Com. v. Skinner, K. ( 2020 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KHALIF SKINNER :
:
Appellant : No. 3156 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 14, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0004727-2018
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 24, 2020
Khalif Skinner appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on June
14, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, made final by the
denial of post-sentence motions on October 10, 2019. The trial court imposed
an aggregate term of 13 to 48 months’ incarceration, after a jury convicted
him of two counts of recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”). 1 The
court also found him guilty of the following summary offenses – following too
closely, driving at an unsafe speed, careless driving, and reckless driving.2 On
appeal, Skinner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3310(A), 3361, 3714(A), and 3736(A), respectively.
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convictions and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review,
we affirm.
There is very little dispute as to the facts of this disastrous accident. The
primary conflict in the litigation was whether Skinner’s actions on that fateful
date were consonant with a criminally culpable state of mind. On October 30,
2017, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Jeffrey and Chieko Flowers, from
Chesapeake, Virginia, were traveling to their hotel in West
Allentown/Fogelsville, Pennsylvania on the Route 222 bypass after spending
time with family in Allentown. Jeffrey was driving the couple’s white Toyota
Prius and Chieko was sitting in the front passenger seat.
Traffic became heavier as it was rush hour, and they started to slow
down in speed, almost coming to a complete stop near the Krocks Road
intersection area. At that moment, a 16-foot long Penske box truck, driven by
Skinner, crashed into them from behind. The impact of the crash caused a
chain reaction, in which the Flowers’ car rear-ended a red Toyota Prius, driven
by Mary Moran.
Prior to the accident, Skinner and his employee, Delano Bostic, were en
route to deliver furniture to a customer in Allentown. While driving, Skinner
asked Bostic to look for his phone so he could inform the customer of their
estimated time of arrival. Bostic started looking on his side of the truck when
he glanced over and saw that Skinner was also looking for the phone. Bostic
indicated that when he glanced back up, the accident occurred.
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Witnesses stopped to help or seek assistance for those involved.
Pennsylvania State Police Trooper James Terry subsequently arrived at the
scene. He first interviewed Skinner. Skinner stated he thought he was going
approximately 40 miles per hour, which was below the 45 mile per hour speed
limit. He believed he had either looked down or reached down to get his cell
phone so that Bostic could call the customer. Skinner also stated that when
he looked back up, the traffic had slowed and he attempted to decrease his
speed but was unable to do so in time to avoid a collision with the Flowers’
car.
As a result of the crash, Jeffrey died at the Lehigh Valley Hospital due
to blunt force trauma. Chieko survived, but suffered from extensive bruises
on the front of her body as well as cuts and bruises on her hands and feet.
Skinner was charged with multiple crimes related to the incident,
including but not limited to homicide by vehicle, involuntary manslaughter,
and two counts of REAP, one each for the Flowers and Moran. At the jury trial,
both Chieko and Moran testified, as well as Trooper Terry and an accident
reconstruction expert, Pennsylvania State Trooper William Hoogerhyde.
Trooper Hoogerhyde testified that based on pre-crash data
approximately five seconds prior to impact, the Flowers’ car was traveling two
and a half miles per hour and the car was braking. He could not determine if
the brake lights were on at time of impact because they were destroyed during
the collision. Furthermore, based on a formula, the trooper was able to
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ascertain, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that Skinner was
going a minimum speed of 36.59 miles per hour at the time of impact. Trooper
Hoogerhyde opined that Skinner’s failure to keep his eyes on the road caused
the crash. Lastly, he conceded that sun glare would have affected all drivers
at that location.
Skinner took the stand and testified. He stated that after he found his
phone in the center console and handed it to Bostic, he looked back up and
was confronted with sun glare. Skinner averred that the sun glare obscured
his vision. In response, he started tapping on his brakes, but he could not see
the Flowers’ car until he was on top of it. He believed he was going
approximately 30 to 32 mph at the time. Skinner also indicated that due to
the weight of the truck, he could not slam on the brakes or swerve the truck
because such actions would have caused more damage than just trying to
brake.
The following day, the jury found Skinner guilty of the two REAP offenses
and not guilty of vehicular homicide and involuntary manslaughter. The court
then found him guilty of numerous summary offenses, following too closely,
driving at an unsafe speed, careless driving, and reckless driving.
On June 14, 2019, the court sentenced Skinner to a term of one to two
years’ imprisonment for the REAP conviction concerning the Flowers, and a
consecutive term of one month to two years’ incarceration for the REAP
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conviction as to Moran.3 The court imposed fines and costs regarding the
remaining convictions. Skinner filed a post-sentence motion, which was
denied on October 10, 2019. This appeal followed.
In his first issue, Skinner contends there was insufficient evidence to
support his REAP convictions because the evidence did not demonstrate that
“he acted with the necessary criminal intent to permit these convictions to
stand.” Appellant’s Brief, at 19. Specifically, he states:
The accident occurred in the late afternoon when the setting
sun was clearly in the eyes of the drivers proceeding southbound
on Route 222. Mr. Skinner testified to his being nearly blinded by
the glare as he approached the area where other vehicles were
slowing or stopped because of the heavy traffic and it was only at
the last instant that he was able to see the vehicle in front of him.
The presence of the sun glare was acknowledged in the testimony
of Trooper Hoogerhyde when he stated that it was present for all
the drivers at that time of day. The testimony from the same
witness indicated that the minimum speed for Mr. Skinner’s truck
at the time of impact was 36.59 miles per hour which was nearly
10 miles under the applicable 45 mph for that roadway. Further,
Mr. Skinner’s testimony was that he acted to slow the truck but
not to swerve out of his lane as he knew the danger that could
occur from a sudden shift of the truck either to the left or right as
the contents of the vehicle could shift and overturn it.
Unfortunately, this led to the impact but his action nonetheless
showed an awareness of the dangers involved in his operating the
vehicle and his desire to avoid a possible accident resulting from
any hard turning of the wheel.
There was no testimony that the truck was being operated
in any negligent or otherwise dangerous manner or that it was
doing nothing more than traveling with the general flow of traffic
prior to the incident. Mr. Skinner was driving a fully functional
vehicle with no known defects or limitations in operation.
3The court ordered that Skinner’s sentence was to be served consecutively to
a sentence he is currently serving for an unrelated matter. See N.T.,
6/14/2019, at 17.
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Id., at 22-23.
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence with the
knowledge that the jury is given great leeway in assessing the credibility and
weight of any evidence presented:
The determination of whether sufficient evidence exists to support
the verdict is a question of law; accordingly, our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. In assessing
[a] sufficiency challenge, we must determine whether viewing all
the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
[Commonwealth], there is sufficient evidence to enable the
factfinder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. [T]he facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence.... [T]he finder of fact while passing upon the credibility
of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 177 A.3d 963, 969-970 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Therefore, we will not disturb the
verdict “unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of
law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.”
Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
omitted).
A person commits the crime of REAP “if he recklessly engages in conduct
which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily
injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. “[REAP] requires the creation of danger, so the
Commonwealth must prove the existence of an actual present ability to inflict
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harm to another.” Commonwealth v. Shaw, 203 A.3d 281, 284 (Pa. Super.
2019) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 215 A.3d 964 (Pa. 2019).
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and
the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor’s situation.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §302(b)(3).
Here, the trial judge concluded there was sufficient evidence to support
Skinner’s REAP convictions:
Regarding the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, I find
the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that [Skinner]
acted recklessly. Unlike homicide by vehicle and involuntary
manslaughter – for which [Skinner] was found not guilty –
recklessly endangering another person does not require [him] to
engage in an unlawful act. Rather, it requires reckless conduct.
The Commonwealth presented evidence that [Skinner], while
operating a box truck, looked down to find his cell phone and
hand[ed] it to his passenger. In doing so, [Skinner] did not see
traffic stopped in front of him and he struck Mr. Flowers[’s]
vehicle, resulting in his death. There was sufficient evidence that
[Skinner] was engaging in unsafe driving to a degree that placed
others in danger of death or serious bodily injury. See
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 864 A.2d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super.
2004).
Order, 10/10/2019, at unnumbered 1-2 n.1.
We agree with the trial court’s analysis concerning the sufficiency of
Skinner’s REAP convictions. Skinner points to evidence that weighs in his favor
– he was potentially blinded by the sun glare as he approached a heavy traffic
area, was driving approximately ten miles under the speed limit, and acted to
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avoid a greater accident by refraining from swerving into another lane.4
However, notably missing from Skinner’s argument is the fact that he took his
eyes off the road to search for his cell phone.
A review of the record supports this point. Bostic, the passenger in
Skinner’s truck, testified that he saw Skinner “looking for his phone” and after
that, Bostic glanced back up and the truck struck the Flowers’ vehicle, which
then hit Moran’s vehicle. N.T., 5/14/2019, at 76. Moreover, Skinner admitted
to Trooper Terry that “he had looked down or reached down to get his cell
phone or find his cell phone so that he could hand it to the passenger of the
vehicle so that the passenger could make a phone call.” N.T., 5/15/2019, at
9. Lastly, the expert witness, Trooper Hoogerhyde, opined to a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty that, based on his review of all the evidence in
the case, Skinner “looked away from the roadway, and the crash occurred.”
Id., at 57.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
when Skinner looked away from the road to search for his phone while
operating a loaded box truck in the middle of rush hour, the jury was entitled
4 To the extent Skinner asks this Court to reweigh the evidence in his favor,
we decline to do so. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 45 A.3d 405, 409 (Pa.
Super. 2012) (appellant’s “argument that his version of the events was more
credible than the Commonwealth’s version goes to the weight of the evidence,
not its sufficiency.”). Additionally, the jury, sitting as the fact-finder, was free
to assess each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence. See Commonwealth v. Golphin, 161 A.3d 1009, 1018 (Pa. Super.
2017).
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to find that he consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
resulted from his conduct. Moreover, the evidence could reasonably support a
finding that his actions constituted “a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a reasonable person would observe” under the circumstances.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §302(b)(3). Accordingly, we conclude there was sufficient
evidence to support Skinner’s REAP convictions, and Skinner’s argument fails.
In his second issue, Skinner challenges the discretionary aspects of his
sentence, claiming that his sentence for Count 3, the REAP conviction as to
the Flowers couple, exceeded the aggravated range of the Sentencing
Guidelines.5 He therefore believes the sentence constituted an abuse of
discretion because the court failed “to set forth appropriate legal or factual
reasons for the sentence and the guideline deviation.” Appellant’s Brief, at 24.
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not guarantee
a petitioner’s right to our review. See Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d
1058, 1064 (Pa. Super. 2011).
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief
has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
5 We note Skinner does not raise any argument concerning his sentence
regarding the remaining REAP conviction.
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Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 337 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation
omitted).
In this case, Skinner filed a timely notice of appeal, and his brief included
a statement of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal, as is required by
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). See Appellant’s Brief, at 15. He also preserved the issue in
a post-sentence motion. See Defendant’s Post Sentence Motion, 6/21/2019,
at ¶¶ 17-24. Therefore, we must determine whether Skinner has raised a
substantial question.
“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526,
533 (Pa. Super. 2011). “A substantial question exists only when the appellant
advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions were
either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or
(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Here, Skinner’s argument raises a substantial question. See
Commonwealth v. Garcia-Rivera, 983 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(“This [C]ourt has found that a claim the trial court failed to state its reasons
for deviating from the guidelines presented a substantial question for
review.”). Thus, we review the merits of Skinner’s claim.
Skinner argues that “even though he was acquitted of all charges related
to the death of Mr. Flowers, … the Court nonetheless sentenced him to the
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maximum sentence … in lieu of any sentence on the more serious charges.”
Appellant’s Brief, at 24-25. Additionally, he states the trial court “failed to
adequately state its reasons on the record for imposing a sentence that
exceeded the Sentencing Guideline[s], that it disregarded relevant mitigating
facts and factors, and ... whether the factors cited by the [c]ourt for the
maximum sentence were not factors already considered in establishing the
Sentencing Guideline[s].” Id., at 25.
We have a deferential standard of review for discretionary aspects of
the sentence claims:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).
While the court is required to consider the sentence ranges set forth in
the sentencing guidelines, it is not bound by them. See Commonwealth v.
Yuhasz, 923 A.2d 1111, 1118 (Pa. 2007). The court may depart from the
“guidelines, if necessary, to fashion a sentence which takes into account the
protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the
gravity of the particular offense as it related to the impact on the life of the
victim and the community[.]” Commonwealth v. Eby, 784 A.2d 204, 206
(Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted). If the court imposes a sentence outside
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the guideline ranges, it must place adequate reasons for the deviation in the
record. See Commonwealth v. P.L.S., 894 A.2d 120, 129-130 (Pa. Super.
2006). Nevertheless, we only vacate an outside-the-guidelines sentence if the
“sentence is unreasonable[.]" 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(3).
In making this “unreasonableness” inquiry, we consider:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
defendant, including any presentence investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).
Here, the sentencing judge had the benefit of a presentence
investigation report (“PSI”), the victim impact statements, and the probation
officer’s recommendation of an above-the-aggravated-range sentence. The
judge also heard Skinner’s own statements during allocution, and argument
from both parties. See N.T., 6/14/2019, at 2-21.
Skinner had a prior record score of zero. See N.T. 6/14/2019, at 3. The
offense gravity score for the REAP offense was a three. See id. The standard
range was restorative sanctions to one month with a plus or minus of three
months for the aggravated and mitigated ranges. See id. The sentencing
judge sentenced Skinner above the aggravated range to a term of one to two
years’ incarceration for the REAP conviction. See id., at 16.
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The judge explained his rationale on the record as follows:
This sentence is in the aggravated range due to the fact that
the victim, Jeffrey Flowers, died as a result of [Skinner’s] conduct,
and his passenger, Chieko Flowers, was injured as a result of
Skinner’s conduct.
That is my reasoning for it, so if my sentence is in excess -
- it has to be in excess of the aggravated range. This sentence is
in excess of the aggravated range for those reasons.
Id., at 16-17. Furthermore, the judge found that while Skinner accepted
responsibility, he had to consider “not just the action but the result” in the
case, which was that one of the victims died due to Skinner’s acts. Id., at 18.
In its order denying Skinner’s post-sentence motion, the judge
subsequently opined:
Regarding the motion to reconsider sentence, I find I did not err
in sentencing [Skinner]. While the sentence on count 3 was above
the aggravated range, it was within the statutory limits, and I
placed my reasons for deviating from the guidelines on the record.
I considered all requisite factors in determining the sentence, and
I had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report.
Order, 10/10/2019, at 1-2 n.1 (citations omitted).
We find Skinner’s assertions are belied by the record. While Skinner
suggests that the judge disregarded certain mitigating factors, the judge had
the benefit of the PSI and we can reasonably infer the judge considered those
factors. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 967 n.7 (Pa. Super.
2007) (“[W]here pre-sentence reports exist, we shall continue to presume
that the sentencing judge was aware of the relevant information regarding the
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defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating
statutory factors.”) (citation omitted).
Our review of the record demonstrates that the judge considered the
applicable Sentencing Guidelines, and determined that an upward departure
from the guidelines was proper, particularly given the gravity of the offense
as it related to the impact on the life of Jeffrey Flowers. We find the judge
sufficiently stated his reasons on the record for imposing a sentence that
exceeded the Sentencing Guidelines.
Furthermore, those reasons are clearly rational reasons to deviate from
the Guidelines. While the jury acquitted Skinner of the more serious charges
in this case, there is no dispute that this accident was the cause of Jeffrey
Flowers’s death. This constitutes the worst possible result of the crime of
REAP. While this result does not necessarily require a deviation from the
guidelines, it certainly is sufficient to support one. Accordingly, we cannot
conclude that the sentence imposed is excessive. Therefore, Skinner’s claim
that the sentencing judge abused his discretion in sentencing him outside the
guidelines merits no relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/24/2020
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