Com. v. Stillman, K. ( 2020 )

J-A27032-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KEVIN LEE STILLMAN :
:
Appellant : No. 3354 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 20, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002267-2018
BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*
JUDGMENT ORDER BY COLINS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 1, 2020
Appellant, Kevin Lee Stillman, appeals from the aggregate judgment of
sentence of nine to eighteen years of confinement, which was imposed after
his convictions at a bench trial for two counts of illegal sale or transfer of
firearms, four counts of recklessly endangering another person, two counts of
terroristic threats with intent to terrorize another, two counts of simple
assault, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of manufacture,
delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or to deliver a controlled
substance by a person not registered.1 We affirm on the basis of the trial
court opinion.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
118 Pa.C.S. §§ 6111(g)(1), 2705, 2706(a)(1), 2701(a)(3), and 2702(a)(6)
and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), respectively.
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In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly set forth the relevant
facts and procedural history of this case. See Trial Court Opinion, dated
May 13, 2020, at 1-7. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.2
Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred in finding there was sufficient
evidence to convict Appellant of two counts of Unlawful Sale or
Transfer of Firearms1 where evidence adduced at trial supported
that there was only a single transfer.
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111(g)(1)
Appellant’s Brief at 4.3
This Court’s standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence
claims is as follows:
We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial,
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when
viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt. Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier
of fact to find every element of the crime has been
established beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of
the evidence claim must fail.
Commonwealth v. Izurieta, 171 A.3d 803, 806 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations
omitted).
____________________________________________
2 On November 22, 2019, Appellant filed this timely direct appeal. Appellant
filed his statement of errors complained of on appeal on December 9, 2019.
The trial court entered its opinion on May 13, 2020.
3 Appellant had raised an additional claim before the trial court that, assuming
that there were two transfers and two separate criminal acts, these
convictions should merge for sentencing. Appellant has dropped this
argument on appeal. Appellant’s Brief at 13 n.4.
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As Appellant’s challenge also requires interpretation of the statutory
language of 18 Pa.C.S. § 611(g)(1), we further note:
In evaluating a trial court’s application of a statute, our
standard of review is plenary and is limited to determining
whether the trial court committed an error of law. In
making this determination, we are guided by the Statutory
Construction Act, which dictates: . . .
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of
statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of
the General Assembly. Every statute shall be
construed, if possible, to give effect to all its
provisions.
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free
from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1921. As a general rule, the best indication of
legislative intent is the plain language of a statute.
In re Steele, 177 A.3d 328, 333 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal quotation marks
and some citations omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable
Thomas C. Branca, we conclude Appellant’s issue merits no relief. The trial
court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of that
question. See Trial Court Opinion, dated May 13, 2020, at 8-14 (finding: as
a matter of Pennsylvania law, the sale of two firearms even though in a single
transaction constitutes a first and second offense under 18 Pa. C.S.
§ 6111(g)(1); the language of Section 6111(g)(1) is unambiguous, as its use
of the article “a” before “a firearm” plainly means “a single firearm”; case law
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has interpreted similar phrasing of “a firearm” in another section of the
Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act to refer to a single firearm; thus,
Appellant’s two convictions for illegal sale or transfer of firearms constitute a
first and second offense for grading purposes; accordingly, Appellant’s first
conviction (Count 1) was properly graded as a misdemeanor of the second
degree, while his second conviction (Count 2) was appropriately graded as a
felony of the second degree). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial
court’s opinion. The parties are instructed to attach the opinion of the trial
court in any filings referencing this Court’s decision.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/01/2020
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