Lambrecht, T. v. Liebl, L. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S46036-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    THOMAS LAMBRECHT,                           :       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :             PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant                :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    LAURA LIEBL,                                :
    :
    Appellee                 :           No. 80 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Decree entered on December 12, 2014
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County,
    Civil Division, No. C-48-CV2011-6521
    BEFORE: MUNDY, OLSON and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                          FILED AUGUST 07, 2015
    Thomas Lambrecht (“Husband”) appeals from the entry of the Divorce
    Decree. We affirm.
    Husband married Laura Liebl (“Wife”) on August 24, 2004. The parties
    did not have any children together.       The parties separated in 2007, and
    Husband filed a Complaint in divorce on July 12, 2011. Wife subsequently
    filed a Petition for ancillary relief wherein she raised a claim for alimony
    pendente lite (“APL”), counsel fees and costs.         On February 6, 2013,
    Husband filed a claim for equitable distribution.
    On September 19, 2013, the parties entered into a partial property
    settlement    agreement     (“Agreement”)   whereby   Husband   retained   sole
    possession and ownership of their marital residence, and Wife waived all
    interest in the property.      The Agreement permitted Wife to remain in the
    J-S46036-15
    residence until she was able to purchase her own home. However, Wife was
    unable to secure financing to move out of the marital residence, and needed
    equitable distribution to occur in order to secure funds for a down payment
    on a home.
    On March 13, 2014, Husband provided Wife with a handwritten, signed
    document (“Document”) as part of the equitable distribution, which stated
    Husband would promptly pay Wife $60,000.00 by certified check. In March
    and April 2014, the parties, through their attorneys, exchanged emails
    regarding performance of the $60,000.00 payment to Wife. Wife accepted
    the offer, and sought the $60,000.00 promised by Husband. Husband, while
    agreeing to pay Wife $60,000.00, disputed whether Wife was to be paid in a
    lump sum or over a period of time.
    On April 13, 2014, Husband provided Wife with a second handwritten,
    signed document titled “Payment Agreement on Property Settlement,”
    (“Payment Agreement”) which provided that Husband would pay Wife
    $60,000.00 upfront and without delay by certified check. Husband failed to
    pay Wife $60,000.00.   On June 11, 2014, Wife filed a Petition to Enforce
    Settlement.   On July 2, 2014, the trial court entered an Order granting
    Wife’s Petition and directed Husband to pay Wife $60,000.00 within ten
    days. A final Divorce Decree was entered on December 12, 2014. Husband
    filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pennsylvania Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 1925(b) Concise Statement.
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    On appeal, Husband raises the following question for our review:
    Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its
    discretion when [the trial court] determined that the document
    dated March 13, 2014[,] was a full, complete, valid and
    enforceable agreement between Husband and Wife[?]
    Brief for Appellant at 4.
    “The determination of marital property rights through settlement
    agreements has long been permitted, and even encouraged.”          Adams v.
    Adams, 
    848 A.2d 991
    , 993 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation and ellipses
    omitted); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3105. A property settlement agreement
    must be treated as a separate and independent contract when it does not
    merge with the Divorce Decree.1 McMahon v. McMahon, 
    612 A.2d 1360
    ,
    1363 (Pa. Super. 1990). “A marital settlement agreement between spouses
    is governed by the law of contracts unless the agreement provides
    otherwise.”   Stamerro v. Stamerro, 
    889 A.2d 1251
    , 1258 (Pa. Super.
    2005) (citation and brackets omitted); see also Gaster v. Gaster, 
    703 A.2d 513
    , 515 (Pa. Super. 1997) (stating that where the settlement
    agreement was not merged into the divorce decree, it is enforceable at law
    or equity and is governed by the law of contracts). Contract interpretation is
    a question of law; therefore, our standard of review is plenary. Kraisinger
    v. Kraisinger, 
    928 A.2d 333
    , 339 (Pa. Super. 2007).
    1
    We note that the instant Agreement has not merged with the Divorce
    Decree. See Ballestrino v. Ballestrino, 
    583 A.2d 474
    , 477 (Pa. Super.
    1990) (stating that a settlement agreement does not merge with the divorce
    decree where there is no evidence that such merger was intended).
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    “[A] court must construe the contract only as written and may not
    modify the plain meaning of the words under the guise of interpretation.”
    Habjan v. Habjan, 
    73 A.3d 630
    , 640 (Pa. Super. 2013).              “Where a
    settlement agreement contains all of the requisites of a valid contract, a
    court must enforce the terms of the agreement.”       Mastrioni-Mucker v.
    Allstate Ins., 
    976 A.2d 510
    , 518 (Pa. Super. 2007).         “Under ordinary
    contract law, contracts are enforceable when parties reach [a] mutual
    agreement, exchange consideration[,] and have set forth terms of their
    bargain with sufficient clarity.”   Biddle v. Johnsonbaugh, 
    664 A.2d 159
    ,
    163 (Pa. Super. 1995). A binding agreement exists where all parties come
    to a meeting of the minds on all essential terms of the agreement.
    Mastrioni-Mucker, 976 A.2d at 518. “An offer may be accepted by conduct
    and what the parties do pursuant to the offer is germane to show whether
    the offer is accepted.” Mountain Props. v. Tyler Hill Realty Corp., 
    767 A.2d 1096
    , 1101 (Pa. Super. 2001). Further, “[w]hether particular conduct
    expresses an offer and acceptance must be determined on the basis of what
    a reasonable person in the position of the parties would be led to understand
    by such conduct under all of the surrounding circumstances.” 
    Id.
     (citation
    omitted).
    Husband contends that the Document and Payment Agreement are not
    valid, comprehensive and enforceable agreements between the parties.
    Brief for Appellant at 8-9, 13.      Specifically, Husband asserts that both
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    documents lack material terms, such as time of payment, a waiver of
    equitable distribution, waiver for counsel fees and costs, and waiver of APL.
    Id. at 8-9, 11. Husband argues that the trial court’s attempt to resolve the
    documents’ ambiguities went beyond mere interpretation.        Id.   Further,
    Husband asserts that neither document is supported by any valuable
    consideration. Id. at 10, 12. Husband also argues that because Wife made
    a counteroffer to the Document, and he did not accept the counteroffer, the
    Document is not enforceable.     Id. at 12.   Husband claims the Payment
    Agreement suffers from the same deficiencies. Id. at 12-13.
    As stated above, on September 19, 2013, Husband and Wife entered
    into the Agreement, which allowed Wife to remain in the marital residence
    until she purchased her own home.      Agreement, 9/19/13.    On March 13,
    2014, due to Wife’s inability to buy a home prior to equitable distribution,
    Husband provided Wife with the handwritten, signed Document that stated
    the following:
    [Husband] will provide and promptly pay [Wife] in the exact
    amount of $60,000.00[,] which will not exceed or be less than
    [the] stated [amount] of money. [Husband] will provide [Wife]
    with a certified check. [Wife] will not be responsible for any of
    the fees or taxes that may or may not accrue in order to make
    this transaction occur.
    Document, 3/13/14.
    Wife’s attorney accepted the offer, and sought the $60,000.00
    payment. Correspondence (Melissa P. Rudas, Esquire), 3/14/14; see also
    Correspondence (Melissa P. Rudas, Esquire), 4/8/14.     Husband’s attorney,
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    while acknowledging the $60,000.00 figure, believed that the parties had not
    reached an agreement because Husband was unable to provide Wife with a
    lump sum. Correspondence (Richard P. Focht, Esquire), 3/24/14.
    On April 13, 2014, Husband provided Wife with the handwritten,
    signed Payment Agreement that stated the following:
    Payment Agreement on Property Settlement
    -April 13th, 2014
    [Husband] agree[s] to pay and provide [Wife,] with no
    more or less than $60,000.00 upfront and without delay in the
    form of a certified check as [P]roperty [S]ettlement. [Wife] will
    not be held responsible for the appearance/cleanliness of the
    [marital residence] as this is too subjective in nature to
    determine. [Wife] may continue to move her property out of the
    [marital residence] without question. [Wife] and her pets may
    continue to live and stay in the [marital residence] until closing
    settlement on a house.
    [Husband] understand[s] closing settlement on [the]
    [marital residence] may take a couple months to process and
    complete.
    [Husband] will make no further requests or propositions in
    this matter.
    Payment Agreement, 4/13/14.
    Based on our review of the Payment Agreement, Husband agreed to
    pay Wife with a $60,000.00 certified check upfront and without delay. See
    Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/15, at 3; see also Muhammad v. Strassburger,
    McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick, 
    587 A.2d 1346
    , 1349 (Pa. 1990)
    (stating that a valid offer exists in a property settlement agreement where
    there is a clear settlement figure); Brangs v. Brangs, 
    595 A.2d 115
    , 116
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    (Pa.   Super. 1991) (stating      that an enforceable       property settlement
    agreement exists where the terms include a specific payment to a named
    recipient).   In exchange for Husband’s promise of $60,000.00, Wife
    promised to move out of the marital residence. See Commerce Bank v.
    First Union Nat’l Bank, 
    911 A.2d 133
    , 146 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that
    a   settlement   agreement   is   a   valid,   binding   contract   supported    by
    consideration where one party surrenders their ability to bring a claim
    against a second party in exchange for a promise). Husband, who drafted
    the Payment Agreement, did not include APL, counsel fees, or costs in the
    Payment Agreement and has not demonstrated that those terms were at
    issue. See Payment Agreement, 4/13/14 (stating that husband will make no
    further requests on this matter after he pays Wife $60,000.00); see also
    Habjan, 
    73 A.3d at 641
     (stating that the parties’ intentions at the time the
    document was signed take precedent over the parties’ intentions on appeal).
    Further, we conclude that Wife accepted the Payment Agreement.
    Here, Husband sent Wife the Document and promised her $60,000.00 by
    certified check. Document, 3/13/14. After receiving the Document, Wife’s
    attorney sent an email to Husband’s attorney accepting the offer.               See
    Commerce Bank v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 
    911 A.2d 133
    , 146 (Pa.
    Super. 2006) (stating that an acceptance occurred where counsel sent an
    email confirming that the proposed settlement agreement was agreed to).
    Exactly one month after he sent Wife the Document, Husband again
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    promised Wife $60,000.00 by certified check.          Payment Agreement,
    4/13/14. Thereafter, Wife filed the Petition to Enforce Settlement. Based on
    Husband’s multiple promises to pay Wife $60,000.00, and Wife’s repeated
    attempts to obtain performance, we conclude that Wife accepted the
    Payment Agreement. See O’Brien v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
    689 A.2d 254
    , 259 (Pa. Super. 1997) (stating that acceptance of an offer may be
    inferred from a parties’ course of conduct); see also Crispo v. Crispo, 
    909 A.2d 308
    , 314 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that wife’s failure to make a
    specific demand for performance of the marital settlement agreement does
    not bar her from recovering the $22,500.00 clearly owed by husband).
    Thus, the trial court did not err in concluding that Husband and Wife
    entered into a full, complete, valid and enforceable settlement agreement.
    See Biddle, 
    664 A.2d at 163
    ; see also Mastrioni-Mucker, 976 A.2d at
    518.
    Decree affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/7/2015
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