and the Will of Regina Lloyd.
Met life responded with a letter requesting the entire divorce decree with the property
settlement, showing the reference to the annuity and how it is to be disbursed, and
stating that it must have the signature of the judge and the date. The letter warned that
if this document was not provided, MetLife would proceed with the beneficiary
designation on file. MetLife sent four requests for this information and the last request
was marked "Final Request". The last letter stated that it would make the funds payable
to the beneficiary on file unless MetLife heard back from the addressee within 30 days.
The final letter was dated July 26, 2011. The letters from MetLife were addressed to
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Arthur R. Constable, Jr., at an address that was not the correct address for Arthur R.
Constable, Jr., but was the address given for correspondence in the initial letter sent to
MetLife after Regina Lloyd's death. Metlife's letters of April 22, 2011, June 10, 2011,
and July 26, 2011 received no response. This Court is troubled by the failure of the
2
Executor to respond to the letters from MetLife. Since MetLife is excused from liability
under 20 Pa.C.S. 6111.2, their payments to a former husband beneficiary makes the
Executor's failure to respond irrelevant.
MetLife contacted Michael Lloyd on November 1, 2011. On September 28,
2012, in response to prior correspondence with MetLife, Michael Lloyd sent MetLife a
notarized handwritten letter providing personal identity information and stating that he
was the rightful beneficiary of Regina Lloyd's Annuity and that there was never any kind
of property settlement in their divorce. Thereafter, MetLife remitted to Michael Lloyd
past payments from the date of Regina Lloyd's death and began paying Michael Lloyd
the amount of $6,469.00 monthly.
On May 7, 2013, Michael Lloyd agreed to sell/transfer part of the future payments
to J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC (hereinafter "Wentworth"). Michael Lloyd
transferred $2,200.00 of the monthly annuity payments for 20 years to Wentworth for
$200,000.00. This sell/transfer was approved by the Florida state court on June 25,
2013. The Petition For Court Approval of a Transfer of Structure Settlement Payment
Rights filed with the Florida Court in May of 2013, (Exhibit P) makes no mention that
Michael Lloyd was not the injured party. It further makes no mention of his divorce from
I •
and subsequent death of Regina Lloyd. The Florida Court Order dated June 25, 2013,
(Exhibit Q) set forth in finding number 1, that the transfer sought does not contravene
"Any Federaf or State Statute". Had the Florida Court been made aware of Regina's
Pennsylvania divorce from Michael Lloyd as well as her death in 2011, that court may
not have approved the transfer. Notice of the Florida court proceeding had not been
3
given to the estate of Regina Lloyd, or to the guardians of Anthony Lloyd prior to this
transfer.
On October 31, 2013, Michael Lloyd attempted to sell/transfer another portion of
the annuity to Wentworth. This time Wentworth notified Arthur and Angela Constable
(the guardians of the person of Anthony Lloyd) of the impending sell/transfer and it was
objected to by the attorney for the Guardian, as well as the attorney for the Executor of
Regina Lloyd's estate. Based on the objections, this second sell/transfer was withdrawn
by Wentworth. Michael Lloyd died in Florida on December 13, 2013.
The instant matter was commenced in this Court on November 26, 2013, when
the Estate of Regina Lloyd filed a Petition for Citation to Show Cause Why Annuity
Payments Should Not Be Paid to Estate. MetLife and Michael Lloyd were the named
Respondents. On February 24, 2014, Wentworth filed an Emergency Petition to
Intervene, which was granted on March 21, 2014. On June 10, 2014, MetLife filed a
Petition for Rule to lnterplead by Notice to Plaintiff Estate of Regina R. Lloyd and
Intervenor Wentwoth and by Citation to Claimant Estate of Michael R. Lloyd, which
interpleader, on July 23, 2014, this Court granted. On July 17, 2014, Anthony Lloyd
filed a Petition to Intervene, which this Court granted. On August 21, 2014, this Court
Ordered that Petitioner, Estate of Regina Lloyd, Intervenor Wentworth, Intervenor
Guardian of Estate of Anthony Lloyd and Claimant, Estate of Michael Lloyd are enjoined
from commencing or further prosecution any action in any court against MetLife for
periodic payments under the subject Annuity, except as a party to the above entitled
action. Currently all monthly annuity funds have been interpleaded into this Court and
fall under the jurisdiction of this Court.
4
The first issue before this Court is whether Florida law or Pennsylvania law is
applicable to determine the effect a divorce has on a husband beneficiary. This Court
has concluded that Pennsylvania has the greater interest in the application of its law,
and Pennsylvania has the most significant contacts or relationship to this matter,
therefore, Pennsylvania law governs this matter. Sheard v. J.J. Deluca Co, Inc., 92
A.3d 68, 76 (Pa.Super. 2014). The decedent, Regina Lloyd, and her son, Anthony
Lloyd, moved to Pennsylvania in September of 2004. Also, Michael Lloyd moved to
Pennsylvania and lived here for many years. Regina Lloyd executed a will in
Pennsylvania on March 16, 2006. She was domiciled in Pennsylvania at the time of
her divorce from Michael Lloyd on September 12, 2007, as well as when she died on
March 11, 2011. Their child, Anthony Lloyd, has continued to be domiciled in
Pennsylvania. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has a distinct interest in protecting
the property rights of its citizens. {Andress v. Zoning Bd of Adjustment of City of
Philadelphia, 410 Pa. 77, 188 A.2d 709 (1963)).
The State of Florida's interest in this matter is more tenuous. The Settlement
Agreement followed by the 2003 Model Qualified Assignment Release and Pledge
Agreement and Addendum (hereinafter "MetLife Assignment Agreement") were
executed in Florida in 2003. The Agreements stemmed from settlement of the personal
injury action that was filed in Florida on June 3, 2003. There is currently no dispute
about the Settlement Agreement or the MetLife Assignment Agreement. These
agreements completed the personal injury matter in 2003 and are not at issue in the
instant estate matter. Thus the State of Florida's connection to this matter was
5
concluded in 2003 and Florida's interest is not as strong as Pennsylvania's interest in
this matter.
The second issue is whether the Settlement Agreement required the beneficiary
designation to remain Michael Lloyd. This Court has determined that the Settlement
Agreement does not require that Michael Lloyd remain the beneficiary of the subject
annuity. The language of Settlement Agreement itself does not require that the
beneficiary designation remain Michael Lloyd. Wentworth argues that the Settlement
Agreement includes the settlement of Michael Lloyd's loss of consortium claim and
therefore Michael Lloyd must remain the beneficiary, unless there is a written change
submitted by both Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd as claimants. However, the wording
of the Settlement Agreement does not contain such a requirement.
The pertinent section of the Settlement Agreement states as follows:
Beneficiary
Any payments to be made after the death of Regina Lloyd shall be
made to such person or entity as shall be designated in writing by
Claimants to the Insurer or the Insurer's Assignee. If no person or
entity is so designated by Claimants, or if the person designated is
not living at the time of Regina's death, such payments shall be
made to Michael R. Lloyd
(emphasis in original) (Exhibit A)
The first sentence allows claimants to designate a beneficiary. The second sentence
names Michael Lloyd if no other beneficiary has been named or if the named
beneficiary predeceases Regina Lloyd. A review of the Settlement Agreement shows
that lumps sums were paid to Regina Lloyd only. Michael Lloyd was not the named
recipient for any payments. Michael Lloyd was not required to be named as beneficiary.
The Beneficiary provision does not require Michael R. Lloyd to continue in perpetuity to
be the beneficiary. It does not prohibit a change in beneficiary, nor does the plain
6
language require both Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd to jointly designate a beneficiary
after the initial beneficiary had been designated. When a contract is clear and
unambiguous, only the writing itself needs to be examined. In re Estate of Hoffman, 54
A.3d 903 (Pa.Super. 2012). Once claimants chose a beneficiary this provision was
fulfilled and it no longer controlled Regina Lloyd's beneficiary designations. This Court
notes that the MetLife Assignment Agreement, which followed the Settlement
Agreement only names Regina Lloyd and her son Anthony Lloyd, as claimants, and is
executed only by them. Michael Lloyd is not named in that Assignment Agreement and
does not have any rights thereunder. There is conflicting language as to who is a
claimant between the language of the Settlement Agreement and the MetLife
Assignment Agreement.
Furthermore, the language of the Settlement Agreement was not incorporated by
reference into any of the subsequent agreements. The Settlement Agreement, MetLife
Assignment Agreement, Request for MetLife Structured Settlement Fixed Annuity and
the Annuity contract were all separate, independent agreements. This Court must
consider all the agreements to reach a fair and just decision. Performance of the
Settlement Agreement was complete in 2003. The only document from which any party
derives a present claim to payments is the Annuity contract. It is the Annuity contract
that obligates MetLife to pay monthly the sum of $6,469.00.
Moreover, all rights of Michel Lloyd to be compensated for loss of consortium
ended upon divorce. Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §3503, the effect of a divorce decree is
that all property rights which were dependent upon the marital relation are terminated,
7
except those that are vested rights, unless the court expressly provides otherwise in the
divorce decree, which did not occur. Michael Lloyd's right to consortium terminated
upon divorce. It was not a vested right because by it's nature it could not extend
indefinitely. This Court, as a court of equity, recognizes that it would be unjust to give
Michael Lloyd the right to block Regina's beneficiary designations beyond the time of
their marriage.
Additionally, if this Court were to agree with Wentworth and decide that the
language of the Settlement Agreement continued to control the rights and obligations of
Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd after 2003, then this Court would consider the entire
Settlement Agreement, including section (3), (claimants Rights to Payments) which
states that claimants (Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd) shall not have the power to sell,
mortgage, encumber, or anticipate the periodic payments, or any part thereof, by
assignment or otherwise. The Florida Court in paragraph D of its Order (Exhibit Q),
made no finding regarding the enforceability of any non-assignment provisions
contained in the original Settlement Agreement or related documents. The non-
assignment provision in the Settlement Agreement was not used by MetLife or
Wentworth to prevent Michael Lloyd from selling part of the periodic payments he was
receiving. Therefore, this Court gives little weight to Wentworth's argument that the
Settlement Agreement continued to control the rights and obligations under the Annuity.
The third and most important issue is whether the application of 20 Pa.C.S.
§6111.2 dictates the result in this matter. This Court concludes that pursuant to 20
Pa.C.S. §6111.2, upon the death of Regina Lloyd on March 11, 2011, her estate was
entitled to all future annuity payments.
8
The effect of divorce on the designation of beneficiaries is governed by 20
Pa.C.S. §6111.2, which provides as follows:
(a) Applicability. - This section is applicable if an individual:
(1) Is domiciled in this Commonwealth:
(2) Designates the individual's spouse as beneficiary of the individual's ... annuity
contract. .. providing for payments to the spouse; and
(3) Either:
(I) at the time of the individual's death is divorced from the spouse; ...
(a) General rule.-Any designation described in subsection (a)(2) in favor of the
individual's spouse or former spouse that was revocable by the individual at the
individual's death shall become ineffective for all purposes and shall be
construed as if the spouse or former spouse had predeceased the individual,
unless it appears the designation was intended to survive the divorce based on:
(1) the wording of the designation;
(2) a court order;
(3) a written contract between the individual and the spouse or former
spouse; or
(4) a designation of a former spouse as beneficiary after the divorce
decree has been issued
(a) liability. -
(1) Unless restrained by court order, no insurance company ... shall be
liable for making payments to a spouse or former spouse which would
have been proper in the absence of this ·section.
(2) Any spouse or former spouse to whom payment is made shall be
answerable to anyone prejudiced by the payment.
Pursuant to the above statute, the estate or Regina Lloyd was entitled to the
entire annuity payments upon the death of Regina Lloyd. It is undisputed that she was
domiciled in Pennsylvania at her death.
Wentworth argues that it was not Regina Lloyd's annuity contract as is required
in 20 Pa.C.S. §6111.2(a)(2), since the owner of the annuity was listed as MetLife
Insurance and Annuity Company, rather than Regina Lloyd. The statute does not
require the individual to own the annuity. The statute requires that the individual's
spouse is designated as beneficiary in the individual's "annuity contract". This Court
finds that the annuity contract belonged to Regina Lloyd since she was receiving the
annuity payments as payee and she was the "measuring life (annuitant)". The fact that
9
she was not listed as owner of the annuity does not prevent this Court from determining
that the phrase 'of the individual's annuity contract' applies to Regina Lloyd under 20
Pa.C.S. §6111.2(a)(2). The plain words of the statute do not require ownership.
Wentworth's other challenge to the application of 20 Pa.C.S. §6111.2(a)(2), is the
claim that the designation of Michael Lloyd as beneficiary was not revocable by Regina
Lloyd pursuant to the MetLife Assignment Agreement which states:
Payee may request in writing that assignee change the payee and/or
beneficiary designation under this agreement. Any change of the
payee/beneficiary designation will only be made with the assignee's
consent. Assignee's decision will be final ...
(Addendum #1 of Exhibit B)
The MetLife Assignment Agreement permits Regina Lloyd to request a change in
beneficiary but Assignee (MetLife) is not obligated to approve the requested change.
During the trial of December 9, 2014, Courtney Sedita, with the MetLife annuity
department, testified that had Regina Lloyd submitted a written request to change the
beneficiary, this request would have been forwarded to legal counsel for approval or
rejection. Since Regina Lloyd is not listed as the owner of the annuity and did not have
unrestricted right to change the beneficiary, Wentworth argues that the beneficiary
designation was not revocable by Regina Lloyd and that 20 Pa.C.S. §6111.2, is not
applicable to the instant matter. It must be kept in mind that the "ownership" of the
Annuity in the name of a third party is solely for tax purposes.
This Court has determined that the beneficiary designation of Michael Lloyd was
revocable despite the condition that MetLife had to approve any beneficiary change.
The term "revocable" is not defined in the statute. When the words of a statute are clear
and unambiguous they are presumed to be the best indication of legislative intent.
10
Chanceford Aviation v. Chanceford Twp. Bd. Of Supervisors, 592 Pa. 100, 923 A.2d
1099, 1104 (2007). Here, since the term "revocable" is not defined in the statute, the
term will be given its ordinary meaning and common usage. (Osprey Portfolio. LLC v.
lzett, 620 Pa. 274, 67 A.3d 749, (Pa. 2013). Delellis v. Borough of Verona, 541 Pa. 3,
10, 660 A.2d 25, 28 (1995), quoted and followed by AMP Inc. v. Com, 578 Pa. 366 at
376, 852 A.2d 1161 at 1167 (2004)).
Black's Law dictionary, revised fourth edition, defines "revocable" as "susceptible
of being revoked", and "revoked" as "to annul or make void by recalling or taking back,
cancel, rescind, repeal, reverse". The term "revocable" does not require an
unconditional right to cancel or withdraw. This Court finds that Regina Lloyd had the
right to change the beneficiary designation with Metlife's approval. There was no
evidence presented at the trial to indicate that MetLife would have denied a requested
change in beneficiary to Regina Lloyd's estate after the divorce. Such a beneficiary
change would have been consistent with Pennsylvania law, and MetLife would not have
had any reason to deny the beneficiary change had it been requested. Since this Court
finds the beneficiary designation was revocable, pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S. §6111.2(a)(2),
the beneficiary designation of Michael Lloyd became ineffective for all purposes after
the divorce and should have been construed as though Michael Lloyd predeceased
Regina Lloyd.
The language of the statute lists several exceptions where it should not be
assumed that the former spouse predeceased the individual because the designation
was intended to survive the divorce, but none of the exceptions apply to the instant
matter. The wording of the beneficiary designation did not indicate it was intended to
11
survive a divorce, nor was there a court order or an agreement between the parties
indicating that the designation of Michael Lloyd as beneficiary was to survive a divorce.
Wentworth argues that the Settlement Agreement included the settlement of
Michael Lloyd's loss of consortium claim and therefore his claim was intended to survive
the divorce. Michael Lloyd was married to Regina Lloyd for less than five years after
the accident which rendered her paralyzed. Since a consortium claim by its nature
terminates upon divorce, it would be inequitable, resulting in unjust enrichment, to
permit Michael Lloyd's consortium claim to survive beyond the divorce, entitling him to
potential payment of more than $1,750,000 for injuries that occurred to his ex-wife.
Michael Lloyd was not injured or involved in the accident for which the annuity
payments are due. Any right to damages that Michael Lloyd acquired from the accident
was due to his marriage to Regina Lloyd.
In 1992, when 20 Pa.C.S. §6111.2 was initially enacted, it was conceptually
patterned after section 2507(2), Will modification by circumstances of divorce, which
was enacted in 1947. Prior to 1947, the right of a former spouse to take under a will
was not affected by divorce. The 1947 legislation rendered testamentary provisions that
favored a person's spouse to become ineffective upon divorce, recognizing the fact that
most people who fail to change or revoke their wills after a divorce would want to have
their wills changed by operation of law. Bloom v. Selfon, 555 A.2d 75, 520 Pa. 519
(1989). This same reasoning can be applied to beneficiaries of annuity contracts, and
was the purpose of 20 Pa.C.S. §6111.2.
Therefore, pursuantto 20 Pa.C.S. §6111.2, all annuity payments after the death
of Regina Lloyd should have been paid to the estate of Regina Lloyd. At the time that
the assignment from Michael Lloyd to Wentworth was approved by the court in Florida,
12
Michael Lloyd did not have any interest in the Annuity to assign. Regina Lloyd was
divorced from Michael Lloyd at the time of her death in Pennsylvania so the beneficiary
designation on her annuity became ineffective for all purposes and should have been
construed by both MetLife and Wentworth as if Michael Lloyd had predeceased Regina
Lloyd, in which case the annuity payments would go to the estate of Regina Lloyd.
Both MetLife and Wentworth had notice that Regina Lloyd and Michael Lloyd
were divorced in Pennsylvania. MetLife had received notice of the divorce shortly after
Regina Lloyd's death. Wentworth knew about the divorce and Regina's death, since the
divorce information was on Michael Lloyd's application to sell a portion of the monthly
annuity payments (Exhibit EE). Had Wentworth closely read the Structured Settlement
Application, it would have noted that the date of divorce is listed as "11-17-2012" and
Regina's date of death as "5-20-2009", some 3Y2 years prior to the divorce date set
forth. Both dates are incorrect. This Court finds that Wentworth never read the "prior
marital status information" on its application form as completed by Michael Lloyd. Had it
done so numerous legal questions should have arisen in the mind of its employees.
Wentworth was not a bonifide purchaser. Both companies had notice of the divorce and
should have been aware that under Pennsylvania law a divorce has an effect on the
designation of a spouse as a beneficiary of an annuity. Wentworth's headquarters are
in Pennsylvania. Wentworth should have known that Michael Lloyd was not the
beneficiary of Regina Lloyd's Annuity after the divorce, and Michael Lloyd did not have
an interest to sell.
It is important to note that Wentworth withdrew its request for a second
assignment by Michael Lloyd when the Florida Court received objections from counsel
for Anthony Lloyd and from counsel for the executor of the estate. In fact, the purchase
13
agreement (Exhibit 0) in section 5(8) permits Wentworth to cancel the agreement if the
Petition for a Court order is ... opposed... Had Wentworth's Florida counsel given notice·
to Mr. and Mrs. Constable of the First Request for Court Approval, filed just five months
earlier, Wentworth would likely have canceled that request.
MetLife, having had notice of the divorce prior to transferring monthly payments
to Michael Lloyd and then acquiescing to the first assignment is not without some
culpability. However, the provisions of 20 Pa.C.S. 6111.2 as enacted by the
Pennsylvania Legislature excuses their liability.
In conclusion, pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S. §6111.2, upon the death of Regina R.
Lloyd on March 11, 2011, the designation of Michael Lloyd as beneficiary was to be
construed as if Michael Lloyd had predeceased Regina R. Lloyd, and all subsequent
periodic Annuity payments were to be paid to the Estate of Regina Lloyd, as the
contingent beneficiary. MetLife is relieved of liability under 20 Pa.C.S. §6111.2(a)(1),
for any periodic payments made to Michael Lloyd and to Wentworth. All interpleaded
funds and funds held in escrow in the instant matter shall be released and paid to the
Estate of Regina Lloyd. All future periodic payments under the subject Annuity shall be
paid to the Estate of Regina Lloyd.
This Court enters the following Order for the reasons stated herein.
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
RE: ESTATE OF NO: 1612 of 2011
REGINA R. LLOYD,
DECEASED
ORDER OF COURT
And Now, To Wit, this { ~ day of January, 2015, in accordance with the
foregoing Opinion, it is Ordered that MetLife distribute all accumulated and future
periodic Annuity payments under Annuity Certificate No. 80451 to the Estate of Regina
Lloyd.
It is further Ordered that Wentworth return to the Estate of Regina Lloyd any
funds received under Annuity Certificate No. 80451.
BY THE COURT:
15