Com. v. Roberts, S. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S06041-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    SEAN MICHAEL ROBERTS                       :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1122 MDA 2022
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 17, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-21-CR-0002611-2020
    BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                          FILED MARCH 30, 2023
    Sean Michael Roberts appeals from the June 17, 2022 judgment of
    sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole imposed after
    a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder.1 After careful review, we affirm
    the judgement of sentence.
    The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:
    In the predawn hours of October 15, 2020, the Carlisle
    Borough Police Department responded to a 9-1-1 call
    reporting a homicide at 169 and ½ East High Street,
    Carlisle, Cumberland County. The caller, later
    identified as Appellant, reported that he had murdered
    Jodi Sivak (hereinafter “Victim”), by stabbing her in
    the neck. The police quickly responded to the call,
    taking Appellant into custody, and securing the scene
    of the crime. Immediately inside the front door of the
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
    J-S06041-23
    property the police discovered Victim, who was
    pronounced dead at the scene due to multiple stab
    wounds to the head and neck. Clearly visible was a
    trail of blood leading from Victim’s body to the first-
    floor kitchen where the murder weapon, a folding
    knife, was recovered from the sink. Also visible was
    a blood trail leading to the second-floor bathroom,
    where Appellant’s bloody clothes were located next to
    the shower. Appellant also had a bandaged wound on
    his hand, which appeared to have been a result of
    either Victim’s attempt at self-defense, or Appellant
    cutting himself while struggling with Victim for control
    of the knife.
    After being detained at the scene, Appellant was
    transported to the Carlisle Police Department, where
    he gave a voluntary interview. In that interview,
    Appellant described that he had flown out from
    Massachusetts to spend a week with Victim, a
    previous girlfriend of his. He stated that they had
    spent a pleasant time together, and that he was
    originally going to fly home on October 15th. Appellant
    went on to describe that, on the night of the crime, he
    and Victim had been drinking whiskey earlier in the
    night, and that a neighbor had provided some “Amish
    weed” for the pair to smoke. However, Appellant flatly
    stated during the interview that at the time of the
    stabbing he was not impaired or intoxicated to the
    point that he was out of control of his actions, and he
    had a clear recollection of having an argument with
    Victim before stabbing her. Importantly, during the
    interview Appellant stated with respect to his alcohol
    consumption being a factor in the murder, “Yeah I
    don’t, I don’t think that had anything to do with it, but
    I mean, whatever, lawyers, whatever is gonna try to
    say otherwise, but I don’t think it had anything to do
    with it.” In fact, the recorded interview demonstrated
    that Appellant was both candid regarding his actions
    and fully cooperative with the police in their initial
    investigation of the murder.
    Notably, Appellant recalled that he grabbed the knife
    and repeatedly stabbed Victim, and that he attempted
    to cover her mouth during the attack to prevent her
    -2-
    J-S06041-23
    from screaming. After killing Victim, Appellant walked
    to the first-floor kitchen to wash his hands and deposit
    the knife in the sink. He stated that he then went to
    the second-floor bathroom to take a shower, dress his
    wound, and change his clothes, before taking a nap
    and then making the 9-1-1 phone call which
    summoned the police to his location. During that 9-
    1-1 call, Appellant informed the operator that he
    intended to peacefully surrender, and that he was not
    armed.
    Trial court opinion, 10/4/22 at 1-4 (footnotes omitted).
    Appellant was subsequently charged with first-degree murder and
    proceeded to a jury trial on April 11, 2022. Following a three-day jury trial,
    the trial court found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder.               As noted,
    Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
    on June 17, 2022. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion which was denied
    by the trial court following a hearing on July 14, 2022. This timely appeal
    followed on August 9, 2022.2
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    I.     Was the conviction against the weight of the
    evidence such that it shocked one’s sense of
    justice based on the evidence of [Appellant’s]
    intoxication presented during trial and the
    Commonwealth’s failure to prove that he acted
    with the specific intent to kill?
    II.    Based on the evidence of [Appellant’s]
    intoxication presented during trial, did the trial
    court err in failing to give the jury instruction for
    voluntary intoxication or drugged condition as
    ____________________________________________
    2   Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    -3-
    J-S06041-23
    defense to first-degree murder, as requested by
    counsel?
    Appellant’s brief at 5 (extraneous capitalization omitted).
    Appellant first argues that the verdict was against the weight of the
    evidence because “it shocked one’s sense of justice based on the evidence of
    [his] intoxication” and the Commonwealth’s purported “failure to prove [his]
    specific intent to kill[.]” Appellant’s brief at 10. We disagree.
    This Court has recognized that “a true weight of the evidence challenge
    concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions
    which evidence is to be believed.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    172 A.3d 632
    ,
    643 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    183 A.3d 970
     (Pa.
    2018). “An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is
    addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Galvin,
    
    985 A.2d 783
    , 793 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 
    559 U.S. 1051
    (2010).
    [W]here the trial court has ruled on the weight claim
    below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the
    underlying question of whether the verdict is against
    the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review
    is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused
    its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
    Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 
    40 A.3d 1250
    , 1253 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation
    omitted).
    Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to
    hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate
    court will give the gravest consideration to the
    findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when
    -4-
    J-S06041-23
    reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict
    is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
    assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial
    is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or
    was not against the weight of the evidence and that a
    new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
    This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by
    the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a
    new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the
    evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a
    trial court’s discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he
    term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment,
    wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate
    conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not
    exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of
    the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the
    foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
    personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.
    Discretion is abused where the course pursued
    represents not merely an error of judgment, but
    where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or
    where the law is not applied or where the record
    shows that the action is a result of partiality,
    prejudice, bias or ill-will.
    Commonwealth v. Clay, 
    64 A.3d 1049
    , 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations and
    emphasis omitted).
    Upon review, we find that the trial court properly exercised its discretion
    in concluding that the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the
    evidence. See trial court opinion, 10/4/22 at 5-7. “[T]he trier of fact while
    passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
    produced,   is   free   to   believe   all,   part   or   none   of   the   evidence.”
    Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz, 
    911 A.2d 162
    , 165 (Pa.Super. 2006)
    (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    926 A.2d 972
     (Pa. 2007).
    -5-
    J-S06041-23
    Here, the jury heard testimony from multiple witnesses that Appellant
    stabbed the victim nine times in her neck and head area, resulting in her
    death. See notes of testimony, 4/12/22 at 183-196, 208-210 (Dr. Wayne
    Ross); 236-238, 244-246 (Robert Johnson). The jury also had the benefit of
    a video recording of Appellant’s interview with the police in the immediate
    aftermath of the murder, wherein he provided a detailed timeline the murder
    and expressly stated that he was not intoxicated to the point where he did not
    know what he was doing. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 10 – Recorded
    Interview; notes of testimony, 4/11/22 at 127-128. The jury clearly found
    the testimony and evidence presented at trial credible and elected not to
    believe Appellant’s subsequent version of the events. We are precluded from
    reweighing the evidence and substituting our judgment for that of the
    factfinder. Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055. Accordingly, Appellant’s weight claim must
    fail.
    Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing
    to charge the jury with an “instruction for voluntary intoxication or drugged
    condition as a defense to first-degree murder[.]”3 Appellant’s brief at 14. We
    disagree.
    The standard of review for a trial court’s decision to refuse a diminished
    capacity jury instruction based on voluntary intoxication is an abuse of
    ____________________________________________
    3   This defense is also known as “diminished capacity.”
    -6-
    J-S06041-23
    discretion.   Commonwealth v. Clemons, 
    200 A.3d 441
    , 465 (Pa. 2019),
    cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
    140 S.Ct. 176 (2019)
    . This Court has stated:
    Our standard of review when considering the denial of
    jury instructions is one of deference — an appellate
    court will reverse a court’s decision only when it
    abused its discretion or committed an error of law.
    Further, the trial court is not required to give every
    charge that is requested by the parties and its refusal
    to give a requested charge does not require reversal
    unless the Appellant was prejudiced by that refusal.
    Commonwealth v. Green, 
    273 A.3d 1080
    , 1084 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citations,
    internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted), appeal denied, ___ A.3d
    ___, 
    2022 WL 17662326
     (Pa. 2022).
    Our Supreme Court has examined when a jury must be provided a
    voluntary intoxication/diminished capacity instruction in Commonwealth v.
    Padilla, 
    80 A.3d 1238
     (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 
    573 U.S. 907
     (2014).
    Padilla involved a defendant who argued that his convictions for first-degree
    murder should be vacated because the trial court erred when it instructed the
    jury that there was no evidence of diminished capacity due to his ingestion of
    alcohol and/or drugs. Id. at 1263. The Padilla Court held:
    A defense of diminished capacity negates the element
    of specific intent, and thus mitigates first-degree
    murder to third-degree murder. The mere fact of
    voluntary intoxication does not give rise to a
    diminished capacity defense. Rather, to prove
    diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication, a
    defendant must show that he was overwhelmed to the
    point of losing his faculties and sensibilities. Evidence
    that the defendant lacked the ability to control his or
    her actions or acted impulsively is irrelevant to
    -7-
    J-S06041-23
    specific intent to kill, and thus is not admissible to
    support a diminished capacity defense.
    This Court has previously made clear that a jury
    instruction regarding diminished capacity due to
    voluntary intoxication is justified only when the
    record contains evidence that the accused was
    intoxicated to the point of losing his or her
    faculties or sensibilities. Evidence that the accused
    ingested alcohol or other intoxicating drug — without
    more — does not warrant a voluntary intoxication
    instruction.
    Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added).
    Upon review, we find no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its
    discretion by denying Appellant’s requested jury instruction on voluntary
    intoxication.    The record reveals no evidentiary basis that Appellant was
    sufficiently intoxicated during his murder of the victim to warrant such an
    instruction.    On the contrary, Appellant’s own admissions during his video
    interview with police immediately following the murder belie his claim that he
    was intoxicated to the point of having lost his faculties or sensibilities.
    As stated by the trial court,
    Appellant provided a detailed walkthrough of his
    actions from the time he first stabbed Victim until he
    summoned the police and surrendered himself into
    their custody. Further, Appellant himself discounted
    his intoxication during the interview, stating that while
    his attorneys might attempt to argue that he was too
    intoxicated to know what he was doing, that was not
    the case. Appellant’s actions following the murder
    through his confession were calm and calculated, and
    reflected a clear recollection of events as well as a
    clear thinking pattern. For example, Appellant stayed
    on the line with the 9-1-1 dispatcher, so she could
    ensure the police knew that he was not armed and
    -8-
    J-S06041-23
    thus they would not find him to be a threat. At no
    time in Appellant’s actions or presentation in the video
    did he act as though he was even slightly intoxicated.
    Trial court opinion, 10/4/22 at 8-9.
    This Court has long recognized that there is no right to have any
    particular form of instruction given; it is enough that the charge “clearly and
    accurately characterize relevant law.” Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 
    216 A.3d 307
    , 321 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    224 A.3d 364
     (Pa. 2020).
    Here, the record reveals that the trial court charged the jury with an
    instruction similar to the one given in Padilla, which permitted the jury to
    consider Appellant’s alcohol and drug intake on the evening in question
    together with all the other evidence in the case to “determine if the
    Commonwealth has met its burden of proving specific intent beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” See notes of testimony, 4/13/22 at 113-114. We find
    these instructions clearly, adequately, and accurately presented the relevant
    law to the jury for its consideration.       Appellant’s claim to the contrary,
    therefore, must fail.
    For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s June 17, 2022
    judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    -9-
    J-S06041-23
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 03/30/2023
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1122 MDA 2022

Judges: Stevens, P.J.E.

Filed Date: 3/30/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/30/2023